Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces

by Viktor Suvorov

  importance, to identify it, and to know how to distinguish real targets from

  false ones, become the most important tasks for spetsnaz, more important

  even than the destruction of the targets. Once a target has been discovered

  it can be destroyed by other forces -- missiles, aircraft, marines, airborne

  troops. But a target that has not been discovered cannot be destroyed by

  anyone.

  Because the business of identifying targets is the most important task

  for spetsnaz it cannot be a separate and independent organisation. It can

  carry out this task only if it relies on all the resources of the GRU, and

  only if it can make use of information obtained by agents and from all the

  various kinds of razvedka -- satellite, aircraft, naval, electronic, and so

  forth.

  Every form of razvedka has its good and its bad side. A complete

  picture of what is happening can be obtained only by making use of all forms

  of razvedka in close interaction one with another, compensating for the

  weaknesses of some forms with the advantages of the others.

  Every officer in charge of razvedka uses spetsnaz only where its use

  can give the very best result. When he sends a spetsnaz group behind enemy

  lines the officer in command already knows a good deal about the enemy from

  other sources. He knows exactly what the unit is to look for and roughly

  where it has to look. The information obtained by spetsnaz groups (sometimes

  only fragmentary and uncertain) can in turn be of exceptional value to the

  other forms of razvedka and be the starting point for more attentive work in

  those areas by agents and other services.

  Only with a union of all forces and resources is it possible to reveal

  the plans and intentions of the enemy, the strength and organisation of his

  forces, and to inflict defeat on him.

  But let us return to the commander of the spetsnaz group who,

  despatching it to a particular area, already knows a good deal about the

  area, the specially important targets that may be found there, and even

  their approximate location. This information (or as much of it as concerns

  him) is passed on to the commander of the group and his deputy. The group

  has landed safely, covered its tracks, established a base and started its

  search. How should it set about it?

  There are several tried and tested methods. Each target of special

  importance must have a communications centre and lines of communication

  leading to it. The group may include experts at radio razvedka. Let us not

  forget that spetsnaz is the 3rd department and radio razvedka the 5th

  department of the same Directorate (the Second) at the headquarters of every

  front, fleet, group of forces and military district. Spetsnaz and radio

  razvedka are very closely connected and often help each other, even to the

  point of having radio razvedka experts in spetsnaz groups. By monitoring

  radio transmissions in the area of important targets it is possible to

  determine quite accurately their whereabouts.

  But it is also possible to discover the target without the aid of radio

  razvedka. The direction of receiving and transmitting aerials of

  tropospheric, radio-relay and other communication lines provides a lot of

  information about the location of the terminal points on lines of

  communication. This in turn leads us right up to the command posts and other

  targets of great importance.

  Sometimes before a search begins the commander of the group will decide

  by the map which, in his opinion, are the most likely locations for

  particular targets. His group will examine those areas first of all.

  If the targets are moved, then the roads, bridges, tunnels and mountain

  passes where they may be seen are put under observation.

  The search for a particular target can be carried out simultaneously by

  several groups. In that case the officer in charge divides the territory

  being searched into squares in each of which one group operates.

  Each group searching a square usually spreads out into a long line with

  tens or even hundreds of metres between each man. Each man moves by the

  compass, trying to keep in sight of his neighbours. They advance in complete

  silence. They choose suitable observation points and carefully examine the

  areas ahead of them, and if they discover nothing they move on to another

  hiding place. In this way relatively small groups of well trained soldiers

  can keep quite extensive areas under observation. Unlike razvedka conducted

  from outer space or the air, spetsnaz can get right up to targets and view

  them, not from above, but from the ground. Experience shows that it is much

  more difficult to deceive a spetsnaz man with false targets than it is a man

  operating an electronic intelligence station or an expert at interpreting

  pictures taken from the air or from space.

  Spetsnaz groups have recently begun to make ever greater use of

  electronic apparatus for seeking their targets. They now carry portable

  radar, infra-red and acoustic equipment, night-vision sights, and so forth.

  But whatever new electronic devices are invented, they will never replace

  the simplest and most reliable method of establishing the location of

  important targets: questioning a prisoner.

  It may be claimed that not every prisoner will agree to answer the

  questions put to him, or that some prisoners will answer the questions put

  by spetsnaz but give wrong answers and lead their interrogators astray. To

  which my reply is categorical. Everybody answers questions from spetsnaz.

  There are no exceptions. I have been asked how long a very strong person can

  hold out against questioning by spetsnaz, without replying to questions. The

  answer is: one second. If you don't believe this, just try the following

  experiment. Get one of your friends who considers himself a strong character

  to write on a piece of paper a number known only to himself and seal the

  paper in an envelope. Then tie your friend to a post or a tree and ask him

  what number he wrote on the paper. If he refuses to answer, file his teeth

  down with a big file and count the time. Having received the answer, open

  the envelope and check that he has given you the number written on the

  paper. I guarantee the answer will be correct.

  If you perform such an experiment, you will have an idea of one of

  spetsnaz's milder ways of questioning people. But there are more effective

  and reliable ways of making a person talk. Everyone who falls into the hands

  of spetsnaz knows he is going to be killed. But people exert themselves to

  give correct and precise answers. They are not fighting for their lives but

  for an easy death. Prisoners are generally interrogated in twos or larger

  groups. If one seems to know less than the others, he can be used for

  demonstration purposes to encourage them to talk. If the questioning is

  being done in a town the prisoner may have a heated iron placed on his body,

  or have his ears pierced with an electric drill, or be cut to pieces with an

  electric saw. A man's fingers are particularly sensitive. If the finger of a

  man being questioned is simply bent back and the end of the finger squashed

&
nbsp; as it is bent, the pain is unendurable. One method considered very effective

  is a form of torture known as `the bicycle'. A man is bound and laid on his

  back. Pieces of paper (or cotton wool or rags) soaked in spirit,

  eau-de-cologne, etc., are stuck between his fingers and set alight.

  Spetsnaz has a special passion for the sexual organs. If the conditions

  permit, a very old and simple method is used to demonstrate the power of

  spetsnaz. The captors drive a big wedge into the trunk of a tree, then force

  the victim's sexual organs into the opening and knock out the wedge. They

  then proceed to question the other prisoners. At the same time, in order to

  make them more talkative, the principal spetsnaz weapon -- the little

  infantryman's spade -- is used. As spetsnaz asks its questions the blade of

  the spade is used to cut off ears and fingers, to hit the victims in the

  liver and perform a whole catalogue of unpleasant operations on the person

  under interrogation.

  One very simple way of making a man talk is known as the `swallow',

  well known in Soviet concentration camps. It does not require any weapons or

  other instruments, and if it is used with discretion it does not leave any

  traces on the victim's body. He is laid face down on the ground and his legs

  are bent back to bring his heels as close as possible to the back of his

  neck. The `swallow' generally produces a straight answer in a matter of

  seconds.

  Of course, every method has its shortcomings. That is why a commander

  uses several methods at the same time. The `swallow' is not usually employed

  in the early stages of an operation. Immediately after a landing, the

  commander of a spetsnaz group tries to use one really blood-thirsty device

  out of his arsenal: cutting a man's lips with a razor, or breaking his neck

  by twisting his head round. These methods are used even when a prisoner

  obviously has no information, the aim being to prevent any possibility of

  any of the men in the group going over to the enemy. Everyone, including

  those who have not taken part in the torture, knows that after this he has

  no choice: he is bound to his group by a bloody understanding and must

  either come out on top or die with his group. In case of surrender he may

  have to suffer the same torture as his friends have just used.

  In recent years the KGB, GRU and spetsnaz have had the benefit of an

  enormous training ground in which to try out the effectiveness of their

  methods of questioning: Afghanistan. The information received from there

  describes things which greatly exceed in skill and inventiveness anything I

  have described here. I am quite deliberately not quoting here interrogation

  methods used by the Soviet forces, including spetsnaz, in Afghanistan, which

  have been reported by thoroughly reliable sources. Western journalists have

  access to that material and to living witnesses.

  Once it has obtained the information it needs about the targets of

  interest to it, the spetsnaz group checks the facts and then kills the

  prisoners. It should be particularly noted that those who have told the

  truth do have an easy death. They may be shot, hanged, have their throats

  cut or be drowned. Spetsnaz does not torture anybody for the sake of

  torture. You come across practically no sadists in spetsnaz. If they find

  one they quickly get rid of him. Both the easier and the tougher forms of

  questioning in spetsnaz are an unavoidable evil that the fighting men have

  to accept. They use these methods, not out of a love of torturing people,

  but as the simplest and most reliable way of obtaining information essential

  to their purpose.

  ___

  Having discovered the target and reported on it to their command,

  spetsnaz will in most cases leave the target area as quickly as possible.

  Very soon afterwards, the target will come under attack by missiles,

  aircraft or other weapons. In a number of cases, however, the spetsnaz group

  will destroy the target it has discovered itself. They are often given the

  mission in that form: `Find and destroy'. But there are also situations when

  the task is given as `Find and report', and the group commander takes an

  independent decision about destroying the target. He may do so when, having

  found the target, he discovers suddenly that he cannot report to his

  superior officers about it; and he may also do so when he comes across a

  missile ready for firing.

  Robbed of the chance or the time to transmit a report, the commander

  has to take all possible steps to destroy the target, including ordering a

  suicide attack on it. Readiness to carry out a suicide mission is maintained

  in spetsnaz by many methods. One of them is to expose obvious sadists and

  have them transferred immediately to other branches of the forces, because

  experience shows that in the overwhelming majority of cases the sadist is a

  coward, incapable of sacrificing himself.

  The actual destruction of targets is perhaps the most ordinary and

  prosaic part of the entire operation. VIPs are usually killed as they are

  being transported from one place to another, when they are at their most

  vulnerable. The weapons include snipers' rifles, grenade-launchers or mines

  laid in the roadway. If a VIP enjoys travelling by helicopter it is a very

  simple matter. For one thing, a single helicopter is a better target than a

  number of cars, when the terrorists do not know exactly which car their

  victim is travelling in. Secondly, even minor damage to a helicopter will

  bring it down and almost certainly kill the VIP.

  Missiles and aircraft are also attacked with snipers' rifles and

  grenade-launchers of various kinds. One bullet hole in a missile or an

  aircraft can put it out of action. If he cannot hit his target from a

  distance the commander of the group will attack, usually from two sides. His

  deputy will attack with one group of men from one side, trying to make as

  much noise and gunfire as possible, while the other group led by the

  commander will move, noiselessly, as close to the target as it can. It is

  obvious that an attack by a small spetsnaz group on a well defended target

  is suicide. But spetsnaz will do it. The fact is that even an unsuccessful

  attack on a missile ready for firing will force the enemy to re-check the

  whole missile and all its supporting equipment for faults. This may delay

  the firing for valuable hours, which in a nuclear war might be long enough

  to alter the course of the conflict.

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  Chapter 12. Control and Combined Operations

  If we describe the modern infantryman in battle and leave it at that,

  then, however accurate the description, the picture will be incomplete. The

  modern infantryman should never just be described independently, because he

  never operates independently. He operates in the closest co-operation with

  tanks; his way forward is laid by sappers; the artillery and air force work

  in his interests; he may be helped in his fighting by helicopter gunships;

  ahead of him there are reconnaissance and parachute units; and behind him is

  an enormous organisation to support and service him, from supplying

>   ammunition to evacuating the wounded quickly.

  To understand the strength of spetsnaz one has to remember that

  spetsnaz is primarily reconnaissance, forces which gather and transmit

  information to their commanders to which their commanders immediately react.

  The strength of those reconaissance forces lies in the fact that they have

  behind them the whole of the nuclear might of the USSR. It may be that

  before the appearance of spetsnaz on enemy territory, a nuclear blow will

  already have been made, and despite the attendant dangers, this greatly

  improves the position of the fighting groups, because the enemy is clearly

  not going to bother with them. In other circumstances the groups will appear

  on enemy territory and obtain information required by the Soviet command or

  amplify it, enabling an immediate nuclear strike to follow. A nuclear strike

  close to where a spetsnaz group is operating is theoretically regarded as

  the salvation of the group. When there are ruins and fires all round, a

  state of panic and the usual links and standards have broken down, a group

  can operate almost openly without any fear of capture.

  Similarly, Soviet command may choose to deploy other weapons before

  spetsnaz begins operations or immediately after a group makes its landing:

  chemical weapons, air attacks or bombardment of the coastline with naval

  artillery. There is a co-operative principle at work here. Such actions will

  give the spetsnaz groups enormous moral and physical support. And the

  reverse is also true -- the operations of a group in a particular area and

  the information it provides will make the strike by Soviet forces more

  accurate and effective.

  In the course of a war direct co-operation is the most dependable form

  of co-operation. For example, the military commander of a front has learnt

  through his network of agents (the second department of the 2nd Directorate

  at front headquarters) or from other sources that there is in a certain area

  a very important but mobile target which keeps changing its position. He

  appoints one of his air force divisions to destroy the target. A spetsnaz

  group (or groups) is appointed to direct the division to the target. The

  liaison between the groups and the air force division is better not

  conducted through the front headquarters, but directly. The air division