Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces

by Viktor Suvorov

  commander is told very briefly what the groups are capable of, and they are

  then handed over to his command. They are dropped behind enemy lines and,

  while they are carrying out the operation, they maintain direct contact with

  their divisional headquarters. After the strike on the target the spetsnaz

  group -- if it has survived -- returns immediately to the direct control of

  the front headquarters, to remain there until it needs to be put under the

  command of some other force as decided by the front commander.

  ___

  Direct co-operation is a cornerstone of Soviet strategy and practised

  widely on manoeuvres, especially at the strategic level, when spetsnaz

  groups from regiments of professional athletes are subordinated to

  commanders of, for example, the strategic missile troops or the strategic

  (long-range) aviation.

  ^1 See Appendix D for the organisation of spetsnaz at strategic level.

  For the main principle governing Soviet strategy is the concentration

  of colossal forces against the enemy's most vulnerable spot. Soviet troops

  will strike a super-powerful, sudden blow and then force their way rapidly

  ahead. In this situation, or immediately before it, a mass drop of spetsnaz

  units will be carried out ahead of and on the flanks of the advancing force,

  or in places that have to be neutralised for the success of the operation on

  the main line of advance.

  Spetsnaz units at army level , on the other hand, are dropped in the

  areas of operations of their own armies at a depth of 100 to 500 kilometres;

  and spetsnaz units under the command of the fronts are dropped in the area

  of operations of their fronts at a depth of between 500 and 1000 kilometres.

  The headquarters to which the group is subordinated tries not to

  interfere in the operations of the spetsnaz group, reckoning that the

  commander on the spot can see and understand the situation better than can

  people at headquarters far from where the events are taking place. The

  headquarters will intervene if it becomes necessary to redirect it to attack

  a more important target or if a strike is to take place where it is located.

  But a warning may not be given if the group is not going to have time to get

  away from the strike area, since all such warnings carry the risk of

  revealing Soviet intentions to the enemy.

  Co-operation between different groups of spetsnaz is carried out by

  means of a distribution of territories for operations by different groups,

  so that simultaneous blows can be struck in different areas if need be.

  Co-operation can also be carried out by forward headquarters at battalion,

  regiment and brigade level, dropped behind the lines to co-ordinate major

  spetsnaz forces in an area. Because spetsnaz organisation is so flexible, a

  group which has landed by chance in another group's operational area can

  quickly be brought under the latter's command by an order from a superior

  headquarters.

  ___

  In the course of a war other Soviet units apart from spetsnaz will be

  operating in enemy territory:

  Deep reconnaissance companies from the reconnaissance battalions of the

  motor-rifle and tank divisions. Both in their function and the tactics they

  adopt, these companies are practically indistinguishable from regular

  spetsnaz. The difference lies in the fact that these companies do not use

  parachutes but penetrate behind the enemy's lines in helicopters, jeeps and

  armoured reconnaissance vehicles. Deep reconnaissance units do not usually

  co-operate with spetsnaz. But their operations, up to 100 kilometres behind

  the front line, make it possible to concentrate spetsnaz activity deeper in

  the enemy's rear without having to divert it to operations in the zone

  nearer the front.

  Air-assault brigades at front level operate independently, but in some

  cases spetsnaz units may direct the combat helicopters to their targets. It

  is sometimes possible to have joint operations conducted by men dropped from

  helicopters and to use helicopters from an air-assault brigade for

  evacuating the wounded and prisoners.

  Airborne divisions operate in accordance with the plans of the

  commander-in-chief. If difficulties arise with the delivery of supplies to

  their units, they switch to partisan combat tactics. Co-operation between

  airborne divisions and spetsnaz units is not normally organised, although

  large-scale drops in the enemy's rear create a favourable situation for

  operations by all spetsnaz units.

  Naval infantry are commanded by the same commander as naval spetsnaz:

  every fleet commander has one brigade of the latter and a brigade (or

  regiment) of infantry. Consequently these two formations, both intended for

  operations in the enemy's rear, co-operate very closely. Normally when the

  naval infantry makes a landing on an enemy coastline, their operation is

  preceded by, or accompanied by, spetsnaz operations in the same area. Groups

  of naval spetsnaz can, of course, operate independently of the naval

  infantry if they need to, especially in cases where the operations are

  expected to be in remote areas requiring special skills of survival or

  concealment.

  There are two specific sets of circumstances in which superior

  headquarters organises direct co-operation between all units operating in

  the enemy rear. The first is when a combined attack offers the only

  possibility of destroying or capturing the target, and the second is when

  Soviet units in the enemy rear have suffered substantial losses and the

  Soviet command decides to make up improvised groups out of the remnants of

  the ragged units that are left.

  ___

  In the course of an advance spetsnaz groups, as might be expected,

  co-operate very closely with the forward detachments.

  A Soviet advance -- a sudden break through the defences of the enemy in

  several places and the rapid forward movement of masses of troops, supported

  by an equal mass of aircraft and helicopters -- is always co-ordinated with

  a simultaneous strike in the rear of the enemy by spetsnaz forces, airborne

  troops and naval infantry.

  In other armies different criteria are applied to measure a commander's

  success -- for example, what percentage of the enemy's forces have been

  destroyed by his troops. In the Soviet Army this is of secondary importance,

  and may be of no importance at all, because a commander's value is judged by

  one criterion only: the speed with which his troops advance.

  To take the speed of advance as the sole measure of a commander's

  abilities is not so stupid as it might seem at first glance. As a guiding

  principle it forces all commanders to seek, find and exploit the weakest

  spots in the enemy's defences. It obliges the commander to turn the enemy's

  flank and to avoid getting caught up in unnecessary skirmishes. It also

  makes commanders make use of theoretically impassable areas to get to the

  rear of the enemy, instead of battering at his defences.

  To find the enemy's weak spots a commander will send reconnaissance

  groups ahead, and forward detachments which he has assembled for the

 
duration of the advance. Every commander of a regiment, division, army and,

  in some cases, of a front will form his own forward detachment. In a

  regiment the detachment normally includes a motor-rifle company with a tank

  platoon (or a tank company with a motor-rifle platoon); a battery of

  self-propelled howitzers; an anti-aircraft platoon; and an anti-tank platoon

  and sapper and chemical warfare units. In a division it will consist of a

  motor-rifle or tank battalion, with a tank or motor-rifle company as

  appropriate; an artillery battalion; anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries;

  and a company of sappers and some support units. In an army the scale is

  correspondingly greater: two or three motor-rifle battalions; one or two

  tank battalions; two or three artillery battalions, a battalion of

  multi-barrelled rocket launchers; a few anti-aircraft batteries; an

  anti-tank battalion; and sappers and chemical warfare troops. Where a front

  makes up its own forward detachment it will consist of several regiments,

  most of them tank regiments. The success of each general (i.e. the speed at

  which he advances) is determined by the speed of his very best units. In

  practice this means that it is determined by the operations of the forward

  detachment which he sends into battle. Thus every general assembles his best

  units for that crucial detachment, puts his most determined officers in

  command, and puts at their disposal a large slice of his reinforcements. All

  this makes the forward detachment into a concentration of the strength of

  the main forces.

  It often happens that very high-ranking generals are put in command of

  relatively small detachments. For example, the forward detachment of the 3rd

  Guards Tank Army in the Prague operation was commanded by General I. G.

  Ziberov, who was deputy chief of staff. (The detachment consisted of the

  69th mechanised brigade, the 16th self-propelled artillery brigade, the 50th

  motorcycle regiment, and the 253rd independent penal company).

  Every forward detachment is certainly very vulnerable. Let us imagine

  what the first day of a war in Europe would be like, when the main

  concentration of Soviet troops has succeeded in some places in making very

  small breaches in the defences of the forces of the Western powers. Taking

  advantage of these breaches, and of any other opportunities offered --

  blunders by the enemy, unoccupied sectors and the like -- about a hundred

  forward detachments of regiments, about twenty-five more powerful forward

  detachments of divisions, and about eight even more powerful forward

  detachments from armies have penetrated into the rear of the NATO forces.

  None of them has got involved in the fighting. They are not in the least

  concerned about their rear or their flanks. They are simply racing ahead

  without looking back.

  This is very similar to the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, on the eve

  of which Marshal G. K. Zhukov assembled all sixty-seven commanders of the

  forward detachments and demanded of each one: 100 kilometres forward

  progress on the first day of the operation. A hundred kilometres,

  irrespective of how the main forces were operating, and irrespective of

  whether the main forces succeeded in breaking through the enemy's defences.

  Every commander who advanced a hundred kilometres on the first day or

  averaged seventy kilometres a day for the first four days would receive the

  highest award -- the Gold Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union. Everybody in

  the detachment would receive a decoration, and all the men undergoing

  punishment (every forward detachment has on its strength anything from a

  company to a battalion's worth of such men riding on the outside of the

  tanks) would have their offences struck out.

  Say what you like about the lack of initiative in Soviet soldiers and

  officers. Just imagine giving men from a penal battalion such a task. If you

  succeed in not getting involved in the fighting, and if you manage to

  outflank the enemy and keep moving, we will strike out all your offences.

  Get involved in fighting and you will not only shed your blood, you will die

  a criminal too.

  Operations by Soviet forward detachments are not restrained by any

  limitations. `The operations of forward detachments must be independent and

  not restricted by the dividing lines,' the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia

  declares. The fact that the forward detachments may be cut off from the main

  force should not deter them. For example, on the advance in Manchuria in

  1945 the 6th Guards Tank Army advanced rapidly towards the ocean, having

  crossed the desert, the apparently impregnable Khingan mountain range and

  the rice fields, and covering 810 kilometres in eleven days. But ahead of it

  were forward detachments, operating continually, which had rushed 150 to 200

  kilometres ahead of the main force. When the officer in command of the front

  learnt of this spurt ahead (by quite unprotected detachments, which really

  had not a single support vehicle with them), he did not order the

  detachments to slow down; on the contrary, he ordered them to increase their

  speed still further, and not to worry about the distance separating them,

  however great it was. The more the forward detachments were separated from

  the main force, the better. The more unsuspected and strange the appearance

  of Soviet troops seems to the enemy, the greater the panic and the more

  successful the operations of both the forward detachments and the main

  Soviet troops.

  Forward detachments were of enormous importance in the last war. The

  speed at which our troops advanced reached at times eighty to a hundred

  kilometres a day. Such a speed of advance in operations on such an enormous

  scale causes surprise even today. But it must always be remembered that this

  terrible rate of advance was to a great extent made possible by the

  operations of the forward detachments. These are the words of Army-General

  I.I. Gusakovsky, the same general who from January to April 1945, from the

  Vistula to Berlin itself, commanded the forward detachment of the 11th

  Guards Tank Corps and the whole of the 1st Guards Tank Army.

  In the last war the forward detachments pierced the enemy's defences

  with dozens of spearheads at the same time, and the main body of troops

  followed in their tracks. The forward detachments then destroyed in the

  enemy's rear only targets that were easy to destroy, and in many cases moved

  forward quickly enough to capture bridges before they were blown up. The

  reason the enemy had not blown them up was because his main forces were

  still wholly engaged against the main forces of the Red Army.

  The role played by forward detachments has greatly increased in modern

  warfare. All Soviet military exercises are aimed at improving the operations

  of forward detachments. There are two very good reasons why the role of the

  forward detachments has grown in importance. The first is, predictably, that

  war has acquired a nuclear dimension. Nuclear weapons (and other modern

  means of fighting) need to be discovered and destroyed at the earliest

  possible opportunity. And the more Soviet troops there are on enemy<
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  territories, the less likelihood there is of their being destroyed by

  nuclear weapons. It will always be difficult for the enemy to make a nuclear

  strike against his own rear where not only are his own forces operating, and

  which are inhabited but where a strike would also be against his own

  civilian population.

  A forward detachment, rushing far ahead and seeking out and destroying

  missile batteries, airfields, headquarters and communication lines resembles

  spetsnaz both in character and in spirit. It usually has no transport

  vehicles at all. It carries only what can be found room for in the tanks and

  armoured transporters, and its operations may last only a short time, until

  the fuel in the tanks gives out. All the same, the daring and dashing

  actions of the detachments will break up the enemy's defences, producing

  chaos and panic in his rear, and creating conditions in which the main force

  can operate with far greater chances of success.

  In principle spetsnaz does exactly the same. The difference is that

  spetsnaz groups have greater opportunities for discovering important

  targets, whereas forward detachments have greater opportunities than

  spetsnaz for destroying them. Which is why the forward detachment of each

  regiment is closely linked up with the regiment's reconnaissance company

  secretly operating deep inside the enemy's defences. Similarly, the forward

  detachments of divisions are linked directly with divisional reconnaissance

  battalions, receiving a great deal of information from them and, by their

  swift reactions, creating better operating conditions for the reconnaissance

  battalions.

  The forward detachment of an army, usually led by the deputy army

  commander, will be operating at the same time as the army's spetsnaz groups

  who will have been dropped 100 to 500 kilometres ahead. This means that the

  forward detachment may find itself in the same operational area as the

  army's spetsnaz groups as early as forty-eight hours after the start of the

  operation. At that point the deputy army commander will establish direct

  contact with the spetsnaz groups, receiving information from them, sometimes

  redirecting groups to more important targets and areas, helping the groups

  and receiving help from them. The spetsnaz group may, for example, capture a

  bridge and hold it for a very short time. The forward detachment simply has