Alexander the Great Failure
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His overseas enemies had drawn together. Lysimachos, Seleukos and Ptolemy,
though political enemies, formed an informal alliance to face him. That they
should do so is a measure of the threat he posed. 11 They did not wait to be attacked, nor did his Greek enemies have to wait for him to leave before striking
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for freedom. The kings had taken note of the active Pyrrhos, who had contacts
with Ptolemy. Lysimachos, whose territories bordered on Macedon, had already
been threatened by Demetrios, and he had good contacts in several Greek cities. 12
Seleukos could do little in the circumstances, being too far off and without a fl eet, but Ptolemy made a preliminary move by sending his fl eet to the Aegean. 13 His control of the eastern Mediterranean and his alliance with Rhodes gave his fl eet secure bases, and he persuaded the League of the Islanders, set up years before by Antigonos, to desert Demetrios. In a foretaste of what would happen on the
mainland, Ptolemy undermined Demetrios’ hold on the league by promising
autonomy for the league council, a reduction in fi scal requisitions, and protection against any retribution. This was precisely what the Greeks under Demetrios
wanted to hear. 14
This development is the more interesting in that it encapsulates the attitudes and policies which became the norm in the succeeding century: the Greek cities required only their internal autonomy to be respected and subject to relatively light tribute demands to accept a king’s protection and patronage. In turn the kings were relieved of the need to use force. The cities were either not garrisoned, or only lightly so. This reduced royal costs and released troops for other uses; the tribute of the cities was a useful supplement to the main taxation of the
kingdoms, which was essentially based on the rural areas. This modus vivendi
between kings and cities was being worked out all around the Aegean during
this time: Demetrios’ methods were those against which those of the other kings could be measured and were seen to be preferable. This is ironic; since it was Demetrios’ father’s policy of ‘freedom’ they were now applying, while Demetrios was a good deal more brutal. 15
This was not the relationship of the kings and the cities they founded. These
cities were never independent, and so did not have a long history of such an
ideal condition to look back on. The king was their patron, their protector, their fi nancier, their founder, and ultimately their ruler; and these conditions gave him great and continuing authority over them. The colonial cities’ range of
autonomy was very limited. The layout of these new cities invariably shows them dominated by a well-fortifi ed citadel, where the royal garrison lived, separate from the citizens. 16
These colonial cities were reminiscent of the urban centres of old Macedon
rather than the cities of Greece, and the ultimate model was Philip’s colonial foun da tions at Philippi and Philippopolis. Given who the founders were
– Macedonian commanders such as Antigonos, Lysimachos and, above all,
Seleukos – this is hardly surprising. Each city had its supervisor, its epistates (in the Seleukid kingdom), who was a means of communication between the
king and the citizens. The relationship was generally polite, with kings formally request ing that the cities do things, and the cities offering formal honours to the
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kings, and to the epistatai. This clearly worked, and very few of these cities ever rebelled or struck out for independence until the kingdoms themselves failed.
Ptolemy’s seduction of the Island League pushed Demetrios’ seaward front
back towards the mainland. A major Ptolemaic base was established on the island of Andros, close to Demetrios’ lands in Euboia and Attika and Boiotia. 17 Ptolemy was in contact with the Athenian opposition, and with Pyrrhos. They planned
to pre-empt Demetrios’ attack by organizing their own, from several directions at once. This meant Ptolemy’s naval advance in the Aegean, and land attacks by Pyrrhos and Lysimachos directed at Demetrios’ power base in Macedon.
This might have been a hazardous exercise, if Demetrios really had 110,000
troops and 500 ships available, and really was fi rmly established as king in
Macedon. The allies were fully aware that his house of cards would collapse
given a fi rm enough shove. The size of his army, possibly exaggerated (maybe
by Demetrios himself, maybe subsequently by his relieved enemies) was
largely negated by his need to hold down the lands where he was unpopular; a
considerable fraction of the troops was distributed in garrisons through Greece, and indeed in Macedon.
The involvement of Pyrrhos in the allied plan was clearly essential. The
Macedonians liked him as a king of the type they appreciated, a bonny fi ghter whose fi ght with Pantauches had led to them singing his praises. His involvement also required that the allies reach agreement on how to divide up the spoils
in advance. Pyrrhos demanded Macedon itself as his share, which was what
Lysimachos also wanted. It is doubtful if the other kings would have been happy to see Epiros and Macedon united under one ruler but Pyrrhos had the whip
hand, for Lysimachos could not fi ght a land war with Demetrios alone, and
Pyrrhos could have stayed neutral. Lysimachos made enough of his claim to
be allocated part of eastern Macedonia. Perhaps Ptolemy, who was probably in
control of the correspondence, simply promised Macedon to both men.
This being settled, the war could begin, probably in 287. Lysimachos invaded
Macedon from the east, besieging Amphipolis, and Pyrrhos came across the
mountains from the west; there was also surely a campaign of subversion directed at Demetrios’ forces in Macedon, for Lysimachos’ ravaging should have alienated the Macedonians, yet Demetrios found that his army refused to fi ght. The soldiers facing Pyrrhos refused to fi ght to keep Demetrios in luxury, which summed up
all the elements of his unpopularity. 18
His wife Phila, Kassander’s sister, committed suicide rather than go on her
travels again, 19 but Demetrios himself refused to give up. He lost Macedon, but still had his fl eet, most of his mercenaries, and his bases in the Greek cities.
He held Tyre and Sidon in Phoenicia, useful bases from which to attack either
Ptolemy or Seleukos, but Ptolemy quietly seized control of both cities, and the Sidonian King, Philokles, entered his service as a notable naval commander. 20
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In Greece, Demetrios was insecure. In June 287 Athens blew up in a rebellion,
assisted by a Ptolemaic force which was landed from Andros. Demetrios was
able to hold on to some forts in the countryside, and laid siege to the city,
which had made serious and successful efforts to get in the harvest before he
arrived. Negotiations followed between Demetrios and Ptolemy’s representative
Sostratos, who was advised by Kallias, an Athenian who had commanded the
Ptolemaic force from Andros.
The situation in Attica was at a stalemate: Demetrios was not able to retake
the city; the Athenians were not able to take Peiraios; Ptolemy was not prepared to mount a full campaign at such a distance from Egypt. Expulsion of Demetrios from Macedon had accomplished the main aim of the alliance, so peace was made
on the basis that Demetrios would hold Peiraios, and Athens would be free of
his political interference. The Athenians did not like it, but they could not fi ght Demetrios without outside help. No doubt Demetrios did not like it either, but he could con
sole himself that he retained the essentials. Peiraios was a major naval base and port, and by holding it he had a grip on Athens’ economic lifeline. 21
This peace marked Ptolemy’s exit from the alliance. He had made major gains,
and now dominated the Aegean, without having committed serious forces to the
war: the main fi ghting had been done by Pyrrhos, Lysimachos and the Athenians.
The two kings amicably divided Macedon, though Pyrrhos affected to be taken
aback to fi nd he was not going to get it all. In the event he also helped Athens to resist Demetrios’ siege, thus honouring his alliance with Ptolemy, an alliance Ptolemy was soon to desert.22
The Athenian settlement meant peace between Demetrios and Ptolemy, indeed
the Athenians were actually subsumed within the treaty the two kings made.
Demetrios would thus seem to have adopted his father’s tactic of negotiating
separately with his enemies, this time with some success. When Pyrrhos arrived in Athens, he also made peace with Demetrios. 23 Combined with Seleukos’ inability to intervene so far to the west, this left Demetrios facing Lysimachos.
Demetrios launched himself on Lysimachos from Miletos. On his arrival at
the city he had been greeted by Eurydike, the estranged wife of Ptolemy, who
presented him with her daughter Ptolemais, to whom Demetrios had been
betrothed, at least formally, since the old diplomatic changes of 299–298. He
took the opportunity to marry again, then set off on campaign. He left his son Antigonos Gonatas, in command of the remaining posts in Europe, Corinth,
Peiraios, Euboia, Boiotia, Phokis, several forts and towns near these cities and Demetrias in Thessaly. From Miletos, Demetrios gained control of several Ionian cities, including Ephesus and Pirene, either by being welcomed or by threats
and conquest, and then marched inland to capture Sardis. He was assisted by
defections of cities and soldiers from Lysimachos, but now came up against a
more powerful enemy in a force commanded by Lysimachos’ son Agathokles,
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who managed, by retaking the cities along the coast, to cut the invader off from his fl eet.
Demetrios is said to have intended to reach Armenia and Media; 24 this seems most unlikely, for he had no experience of these areas, and no connections
there. He certainly marched inland to get away from Agathokles’ superior force.
Agathokles carefully refused to fi ght him, except in skirmishes, but he also refused to let go of the invaders, and shepherded Demetrios and his army steadily further east to the Taurus mountain area. The old loyalties Demetrios may have counted on did not revive after the fi rst victories; he was out-generalled by Agathokles; his army began to fade away, partly by desertion, partly by casualties and disease.
Most of the mercenaries remained with him to the end, but they could not win.
Agathokles manoeuvred him out of his father’s territories and over the Taurus
Mountains into Kilikia, Seleukos’ territory. 25 At last Seleukos got into the war.
Demetrios appealed to Seleukos as a relative by marriage, and meanwhile
conquered Kilikia. Seleukos, supposedly persuaded by his general Patrokles – as if he needed to be persuaded to be suspicious of Antigonos’ son – gradually
hardened his attitude. Kilikia was not seriously defended, though there were,
as with Agathokles’ army, several skirmishes. Again, no rising to his support
happened in either Kilikia or Syria. Seleukos, like Agathokles, used blockade
rather than risk battle against such a commander. And indeed, there was no need to risk casualties, and even possible defeat, for the poor condition of Demetrius’
forces became clear very quickly. Demetrios’ army reached the Amanus Hills, the boundary of Kilikia and Syria, high and diffi cult to cross even now: they were weary, hopeless, hungry and unpaid. Seleukos understood their physical and
psychological condition and posted his own forces to surround them, lighting
fi res to show their presence, making it obvious that they were there and yet
keeping them out of reach. There were few provisions available in the hills where they were all camped, but Seleukos’ army could be supplied and Demetrios’ men
starved. After allowing the situation to become apparent, Seleukos came forward and stood before them, took off his helmet, and asked them to give up. It was
enough. The adventure was over. They handed Demetrios over, on a promise of
his life being spared (just as, 40 years before, Eumenes had been handed over to Demetrios’ father). Demetrios’ last act, before his own surrender, was to send orders to his son and to his men in Europe to obey no more orders from him,
but to obey Antigonos instead. 26 Soon afterwards Seleukos founded another new city in the valley of the Kara Su just east of the scene, and called it Nikopolis,
‘Victory-city’.
Demetrios’ last adventure showed that an Alexander-type conquest was
no longer possible. It may have been romantic – though Seleukos’ gesture of
appealing directly to his soldiers trumped even that – but it was hopeless, and was seen to be hopeless from the time he failed to bring over more than three
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or four cities to his cause. He was rejected by every king, by all the cities who might have supported him, and by public opinion generally. He might leave a
great name behind him, but not a great achievement. This failure was the fi nal sign that the great adventures were over. But one man still felt that the unity of the empire was attainable.
13
The last chance for the empire, 285–281 bc
In 285, once Demetrios was captured by Seleukos, the three most powerful rulers in the western world were all contemporaries of Alexander the Great, who had
died 40 years before. Within four years all of them (and Demetrios, a generation younger) were dead. As is to be expected of kings who were Macedonian in
origin, their goings produced confusion and confl ict, but this was not wholly their fault, and two of them had already solved the old Macedonian problem of
the royal succession.
The removal of their common enemy took away the only glue holding the
alliance of the kings together. Ptolemy had already made peace with Demetrios; and by expelling him and his army into Kilikia, so, in effect, had Lysimachos.
Seleukos cannot have been pleased to fi nd that the disturber of the peace had been shoved over the mountains into his territory, but he overcame the problem with minimal casualties, and had acquired thereby a reasonable increase in his fame. Further, the division of Macedon between Lysimachos and Pyrrhos was
hardly the result the Macedonians had expected when they removed themselves
from Demetrios’ kingship, and it was clearly an unstable situation.
Pyrrhos claimed he had been promised all Macedon; Lysimachos had suffered
the defeats, damage and casualties, and required compensation. Neither accepted the other’s argument; both wanted all Macedon.1 Pyrrhos’ growth – he seized Thessaly from Antigonos Gonatas soon after Demetrios left2 – was not welcome to his former allies, and he began to seem as threatening as Demetrios. Nor
was his new power welcome to his neighbour, the Aitolian League, which again
found itself surrounded on three sides, west, north and east, by his territories.
Lysimachos exploited his problems. He had assured himself of Athenian
goodwill by a present of money in the crisis of their rising against Demetrios, and contacted Aitolia, both being at odds with Pyrrhos. Antigonos Gonatas held his father’s old possessions, scattered along the Aegean side of Greece from the northern Peloponn
ese to Demetrias, together with their garrisons and a fl eet of ships, and was not a negligible quantity either. 3
When Lysimachos moved against Pyrrhos not long after Demetrios’ capture,
he had either the support or the acquiescence of these Greek neighbours.
Without too much diffi culty he pushed Pyrrhos across the mountains into his
home kingdom. Pyrrhos made an alliance with Gonatas,4 but neither was in a
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position to help the other. By the end of the year, Lysimachos was in control of all of Macedon and Thessaly, though Pyrrhos kept hold of his old gains in the
bordering hills.
This was hardly the result either Ptolemy or Seleukos would have wished for
when they allied with Lysimachos to overthrow Demetrios. In theory the union
of Macedon with Asia Minor (and Thrace) produced a most powerful state,
capable of fi elding a huge army, and it had the potential for a big navy as well.
No matter that Lysimachos was not aggressive towards his fellow kings (except
Pyrrhos), he was clearly a threat; he was old, as the others knew all too well, but he had a competent and vigorous son in Agathokles. His acquisition of Macedon
made him everyone’s enemy.
One reason for the ease of Lysimachos’ victory was contemporary events
in Egypt. During 285 Ptolemy I co-opted his son Ptolemy II as co-ruler. This
was either an attempt by the old man to prevent any disputes when he died,
or a disguised coup by Ptolemy II. It seems best to see here one of Ptolemy I’s methodical solutions to a diffi cult problem, in this case one of his own making.
He had been married three times, had children by two of his wives, and several other children by other women to whom he was not married. Of the ‘legitimate’
children there were three sons by Eurydike, the daughter of Antipater, and one or two by Berenike, Antipater’s granddaughter, who supplanted her aunt Eurydike
in Ptolemy’s bed, and later as his wife. There were daughters of both marriages, who were used in the political marriage market, and four of them married kings.
By the early 280s the daughters were mainly married off, and there were three