Alexander the Great Failure

by John D Grainger

  sons at the court. Berenike had another son, Magas, by an earlier marriage. 5

  Berenike’s son Magas had been placed as Ptolemy’s viceroy in Cyrenaica

  in about 300. She now intrigued with her husband to choose their son as his

  successor to the main kingdom.

  Needless to say, neither Eurydike nor her sons accepted this, though it was

  clearly a decision for the king. The confl ict within the court is largely invisible now, but it claimed casualties outside the family, so it was fairly unpleasant.

  Eurydike and her sons left the court and Egypt, probably in 286, and Berenike’s son, Ptolemy of Kos, was then crowned and made co-ruler as Ptolemy II, in the

  winter of 285/284. 6

  Eurydike aimed for revenge. She persuaded Demetrios to marry Ptolemais in

  Miletos in 286; her eldest son, another Ptolemy, surnamed Keraunos (‘Thunderer’), went to Lysimachos’ court, where his half-sister Arsinoe (called Arsinoe II) was the wife of the king, and his full sister, Lysandra, was married to Agathokles. Partly as a result, this royal court soon became an even more murderous place. 7

  It is not clear who was in control in Egypt during the two years of the co-rule of father and son. The elevation of Ptolemy II to the kingship may have been in name only, or it may have been due to Ptolemy I’s senility – he was in his eighties

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  by then. The main point was that, despite the family dispute, the transfer of power from father to son was generally peaceful, and was certainly an improvement on the usual situation among Macedonian royalty.

  The problem of the succession had the same enervating and destructive effects

  in Lysimachos’ court, though the results were more calamitous. During 284

  Lysimachos’ wife Arsinoe II began to agitate for her sons to be preferred over those of Lysimachos’ earlier wives. He had, like Ptolemy, been married three

  times. His fi rst wife, Antipater’s daughter Nikaia, was the mother of Agathokles.

  By his second wife, Amastris, he had no children. Amastris had been the bride of Krateros at Alexander’s marriage ceremony at Susa in 324, was soon dismissed by her husband like most of her colleagues, then married Dionysios, the tyrant of Herakleia Pontike on the Black Sea coast of Bithynia, and who made himself king just before he died in 305. Amastris was of distinguished Persian ancestry, being the niece of Dareios III, and after Dionysios died, she ruled Herakleia as regent for his sons. Lysimachos’ campaign against Antigonos the One-Eyed in 302 brought

  him to a great camp just south of Herakleia, and he made an alliance with the

  city, through which he could bring food and supplies and reinforcements. His

  fi rst wife was dead and the military-political alliance led to the marriage of the queen and the king, apparently, at least according to one ancient historian, a love match, though this is now doubted by more cynical modern historians.

  Neither partner was young any more, and the marriage lasted only a short time.

  Soon after Ipsos, Lysimachos renounced her, so that he could marry Ptolemy’s

  daughter Arsinoe in the diplomatic bouleversement of 299/298. But he kept a grip on Herakleia, and continued to respect Amastris and her sons by her fi rst husband. She was murdered by her sons in 284; Lysimachos then effortlessly

  annexed the principality. 8

  Arsinoe II was thus Lysimachos’ third wife. She was the daughter of Ptolemy

  I and Berenike and so the full sister of Ptolemy II. She was 16 when she married Lysimachos, who was in his fi fties, and had three sons by Lysimachos. There was also another son, Alexander, by a woman Lysimachos had not bothered to marry.

  Arsinoe no doubt wanted one of her sons to be Lysimachos’ successor, but it was not until 284 that, perhaps inspired by her mother’s success in Egypt, she actively intrigued to displace Agathokles. Her persuasiveness was such that Lysimachos

  had Agathokles executed. 9

  This, of course, is the ‘romantic’ version, on a par with the allegation that

  Lysimachos’ and Amastris’ marriage was a love match. Unless we are to credit

  Arsinoe with superhuman attractiveness – she had been married to Lysimachos by this time for two decades, so a sudden infatuation is hardly likely – or Lysimachos with senility, we have to seek out other reasons for the king’s actions.

  The obvious reason is impatience on the part of Agathokles, particularly

  after his successful campaign against Demetrios. The presence of Eurydike and

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  her sons at the court drew attention to the success of Ptolemy II in muscling

  into power in Alexandria; Antiochos, King Seleukos’ son, had been ruling the

  eastern lands for a decade. Agathokles was the only one of his generation not

  yet with full access to royal power, though he is known to have founded a city in Mysia which bore his name. 10 None of the ancient reasons we are given are at all convincing, and it is probably best to see the crisis at the court as a sudden explosion of emotion, in which all the suggested elements – Arsinoe’s ambition for her children, Eurydike’s presence, Agathokles’ ambition and frustration,

  Lysimachos’ age – combined. And the deed once done could not be undone, and

  had continuing consequences. 11

  Agathokles’ wife, Lysandra, was a daughter of Ptolemy I and Eurydike – so

  tangled was this unpleasant affair. She fl ed, along with her brother Ptolemy

  Keraunos, to Seleukos, where they urged that he attack Lysimachos. 12 Lysimachos now found that the main prop of his regime was gone, and the heirs to his

  kingdom were no more than children: Arsinoe’s eldest son, Ptolemy (later called

  ‘of Telmessos’) was in his early teens.

  This may well be the root cause of the apparent loss of support for Lysimachos’

  regime which followed. These kingdoms were still fragile political constructs.

  The repeated failures of the royal regimes in Macedon, and the collapse of

  Antigonos’ kingdom, were warnings of what might happen to the other new

  kingdoms. The problem in Macedon was always one of the royal succession, as

  had been recently demonstrated yet again. This was part of the background to

  the transfer of political power to Antiochos and Ptolemy I by their fathers, for all the contemporaries of Alexander will have had the royal succession problem of

  Macedon as part of their basic political knowledge. It is a perennial concern in any monarchy, but the Macedonian system was exceptionally disruptive.

  The execution of Agathokles removed the main hope for an orderly succession

  in Lysimachos’ kingdom. The old king, in his seventies, could hardly last much longer; the succession of teenage boys, supervised by their mother, had recently resulted in great unpleasantness in Macedon (and in Herakleia Pontike). For

  Lysimachos’ subjects it was time to look to their futures. Many of them had been Antigonos’ and Demetrios’ subjects, so a general desertion to an invader might be expected. Lysandra was not the only one to look to Seleukos.

  Lysimachos’ kingdom was a conglomerate of many different lands – Macedon,

  Thrace, Greek cities on the Black Sea and the Aegean, former Persian provinces.

  The Macedonians required the king’s personal attention; this was one of the

  things which had kept them loyal to Kassander. But Lysimachos had killed

  Antipater, Kassander’s son, and now he had killed his own son, then executed

  men who complained at Agathokles’ killing. 13 Within the old Antigonid lands in Asia Minor some army offi cers defected to Seleukos. 14 At least one of Lysimachos’

  high offi cials, Philetairos, the governor of Pergamon and guardian of part of the

 
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  king’s treasure, appealed for Seleukos’ intervention; 15 no doubt others did so as

  well. The destruction of Lysimacheia by an earthquake in 287 was later seen as an omen; even at the time it was disruptive.16

  Seleukos was isolated diplomatically by the marriage alliance of Lysimachos

  and Ptolemy; Lysimachos’ acquisition of Macedon made him a threatening

  fi gure, so the disruption of his court was welcome. The captivity of Demetrios and the presence at his court of Ptolemy Keraunos and Lysandra and her children gave Seleukos useful cards with which to threaten both of his rivals: he threatened to release Demetrios on to Lysimachos, 17 while Keraunos hankered for the Ptolemaic throne, which, in the process of transition, was vulnerable. The kings were close to war from 285 onwards. The capture of Demetrios had exposed the

  latent confl ict between them. With the players in the game reduced to only three, the possibility of the reunifi cation of the empire had reopened.

  Demetrios, kept prisoner in some luxury by Seleukos at Apamea in Syria,

  fi nally succumbed to his excesses and his luxurious living in 283. Seleukos sent the ashes back to Antigonos for burial, 18 a diplomatic gesture which might turn away Antigonos’ wrath. In Alexandria, Ptolemy II was joint king until the end

  of that year; he went through a pharaonic coronation ceremony in January 282,

  so presumably Ptolemy I died a few days earlier.19 He took over full authority smoothly enough in Alexandria, but his half-brother Magas took the opportunity to declare himself king in Cyrenaica.20 Magas’ action was distinctly unpopular with his half-brother, but Ptolemy could not do much about it. The death of a

  king cancelled the existing treaties he had made, so whatever agreement there

  had been between Ptolemy I and Seleukos over Syria was now void; Ptolemy II

  could not afford to launch an expedition against Magas in case Seleukos took

  advantage of his westward preoccupation to invade Syria; equally he could

  not intervene in the crisis in the north for fear of Magas, who might well have ambitions to rule Egypt.

  Seleukos was thus presented with a whole set of delectable alternatives, to turn to the south in order to interfere in the Ptolemaic succession with the immediate aim of seeking control of Phoenicia and southern Syria, perhaps in alliance with Magas; or to the north, to interfere in the crisis in Lysimachos’ realm and perhaps to secure a good deal more. The two potential enemies were still allied by marriage, and if either was threatened, the alliance might be activated. An invasion of Syria could allow Lysimachos, whose main problem lay within his own family, to move south through the Taurus passes into Kilikia, just as Demetrios had

  done three or four years before; a move north into Asia Minor, while Ptolemy

  II was concerned to consolidate his own position, could be accomplished with

  little prospect of being attacked from the south. Ptolemaic policy in Syria had long been defensive, seeing southern Syria and Phoenicia as bastions for the

  defence of Egypt rather than as routes through which the Ptolemaic armies could

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  invade the north. It was unlikely that the new king in Egypt would be thinking of invading his neighbour; if he did, Seleukos could encourage Magas, or back

  Ptolemy Keraunos for the throne. Seleukos decided to respond to the crisis in

  Asia Minor.

  There was also a further consideration, which cannot have escaped Seleukos.

  Conquest of Lysimachos’ kingdom would produce for him a fi nal opportunity to

  reunite Alexander’s empire. If he won, he would rule from the borders of India to the borders of Epiros, just as Alexander had done, with the exception only of Egypt. The prospect was surely one he felt to be irresistible. He must also have seen the inevitable result: he would need to fi ght Ptolemy II soon after; Ptolemy could see it too. Nor would the prospect be pleasing to the various pretenders he had at his court.

  The precise trigger for the war’s beginning is unknown; perhaps it just began

  when Seleukos was ready. He was gathering troops and supplies, according to a

  Babylonian source, in mid-282, 21 and the decisive battle at Koroupedion took place in February 281. Seleukos must have crossed into Asia Minor before the

  snows blocked the passes, in the autumn of 282. The campaign took several

  months but details are few. Lysimachos’ son Alexander, fi ghting for Seleukos, gained control of the city of Kotiaion; Seleukos besieged Sardis.22 So Seleukos penetrated into western Asia Minor, forcing Lysimachos to fi ght at home. At

  least one city, Pergamon, held by Lysimachos’ treasurer Philetairos, had been

  promised to the invader beforehand; most other lords and cities waited to see

  who would win. In the end, in the one battle the two old men fought, Lysimachos was defeated and killed. The fi eld of battle was near Sardis, so perhaps Lysimachos had to fi ght to save the city.23

  Seleukos spent several more months organizing his conquests, no doubt

  savouring his achievement, and making decisions on the disposition of his

  conquests. Lysandra was consumed with a desire for revenge, but Lysimachos’

  son Alexander insisted on his father having a decent burial at Lysimacheia. 24

  None of the family was assigned a kingdom. Presumably Seleukos was willing

  to provide generously for them, but not to the extent of setting any of them

  up as independent kings. This will have become clear as the months went by,

  and Ptolemy Keraunos was certainly clear by the autumn that he would get

  nothing.

  Ptolemy II was no doubt especially concerned at Seleukos’ triumph. Seleukos

  would not need to say or do anything to threaten him: his victory over Lysimachos did that for him. Ptolemy had plenty of relations at Seleukos’ court, and he will have known of Keraunos’ ambition and temperament – ‘ keraunos’ implied loud noises and sudden actions. And in the event it was Ptolemy II who benefi ted

  most, in a negative sense, from what happened next. There is no evidence for his direct involvement, but one must harbour suspicions.

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  Seleukos made administrative arrangements to take over the whole of

  Lysimachos’ kingdom. At fi rst he did not need to do more than confi rm any

  local offi cials who had stayed at their posts, and appoint others where necessary.

  Philetairos in Pergamon was certainly retained. An attempt was made to enforce his suzerainty over the ruler of Pontos, on the north Anatolian coast, but it failed; the lord there, Mithradates of Pontos, took the royal title to celebrate his victory. 25

  The Bithynian king also survived a Seleukid attack by one of the new king’s

  generals. 26 Neither of these rebuffs was particularly serious, but when he was approached by a delegation from Herakleia Pontike, the meeting ended in mutual annoyance, which was a mistake on Seleukos’ part. 27 The lands of northern Asia Minor became even more determined on independence than before.

  Arsinoe (II), Lysimachos’ widow, escaped from Ephesos (where a mob had

  quickly formed to hunt for her) and ships of Lysimachos’ fl eet took her to

  Kassandreia in Macedon. 28 She intended to claim the kingship for her son, which made sense, but she was not wanted; it is doubtful that any Macedonians wanted another teenaged king supervised by his mother. She had no power beyond a few

  ships and soldiers, but she did manage to seize control of the city.29 There was another claimant to the kingship in the person of Demetrios’ son, Antigonos

  Gonatas, who still controlled parts of Greece and had a fl eet. Pyrrhos might also revive his claim. It does not seem that anyone consulted
the Macedonians, no

  doubt as confused as everyone else.

  Seleukos demobilized most of his forces. Those he had brought from Syria

  were sent home, the mercenaries and his professional army retained; there was

  plenty for them to do in Asia Minor. The soldiers who had fought for Lysimachos could also largely be dismissed to their homes, some to various parts of Asia

  Minor, others to Macedon, though it is likely that there were relatively few of the latter. The mercenaries would no doubt mainly re-enlist with Seleukos, though

  some clearly stayed with Arsinoe.

  Seleukos had next to impress his control on Macedon. By this action he

  would claim the kingship, but this required ratifi cation by the Assembly. None of his competitors had succeeded in securing this consent; and Seleukos did

  not anticipate any dispute as to his claim. When he set out for Macedon he was escorted by former soldiers of Lysimachos, men who were probably going home.

  He and his court and escort crossed the Hellespont to Lysimacheia in late August or early September. Seleukos rode on, heading for Thrace on the way to Macedon.

  At this point, though not yet acclaimed as such by any of the Macedonians, he

  was de facto king of Macedon, despite Arsinoe in Kassandreia and the other

  competitors.

  Seleukos was the last of Alexander’s offi cers. Next to Ptolemy I, he was the

  most cautious but, unlike Ptolemy, he retained a full measure of Alexander- and Antigonos-type ambition, and he was on the verge of achieving what Antigonos

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  and Demetrios had worked for, and what Kassander and Ptolemy I – and he

  himself until now – had worked against: the reunifi cation of Alexander’s empire.

  It would be astonishing if he had not wished for this more than once in the

  past 40 years, though he had never hinted at such an ambition. Yet when the

  opportunity arrived he grasped it. Now all he had to do was to reach Macedon

  and establish control.

  In his suite was Ptolemy Keraunos, who had hoped Seleukos would assist

  him to a kingdom of his own, possibly Egypt, or that of Lysimachos in Asia, or Macedon. Keraunos’ whole career suggests that he felt that he was entitled to