The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  Was an election inevitable? Some felt it wasn’t. As we saw above, Dillon believed Costello could and should have tried to soldier on, but that he had lost heart after the death of his wife. Dillon thought that if MacBride had known that Costello would call an election, he would have withdrawn his motion of no confidence.153 However, this seems unlikely, as it was not MacBride but the Clann executive that insisted on putting the motion in the first place. In any event, a hard-headed look at the numbers in the Dáil showed the Government’s position was untenable. Fianna Fáil’s Thomas Derrig had died in November, leaving the Dáil with 146 members, one of whom, Ceann Comhairle Patrick Hogan of Labour, would not vote unless there was a tie. Fine Gael had lost two seats and Labour one in by-elections, while Patrick Finucane of Clann na Talmhan had withdrawn his support from the Government in a dispute over milk prices and the failure to supply a factory for Listowel, as promised in the North Kerry by-election.154 After the loss of Clann na Poblachta’s three votes, this left the inter-party grouping with 71 seats (excluding the Ceann Comhairle), while Fianna Fáil, Clann na Poblachta and the Independents likely to vote against the Government had 74.155 Any faint hope that Fianna Fáil might support the Government in an act of anti-IRA solidarity were dispelled when de Valera put down his own no confidence motion the day after MacBride’s.156 The British Ambassador described the Clann’s sudden withdrawal of support as “a bombshell to the country”, while the Fianna Fáil motion “finally dashed” any hope of Costello’s government remaining in power.157

  Determined to avoid inevitable defeat in the Dáil, Costello advised the President on 4 February that he would be seeking a dissolution on the twelfth of the month (the day the Dáil was due back after the Christmas recess). Polling day was to be Tuesday 5 March, with the new Dáil to meet on 20 March.158 Announcing his plans nearly a week before the formal dissolution of the Dáil allowed Costello to use the Fine Gael Ard Fheis on the sixth to launch his election campaign. He acknowledged that an election at that time “must be gravely damaging to the national interest”, but insisted he had no alternative. Responsibility rested with those parties who had put down motions of no confidence. These made an election inevitable, showed “a reckless and irresponsible disregard of the country’s interests”, and were “criminal and miserable acts of sabotage”. He said the real reason for MacBride’s action was, “to put it quite bluntly, because of Government action against the unlawful use of force”.

  The Taoiseach suggested a federal solution to the problem of partition, promising that minority rights would be respected in a united Ireland. “The spirit of peace cannot thrive in any community where there is discrimination against a particular category of people … The object of our policy is a reunion willingly entered into and fully safeguarding the rights of all minority interests.” He also again deplored the outbreak of violence and repeated his Government’s determination to tackle it.159 His speech was welcomed by the British Government, which saw it as containing “some of the most significant and moderate comment on the Partition issue to have come out of Dublin for some time past”.160

  The Government made some efforts to lighten the economic gloom. Even before the election was called, it had rescinded an earlier decision to restrict the public capital programme to £27 million. This decision had been made in November 1956, but at the start of the year Sweetman was complaining that Departments had submitted estimates for capital spending totalling £38 million. The Government avoided the hard decisions on cutting those estimates by deciding that the limit on capital spending should be increased to between £38 and £40 million, in order “to avoid a further deflationary effect on the economy”.161 On 16 January Costello announced a £4.5 million “mini capital budget” to bring relief to the unemployed. As he later pointed out, these moves were announced before MacBride’s no-confidence motion precipitated the election.162

  The same could not be said of certain other Government decisions. A few days before the election, it decided to reduce the price of tea. Lemass claimed there was no justification for this move163—except, presumably, possible political advantage. The Taoiseach also successfully interceded with CIÉ Chairman Ted Courtney (a contributor to his election fund) over the proposed dismissal of painters by the company. Costello wrote after the election to thank him: “It is a comfort to both of us that your action was not a mere political one but resulted in the saving of distress to a large number of families. That is your consolation and mine.”164

  There was some good economic news during the course of the campaign, with trade figures for January showing an increase of £3.7 million in exports, up 50 per cent on the same month in the previous year. Imports had fallen by £2.3 million on January 1956. In the light of these encouraging figures, Costello claimed the Government was “entitled to full credit for stopping the rot in the balance of payments and for producing a clear, definite and practical policy for increasing production”.165 However, he admitted that his Government’s plans and policies were “only partially showing results” because of the unexpected timing of the election. The Taoiseach also stressed the scale and scope of the problems which had hit the country at the one time, and faced the Government “with difficulties which no other Irish Government ever has had to face”.166

  The campaign was marked by repeated Fianna Fáil attacks on the very concept of coalition government. Costello complained that “the phrase ‘single party government’ drums through all their speeches … like the monotonous beat of an African tom-tom”.167 It was true that Fianna Fáil happily made hay of coalition differences. Frank Aiken said the members of the Government “spent most of their time double-crossing the people who voted for them and preparing to double-cross one another”.168 Jim Ryan said the country had suffered “not only the evils of a Coalition Government but the disaster of an incompetent Government”.169 Lemass said they were not going to simply find fault with the Government; he said they “did their best” but were “condemned to failure from the start” by the fact they were a coalition. “Each party in it was, for the past year, trying to judge the right time, in its own party interest, to get out of it, and in the end the smallest party beat them to it.”170 De Valera had a historical analogy. Recalling the “scurrying of the envoys that went from Party to Party when the first Coalition was being arranged”, he said it was “sadly reminiscent to some of us of the scurrying of envoys that took place at another important juncture in our history”.171 He didn’t actually mention the Treaty negotiations, presumably because his reference would have been understood by his audience.

  But Costello didn’t take these attacks lying down. He pointed to differences between senior Fianna Fáil figures. “It is impossible to reconcile … Mr Lemass’s plan which contemplates a large increase in public expenditure of approximately £20 million a year with the ‘rigid economy’ favoured by Mr MacEntee.”172 Lemass, with a cheerful disregard for the facts, dismissed this as “nonsense”. He claimed that he and MacEntee “never had a fundamental disagreement on the aims of policy” (which of course is not the same as disagreement on the policy to achieve the aims). “Of course, we had arguments … every Minister worth his salt has arguments with the Minister for Finance sooner or later.”173

  The Taoiseach criticised Fianna Fáil for not producing an alternative policy, in contrast to his own Policy for Production outlined the previous October. However, he acknowledged that the new policy had just commenced and had yet to take effect. “It has been like a machine which is at work but whose productive benefits have not yet reached the consumer—they are still along the assembly belt.”174 He also claimed that a sign of the “staleness of the political situation” was that the Fianna Fáil speeches “could all have been made … at any one of the four elections which have been held since the War”. The reason, he suggested, was that de Valera “refuses to discuss the real issues of policy”.175 He had evidently forgotten his own refusal three years before to commit himself on policy. In fact, speeches in this seri
es of elections were somewhat interchangeable—not within Fianna Fáil, but between government and opposition. The speeches Costello made in 1951 and 1957 as outgoing Taoiseach could easily have been made by de Valera in 1954; equally, his criticisms of the Government in 1954 were echoed by Fianna Fáil in 1957.

  One new issue was the IRA’s Border Campaign. Former Fianna Fáil Justice Minister Gerry Boland claimed this was “a direct and inevitable result of Coalition policy. If carte blanche had not been given to this illegal organisation there would have been no Coalition Government in 1948 or 1954.”176 Costello took grave exception to this, indignantly denying that his government had turned a blind eye to the IRA. He pointed out that the raid on Armagh barracks took place 10 days after his second government took office, and the “arming, drilling, recruiting and planning” for that operation were clearly going on while Fianna Fáil was in office. The Taoiseach said he had no apology to make for his policy, which had been “temperate, but firm”.177 Following further criticism from MacEntee, he said the Government had accepted the challenge from the IRA “within 24 hours … notwithstanding Clann na Poblachta, and the recognition of the temptation which would be presented to Fianna Fáil. This Election has come about, not because of any weakness in the Government but because of the Government’s strength and devotion to principle, and because of its refusal in the national interest to make any compromise.”178

  The economic background music might have been dismal, but Costello remained upbeat, writing on 22 February that as he moved about the country, he found Government supporters “quietly confident of the result … I always endeavour to avoid forecasting. I certainly feel, however, that the Government, particularly in the last ten days, have gathered considerable support.”179 Four days before polling, he predicted “a national rally” to the Government parties. “Such a rally would be a tonic not merely to the political system itself but to the national spirit generally … I have no doubt of your support.”180 He should have.

  In Dublin South-East, Costello still topped the poll—but his vote, at 28.4 per cent, was down almost 14 percentage points on 1954. That meant the end of John O’Donovan, whose seat was taken by Noël Browne, now running as an Independent. Browne’s first-preference vote of 24.8 per cent was four points higher than three years before, when he was a Fianna Fáil candidate. The other seat was taken by MacEntee, who was also just under a quota with 24.3 per cent of the vote. It was, ironically, a small transfer from Costello which elected Browne to the Dáil again.181 Nationally, Fine Gael lost the gains made in 1954, being reduced to 40 seats, the same number as in 1951. Labour slumped to 12 seats, and Clann na Talmhan to just three. The other Clann, which had precipitated the election, returned just one TD, John Tully; Seán MacBride would never be elected to the Dáil again. There were four Sinn Féin TDS, who were of course abstentionst. But the big news was the Fianna Fáil performance. In de Valera’s last general election as leader, his party won 78 of the 147 seats on offer.

  The British Ambassador was surprised at “a landslide of these dimensions … since the whole campaign was deceptively quiet and even in its closing stages was marked by a discouraging lack of interest on the part of the general public”.182 But, as The Leader pointed out, “Circumstances were hard on the government. They had to apply unpopular measures, and Mr Costello had the great sorrow of seeing his policy of ‘taking the gun out of politics’ apparently thwarted … Our gratitude to them is genuine, especially to Mr Costello who is patently a man devoid of personal ambition, and who has continued his disinterested service to the country when stricken with domestic sorrow.”183

  A typically pungent comment on the Government’s plight was offered by Patrick Lindsay, who travelled to Áras an Uachtaráin to surrender his seal of office with Costello and Dillon. As they passed a pub on the quays, Dillon said he’d never been in a pub except his own in Ballaghaderreen, which he sold because “when I saw people going home having spent so much money on drink, I decided that they were depriving their families of essentials”. Costello then chipped in the observation that he had only been in a pub once, in Terenure, “and was nearly choked by a bottle of orange”. To Lindsay, the pub was “the countryman’s club, where everything is discussed and where contacts are made”. He was horrified by the attitude of his colleagues. “****. I now know why we are going in this direction today and why we are out of touch with the people.”184

  The Taoiseach was more philosophical. As he told Archbishop McQuaid, “there are many compensations in defeat”, although he regretted that his Government had been “judged at the worst time and in the most adverse circumstances”.185 To another correspondent, he observed that “defeat was inevitable in the circumstances. It is distressing that we should be judged on incomplete work, but such is the nature of democracy.” He added that he was “in no way discouraged”.186 He spent his final weekend as Taoiseach in Cork with his daughter Eavan.187

  There was no suspense about the election of the Taoiseach in 1957, as de Valera was the only nominee. Costello opposed the nomination “in no spirit of animosity … but in the firm conviction that in present circumstances the Party to which he belongs is not equipped to provide the kind of Government which the country needs … That Party has so far shown no policy which would justify a Government being selected from it.” De Valera’s nomination was approved by 78 votes to 53.188 Later, in the debate on the nomination of the members of the Government, Costello promised that Fine Gael would be a constructive opposition, and claimed they left behind them a “solid contribution to some of the difficulties” facing the country. He pointedly said his party would try to forget that Fianna Fáil had not given them any cooperation in the previous Dáil.189

  Despite his return to the opposition benches, Costello remained enthusiastic about politics, about Fine Gael, and about the inter-party approach. He told one correspondent that “so far as I have health and strength I will do everything possible to continue the fight and pass on the torch”. To that end, he planned to continue his efforts to bring “young people and new ideas” into Fine Gael so as to revive the party and “make it a force not merely in politics but in ideas throughout the country”. The former Taoiseach insisted that “we did a good service to the country by associating with the Labour Party”—they had been given an opportunity to see what government really involved.190 But Labour were bruised by their experience, and by dealing with Sweetman in particular. Brendan Corish swore he would never again serve in government with the former Minister for Finance.191 It did not point towards a happy or a productive period in opposition.

  Chapter 14

  A PERFECTLY HAPPY MAN

  “Recent changes were … rather a hurtful shock to me.”1

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, DECEMBER 1959

  “Put upon your banners the Just Society, that Fine Gael is not a Tory party.”2

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, 1969

  “Am I a happy man? Yes, perfectly.”3

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, NOVEMBER 1974

  The day after he lost office, Costello was back at the Bar, starting work immediately with a brief in Cork.4 He was quite happy to return to the law after serving as Taoiseach—and there were plenty of people in the legal world happy to welcome him back.5 The speed of his return to the law also demonstrated his priorities—as before, he would be a part-time Opposition politician.

  The summer break was spent quietly. He told his friend Tom Bodkin that he was enjoying his first Long Vacation for four years. “I have done literally nothing—played golf and read and brought my grandchildren to the sea when the weather permitted.” However, as a result of “a family conspiracy”, he was persuaded to go to Cannes on holiday in September. He told Bodkin “my own honest desire was to stay at home but the conspiracy was too much for me”.6 Despite his reluctance, he was later reported to have had “a most enjoyable and particularly a most restful holiday in Cannes and looks very much the better for it”.7

  The loss of public office meant he had to deal again
with the tax authorities, who seemed oblivious to his recent eminence. After receiving a tax assessment in September 1957 he had to complain that the inspector seemed unaware that he became a senior counsel 32 years before and was no longer “an ordinary Barrister-at-Law”. Worse, the inspector had not adverted “to the position which I occupied until the 20th March last”.8

  Officialdom may have forgotten that Costello had been Taoiseach; but despite his return to active work at the Bar, he remained leader of the Opposition. One of his first tasks in that role was to respond to the first Budget of the new government. In a broadcast on Radio Éireann, he criticised Fianna Fáil’s failure during the election to signal its intention of removing food subsidies. “It would have been better if the sacrifices now writ so large in the Budget had been writ even small in the election campaign.”9 In the Dáil, Costello rejected suggestions that the new government was following the advice of the Capital Advisory Committee in abolishing the subsidies. He pointed out that the Committee had recommended abolition in order to sustain the capital programme—not as a relief for general Government spending. “What they have done is not what the Capital Advisory Committee said they were to do—utilise the food subsidies for capital purposes because capital was so scarce—but they have done what the Capital Advisory Committee said that they were not to do at all—used them as current revenue.”10