The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  However, he was later to stress that Fine Gael’s opposition to the Government was “moderate”, because the party “could not honestly oppose much of the legislation proposed … because they represented merely a continuance of policies which we had introduced when in Government”. In the same speech (to the Fine Gael Ard Fheis in February 1958) he claimed Fine Gael had “placed the national interest before its Party interest” in 1956, introducing unpopular measures to tackle the balance of payments deficit and meeting the challenge of the IRA. Because of that, the party was in opposition. “We had no illusions as to its effects on our political fortunes, nor did we smugly console ourselves with the consideration that political virtue is its own reward. Our recompense is that we gave an honest headline for future politicians to follow and did something to increase the experience of reality by our democracy.”11

  There were some other pointers for the future in his early contributions from the opposition benches. Proposing a fact-finding committee to educate TDS and senators about the implications of the EEC and the Free Trade Area—he claimed that 80 per cent of Deputies didn’t know the difference between the two—Costello firmly said Ireland could not leave itself outside their scope. He said the proposals for a Common Market presented a challenge, adding, “Personally, I think they also present us with an opportunity.” But that opportunity could not be availed of unless politicians were fully informed.12 His proposal was rejected by the Government. He also hinted that he realised his generation had nearly finished its time at the top in politics. “If we have not reached the end of a chapter in Irish history, at least we are nearing the end. You have only to look around you in this House and see that those people who bore the brunt of the effort to create the State, and subsequently to maintain it, are passing on.”13

  The most significant development under de Valera’s final government was the publication of Economic Development, written by Ken Whitaker, in November 1958. In March of that year, Costello foreshadowed some of the themes of that document. He argued in the Dáil that “it is about time that a little bit of expansion was tried … You cannot get that increase in business activity which can give its full and essential contribution to the ending of unemployment and emigration … unless we can get foreign capital in here … God only knows the amount of capital we have lost because of the Control of Manufactures Act.”14 John F. McCarthy has pointed to Ken Whitaker’s support for foreign investment as one of the important differences between Economic Development and Costello’s 1956 Policy for Production (the other difference he noted was the greater economic sophistication of the former).15 Costello’s Dáil comments, made before the publication of Economic Development, suggest there was less of a difference on foreign investment than McCarthy believed.

  On the document itself, and the accompanying White Paper, Costello was reserved—but crucially, he and Fine Gael did not oppose the new direction. Ken Whitaker found the lack of criticism from the Opposition benches “quite extraordinary”, and very welcome.16 Costello told the Dáil in April 1959 that he didn’t believe the documents contained schemes “which will come to any degree of fruition or will introduce any substantial increase in employment”.17 He claimed Fianna Fáil policies were like dud cheques. In this case, they had to get “a cheque which would not be accepted by the people … marked good by the most distinguished civil servant we have in the service of this State”.18 And he pointed out that his government had put in place “two very valuable contributions to the building up and strengthening of our industrial fabric”—tax breaks for exports, and the attraction of foreign investment.19

  The last point may have been stretching it a bit, but Costello could certainly claim that his government had started to pursue policies very similar to those in Economic Development before it left office. Costello’s plan was based on the incorrect assumption that agriculture would be the main driving force of expansion—but so was Whitaker’s.20 Ronan Fanning suggested that “the larger historical significance” of Whitaker’s initiative “was ultimately psychological … [it succeeded] because so many so badly wanted it to succeed”.21 Had things worked out differently, perhaps Costello’s Policy for Production would have been remembered as a turning point in Ireland’s economic history.

  Some of those closest to the former Taoiseach were trying to continue the process of modernising Fine Gael. The main movers were his son Declan, son-in-law Alexis FitzGerald, and the former Minister for Health, Tom O’Higgins. Alexis and Declan were the joint editors of a new party paper, the National Observer. In his first editorial, FitzGerald suggested that “all the sacred cows may be chased around our pasture and we are not without hope that some of them will expire from the exhaustion of the exercise”.22 As could be expected, some of the owners of the sacred cows were less than enthusiastic about this idea. Tom O’Higgins, chairman of the paper, received a blistering complaint from party grandee Michael Hayes that “the National Observer is so busy belittling Fine Gael that it has no time for praise”.23

  In April 1959, Bishop Michael Browne of Galway wrote to Costello complaining about comments concerning him in an issue of the paper. The Bishop noted that the directors of the company were O’Higgins, FitzGerald and Declan Costello, and complained that the language used about him had “heretofore … been associated with anti-clericals and Communists”. Alexis—who had written the offending article—told his father-in-law he stood over the comments, and believed it was their duty to speak out with “a frankness, if not with an authority or a responsibility” equal to Bishop Browne’s. Costello wrote a frosty letter to the Bishop, telling him the three individuals he mentioned “are exemplary Catholics. There is not a grain of either anti-clericalism or communism in any one of them, and I am surprised that Your Lordship should have thought it fitting to suggest otherwise. I am glad to have the friendship of Mr T.F. O’Higgins, and I thank Almighty God for my son Declan and my son-in-law Alexis FitzGerald.”24

  Their other initiative was the Fine Gael Research and Information Centre. The aim here was to generate discussion on new ideas, particularly on social and economic issues. As Declan Costello recalled, they felt they had to create public interest in Fine Gael if they were ever to get back into power.25 Their work was welcomed by The Leader. “It has often been said that the one class of men who do not continue their education in after life are those who most need it, politicians.”26

  In opposition as in government, John A. Costello relied heavily on these close collaborators. For instance, in February 1958 he wrote to Alexis about a request from the Irish Times for him to contribute an article to a series about the present and future prospects for the country. “Needless to say my first reaction is not to turn myself into a journalist, and, in accordance with my practice, I am leaving the matter lie for the moment, but perhaps you would think about it and talk to Declan and Tom O’Higgins and any others you think proper …” Predictably, FitzGerald was “very keen” that his father-in-law should write an article, which duly appeared under the very Costello-like headline “Pessimism throttles our progress”.27

  The other key figure in Costello’s team was his secretary, Ita McCoy. A sister of Kevin and Dr Tom O’Higgins, she had been present when their father was murdered by the IRA during the Civil War. She had come to work for Costello when he became Taoiseach, having previously been personal secretary to Dick Mulcahy. Later, she was secretary to her nephew, Tom O’Higgins, when he was deputy leader of Fine Gael, and then to Garret FitzGerald when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs.28 Her efficiency was legendary—which was just as well as Costello juggled political, legal, constituency and personal affairs. She was also better able to decipher his terrible handwriting than most mortals. Enclosing a message for her to type in March 1958 he admitted that it was “indecipherable as usual”.29 On his retirement, he paid her a handsome tribute, describing her as “my guide, philosopher, and, I am glad to say, my friend. When I was dictating a speech or even in my legal work … I know that I can’t make a
mistake because if I do she spots it at once.”30

  As we saw in the last chapter, Labour politicians were bruised and bitter after their experience in government, and determined to follow a more independent line. In July 1957 James Larkin objected to the Ceann Comhairle’s description of Costello as leader of the Opposition. “I have a great regard for Deputy Costello’s work as Taoiseach … However, he is not my leader …”31 There were tensions, too, within Fine Gael. Liam Cosgrave held Gerard Sweetman personally responsible for the party’s defeat at the polls, and told him so. He reportedly told the patrician Sweetman that Fine Gael “was no longer led by people living in big houses at the end of long avenues”. For the next few years their communications were “strictly official”.32 Sweetman, meanwhile, was resentful of the way he had been treated by Costello, and implacably opposed to another coalition with Labour.33

  Costello wasn’t the only Fine Gael frontbencher who returned to a full-time career outside politics. The result was that much of the work in the Dáil devolved on those who were full-time politicians, principally Mulcahy, Cosgrave and Dillon.34 Despite the Government’s seemingly unassailable majority, Dillon did his best to keep Fine Gael on its collective toes, claiming in September that they had been waiting six months for de Valera to “get cracking”, and the only result so far was “cracked” prices. “This Government may not last long, and it is of vital importance to this country that it should be succeeded by a strong Fine Gael Government, for which we should start organising now.”35 Costello, meanwhile, was proclaiming that he remained optimistic “because my faith in the country’s future has never been shaken or dimmed … Not even at the worst moments of last year’s great economic stress did Fine Gael lose faith in the fundamental capacity of our people to overcome any problem that might temporarily thwart them.”36

  This declaration of faith in the people was made at the start of a by-election campaign in Dublin North-Central, caused by the death of Fianna Fáil TD Colm Gallagher. The result was a surprise—and comfortable—victory for Independent Frank Sherwin, who took just over a third of the first preference vote. The Fianna Fáil candidate came second with 27 per cent while Fine Gael took just under 20 per cent. Sherwin had more than doubled the 15 per cent he received in the general election just seven months before, while Fianna Fáil had lost 21 per cent from its first-preference vote. By contrast, the Fine Gael vote was down by only 2 per cent, a reasonably acceptable result given the swing to Sherwin.37

  There were five further by-elections during Costello’s leadership of the Opposition. Fine Gael’s best result was in Dublin South-West in July 1959, where Richie Ryan won a seat from Fianna Fáil. In three of the other contests, the party’s vote was lower than in the general election—a 5 per cent drop in Dublin South-Central in June 1958, and 6.5 per cent in Clare and 1.4 per cent in Meath in July 1959. It wasn’t disastrous, but it certainly didn’t indicate that the party was recovering lost ground, particularly as the Fianna Fáil vote was substantially down in each of the five by-elections. In its commentary on the Dublin South-Central by-election, The Leader denied that any moral was to be drawn from the result. “… as there is at the moment nothing very exciting happening, what people call ‘apathy’ gives the tone and result.”38

  But if by-elections failed to generate much excitement, a Fianna Fáil proposal to change the electoral system certainly did. As we saw in Chapter 6, Costello had advised de Valera not to specify the use of PR STV in the 1937 Constitution, arguing that the system would eventually lead to a large number of small parties and unstable governments; better, he argued, to leave the type of proportional representation open, as it had been in the Free State Constitution. De Valera rejected this advice, on the grounds that a government could find an electoral system that seemed proportional, but in fact wasn’t.39

  Twenty-one years later, de Valera had changed his mind. Not alone did he want to get rid of the single transferable vote, he wanted to abolish proportional representation altogether. The reason was the very one advanced by Costello in 1937, that the system led to a multiplicity of parties. When the Bill was introduced in the Dáil on 12 November 1958, Costello (along with Norton) opposed its first reading, normally a formal introduction without a vote. He acknowledged that this was an unusual tactic, but said it was “essential that we should at the earliest opportunity emphasise our implacable opposition” to the measure. Lemass’s testy response indicated the Government’s annoyance at his action.40

  When it came to the substantive debate, Costello accused Fianna Fáil of arrogance in insisting that PR must go “just because they were beaten twice by the electorate under the most democratic system in the world”. He accepted that he had argued that PR would lead to a multiplicity of parties, but now added the rider that if voters wanted a number of parties, they were entitled to have them. The impact of the alternative system could only be guessed at—the Irish Parliamentary Party had been wiped out in 1918 under the first-past-the-post system, even though it got a higher percentage of the vote than Fine Gael received in 1943, 1944 or 1948. “P.R., if you like to say so, saved Fine Gael at that time”—an argument, it might be thought, hardly likely to appeal to de Valera.41 Costello believed that once the system was changed, it would be almost impossible to change it back, because Fianna Fáil would have an unshakable grip on power. “A dying generation such as we are has no right to impose its will upon young people … They will never get a chance to change it by constitutional means and it will require something like a revolution to do so.”42

  The Government announced that the presidential election would be held on the same day as the referendum, claiming this would reduce costs. Nonsense, Costello told the Dáil: “it is the last effort to try to save the Referendum Bill from defeat by throwing the personality of the Taoiseach into the arena at the last minute … they are asked ‘Do not let the poor old man down; do not let him down now by voting against him on the Referendum Bill’”.43

  Outside the Dáil, Costello pointed out that the main argument for change was to ensure that governments had a strong enough mandate to give stability and achieve economic progress. But the current government had one of the largest majorities in the history of the State, and after almost two years in office “even the most optimistic cannot say that there has been anything other than a slight indication of recovery”.44 Without any public demand, the issue of electoral reform had been brought forward and was now dominating debate. “The Government appears to have lost all sense of perspective in its dealings with the affairs of the country … the proposals involve a leap in the dark and a journey into the unknown”.45 In what was to be his last Ard Fheis speech as leader of the Opposition, he accused de Valera of being “obsessed with the fact that he has been twice defeated under the present electoral system”. The Taoiseach admitted he had been wrong on this issue in 1937 and “now blandly states … that he is right now radically to change the Constitution in a revolutionary manner without adequate examination or opportunity for calm consideration”.46

  In a speech in Cork in April 1959, Costello linked the two votes, on PR and on the presidency, saying voters had to “make decisions of grave import to the future of the country”. He was confident that “the proper decision” would be made in the referendum. Evidently, he was less optimistic about the presidency. He suggested the holder of that office should have the confidence of every section of the community; he didn’t mention de Valera by name, referring to him as “General Seán MacEoin’s opponent”, and pointing out that he was “a highly controversial figure”.47 In his final broadcast of the referendum campaign, he warned that “governments can be too strong”. The aim of the change, he claimed, was “to secure the election of a government which can rule in the knowledge that it has an over-whelming majority in a subservient Parliament from which all effective Opposition is substantially excluded … Hold fast to your own voting system. Have the courage to say NO …”48

  The voters did exactly that, though it was a
close run thing—the proposal was rejected by 51.8 per cent to 48.2 per cent. Costello’s Dublin South-East constituency had the highest voter turnout in Dublin, rejecting the Government’s proposal by a thumping 64.4 per cent to 35.6 per cent. However, the voters were far more enthusiastic about the idea of a President de Valera—he defeated MacEoin by 56 per cent to 44 per cent. This, naturally, led to a change of Taoiseach, with Seán Lemass the sole candidate for the leadership of Fianna Fáil and therefore of the Government.

  Costello told the Dáil he and his party opposed Lemass’s appointment “not … on the personality of the Taoiseach designate but on the fact that he and the Government … have been guilty … of grave dereliction of public duty and gross breach of confidence”. He said they had been elected on the promise of dealing with the economy, but instead had wasted time by attempting to abolish proportional representation. The response from the Fianna Fáil benches was significant as it drew attention to Costello’s less than exemplary Dáil attendance—Michael Davern jeered that he “was not two hours in the House in the past two years”.49

  Costello’s part-time leadership was causing concern within Fine Gael as well. He generally attended the Dáil after court had risen for the day; and if the High Court was in Cork, he didn’t attend at all. As well as being a lucrative source of cases, his work in Cork had personal attractions—he was able to stay with his daughter Eavan and her husband, Ralph Sutton, then living in the southern capital.50 From the late 1950s on, the High Court sat twice a year in Cork for two weeks; there were also two one-week Assizes each year, when appeals would be heard from the Circuit Court. As in Dublin, most of Costello’s work involved personal injury cases.51