Sun in a Bottle
Page 31
Lawrence, Ernest
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratoryn
cold fusion and
laser fusion at
magnetic fusion at
National Ignition Facility at
leadn
Lewis, Nathan
Li, Tanhui
Libby, Willardn
light:
color of
converting sound into
generating
Lilienthal, Davidn
Limited Test Ban Treaty
lithium
Lopez de Bertodano, Martin
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Fuchs at
Halite/Centurion experiments at
laser fusion projects at
Manhattan Project at
pinch program at
Los Angeles Times
Lyne, Andrew
MacArthur, Douglas
McCarthy, Joseph
Mach, Ernstn
McMahon, Brien
Maddox, John
magnetic fields
magnetic fusion
budgets for
cleanliness of
ignition and sustained burn in
international collaboration in
pinch machines, see pinch machines
Stellarator
tokamaks, see tokamaks
magnetic mirror
magnetohydrodynamics
Mallove, Eugene
Manhattan Project n
Manley, John
Mao Tse-tung
Mark, Carsonn
Marx, Karl
Mascheroni, Leo
Maxwell, James Clerk
Mendeleev, Dmitri
mercury
Meyerhof, Walter
Miller, Brad
Milton, John
momentum, conservation ofn
Monte Carlo methodn
moonn
Moran, Mike
Moss, William
Mossadegh, Mohammedn
muon-catalyzed fusion
muons
Naranjo, Brian
NASAn
National Ignition Facility (NIF)
National Nuclear Security Administration
Nature
bubble fusion and
cold fusion and
laser fusion and
ZETA and
neon
neutron activation
neutrons
bubble fusion and
cold fusion and
damage caused by
discovery of
false
in fission
in fusionn
in laser fusion
in pinch machines
in Putterman’s device
radioactivity caused by
neutrons (continued)
in Scylla
in ZETA
New England Journal of Medicine
New Republic
New Scientist
Newton, Isaac
New York Timesn n
nickel
NIF (National Ignition Facility)
nitrogen
Nixon, Richard M.
Nova
Nuckolls, John
Nuclear Engineering and Design
nuclear fallout
nuclear fission, see fission
nuclear fusion, see fusion
nuclear power, peaceful uses of
Program No.
Project Plowshare n
nuclear reactors
nuclear weapons
aging of
Dyson on
moratoriums on
National Ignition Facility and
Reliable Replacement Warhead
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator n
stockpile stewardship program and
see also fission bomb; fusion bomb
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
bubble fusion and
Observer
Odyssey, The (Homer)
oil
oil crisis
Olson, Thiago
OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
Oppenheimer, J. Robert n
background of
Communist sympathies of
General Advisory Committee chaired by
hearing on
odd behavior exhibited by
Teller as enemy of
Oppenheimer, Kitty
Osbourne, Ian
oxygen
palladium
Palmer, E. Paul
Panama Canal
Paneth, Fritz
Paradise Lost (Milton)
Park, Robert
particle accelerators
Pauling, Linus
PCAST (President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology)
Perhapsatron
Perón, Juan
Peters, Kurt
Peterson, Chase
photons
Physical Review E
pyroelectric fusionn n
pinch machines
Columbus
density of plasma in
kink instability in
makeup of plasma in
Perhapsatron
sausage instability in
Scylla
ZETA
Pitzer, Kenneth
Planck, Max
planet, discovery of
plasmas
lasers and
see also laser fusion; magnetic fusion; pinch machines
Platt, Charles
plutoniumn
polywater
Ponomarev, Leonid
Pons, Stanley
President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
Princeton University
Program No.
Project Chariot
Project Plowshare n
Project Sherwood
proton-proton chain
protons strong force and
pulsars
Purdue University
Putterman, Seth
fusion device of
Rabi, Isidor
radiation
radioactivity fallout
radium
radon
Rayburn, Sam
Rayleigh-Taylor instability
Reagan, Ronaldn
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
Religio Chemici (Wilson)
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Richter, Ronald
Richter: The Opera
Riedinger, Lee
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator n
Roentgen, William
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
Rose, Basil
Rossi, Hugo
Rusk, Dean
Russia:
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and
see also Soviet Union
Rutherford, Ernest
Sakharov, Andrein n
lasers and
sloika design of
Teller and
tokamak designed by
Salamon, Michael
Saltmarsh, Michael
Sandia Natural Laboratories
sausage instability
science
Science
Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program
science journalism, embargo system in
Scientific American
Schwarzschild, Martin
Schweitzer, Albert
Schwinger, Julian
Scylla
Serber, Robertn
Shapira, Dan
Shiva
Siegel, Keeve M.
silicon
sloika bomb
sonoluminescence
South Korea
Soviet Union
atomic weapons of
fusion projects in n
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and
in Korean Warn
Limited Test Ban Treaty with
nuclear weapons moratorium in<
br />
Program No.in
Sputnik launched by
Star Wars program and n
ZETA and
space programn
Spitzer, Lyman
tokamak and
stability:
atoms’ desire for
see also instabilities
stars
equilibrium in
fusion in
pulsars
supernovas
see also sun
Star Wars programn
Stellarator
stimulated emissions
stockpile stewardship
Strauss, Lewis
strong force
strontium-
Suez Canal
sulfur
sun
age of
energy of
fusion in
Sununu, John
superbomb, see fusion bomb
supernovas
surface-enhanced Raman scattering
Suslick, Ken
tabletop fusion
bubble
Ditmire device
Farnsworth device
Olson device
Putterman device
Taleyarkhan, Rusi:
bubble fusion work of
investigation of
variable-speed bullet invention of
Tamm, Igorn
Tassn
Tatlock, Jean
Taylor, Ted
television
Teller, Edward
Alarm Clock design of
as anti-Communist
background of
cold fusion and
egocentrism of
Limited Test Ban Treaty and
nuclear weapons moratorium and
Oppenheimer as enemy of
optimism of
paranoia of
and peaceful uses of nuclear weapons
radioactive fallout as viewed by n
Sakharov and
Star Wars program and n
Teller instability
TFTR (Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor)
thermodynamics, laws of
thermotron
Thirring, Hans
Thomson, J. J.
Thomson, William, Lord Kelvin
thorium
Timen
tokamaks
ignition and sustained burn in
ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor)
JET (Joint European Torus)
JT-
TFTR (Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor)
tritiumn n n
bubble fusion and
National Ignition Facility and
tritium-deuterium reactions
Truman, Harry S.
Tsoukalas, Lefteri
Tuck, James
Ulam, Françoise
Ulam, Stanislaw
Ulam-Teller devices n
United Nations (UN)
Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC)
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
universal solvents
uranium nn
uranium-
Valone, Thomas
Von Neumann, John
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
What’s New
Wheeler, John Archibald
“Will to Believe, The” (James)
Wilson, George
Wired
wishful thinking
World War
x-rays
Xu, Yiban
ZETA (Zero-Energy Thermonuclear Assembly)
1 Apparently, Soviet translators erred when they received word of Fermi’s experiment. Soviet scientists were led to believe that the nuclear pile was in a “pumpkin field” instead of a “squash court.”
2 In the interest of secrecy, Manhattan Project scientists seldom referred to these compounds by their real name. Uranium-235 was referred to by the code names “magnesium” or “25”; plutonium-239 was “copper” or “49.”
3 Teller’s obsessive hatred of Communists and single-minded desire to build fusion weapons reportedly led Enrico Fermi to tell him, “In my acquaintance, you are the only monomaniac with several manias.”
4 Teller was so ridiculously optimistic that fellow physicists measured enthusiasm in “Tellers” just as they would measure mass in kilograms or time in seconds.
5 The Los Alamos physicist Robert Serber later wrote, “On Edward Teller’s blackboard at Los Alamos I once saw a list of weapons—ideas for weapons—with their abilities and properties displayed. For the last one on the list, the largest, the method of delivery was listed as ‘Backyard.’ Since that particular design would probably kill everyone on Earth, there was no use carting it elsewhere.”
6 That didn’t end the speculation. As General Groves later recounted, “I had become a bit annoyed with Fermi the evening before [the first atomic bomb test], when he suddenly offered to take wagers from his fellow scientists on whether or not the bomb would ignite the atmosphere, and if so, whether it would merely destroy New Mexico or destroy the world.”
7 Teller limped because of an accident in his youth. At the age of twenty, he jumped off a tram and nearly lost his right foot.
8 This was, in part, because Russian military intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project. Klaus Fuchs, a physicist who was involved at the highest level of theoretical work on the atomic and hydrogen bombs, was a spy.
9 They were using a technique that became known as the Monte Carlo method; the dice were for generating random numbers that allowed them to get a ballpark solution to a problem much more quickly than an exact calculation would permit.
10 The world came very close indeed. After the Soviets and Chinese massed a fresh set of troops on the Korean border in March 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that atomic bombs be used if the Communist troops launched a major new offensive. The bombs were deployed. Truman even signed an order authorizing their use but, luckily, he never sent it.
11 Teller, as often was the case, remembered the situation differently from how his peers did: he says he came up with a solution himself. According to Carson Mark, a weapons designer, “Ulam felt that he invented the new approach to the hydrogen bomb. Teller didn’t wish to recognize that. He couldn’t bring himself to recognize it. He’s taken occasion, almost every occasion he could, not every one, to deny that Ulam contributed anything.”
12 It’s not entirely clear why Oppenheimer and others who had expressed such deep moral qualms about the hydrogen bomb in 1949 reversed their position so dramatically in 1951. Oppenheimer said that the idea was so “technically sweet” that the United States had to go ahead and try it and then, later, argue about what to do with it.
13 Oppenheimer’s history was troublesome, especially an incident in 1943, in which, ironically, he alerted authorities to a possible security risk. Oppenheimer told a military officer that a certain person was worth keeping an eye on (and he was), but he lied about the details of how he knew this (through a friend who was a member of the Communist Party). Oppenheimer, when confronted with the lie, admitted to it in front of the panel: “Isn’t it a fair statement today, Dr. Oppenheimer, that according to your testimony now you told not one lie to Colonel Pash, but a whole fabrication and tissue of lies?” asked the AEC attorney. “Right,” answered Oppenheimer.
14 In 1910, the famed physicist Ernst Mach wrote, “If belief in the reality of atoms is so crucial, then I renounce the physical way of thinking, I will not be a professional physicist, and I hand back my scientific reputation.”
15 In truth, the analogy is terribly flawed, and electrons don’t really “orbit” a nucleus. To explain the behavior of electrons in an atom, you need to get into quantum theory, but this level of subtlety isn’t necessary to understand fusion.
16 Technically, these pieces are helium-4 nuclei: two protons and two neutrons all bound together in a tight bundle.
17 Technically, a third particle known as an antineutrino is als
o created.
18 The fusion furnace accounts for the abundance of light elements. But if fusion can’t fuse nuclei to get atoms heavier than iron, where do we get gold and lead and uranium from? It turns out that they are created in the very final moments of a star’s life. As the star explodes, the explosion is so hot and so violent that heavy nuclei are colliding with protons, neutrons, and other particles with great force. Sometimes, the particles stick, making the nucleus bigger. This process absorbs energy rather than releasing it—it’s like rolling the ball up the shallow side of the hill—but it happens because the explosion is so energetic. It is from the very last moments of a supernova that we get all the elements heavier than those in the iron group.
19 A fusion reaction that isn’t properly compressed becomes a big, expensive dud. In weaponeers’ terminology, the bomb “fizzles.” Livermore’s first nuclear tests fizzled, including its first hydrogen bomb test, Castle Koon.
20 While fusion hawks like Teller and Strauss led the push to turn weaponry into something to benefit mankind, even the scientists on the other side of the hydrogen bomb divide—those who opposed the development of the Super—pushed to turn nuclear knowledge into a boon for humanity. “I had a hand in formulating and popularizing that hope of peaceful potentials,” wrote the former AEC chairman (and Oppenheimer ally) David Lilienthal. “The basic cause, I think was a conviction, and one that I shared fully, and tried to inculcate in others, that somehow or other the discovery that had produced so terrible a weapon simply had to have an important peaceful use.”
21 Taylor had less peaceful uses in mind, too. The neutrons generated by an exploding fusion bomb buried under the ice could generate oodles of tritium; such a bomb exploded over a blanket of uranium could manufacture all the plutonium that the defense industry could possibly need.
22 He would not be the last, nor would Castle Bravo be the only fusion “oops.” When the Soviets detonated their first Ulam-Teller-type device in 1955, a temperature inversion in the atmosphere reflected the shockwave back to the ground, causing a tremendous amount of damage. A Russian soldier died when his trench collapsed, and in a nearby settlement a two-year-old girl, who had been playing with blocks, was killed when the shockwave smashed the bomb shelter she was in.
23 Despite the bad press, some scientists involved with the project were glib. A month after the accident they dubbed a draft plan to return the evacuated islanders to their home Project Hardy, as in Thomas Hardy, who wrote The Return of the Native.