Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  On the morning of 11 August the troops were raised around 3 a.m. and stood to arms until after daybreak when it was confirmed there was no sign of a French attack. The army remained around Leiria until the morning of the 14th when after a cold, foggy start the warm weather quickly turned into a hot, dry day with copious amounts of dust covering everyone. Staying close to the coast, the army advanced to Alcobaça where the first contact with the French under Delaborde occurred. The Allied army then moved on to Caldas da Rainha on the 15th. The next day, at Óbidos, Landmann describes his Engineers’ training kicking in.

  My first object was to reconnoitre the whole of the surrounding country [around Óbidos]. Having quickly inspected the ground to the west, I crossed the valley to the eastward of the town … where there is a good road … which I suspected might join … the more direct road to Lisbon which is by Roliça. Having questioned several of the country people … they confirmed my conjecture.5

  He then rode back to Óbidos to brief General Fane, reporting that the French could be clearly seen on the heights of Columbeira. Although Landmann recounts as his own idea the decision to reconnoitre in front of the advancing army, it is more likely that such activity was being ordered by Wellesley and co-ordinated through Elphinstone.

  On the morning of 17 August, Landmann was back in the Moorish tower at Óbidos watching the French ‘with my famous three-feet telescope, by Watson’6 when Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived. Landmann’s account has him passing his telescope to Wellesley and then briefing him on the terrain based on his reconnaissance the day before. Five engineer officers were present at the first battle of the war at Roliça on 17 August 1808. They were Elphinstone in command, Captain Landmann and Lieutenants English, Mulcaster and Wells. Landmann was with the flanking force under General Fane and Elphinstone remained with Wellesley. Late in the day, Elphinstone was wounded, a musket ball shattering his lower jaw. Landmann related that Elphinstone was watching the assault of the 29th Regiment at Columbeira through his telescope when he was hit, the shock knocking him from his mule. ‘He was raised by Lieutenant Mulcaster’7 and Elphinstone described, as he retired, ‘a second ball did me the favour to graze my thigh – a third saluted me on the rump’.8 Landmann lost no time in personally visiting Wellesley at headquarters and writing to the Board of Ordnance reporting he was now the Commanding Royal Engineer, but could not find the time to visit the injured Elphinstone until the following day. He reported the action as follows:

  I have to report that yesterday the army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, proceeded from Óbidos, and engaged the French troops under the command of General La Port [sic], who had taken a very strong post in the mountains we now occupy, which we carried after a very severe action of about four hours – It is with the deepest regret that I have to say that Captain Elphinstone was severely wounded by a musquet ball in the face, the surgeons report is very favourable, and I hope he will be again able to take the command, although I fear it may be some time. I was unfortunately not able to see him myself, as we had advanced too far before I heard of the accident. Lieutenant Mulcaster was with Captain Elphinstone at the time, and has seen him last night who says he was in good spirits, and well taken care of in a small village about three miles in the rear of our present situation. I am happy to add that all the other officers of the corps have escaped unhurt.9

  The Allied army now moved south to Vimeiro to cover the landing of Acland and Anstruther’s brigades. Junot, realising that any chance of success would diminish once these troops were ashore, attacked on the morning of 21 August. Although Sir Harry Burrard had arrived in Maceira Bay to take over command, he had not yet landed and Wellesley was able to retain command during the battle. During the battle, Landmann described the situation around Wellington who was ignoring the French skirmishers shooting at him, causing much anxiety to the young engineer Lieutenant Edmund Mulcaster. After the second time that Mulcaster brought the situation to Wellington’s attention, he was ordered to chase them away, which he promptly carried out with the assistance of some orderly dragoons.

  Landmann’s report on Vimeiro was short and to the point:

  I have the honour to report to you that a little after eight o’clock this morning we were attacked by a large force of the enemy said to be about sixteen thousand under the command of General Junot. We obtained a complete victory by 12 o’clock, the enemy having left in the field about 15 pieces of ordnance and a great quantity of ammunition. It is with great regret that I have to report that Lieutenant Wells is missing. I have no doubt of his being a prisoner, for had he been killed or wounded we should have found him, as the field of battle remained in our hands. The last accounts I had of the state of Captain Elphinstone’s wounds were very favourable, and I expect him to be able to return to duty in about a month.10

  There may have been a practical reason why his report was so short. He recorded in his book that it was written in the rain, under an umbrella picked up on the battlefield. Lieutenant Wells had been assigned to General Acland’s brigade and was asked to ride to a unit of Portuguese cavalry to give them orders. Being short-sighted, he got lost and mistook a group of French staff for his intended target, whereupon he was made prisoner. Wells was then taken to Junot and spent the remainder of the battle with the French commander. He remained a prisoner until he was released as part of the terms of the Convention of Cintra.11

  Captain Richard Fletcher RE had arrived with Sir Harry Burrard on the eve of Vimeiro but neither got ashore until after the battle. Burrard replaced Wellesley as commander of the army and Fletcher took command of the Royal Engineers. Fletcher, because he was not present at the battle, allowed Landmann the honour of reporting to the Board of Ordnance the victories of Roliça and Vimeiro to the Board of Ordnance.

  Elphinstone had held the position of CRE for sixteen days and Landmann for a mere four days. Elphinstone showed his character very early with his annoyance when he discovered a French émigré engineer, Captain Preval, was on board HMS Crocodile with Wellesley and who quite rightly, being his senior, would not accept Elphinstone’s authority. Preval, who was under the command of the Royal Engineers, had been sent out to Lisbon in advance of the main force to evaluate the situation there. Wellington sought his advice when he briefly visited the city and took him on board before returning to Mondego Bay. Elphinstone lost no time writing home reporting the situation and also complained to his wife that it was very ‘shabby’ that Fletcher had been sent out above him. Elphinstone’s reason for requesting leave to go home was more about his injured pride rather than his injured chin.

  Issues around seniority were a constant theme for engineer officers in the Peninsula. The senior officer of engineers at any location or an officer acting on his own was entitled to claim the title of Commanding Royal Engineer. This could lead to a greater chance of recognition in dispatches and the potential for brevet promotion in the army lists. Apart from the kudos of commanding, positions of authority also came with increased pay and allowances. This additional pay was significant. Fletcher noted the award of 5s [shillings] per diem command pay in 1808.12 A captain’s daily pay was 11s, in this case doubled to 22s as engineers received double pay when on active service to help cover their additional costs.13 Before Fletcher left England in July 1808, he wrote to his superiors at the Board of Ordnance asking for clarification on his role. He pointed out that Colonel Harding was likely to be appointed to command the Royal Artillery and would be a senior Ordnance officer. He asked for clarification that he would command the engineers with the Army and that this would also be independent of the engineering command at Gibraltar.14 Fletcher received the confirmation of his appointment as CRE in Spain and Portugal in early September 1808.15

  Why was Richard Fletcher selected for this very important role? This was the biggest expedition organised by the British Army for many years. At first glance the decision seemed odd. Fletcher’s seniority in the Corps was a lowly 24th out of 143. However, when you go through his superiors a
nd strike off those holding senior posts at Ordnance headquarters, those commanding major stations in the UK, those commanding stations abroad, the choice came down to two officers, Robert D’Arcy and Richard Fletcher, with three less likely possibilities (Alexander Bryce, Augustus De Butts and John Rowley). It looks likely that Fletcher was selected as he had the most recent field experience. D’Arcy went on the ill-fated Walcheren campaign in 1809 where he narrowly avoided a court-martial for insubordination but was still offered a baronetcy, something Fletcher did not get until the end of 1812! It should also be noted that some of Fletcher’s superiors were VERY old, with several being over 60. Fletcher was a sprightly 40 years young. It also says something about his views on his duty that despite having lost his wife a few weeks earlier, he left his six children in the care of relatives to go on this expedition.16

  The day after the Battle of Vimeiro, the French asked for a ceasefire to discuss terms for their evacuation of Portugal. These negotiations led to the unpopular Convention of Cintra where the French and their ‘personal possessions’ (in many cases including items stolen from Portugal) were transported home in British ships with no restrictions on the troops serving again. Following widespread outrage at home and in Portugal, the Allied commanders Dalrymple and Burrard, along with Wellesley, were recalled for an inquiry with Sir John Moore taking over command of the Allied army. Under the terms of the Convention, the French troops started to embark at the beginning of September 1808 and Fletcher was assigning his officers to various tasks. These included:

  • Trying to obtain maps and plans from the Portuguese archives before the French removed them.

  • Ordering plans to be made of the defences at Lisbon and St Julian to the south of Lisbon, St Julian being a possible point of embarkation.

  • John Burgoyne ordered to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo to report on the defences.

  • John Squire assigned to General Hope’s division that was marching to Elvas to take control of it from the French.

  • George Landmann ordered to survey Peniche as a place of defence and possibly for embarkation.

  • Peter Patton being ordered to review the defences at Setuval, south of Lisbon, that was also being considered as a point of embarkation for the army.

  • Edmund Mulcaster being ordered to survey the Tagus at Villa Velha and Abrantes for possible crossing-points.

  In addition Moore had ordered Lieutenant Boothby RE to the Portuguese frontier fortress of Elvas with the party sent to demand the surrender of the French garrison under the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Leading this group was John Colborne who was required to make three journeys between Lisbon and Elvas. At first, the terms were challenged by the French garrison and then the Spanish refused to let the French garrison leave. Boothby took the opportunity to review the defences and look for plans whilst at the fortress.

  In early October 1808, the first reports on the roads and rivers were being returned, with details of the routes from Lisbon to Almeida and Abrantes being some of the first received. This was the start of a mapping exercise that would be carried out by Staff Corps, Engineer and QMG’s staff continually to the end of the war. The targets of these surveys quickly spread with reconnaissance in the Alentejo and south of the Tagus towards Setubal.

  Advance of Moore’s Force

  Sir John Moore was officially confirmed as commander of the Allied forces on 7 October 1808 and immediately started considering how best to support the Spanish armies, an operation that was expected by both the British and Spanish governments. On the 8th, Fletcher reported home that orders had been issued for the advance of Sir John Moore’s army into Spain and most of the engineers would accompany it. Much to their disappointment, Captain Patton and Lieutenants Williams, Stanway and Forster were ordered to remain in Lisbon.17 Captain Landmann also remained in Lisbon as technically he was part of the Gibraltar garrison and not attached to the army in Portugal. Landmann appeared entirely happy with this arrangement. He always seemed to find a way of not coming under the direct control of any of his seniors, a situation that he used to his advantage throughout the war.

  Fletcher’s attention turned to how to move the engineer stores with the army, a task that proved nearly impossible due to the shortage of transport. He expected the Ordnance store ships would move to Corunna or Grijon and, writing home on 22 October, he reported that he could only obtain transport for entrenching tools for 1,000 men.18 The Army was in a very similar position, with transport only for the most basic supplies.

  Moore’s army started its advance from Lisbon on 18 October although the General did not leave Lisbon until the 27th. Fletcher left Lisbon on the 26th, although other engineers were already moving ahead of the army surveying the various routes, e.g. on 1 November, Lieutenant Wells wrote a report on the road from Almaraz to Salamanca.19 On the same day Fletcher reported that the army was moving to Abrantes and the route from there would depend on the reports that were coming in. However, one important decision had been made, based on inaccurate information on the state of the roads. Burrard had come to the conclusion that the artillery could not follow the route of the army to Ciudad Rodrigo through Coimbra and Almeida and planned to send the artillery via Elvas. Moore came to the same conclusion and made the dangerous decision to split his forces. He sent his artillery protected by Hope’s division, by the main road through Elvas to Almaraz and then north.20 This led to several days’ delay at Salamanca whilst Moore waited for his forces to concentrate. If time had not been so critical and Moore could have justified delaying his advance for a couple of weeks, he would have been in possession of accurate reports on the roads and he would have had more confidence that the artillery could have moved with the army via Coimbra and Ciudad Rodrigo. Having said that, the early surveys by engineer officers warned of the difficulties of moving artillery over the route. John Burgoyne described the roads in the first part of the journey from Lisbon to Coimbra as ‘good’ and ‘frequently extremely fine’. He then reported that they deteriorated:

  from Coimbra [towards Almeida] the road is very bad, steep and narrow, and in its present state not practicable for artillery, the country carts do pass it, but with much difficulty that they can scarcely get from Coimbra over the mountains 10 miles in a whole day; from the foot of the mountains the road is bad but passable for carriages.21

  Fletcher also noted that the few light guns travelling with General Hill ‘will find many difficulties as the roads are said to be almost impassable for carriages of any description’.22 Whilst it may have been possible to move the artillery by the more northerly route, with winter approaching and an inexperienced army and commissariat the decision to send the artillery by the best road may have been the correct one.

  Moore arrived in Salamanca on 13 November with Fletcher arriving on the 15th. Moore now waited for his forces to concentrate, most of his infantry arriving by the 23rd, but his artillery did not arrive until early December. He was also waiting for a further 16,000 troops under Sir David Baird which had arrived at Corunna on 13 October but could not get permission to land until the local Junta had received approval from Madrid. Baird finally concentrated his troops at Astorga by 22 November, but by then Moore had decided to retreat and Baird was instructed to head for Vigo to re-embark.

  Fletcher, whilst stationed at Salamanca, continued to receive reports from engineer officers on the state of the various roads. This extract from one of Fletcher’s reports indicates the type of activity underway:

  I have now sent Captain Burgoyne and Lieutenant Meineke, to reconnoitre the province of Avila, its roads, rivers, bridges etc and Lieutenant Boteler is gone from hence to Zamora, and … will proceed up the Douro as far as he can with safety, to examine that river and the roads leading to and from it. Lieut. Wells arrived this morning, from Elvas, by way of Badajoz, Merida, Truxillo, Almaraz and Plasencia, and he is going on towards Madrid, to meet the head of Lieut.-Gen Hope’s column, and report on the country he has passed through.23

  When he
arrived at Avila, Burgoyne heard that General Hope with the cavalry and artillery were at Madrid and, taking the initiative, rode overnight, arriving on 21 November. Burgoyne then worked with Hope’s Quarter Master-General, De Lancey, to plan the route for the artillery over the Guadarrama mountains and on towards Salamanca.24 Lieutenant Meineke, who travelled with Burgoyne, wrote two detailed reports on the route for Fletcher. Whilst Fletcher makes no reference to receiving direct orders from Moore, he was building a detailed picture of the operational environment whether it was ordered or not. Officers had realised very quickly that most of the maps had serious errors. The engineer John Squire remarked:

  All the maps of Portugal, particularly in this part of the country, are extremely incorrect, Faden’s last map … is as bad as any of them. The Carta Militar published at Lisbon can never be depended upon. To form a good judgement, it is necessary to actually visit every part of the frontier.25

  The activities of the engineer officers over the last three months now meant that the British had detailed descriptions of the area around Lisbon and the three main routes from Lisbon to Elvas, Castello Branco and Coimbra and the routes into Spain via Badajoz to Madrid and Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca. There were also reports of the condition of the four border fortresses. We will leave Moore at this time and look at what had been happening in the north of Spain.

  Military Liaison in the North of Spain between the British and Spanish

  Whilst the main engineering activity was concentrated around the British army in Portugal, a completely separate activity was underway further north. Following the Spanish risings against the French occupation in mid-1808, a number of emissaries had been sent to London to request support from the British government. In the absence of a central Spanish government, which was not formed until late September 1808, in June the British government ordered out a number of military agents ‘acquainted with the Spanish Language’26 to liaise with the Spanish provinces and report on the situation.27 These officers initially arrived in the northern provinces of Asturias and Galicia and then, with more enthusiasm than good sense, encouraged the Spanish into uncoordinated actions against the French with vague promises of British help. They also wrote a stream of misleading reports to the British government, which rapidly regretted these appointments. On 29 August, Canning (Foreign Secretary) wrote to Castlereagh (Secretary of State for War and the Colonies) expressing horror at what Colonel Doyle was promising the Spanish authorities: