Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  Nothing can be more unlucky than the orders which Colonel Doyle has given [to prepare accommodation at Corunna in expectation of the arrival of a British force] … as it appears to excite expectations which will be disappointed, and the disappointment of which may lead to disasters of great extent.28

  Realising that the situation in northern Spain needed better control, Generals Leith and Broderick were dispatched in August to Santander and Corunna respectively. Four officers from the Royal Engineers were also appointed under the command of General Leith. These were Captains Charles Lefebure, John Francis Birch, Charles William Pasley and John Thomas Jones. General Leith set out on 17 August, arriving in Santander on the 23rd. Castlereagh’s detailed instructions to Leith were delivered by Lefebure when he and John Jones joined him at Oviedo: ‘This letter will be delivered to you by Captain Lefebure whose talents as an engineer will be of much use in accelerating the survey of the military line of the Asturias and the principality of Santander.’29

  The engineers’ orders were to carry out surveys of the northern provinces and report on the state of the Spanish forces. This seems like the same brief that was originally given to the first group of military agents who were now running almost out of control. The main difference was that the engineer officers were clearly under military control.

  Leith-Hay, in his Narrative of the Peninsular War,30 responded to what he felt was unjustified criticism by Napier describing the engineer officers as follows: ‘That, in point of zeal, intelligence, military knowledge, or sound judgement, four more distinguished persons could not have been selected from any army … these officers were active and zealous, constantly moving from one point to another.’ Leith-Hay, who was present as ADC to General Leith, went on to remark that finding suitably-qualified persons in the British Army at this time would have been difficult due to the state of practical knowledge (or more precisely, the lack of practical knowledge).31 Leith-Hay’s defence of the engineer officers was unnecessary, as Napier’s criticism was almost certainly directed at the originally appointed military agents Doyle, Dyer, Roche, Whittingham and Patrick.

  Pasley, who was waiting to sail with Sir David Baird’s force, received orders directly from Castlereagh on 30 August to proceed to Gijon ‘on a particular service’ and set off immediately for Portsmouth, reporting two days later that the fleet was ready to sail as soon as the ‘dollars’ arrived.32 The dollars were of course the funds that the British government were sending out to support the Spanish revolt. Pasley joined General Leith at Oviedo on 11 September.33

  Through the early part of September the engineer officers, Lefebure, Jones and Pasley, stayed close to General Leith as he moved between Oviedo, Gijon and Santander.34 On 20 September, the Spanish under Blake pushed the French out of Bilbao and Lefebure and Jones moved into the town to liaise with the local authorities. At the same time, Pasley was ordered to carry out a survey of the Asturian mountains and Birch was ordered to join the Spanish Army of the Centre under Castaños to report on his intentions and the condition of his army. The French, stung into activity by the advance of the Spanish, regrouped and started closing in on Bilbao. On 26 September, Lefebure and Jones carried out a forward reconnaissance35 and found the French under Marshal Ney advancing on the town, necessitating a rapid withdrawal by the Spanish and the loss of Jones’ baggage.

  General Leith, who was present when the French marched back into Bilbao, then went inland to Frias, accompanied by Jones, where he expected to find General Blake. He eventually found him at Lastras de la Torre and having discussed the situation with him, Leith, returned to Santander. Leith-Hay, who was with General Leith, expressed surprise at the lack of knowledge Blake had of the location and movements of the French.36 Meanwhile Pasley had returned from his survey of the Asturian mountains on 30 September, writing a detailed report for General Leith and also later copying it to General Sir David Baird.37

  There was now a lull in Spanish activity as their generals and juntas discussed the next steps. Agreements had been made to form three armies: the Army of the Left under Blake around Bilbao and Valmaseda; the Army of the Centre under Pignatelli around Logrono; and the Army of the Right under Castaños between Logrono and Tudela. Another force, mainly levies under Palafox, were around Zaragossa.38 Lefebure wrote an update for the Board of Ordnance on 7 September:

  I lay before you a letter from Captain Pasley, in the hope that you will be pleased to find that the officers of your corps are gaining the good wishes of the generals on the spot. General Leith’s statements to Lord Castlereagh are all very flattering to each and every engineer with this mission.39

  On 8 October, the Spanish army received some welcome news when HMS Defence arrived at Bilbao with a convoy carrying 9,000 Spanish troops that had been serving in northern Europe with the French.40 They had been secretly embarked from Nyborg in Denmark. Unfortunately for them, their commander, General Romana, had travelled separately via London and Corunna. Pasley, commenting on the event, wrote:

  I have been here since I wrote you last with Major-General Leith, and have been witness to the happy return of the Spanish army of the north to their country, who are very fine looking and well-disciplined troops. The greatest part is still here either waiting orders from Madrid or the arrival of their general, the Marquis de la Romana. At present they are commanded by the Conde de San Roman, who is a fine soldier-like man. On his arrival he gave out a very impressive order to his troops which was read at the head of each regiment on King Ferdinand’s birthday; A Major of one of the regiments who was reading it was so much affected that he could not proceed. They all seem full of ardour and patriotism and their presence will inspire confidence whatever army they may join.41

  Blake, taking full advantage of his unexpected reinforcements, advanced on Bilbao, pushing the French out again on 11 October.42 He then settled into a period of inactivity that allowed the French to regroup and to absorb the large reinforcements that were pouring over the Pyrenees. Jones noted with great satisfaction that the personal possessions that he had lost when the French retook Bilbao on 29 September had been hidden by the Spanish and were returned to him when he went back to his billet.

  On 13 October, around 16,000 reinforcements under Sir David Baird arrived at Corunna. Travelling with Baird was Captain James Carmichael-Smyth RE. The junta at Corunna would not let Baird land without permission from the Central Junta at Madrid. Riders were sent for their approval, which was received on the 22nd. Much to his displeasure, Baird was instructed to move his troops in small numbers to limit the impact on the local population. The landings began on 26 October but it was not complete until 13 November, on which day Baird set off for Astorga.43 Like his fellow generals, Baird had sent his engineers forward to reconnoitre the route to Astorga and to review the terrain around Villa Franca ‘with a view to its defence’.44

  On 21 October, Pasley wrote an update report for the Board of Ordnance in England. Jones, Lefebure and himself were at Santander with General Leith and Birch was attached to Blake’s army to report on its activities. He said that Lefebure had been ordered to go to Bilbao to assist in arming the inhabitants. Pasley went on to express concern on the state of the Spanish armies: ‘That great portion of the Spanish troops, being newly raised, imperfectly disciplined, and officered by peasants, so that you cannot reckon a Spanish army of 30,000 equal to more than a veteran army of 20,000 or less.’45 Similar sentiments were expressed by Jones: ‘The new regiments (I mean the armed and organised peasantry) have not sufficient confidence in themselves to contend with the French veterans, and it is to be doubted whether the men are under sufficient command to be kept together should the French follow up.’46

  Although working completely independently, it is interesting to note that the engineers serving under Leith in the north of Spain were corresponding with Fletcher who was with Moore’s army and we can assume that this information was passed on to Moore.47 Moore was expressing concern about the limited information he was receiving from L
eith on the activities of the various Spanish forces.

  Birch, who had been with Blake for some weeks, was ordered to join the Spanish Army of the Centre under Castaños and find out his intentions. Jones and Pasley were sent to replace him at Blake’s Headquarters. Birch, writing from Burgos in early November, described the formation of a Spanish grand strategy to outflank the French forces. He arrived at Castaños’ headquarters on 27 October and then travelled with him to Saragossa where they met Palafox:

  The result of which I understand from General Doyle was that the army of the centre should unite itself to the army of the right on the Aragon near Sanguesa … and that at the same time the army of the left should move along the mountains in the rear of the enemy and form a junction with the two others. General Blake had sent an officer to arrange his movements with General Castaños. He [Doyle] was present when the above measures were decided upon, and told me … that he had little doubt of their success, and hoped to … accompany General Castaños to carry to General Blake the notice of the time when the movements were to commence.48

  The British military agent Colonel Doyle, who was now using his new honorary Spanish rank of Major-General, claimed the idea for this strategy was his. Birch noted that Doyle was ‘on the most intimate footing’ with Palafox. Birch found the Spanish plans ‘very extraordinary’ and felt ‘the army of the left … would be exposed to entire destruction’, and said he planned to go to Blake ‘to take the liberty of explaining my sentiments’. Before Birch had an opportunity to do this and before the Spanish grand plan had commenced, their moment had passed.

  In late October the French reacted to Blake’s further advance. Although Napoleon had ordered that no action should be taken until he arrived, General Lefebvre decided to attack, pushing Blake out of Zornosa on 29 October. Jones, who was present at the battle, reported the action as follows:

  It was my fortune to be present in the action, and I have great pleasure in being able to state that the Spanish troops behaved with the greatest gallantry and the success of the French is to be attributed to their superiority in numbers and in artillery, and not at all to their superior courage – the ground having been disputed inch by inch – and when General Blake saw it was useless contending any longer, he took up a new position about two leagues in the rear of his former position, which was occupied with so much skill as to deter the enemy from renewing their attack that afternoon, in the night General Blake drew off all his forces and retreated towards Valmaseda – the retreat was conducted with so much order that no loss was sustained, and scarcely a musquet left behind.49

  Jones stayed with Blake for a few days after the action reporting on the situation and then returned to Santander. This repulse meant that Bilbao again became indefensible. Captain Lefebure, who had been sent to organise distribution of arms to the Spanish was ordered to send the supply ships back to Santander and then return there himself.50

  Meanwhile Blake, realising that some of his troops had been cut off by his retreat, pushed forward again on 5 November, allowing the stranded troops to rejoin him. For the next six days the French applied constant pressure on Blake, steadily pushing him back. Birch, who had rejoined Blake’s army, was wounded in a skirmish on the 7th and was shipped out to Corunna.

  Despite the best efforts of General Leith, the situation with the Spanish armies remained unclear. Conflicting reports continued to be circulated. Pasley, writing on 7 November, described as ‘absurd’ the report dated 3 November from the British Military Agent, Captain Caroll, saying that Blake had been cut off after the battle at Zornosa on 29 October.51 Four days later Pasley wrote:

  You will recollect my mentioning that we had very desponding accounts from Captain Carroll, who by letter to Gen Leith dated the 3rd instant from Headquarters expressed his fears that the army would be cut off – What grounds he went upon he did not state but the next thing we heard from him was the account of a splendid victory … This morning a dispatch arrived from General Blake who notwithstanding all these favourable accounts it appears has retreated from Valmaseda.52

  Moore, who was in the vicinity of Salamanca, needed clear information on the state and intentions of the Spanish armies if he was to have any chance of making a successful strike against the French. This he was not getting. On 16 November, Moore wrote to John Hookham Frere, British Ambassador to the newly-formed Spanish Central Junta, as follows:

  Officers employed to correspond, … might have been useful before you or I were sent to Spain … but I … disapprove of any person being authorized to correspond officially with Government but you and me … my wish is to overset the whole system; to send them with their Spanish rank to England, and to send, as they may occasionally be wanted … officers … who will look to no rank or emolument but from their own country, in whose duty they should consider themselves employed.53

  Moore clearly had a problem with the British agents being awarded Spanish commissions and the potential conflict of interest that it created. Doyle had been given the honorary Spanish rank of major-general and Caroll was made a lieutenant-colonel.

  With Moore arriving in Salamanca and being able to communicate directly with the Central Junta and with the Spanish commanders, the need for a separate military authority in northern Spain came to an end. This seemed to be recognised by both Moore and Leith. Writing on 17 November, Jones, who was still with Leith, reported that Lefebure had been sent to Moore to deliver dispatches and to provide any further information requested. He also reported that Pasley had been sent to join Sir David Baird’s force. Jones then returned to Santander to remove any remaining British money and provisions.54 His final task (according to himself) before winding up his military adventures was to return to Corunna and take charge of a delivery of 100,000 dollars for General Romana. Jones recounts leading his forty-mule convoy against the flow of troops heading for Corunna before being dispersed in the disorder at Astorga. He wrote that half was handed over to the British commissary ‘without receipt or acknowledgement’. The other half was thought to be lost but was handed back by the Spaniard in charge of it after the Battle of Vitoria in 1813. The whole story seems implausible if it were not mentioned in a letter to the Board of Ordnance by Pasley.55

  On 19 November, Moore wrote to John Hookham Frere complaining that he had received no correspondence from Leith ‘who is employed with that army to correspond’. He went on to say that as he had a shortage of general officers, he had ordered Leith to join Baird at Astorga.56 Moore’s complaint about the lack of communication from Leith was resolved soon after when Lefebure arrived at Moore’s headquarters to brief him.57 Leith had clearly realised his role in northern Spain had come to an end. At the same time that he ordered Lefebure to Moore’s headquarters, he added Jones to his staff as an extra ADC and dispatched Pasley to Astorga. There, Pasley briefed General Craufurd and passed over a dispatch to be sent to Moore at Salamanca (probably a duplicate of the information that Lefebure was delivering in person). Baird then kept Pasley on his staff on account of his knowledge of Spanish. Pasley later transferred on to Moore’s staff for the same reason.

  The role of these four engineer officers during the period from September to November 1808 showed their flexibility. Whilst their initial brief was to carry out surveys of the northern Spanish regions, this turned out to be a minimal part of their work. Their primary task was liaison with Spanish military and civilian bodies and accurate evaluation and reporting of the rapidly changing situation. They also became heavily involved in the distribution of arms, supplies and money to the Spanish.

  Moore’s Retreat and Corunna

  Moore, having arrived at Salamanca on 13 November 1808, now started receiving reports of the reverses suffered by the Spanish armies and also the advance of the French as far as Valladolid, which would threaten his plans to join with Baird. When Moore heard on 29 November of Castaños’ defeat at Tudela, he felt he had no choice but to order a retreat to Lisbon. He urgently needed good intelligence of the position of the
advancing French. Amongst others, engineer officers were employed to probe for the French forces. Lieutenant Charles Boothby noted in his diary that he set off on 30 November to reconnoitre north-east towards Valladolid. That morning they met a Spaniard carrying a French requisition for rations and a proclamation from the French announcing the defeat of Castaños. He continued out in advance for some days before joining General Paget at Villapando on 17 December 1808.58

  In the first days of December Moore had communications from Castaños informing him that he was reforming his army, and from Stuart and Hookham Frere, who were both strongly against Moore’s retreat. Also Moore finally met up with his artillery on 4 December at Alba de Tormes. The claims that the Spanish intended to defend Madrid swayed Moore to make one last effort on their behalf. He recalled Baird to Astorga and then planned a move north to Zamora and Toro. Even whilst cautiously moving forward, Moore made plans and arranged depots in case a retreat was needed. Corunna and Vigo were being considered as likely points of retreat. On 14 December, he learned from a captured French dispatch, that Soult was unsupported and moved his forces against him. Lieutenant Charles Boothby RE, who was attached to the reserve under Paget, excitedly reported on 19 December ‘Sir John [Moore] dines with General Paget, Battle is the word!’.59 Two days later, Paget’s cavalry surprised and dispersed the French cavalry at Sahagun. Three days later, when about to launch his offensive against Soult, Moore received information that Napoleon was advancing north to cut off his retreat.