Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  A more contentious issue is the view expressed at the time that the 5th Division had not tried very hard. Oman called this a ‘monstrous injustice’ writing ‘everything that mismanagement could accomplish had been done to discourage them’.50 He quoted statements from Frazer and Larpent (Judge Advocate General and part of Wellington’s headquarters) who are generally respected commentators, but pointed out that neither was present at the assault. Burgoyne, recognised by Oman as one of the authorities on the siege, also recorded that the officers ‘could not get the men to follow them’.51 Jones wrote that the attack was not pressed energetically, but finished cryptically by noting although many officers thought so, it could not be true as the ‘highest authority’, Graham, had stated in his dispatch that the troops had done their best.52 One authority not used by Oman was Lieutenant Harry Jones RE, who led the column to the main breach and was captured there after being wounded. He commented:

  Finding the descent [from the breach into the town] too great on the inside, I returned for the ladders … but upon reaching the foot of the breach everybody was running back with their heads between their legs as hard as they could. At the foot I waited, expecting them to rally and come on immediately, which not being the case, the enemy’s Grenadiers jumped into the breach sword in hand and made prisoners all who were able to crawl.53

  Oman’s comment about the mismanagement has some validity, but this, sadly, was true of every other siege and the troops usually did their best despite the mismanagement of their superiors. Whether the criticism of the 5th Division was fair or not, this was a view held at the time and Wellington was clearly concerned enough to ask for volunteers from the other divisions, which the 5th Division took as a clear insult.

  A figure that appears to have generated much of the criticism of the engineers was Lieutenant-Colonel William Gomm, who was with the Quarter Master-General’s department attached to the 5th Division and also an officer of the 9th Foot, one of the regiments involved in the failed assault. Gomm’s criticisms are extensively used by Oman, Fortescue and Myatt with variants of:

  The successes [at Ciudad Rodrigo and the third siege of Badajoz were] … owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops has checked the progress of science among our engineers … the artillery have become as summary in their proceedings as our engineers … providing they can make a hole in the wall … they care not about destroying its defences.54

  Of the above writers, only Fortescue uses the portion of Gomm’s letter that reads: ‘had we … attended to the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo or of [the third siege of] Badajoz it is possible we should have taken neither’. Gomm appeared to recognise that the sieges were being undertaken using methods that were not typical, and commented in the same letter that in his opinion there were sufficient resources to attack according to the normal rules of siege warfare. This was clearly not a view shared by Wellington, the artillery officers or the engineers. Gomm’s scathing comments continue in his subsequent letters with phrases such as: ‘escaping from the hands of those Philistines, the engineers’ and ‘when we commence [the siege] again, I dare say we shall do it a little less en charlatan and more en regle’.55 In this same letter he also notes that ‘the enemy made a sortie this morning upon our lines, and, as we did not expect them, gave us more trouble than was necessary’. Perhaps the army officers should have been paying more attention to their own duties before criticising other branches of the military. Gomm was not untypical of the ambitious, confident officer who had a view on everything, which sometimes did not match the views of their superiors or the actual circumstances. A number of the engineer officers would also fall into this category from their private letters.56 They may be entertaining to read but that does not make them accurate. It is a little more surprising that Gomm is so outspoken about scientific soldiers, because he was one of them, having attended the Royal Military College in 1805. It is possible that there was an element of professional jealousy in his opinions.

  One final puzzling fact from the first siege of San Sebastian is the complete lack of comment on the presence of a large body of the Royal Sappers and Miners for the first time. Connolly’s history of the corps details their efforts in the siege and the assault,57 but there is no mention of them by either engineer or army officers

  Roncesvalles and Sorauren

  Soult was determined to try and relieve the invested French fortresses. On 25 July, the same day as the first assault on San Sebastian, he launched two attacks on the Allied positions at Maya and Roncesvalles. Although the 3rd and 4th Divisions were initially surprised and pushed back, the Allies regrouped and then held their ground over the next few days until Soult realised that his attack had failed. He had got within a few miles of Pamplona but could not break through. Lieutenant Wright RE, who was with the Allied troops, reported trying to warn General Byng, brigade commander in the 2nd Division, of the danger to his left flank ‘but in vain; I had not an opportunity of doing so to General Hill until the day it happened. General Hill then became very anxious about that point, but before any order could be sent the attack took place’. Wright remained with Hill until 28 July, working on repairing roads in the area and then asked for permission to return to San Sebastian. Hill ordered Wright to stay and later he was ordered to fortify the ground around Roncesvalles. He remarked ‘I have never had so much work in my life.’58 Wellington realised that Soult’s attack had nearly succeeded and, writing to Fletcher, said: ‘A great deal can be done to strengthen the positions on the right; but engineer officers and intrenching [sic] tools will be required. I beg to know where the field equipments [sic] of intrenching tools are, and what officers can be sent on this service, without loss of time.’59

  In the period between the two sieges, whilst the Allies waited for new supplies of ammunition to arrive, Wellington made use of the pause by ordering an engineer officer to the port of Guetaria, as he wanted to provide the maximum number of safe anchorages for Allied shipping, particularly as winter was approaching. He asked for an investigation into ‘the time and expense would be required to construct wells’ as well as an estimate of the size of the garrison required. If wells could not be dug, then water would need to be supplied in casks. Captain Stanway was given this task and Graham reported back to Wellington on 14 August that Stanway thought ‘the making of the wells would be tedious’.60 The following day, after receiving an update from Beresford, Wellington gave up on the idea and ordered the engineers to destroy the place.

  The Second Siege of San Sebastian

  Whilst Wellington was busy repelling Soult’s attacks at the end of July, Graham remained at San Sebastian with sufficient troops to maintain the blockade and keep the French from recovering any of the ground that had been taken. It was not possible to stop them making repairs in the town but there was only a limited amount that they could achieve.

  Timeline for the Second Siege of San Sebastian

  19 August 1813

  Supply ships arrive from England

  21 August 1813

  Remaining supply ships arrive from England

  24 August 1813

  Work on batteries resumes

  26 August 1813

  Guns open on fortress

  26 August 1813

  Island of Santa Clara seized on night of 26/27th

  31 August 1813

  Town stormed successfully, French retire to castle

  1 September 1813

  Bombardment starts on castle

  3 September 1813

  Governor refused second summons to surrender

  8 September 1813

  French surrender

  Following Wellington’s orders, the siege guns were returned to the transports until it was judged safe to land them again. Everything was on hold, waiting for the additional guns and ammunition from England. Four transports arrived on 19 August containing two full siege trains and a further full siege train arrived on the 21st. There was now sufficient roundshot to consider rest
arting the siege. For the first time in the Peninsular War, the Allied army had more heavy guns than it could use.

  All the guns were back in place and fifty-seven guns opened fire on the morning of 26 August. The plan, as mentioned above, was similar to that used in the first siege. The larger number of guns on the eastern attack would attempt to destroy the whole south-eastern corner of the fortress. There were fewer guns used on the attack on the left (isthmus) and they made poor progress due to the distance from the walls. Graham complained about this on the 26th and 28th,61 and Wellington ordered a new battery to be constructed. Frazer noted that ‘Wellington wisely ordered another and more advanced battery’.62 This battery had an immediate impact on the wall of the fortress when it opened fire.

  A false attack was made on the night of the 29th, to try to get the French to blow any mines they had placed in the defences of the town, but they were not taken in. By the next day, the damage caused by the batteries formed one continuous breach in the walls, and many of the guns were turned to attacking any remaining defensive armament, the intention being to assault the town the following morning at low tide.

  The assault was scheduled for 11 a.m. on 30 August. The situation with regard to the perceived lack of effort from the 5th Division in the first assault was resolved to no-one’s satisfaction. General Leith, who had returned as commander of the 5th Division on the 27th, refused to have the volunteers lead the assault and they were to be held in reserve, with the 5th Division making the attack. The attack started on time and once again the troops could not get through the breaches due to the fire and defences of the French. The volunteer reserves were also thrown in without effect. An attack was also made across the estuary by the Portuguese but they did not make any better progress. After about an hour, Graham gave the risky order for the siege guns to open fire and sweep the walls and defences of the town over the heads of the attacking troops. Twenty minutes later, when the guns ceased firing, the assault had finally made some progress with the French retreating into the castle. By 2 p.m., the town was in Allied hands, but it was also in ruins and large parts of it were on fire due to the shelling. Following what was now becoming the norm, many of the troops dispersed in an orgy of looting and destruction that took two full days to settle down. During this period, Graham and Wellington were genuinely concerned that if the French made a sortie from the castle, the Allies would be hard-pressed to hold the town. Fortunately, the French were in no fit state to do so.

  The Allied guns were now turned on the castle. Beginning on 1 September, they bombarded it for the next six days during which time fires continued to rage through the town. The French governor, Rey, refused another summons on the 3rd, and new batteries were prepared to attack the castle. At 10 a.m. on 8 September, fifty-six guns opened on the castle, which had no shelters for the French or their prisoners. Rey finally accepted the inevitable and raised the white flag around noon.

  Casualties during the siege and assault were high, with nearly 2,400 killed and wounded. Engineer casualties were three killed, including Fletcher, and three wounded, including Burgoyne,63 but his wound was not serious and he temporarily took command of the engineers.64 Across both sieges, of the eighteen engineer officers present, four were killed and seven were wounded. Captain Stanway was left to repair the fortress with a company of Royal Sappers and Miners, work continuing until six months after the end of the war.

  Analysis of the Second Siege of San Sebastian

  During both sieges, Wellington was again pushed for time due to the very real threat from Soult, who made two determined attempts to disrupt the siege and the blockade of Pamplona. There is no doubt that there would have been fewer casualties had San Sebastian been besieged according to the established rules, but, as Fletcher pointed out, this would have taken much longer. In both sieges, the time from opening fire to the assault on the town was five days, which only allowed the walls to be breached and did not allow sufficient time to destroy the defenders’ artillery and reduce the garrison both physically and morally. Ironically, Wellington had given orders to limit the amount of shellfire so as to reduce the damage to the town, with a consequent reduction in damage to the defenders. Unfortunately the town was pretty much destroyed by fire anyway and Wellington was accused by the Spanish of deliberately burning the town to the ground as a punishment for the Francophile tendencies of its population. Like the previous three sieges at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and Burgos, Wellington cut corners to reduce the time required due to external pressures. The impact of the time reduction was measured in the increase in casualties that occurred.

  The biggest single criticism of the siege concerned the strategy selected for the attack. It is inconceivable that Wellington was not aware of the risk and costs associated with the plan selected. He wanted the fortress taken quickly to avoid the very real chance that Soult would relieve it. Blaming the engineers for the plan is unreasonable since they were producing plans that met the requirements given to them by Wellington. With hindsight, it may have been better to go for the formal attack, as the twin sieges took nearly two months in total, but that was not known or expected when the first one began. However, the plan agreed by Wellington was to continue the same basic plan of attack for the second siege.65 The criticism of the engineers, and to a lesser extent the artillery, suggesting that they were indifferent to the casualties in the army, is unfair and ignores the fact that it was usually an engineer officer who was leading these desperate attacks and their casualties reflect this. The high casualties in the besieging army were caused by rushing the sieges and the responsibility for that rests with the commander. This was compounded on the first assault by it taking place before daylight, an action that Wellington had strongly discouraged.

  In terms of the operations of the engineers, both sieges were managed reasonably well. There were some problems with the use of short naval 24-pounders (accuracy), the supply of working parties and the distant positioning of some batteries, but nonetheless the breaches were still made very quickly. Neither assault would have been quicker if these events had not occurred, as there were other tasks that had to be completed before the assault could happen. The siege was under the control of Sir Thomas Graham, who corresponded with Wellington daily. In some of these letters, Wellington was personally critical of Fletcher and Dickson, particularly of their demands for working parties.66 Such criticism must have undermined the credibility of these officers with Graham. Wellington knew Dickson and Fletcher well, trusted them and had worked with them for a number of years, but Graham did not know them and such criticism must have affected his view of their competence. Graham had no experience of commanding at a major siege and his lack of experience cannot have helped the situation.

  The availability for the first time of significant numbers of troops from the Royal Sappers and Miners does not appear to have had any material effect. There is a surprising lack of comment on their presence by both engineer and army officers. Harry Jones makes one comment about the lack of training – ‘sappers and miners who have never seen a gabion made!’67 – but this is in a letter complaining about the number of engineer and sappers present at the siege, which is full of errors. Neither John Jones nor Burgoyne made any comment at the time, but it is telling that when Burgoyne was asked to carry out some mining activities between the sieges, he requested volunteers from the line regiments.68 Though most of the sappers present were troops who had been in the Peninsula for some time, the company that arrived on 15 August was the first to have been through Pasley’s School of Military Engineering. Unfortunately, the company did not initially live up to expectations. Writing several weeks later Burgoyne reported:

  On the subject of the Sappers, my complaint lies not to their want of ability but, I am sorry to say, to their irregularities and insubordination … Many of them, as individuals, showed ability, spirit and regularity as was highly useful and creditable. They commenced [the second siege of San Sebastian] however by such insubordination, almost amounting to
mutiny, and proved in many instances so little trustworthy, disappointing us in the execution of important services, that although many, and perhaps most of them, were very good men, we lost all confidence in them and did not therefore reap much benefit from their employment…. I have, since the siege, given the command of this company to Captain Pitts, an active officer who, having them with him, attached to repress their irregularities, and I fully expect that at the next siege they will render us good service and enable the Commanding Engineer to give a more favourable account of them than I feel myself justified doing on this occasion.69

  A few weeks later, Burgoyne was able to give a more positive report

  I send a further note from Pitts on the latest company from you. I learn from him that they are ‘excellent, able, useful and steady’, in short, he now has a good military view of them which was all they wanted and he is delighted with them.70

  The first assault on San Sebastian was a very poor attempt that was never going to succeed, mainly thanks to the bad planning on the day of the assault. The second assault on the town barely succeeded and could very easily have failed also. The pinpoint artillery fire during the second assault just tipped the edge in the attackers’ favour. It could easily have gone either way. Again, Wellington was lucky.

  The Death of Fletcher

  Wrottesley, the biographer of John Burgoyne, recounted a story that Wellington wanted to retain Burgoyne and that was why he did not recall Elphinstone from Lisbon after Fletcher’s death.71 I also think it is likely that Wellington was perfectly happy with Burgoyne commanding the Engineers and was in no hurry for Elphinstone to come up. On 10 September, Burgoyne sent his account of the siege direct to London saying ‘which I transmit to you direct to avoid any circuitous route by Lisbon through Lieutenant Colonel Elphinstone, which I trust will meet with your approbation’.72 Elphinstone would have been extremely unhappy about this. Fletcher had led the Royal Engineers for most of the war but he never managed to create any real sense of loyalty in his subordinates. John Jones wrote: