Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  Sir Richard Fletcher possessed in an unusual degree, the knowledge and accomplishments of a finished soldier … but these valuable qualities were … almost paralysed, by what in military language is called a deficiency of moral courage, or in other words, being too sensitive to the awful responsibility of risking human life, and being … distrustful of his own judgement to plan or direct any unusually bold or hazardous enterprise. He also had the military weakness of being far too honest and conscientious to support or advise any … undertaking of his chief, which his military judgement did not approve.73

  He went on to say he believed Wellington blamed Fletcher for the heavy casualties at the third siege of Badajoz due to him recommending a day’s delay in the assault. He also said that Fletcher was strongly opposed to the plan for the siege of San Sebastian and arguing against it further set Wellington against him. Elphinstone, not the most reliable of sources, writing in 1813 stated that three of the senior engineers ‘Goldfinch, Burgoyne and Boteler do not speak to Fletcher’,74 and Burgoyne, writing after Fletcher’s death, said: ‘Poor Sir Richard had no arrangement whatever, any system or improvement recommended to him, he would highly approve of, but never acted upon it.’75

  Burgoyne had not been mentioned in Wellington’s dispatch after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, an error which led to him not receiving brevet promotion, while two junior engineer officers did. In the nineteenth century there was nowhere to get news other than the official dispatches. If you were not mentioned then you had done nothing remarkable. Even worse in this case, two of Burgoyne’s juniors were mentioned, so people might have thought that Burgoyne was being deliberately snubbed due to some failure. It was corrected a few months later but Burgoyne was very angry about it.

  Whilst there was some criticism of Fletcher, I believe that Wellington was not unhappy with him. When compared with the way he treated the senior artillery officers during this period it is safe to assume that Wellington could have made life very difficult for Fletcher if he did not want him. Whilst not a dynamic leader, Fletcher showed great competence in coordinating the various wide-spread activities of his officers and managing the difficult boundary between the Army and the Ordnance. Wellington’s anger and frustration at the sieges clearly boiled over into highly critical letters home, but that is different from believing the engineer officers with him were at fault. As Wellington was to find out, Fletcher’s successor was not an improvement.

  Elphinstone arrived unannounced at headquarters at Vera on 13 October, ‘so that they were rather surprised at seeing me’ he said.76 The following day he dined with Wellington and wrote:

  The dinner went off exceedingly well and I now consider myself completely fixed. I therefore send you a list of articles for the canteen. I must keep a table, therefore it is nonsense buying trumpery articles. Indeed considering my pay and station it would be mean and paltry not to do so.

  Two days later, he wrote to his wife:

  The conduct of the officers of the Corps has been most gratifying to me, indeed Burgoyne wrote to me to say that if Wellington attempted to give him the command, upon his present commission, he would refuse it … My coming up will I fancy make some little bustle at Woolwich, as Ld W. has sent away two Lt. Col’s and put Dickens [sic – Dickson] in command upon his brevet rank over the heads of four senior officers in the country, all of whom are mean enough to remain and serve under him.77

  Elphinstone was of course referring to the ongoing controversy over the appointment of Dickson to command the artillery. Wellington had made life so difficult for Dickson’s superiors that one after another they had resigned. There were still artillery officers senior to Dickson in the Peninsula, but Wellington made sure they did not come anywhere near his army. Elphinstone half expected that he was going to receive the same treatment to allow Burgoyne to continue in command with Wellington’s forces.

  Howard Elphinstone, like Fletcher, had operational experience that equipped him for this role. The son of Admiral John Elphinstone, he had been commissioned in October 1793. His first active service was at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope in 1795 after which he served in India for the next five years. In 1801 he accompanied the division sent from India to Egypt under Sir David Baird, arriving in Egypt in August 1801 after which he returned to the UK serving at Plymouth. In 1806 Captain Elphinstone was attached to Lord Rosslyn and General Simcoe’s special mission to Portugal, to advise the Portuguese government on the defence of Lisbon. In early 1807 he accompanied Major-General Whitelocke to South America as Commanding Royal Engineer, but he never landed in South America, arriving after the expedition had failed. By the time he landed back in the UK he had spent a year on board the fleet. He was then assigned to command the proposed South American expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and when this was diverted to the Peninsula, he travelled with it.

  Clearly Elphinstone knew that his coming to HQ was not going to be universally welcomed. It is also clear where his priorities were. Most of his letters home during this period focus on getting the appropriate uniform, stable and canteen for an officer of his station. What is interesting is that there is almost no correspondence between Elphinstone and his subordinates, the Army and the Ordnance. Apart from his letters to his wife, it is as if he never existed. The few letters home are complaints about allowances, refusal to appoint a bridge master and engineer officers not getting medals when he thought they should (including himself). He even records being officially ‘encouraged’ to write home more but making it clear he had no intention of.

  The impact of the change of command quickly became apparent. Captain Stanway, who had been left to repair San Sebastian, wrote to Burgoyne two weeks after Elphinstone’s arrival saying: ‘I can get nothing from Colonel Elphinstone neither men nor authorities for the Alcades, so that I shall give it up as a hopeless job … If you have any interest with Col. E. pray get him to represent my want of men.’78 Other engineer officers were making similar comments: ‘Now that Sir Richard is dead we have found out his value and I fear we shall not soon see his place as ably filled.’79

  Elphinstone seemed to delight in fighting with everyone, including the Board of Ordnance, his fellow officers and even Wellington. Whilst there was friction between the generals and some Ordnance officers, there was generally a good working relationship between engineer officers and the senior commanders. One example is demonstrated by a request from Burgoyne to General Cole to write a testimonial for Lieutenant Pitts after the siege was completed. Cole responded:

  I enclose a letter you required respecting your friend Pitts … and have done it so as to appear as if it came from myself without the suggestion of others. Independent of my regard for Pitts, I shall feel great pleasure at all times in doing justice to a corps throughout the younger branches of which there is a spirit that no other corps I know of possesses to the same degree.80

  Actions on the French Border

  Whilst the siege of San Sebastian was still underway, Wellington was looking ahead to the next steps. Following Soult’s failed attacks at Maya, Roncesvalles and Sorauren, he considered pursuing the French straight across the Bidassoa. On 1 August 1813, Wellington asked Graham to bring up the pontoon train and prepare for the crossing of the Bidassoa.81 But he quickly went off the idea when he took stock of his losses and the condition of his troops and equipment. Explaining his decision to Bathurst, he wrote:

  It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs … that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be in Paris in a month … the enemy still possesses all the strongholds within Spain [the border fortresses] … Then in France … there are other strongholds … [The] army … is much deteriorated … the equipment, ammunition, shoes etc. require renewal. I entertain no doubt that I could tomorrow enter France and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no further.82

  Wellington realised that securing his current position should be his priority. Major Charles Smith RE was orde
red to Irun to make proposals for fortifying the place. Captain Todd RSC was similarly ordered to the area to survey the terrain. Wellington wrote to Graham on 15 August, in response to his recommendation to start a second line of defences behind the Bidassoa, remarking ‘we cannot make the position between Oyarzun and the Bidassoa too strong … no time should be lost in commencing the works’. On 21 August, Wellington wrote a detailed memo to Fletcher detailing the defensive works he wanted constructing around Irun. The first line would cover the site of the bridge at Irun through to the convent at San Marcial. It comprised three redoubts and ‘breastworks, abatis and musketry posts which the troops on the ground can construct’. Wellington said Captain Todd RSC would point out the locations. A second line would also be prepared overlooking the Bidassoa, which Major Smith RE could point out the locations for. Between Irun and Funterrabia, a third set of defences was to be constructed with a fourth set in the valley of the Bidassoa between Irun and Oyarzun.83 Wellington asked Fletcher to mark out the works and estimate the number of workers he would require. The following day Fletcher received a similarly detailed letter from George Murray, the QMG, confirming that the instructions were based on Wellington riding over part of the terrain with Captain Todd and also from the surveys carried out by Major Smith. Murray asked Fletcher if he could ride over the terrain and ‘exercise your judgement both as to the situation and the form of the works to be constructed’. He expressed the concern that this might not be possible owing to the wound Fletcher had recently received during the first assault at San Sebastian. Murray clarified the purpose of the defences in his final paragraph:

  Our first object by these works is present security, until we can get possession of San Sebastian and Pamplona, But besides that, we should look forward to rendering a part of our force disposable for operations more to the eastward, if necessary; also securing tranquillity in the winter and even to something of permanent utility to the Spanish frontier. Our offensive operations have turned out very well, but we have not yet such firm hold of our conquests as we ought to have.84

  Significant defensive works were also being constructed in the passes to the east. Lieutenant Pitts RE, who was present with the 4th Division during the French attacks at the end of July, was ordered to construct a number of redoubts and breastworks around Maya. Writing to Burgoyne on 25 August, he reported that Wellington had sent for him and asked him to make some changes to the defences that he had already completed.85 As mentioned earlier, Lieutenant Wright RE was ordered to construct similar defences at Roncesvalles. Work on improving the defences in this area continued through to October 1813.

  By the end of August, the Allied army’s situation had improved significantly. San Sebastian had finally fallen. A final desperate attack by Soult at San Marcial on the 31st failed, in part due to the substantial defensive works that had been prepared over the last few weeks. Pamplona still held out, but the Allies were getting information on its state of supplies and knew the fortress could not last much longer. Wellington was sure that the French were unable to breach his defences and could look to his next move.

  On 9 September, the day the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, he wrote to Graham ordering the officer in charge of the engineer department to do two things:

  The pontoon train must be got together, with the exception of those boats absolutely necessary for the communication with San Sebastian, and the train should be assembled somewhere near Oyarzun.

  He must immediately take measures for securing the place [San Sebastian] against a coup de main, by clearing the rubbish and blocking the breaches and he must let me have without loss of time, a plan and estimate for the repair of the place.86

  Wellington mentions Dickson, the commander of the artillery, by name in the letter but refers to ‘the officer in charge of the engineer department’. Wellington was fully aware that Burgoyne was the senior engineer so the omission of his name is odd in the context of what happened next. On 17 September, Wellington, with great anger, complained to Graham that:

  Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne is really too bad: this is the eighth day since he received the orders to collect the pontoon train on the high road and he is not now certain that the orders he sent have reached the officers in charge of them, and he has taken no measures to repeat them.87

  On the same day, Burgoyne received a letter from the Adjutant General asking for an immediate detailed explanation of how he sent his orders for the movement of the pontoon train and asking for an officer to ride post to Vitoria to order the pontoon train forward. Two days later, Wellington was still angry, telling Bathurst that he had intended to move the army across the Bidassoa immediately after the fall of San Sebastian but it had ‘been delayed by a mistake made by the officer of engineers in transmitting the orders for the collection of the pontoon train’. He continued saying ‘But I acknowledge I feel a great disinclination to enter the French territory under existing circumstances’.88

  Wellington’s letters around this time have an even greater level of sharpness than was usual for him. One wonders if the pressure was beginning to tell. He was trying to deal with a number of events that could or were impacting on his operations. These included:

  • The failure of Royal Navy to blockade the northern coast leading to difficulties for his supplies and the regular supply of the French forces.

  • The continued resistance of the French in Pamplona and San Sebastian.

  • Murray’s mismanagement at Tarragona.

  • The delays in the Board of Ordnance supplying additional siege guns.

  • The continued issues with the Spanish government over command of their army.

  • Concern about the reaction of the French population when he invaded France.

  • Concern about how the Portuguese and Spanish troops would treat the French population.

  • Concern about what the European powers were planning around the invasion of France.

  Wellington’s complaint about Burgoyne does not ring true. Nothing done by that officer before or after this incident fits the unprofessional picture painted by Wellington. Burgoyne’s diary is strangely silent from 10 September, when the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, until the 27th. The inference is that he was working on the damage at San Sebastian as his diary entry for the 27th notes him completing his report on the repairs of San Sebastian and setting off for headquarters.89 Wellington must have had some knowledge that the pontoon train could not be moved immediately as he noted in a letter to his brother on 12 September, ‘I am waiting here till the animals of the pontoon train will be relieved from the work consequent on the siege, when I shall cross the Bidassoa’.90 Again, on 15 September, he asked Graham to let him know when the pontoon train was likely to be on the road with its equipment. Looking at Wellington’s original letter of 9 September, the priority of repairing San Sebastian is clear, the movement of the pontoon train less so.

  On 15 September, Captain Stanway RE delivered a report on the options for crossing the river Bidassoa in front of the height of San Marcial. The same day Wellington rode over the area with an engineer officer (Stanway, I assume) pointing out where he wanted further redoubts building to support the planned crossing. Wellington was planning on the initial advance being carried out by infantry fording the mouth of the Bidassoa. This was only possible at the lowest tides which were around 23 September. Finding the pontoon train was not going to arrive in time for the fording of the river probably led to his show of impatience.

  I expect that Burgoyne got distracted working to make San Sebastian defensible and, having passed the order for the pontoon train to move, lost sight of what appeared to be a secondary task. It is also clear that Graham had done nothing to check on the situation even though the orders had been sent to him. Everyone had taken their eye off the ball. It unlike Wellington to miss an important detail like this. Perhaps, it suited him to have someone to blame for the delay in entering France? The next low tide was around 9 October 1813 and Wellington planned to b
e ready.91

  Chapter 9

  1813–14 – Into France

  In the days leading up to 7 October 1813, Wellington tried with evident success to convince the French that his attack, when it came, would be inland, probably around Maya. Soult therefore placed the bulk of his troops in this area, leaving the mouth of the Bidassoa virtually undefended, believing that the river was not fordable. Unfortunately for the French, Wellington knew that it was, thanks to the help of local fishermen. The French had heavily fortified the right bank of the river and their troops were spread over many miles, manning various redoubt and forts. The defences looked impressive but Wellington was confident they could be taken, saying to Captain Harry Smith of the 95th Foot ‘These fellows think themselves invulnerable, but I will beat them out with great ease’.1 He went on to explain that they did not have enough troops to hold their position. On the morning of 7 October, the attacks were launched. The two main attacks were at the mouth of the Bidassoa and against Vera. Captain Todd RSC, who had been surveying the area for some weeks, was with the attackers fording the river, no doubt guiding them to the fords. Other RSC officers carried out similar roles at the several fords used to get the troops across. As predicted, Wellington was able to outflank and overwhelm the enemy.

  Two days later the whole area was in Allied hands and Soult had withdrawn his demoralised troops across the next barrier, the river Nivelle. As soon as the right bank was secured, work started on laying the bridges. Wellington’s orders for the attack stated: