The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  August 16, 1972, Camp David

  The president telephoned Haldeman shortly before four o’clock to inquire about Magruder, who was still at the U.S. courthouse before the grand jury. There is no recorded telephone call of Haldeman giving Nixon a report on Magruder’s appearance, although I telephoned Haldeman late that afternoon to tell him that I had called Henry Petersen at the Justice Department, who said that Magruder had gotten through “by the skin of his teeth.”21

  Clearly Haldeman passed along this information to Nixon, who stopped asking about Magruder in subsequent conversations. Undoubtedly the gist of what Haldeman told him was very close to what he wrote in his diary:

  Had a report from John Dean on the Watergate business, says that things went okay with Magruder, at an informal thing last night and then with the grand jury today. He was about two and a half hours, came off okay with no surprise questions or any new evidence. They focused on me, apparently, in trying to get Jeb to tie me into the case somehow today, although last night they focused on Colson. John thinks that things are under reasonably good control there.22

  August 17 to September 15, 1972

  Investigations, Indictment and the President Meets with His White House Counsel

  By mid-August most everyone on the president’s staff, when not addressing government business, was absorbed in the effort of producing a flawless convention, of orchestrating the speakers at the podium and “spontaneous” events on the convention floor to make them engaging for television viewers. All of the prime-time events would be scripted; aides at the podium and on the floor would be electronically connected to others in a trailer outside the convention hall, and together they would make sure the script was followed.

  On August 17, Clark MacGregor gave a wide-ranging interview to a number of reporters, most of whom were primarily interested in Watergate. At one point MacGregor said Liddy, as general counsel of the finance committee, had given the twenty-five-thousand-dollar Dahlberg-Andreas campaign contribution to Bernard Barker, but MacGregor did not know why. He also stated that he had not authorized the lawyers to seek postponement of the Democrats’ civil lawsuit; the break-in had “embarrassed the Nixon campaign,” but when more facts were known it would not be as troubling as it seemed; and they would make a detailed response to the GAO report. He added that, while all he knew was hearsay, he felt that the grand jury proceedings and the depositions in the Democrats’ lawsuit would give “people now or formerly in a position of authority an opportunity to speak out.”1

  When Mitchell learned of MacGregor’s remarks he phoned Haldeman, who noted in his diary, “Mitchell called, very concerned because MacGregor was putting out some stuff on the Watergate thing in self-defense. John’s very concerned because what he’s putting out is not the line, and it undercuts our legal posture, and so on. He wanted me to call MacGregor, tell him he’s got to use the line of ‘no comment’ because individual rights are involved. We’ll have a statement at the appropriate time and then scare him into the fact that he may blow the lawsuit and some of the individuals concerned if he doesn’t stay with the line.” Mitchell also worried that MacGregor would be making television appearances and talking about Watergate during the convention.2

  Also by mid-August the White House congressional liaison staff had learned that one or more committees of the Democratic-controlled Congress, both House and Senate, were considering Watergate-related investigations. On August 19 Chairman Wright Patman of the House Banking Committee announced that he had directed his staff to undertake an investigation into the $114,000 that had passed through the Committee to Re-elect the President and into the bank account of Bernard Barker via U.S. and Mexican banks.3 In the U.S. Senate, Teddy Kennedy was preparing his Administrative Practice and Procedure subcommittee staff to undertake a Watergate-related investigation.

  The president remained at Camp David, working on his acceptance speech, until August 21, when he traveled by helicopter to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to visit with former first lady Mamie Eisenhower. He then returned to the White House, where he got his hair cut and did some final work on his speech. On the afternoon of August 22 he arrived at Miami International Airport and greeted crowds (bused to the site), an event that was broadcast live, and that evening addressed a rally of Young Voters for the President. He spent the following day working in his den at his home in Key Biscayne, meeting with aides, going over the logistics of the convention and talking to GOP dignitaries. At 9:44 P.M. he flew by helicopter to the convention center, went to the holding room, had his makeup applied, and following an introduction by Vice President Spiro Agnew, stepped to the podium at 10:27 P.M. to deliver his acceptance speech to the cheering delegates. The next morning the First Family departed for San Clemente in California, where Nixon remained, working at the Western White House, until September 6.

  The GOP convention coverage largely overshadowed several big Watergate stories that were covered by Time magazine and The Washington Post. On August 21 Time reported that the reelection committee had successfully bugged the DNC and operated a listening post across the street at the Howard Johnson Motor Hotel prior to the date the burglars were caught. The partially accurate story claimed that, after the arrests at the DNC, the “Security Intelligence Squad of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, [which] grew out of a team of so-called ‘plumbers,’ originally recruited by the administration to investigate leaks to the media,” had cleared out their DNC records and tapes from the motel rooms.4 Time linked this squad to Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy but incorrectly included Mitchell aide Robert Mardian, who was apoplectic at being so identified. It was the first story on the plumbers, but because of the convention, no one at the White House focused on it, nor on the Post story. The latter revealed that the GAO had cited violations of the campaign law in the CRP’s fund-raising and expenditures.5 Judge Richey, as reported in a Post article that was critical of his actions, ordered that all pretrial testimony in the Democrats’ lawsuit be kept under seal.6 In addition, there was clearly well-informed media speculation that, while indictments in the Watergate case would be forthcoming, the criminal trial would be delayed until after the election.7 Two days later the media-sensitive Richey announced that he would start the bugging case civil trial before the election to “insure the right of the public to know and the right of the press.”8

  August 26–30, 1972, the Western White House

  Notwithstanding the absence of recording equipment at San Clemente, documents and records reveal that Watergate remained very much on the president’s mind during this California trip. For example, on Saturday, August 26, in anticipation of a forthcoming press conference, Nixon instructed Haldeman to have Pat Buchanan determine what Watergate questions might be asked. One that was certain to be posed was the matter of appointing a special prosecutor for Watergate, an issue that Larry O’Brien had been pressing almost daily. On August 28 Attorney General Kleindienst categorically rejected the proposal, telling reporters it was impossible, because Watergate was “not a matter of looking into the conduct of government officials, but alleged criminal conduct on the part of private individuals.” Kleindienst promised “the most extensive, thorough and comprehensive investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy.”9

  As the president gathered his thoughts for the press conference he made notes (transcribed following) about how he would address Watergate; they indicate that he had decided to announce not only a reelection committee investigation, but one of his own:

  8-29-72

  P.C.—S.C. [Press Conference–San Clemente]

  kind of activity political

  Watergate: This ^ has no place in our ^ process

  This is being thoroughly investigated by F.B.I., Dept of Justice, G.A.O. and Banking & Currency Committee

  For W.H.—John Dean—Counsel to Pres conducted investigation & no one in W.H. or in any govt agency was involved

  For Committee Mitchell initiated very extensive—independent investigation<
br />
  Those who are implicated, or who refuse to cooperate will be discharged

  Their [sic] making this their major issue

  Indicates lack of confidence in Defense, foreign policy other great issues—

  Haldeman and Ehrlichman requested I come to San Clemente to update them, so I flew to California on August 28 and met with them on the morning of August 29, shortly before the president’s press conference. They mentioned nothing to me about my ostensibly having undertaken any sort of White House investigation, for they knew I had done nothing even resembling one. I returned to my hotel in Newport Beach to watch the press conference on television, and by the second question the subject turned to Watergate: “Mr. President, wouldn’t it be a good idea for a special prosecutor, even from your standpoint, to be appointed to investigate the contribution situation and also the Watergate case?”10

  “With regard to who is investigating,” Nixon responded, “it now, I think it would be well to notice that the FBI is conducting a full field investigation. The Department of Justice, of course, is in charge of the prosecution and presenting the matter to the grand jury. The Senate [actually, the House] Banking and Currency Committee is conducting an investigation. The Government Accounting Office, an independent agency, is conducting an investigation of those aspects which involve the campaign spending law. Now, with all of these investigations that are being conducted, I don’t believe that adding another special prosecutor would serve any useful purpose.”

  Nixon continued: “The other point that I should make is that these investigations, the investigation by the GAO, the investigation by the FBI, by the Department of Justice, have, at my direction, had the total cooperation of the, not only the White House, but also of all agencies of the government.” This, of course, was untrue; he went on: “In addition to that, within our own staff, under my direction, counsel to the president, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which might involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident.” (Emphasis added.)

  At the time I thoughtlessly considered the president’s statement about me a public vote of confidence, and I was delighted, although when reporters started asking the press office for a copy of my investigation, I had to tell Ron Ziegler that, in fact, I had not conducted one.11 At the time it did not occur to me that the president was starting to refine and build his defense, and that he was using me as a shield he would be only too willing to sacrifice later.12 In claiming the existence of these bogus investigations, Nixon had done himself what he had wanted Mitchell and MacGregor to do.

  The president then said, addressing the points he had made in his notes: “At the same time, the committee itself is conducting its own investigation, independent of the rest, because the committee desires to clear the air and to be sure that as far as any people who have responsibility for this campaign are concerned, that there is nothing that hangs over them. Before Mr. Mitchell left as campaign chairman he had employed a very good law firm with investigatory experience to look into the matter.” This was a half truth to which he then tied his new campaign director: “Mr. MacGregor has continued that investigation, and is continuing it now. I will say in that respect that anyone on the campaign committee, Mr. MacGregor has assured me, who does not cooperate with the investigation, or anyone against whom charges are leveled where there is a prima facie case that those charges might indicate involvement, will be discharged immediately. That, of course, will be true also of anybody in the government.” In fact, MacGregor had made no such assurance, nor had he continued any investigations.

  The president then concluded: “I think under these circumstances we are doing everything we can to take this incident and to investigate it and not to cover it up. What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up. I would say that here we are, with control of the agencies of the government, and presumably with control of the investigatory agencies of the government, with the exception of the GAO which is independent. We have cooperated completely. We have indicated that we want all the facts brought out, and that as far as any people who are guilty are concerned, they should be prosecuted. This kind of activity, as I have often indicated, has no place whatever in our political process. We want the air cleared. We want it cleared as soon as possible.”

  Even as the president was proclaiming assurances about Watergate, the lawyers who had filed the civil lawsuit for the Democrats were beginning to realize that they had hooked something far larger than they had imagined, and they were now pursuing their action more seriously and aggressively. Their suit had begun as a fishing expedition, one based purely on suspicion that higher-ups might be involved in Watergate and on the hope that they might get lucky—that with depositions they might uncover information politically damaging to the Nixon campaign. The reason for their newfound confidence was revealed only decades later in the memoir of Joseph Califano, Jr., the lead attorney for the suit.

  On August 28, a Califano associate interviewed Alfred Baldwin, the former FBI agent McCord had hired to monitor the listening equipment at the DNC’s Watergate offices from the Howard Johnson across the street. Baldwin had been the lookout on the night of the June 17 arrests, after which Hunt had ordered him to get out of town. From his home in Connecticut, Baldwin hired a lawyer, John Cassidento, a former assistant United States attorney whom Califano later described as a “committed Democrat.” Cassidento had tipped off Califano that Baldwin “was angry” with the people at the reelection committee because he had not been paid, and he was now talking to investigators. Califano wanted to go public with Baldwin’s information, but Edward Bennett Williams, his partner, advised against it.13 Rather, they began leaking it immediately (probably to Time), and soon Larry O’Brien was openly charging that the Nixon committee had been bugging his phones even prior to June 17, 1972, clearly based on Baldwin’s information.

  Baldwin’s story made it to The Washington Post on September 1, 1972, when Woodward and Bernstein reported that Liddy and Hunt had been at the Watergate and, having been warned by walkie-talkie (i.e., Baldwin) that the police had arrived, narrowly escaped being arrested. The Post story also reported that photographs of DNC letterhead documents had been developed for Bernard Barker at a Miami photography shop, according to information given to Florida’s state attorney, Richard Gerstein, who was conducting his own Watergate-related investigation. The Post story further noted that the FBI had not yet interviewed the man who developed thirty-eight photos taken inside the DNC for Barker.14 It was Gerstein who had given Woodward and Bernstein leads on the twenty-five-thousand-dollar Dahlberg-Andreas check, but none of this was new information to the Nixon White House, or to the FBI.

  On September 2 Democrats tried to depose John Mitchell, but his lawyers instructed him not to give anything other than his name and address, because those arrested in the DNC had filed a motion objecting to the prejudicial pretrial publicity that the Democrats’ lawsuit was generating. Williams, now aware that he had a real case, demanded a Saturday session with Judge Richey, who issued an order for Mitchell to be deposed on Monday, September 5. Califano never forgot the scene. Williams sat directly across from Mitchell in his office conference room, and on the table between them he had placed three large notebooks labeled Mitchell I, Mitchell II and Mitchell III. Williams periodically thumbed through the notebooks as he questioned a nervous Mitchell about the DNC break-in and bugging, alluding to information they had from Baldwin. (When he first described this deposition to me years later, Califano roared with laughter, as those notebooks were filled with blank sheets of paper.) After the deposition, Williams confided to Califano that he believed they had “one helluva lawsuit,” explaining, “I may not know
much about politics, but I know when someone is lying and when he’s scared. John Mitchell had to squeeze his thighs together to avoid wetting his pants.”15

  The next morning, September 6, The Washington Post had a front-page story about the deposition and featured a photo of Mitchell surrounded by reporters and photographers as he emerged from the two-hour grilling. Mitchell told reporters: “Neither the President nor anyone at the White House or anyone in authority at the committee working for his reelection [had] any responsibility for the break-in and alleged bugging attempt.” The story further reported that the attorney for the five men arrested at the DNC, who had been named as defendants in the Democrats’ lawsuit, had served notice to depose ten Democratic Party officials, including Larry O’Brien.16

  September 7–8, 1972, the White House

  The president, meanwhile, was eager to arrange for the Secret Service to infiltrate Teddy Kennedy’s world by providing protection that would at the same time supply the White House with inside information about the senator. During a morning meeting in the Oval Office with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon ordered his aides to “plant one or plant two” guys on Kennedy.17 (The undertaking ultimately failed, because Kennedy refused the offer.) Ehrlichman then gave the president a piece of bad news: He had had his man at the IRS, Roger Barth, personally review Larry O’Brien’s returns, and his taxes were in proper order. “It’s a dry hole,” Ehrlichman explained. Bobby Baker’s information was proving largely useless.