The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  With the FBI’s investigation and the grand jury’s work largely completed, Watergate came up less frequently in the president’s conversations, although he did continue to ask Haldeman and Ehrlichman if a date had been set when the indictments would be handed down by the grand jury.18 Mid-September remained the best estimate. The president also asked Ehrlichman if he had been deposed by the Democrats, which he said he had not; he explained that he had seen Hunt and Liddy on only one occasion at the White House, and he “would not know their work product” if he was asked.19 When meeting with his top campaign fund-raiser and former secretary of commerce, Maurice Stans, the president asked about the well-being of Hugh Sloan, who Stans reported was struggling. “Well, we’ll take good care of him,” the president instructed Stans, if his testimony did not cause any problems.20

  September 11, 1972, the White House

  Woodward and Bernstein broke a front-page Post story based on Baldwin’s information under the headline BUGGING “PARTICIPANT” GIVES DETAILS: “Democratic investigators” had learned that “the telephone conversations of Democratic Party leaders were monitored, transcribed and then sent in memorandum form to high-ranking officials of President Nixon’s reelection committee and to a presidential assistant.” The FBI, however, had been unable to locate any of these documents.21 Nixon asked Haldeman about the story during a brief morning meeting, but Haldeman was wrong when said he did not think the unnamed participant had been Martha Mitchell’s bodyguard, and he was unable to answer the president’s question about whether the grand jury had copies of the memoranda in question.22 If, as the article claimed, such information had been delivered to a presidential assistant, had anyone on his staff been called before the grand jury? Nixon asked. Haldeman assured him they had not.

  The Post story reminded the president that they still had not developed an appropriate PR response to Watergate other than his August 29 press conference statements, and he began peppering Haldeman with questions about their plans, to which Haldeman had few answers. Nixon, eager to take the offensive, told Haldeman, “I’m just trying to think of getting a line on developments. I thought Dean would be doing it, you know? I mean, is there somebody on our side working on this? Maybe you’ve got to give it to Colson? He’d work hard. Or is he the right one?”

  The president was satisfied when Haldeman said that Ehrlichman was working on it, but he cautioned that they were not planning on going “too far on the offensive” because of the developing congressional investigation. When the president asked for more information on the Post story, Haldeman called me for an update, and then reported to Nixon that the unidentified participant in the Post story was Alfred Baldwin: “He was assigned to Martha at one point. But he knows nothing, and everything he has, everything he does know has been told to the grand jury and will come out in the indictment. And whatever he’s given the Democrats, he can’t go beyond that. He doesn’t know any more. And we think he may have made up some of that.” This last comment referred to the claim by Baldwin that he thought he had delivered memoranda of the overheard conversations on one occasion to a presidential aide, and the only name he recognized was Bill Timmons. But that had never happened.

  “Why is he talking to them?” the president asked. When Haldeman answered that he didn’t know, Nixon wondered how Baldwin fit in the picture, since a guy who was now talking to the Democrats was “a hell of a guy” to have been involved in the operation. Nixon wanted to know if they were all “kooky,” and Haldeman could not deny that analysis. “They were all kooky,” Haldeman conceded. “The Cubans, in their own way, are kooky Cubans,” he noted.

  When they met later that afternoon in the EOB office, Haldeman reported that everything was still on track for the indictments to be issued on Friday, September 15.23 Only those arrested in the DNC, plus Hunt and Liddy, would be named. As planned, they would “ride” the indictments with a MacGregor statement.

  The president recalled that during the Hiss affair nothing seemed to hurt Hiss and his supporters until he was actually indicted. “Now, in our case,” the president told Haldeman, “we’ve got to be very, very careful to lay the foundation for the trial.” Nixon remained concerned that they would be charged with a cover-up, but Haldeman countered that the public would be getting more than anticipated with Hunt and Liddy being included in the indictment. Haldeman was thankful the indictments did not reach “upper levels of the committee or in the White House,” and both men were satisfied that all who would be named had already been publicly tarnished by Watergate.

  Haldeman reported that they had leaked O’Brien’s tax information to the Las Vegas Review Journal.24 Herb Kalmbach was doing a further follow-up with Bobby Baker, and the president hoped Baker would produce negative information on either O’Brien or Teddy Kennedy, preferably O’Brien. Both Nixon and Haldeman were disappointed that there was little press interest in Teddy Kennedy’s ongoing affair with socialite Amanda Burden, a story Colson had been spreading to anyone who would listen. Haldeman reported that whenever Teddy campaigned for McGovern someone in the audience always carried a sign asking: Where’s Amanda, Teddy?

  September 12–13, 1972, the White House

  Consistent with his effort to take the offensive on Watergate, the president had Attorney General Kleindienst brief his cabinet and Republican congressional leaders at a breakfast in the State Dining Room on September 12. (I was not invited, and when Ziegler’s assistant, Gerald Warren, called to ask me why, I told him that I was certain it was so I would not be asked about the investigation I had never conducted.) During the closed session Kleindienst told the GOP leaders that the Watergate indictments would be handed down on Friday, September 15, and that no one at a high level of the reelection committee or at the White House would be named. Kleindienst said he anticipated claims from the Democrats and the news media of a “whitewash,” so he had hard data to refute that charge (which he later used, following the indictments). He reported that the FBI’s Watergate investigation had exceeded that of the Kennedy assassination inquiry, for it had involved 333 FBI agents in 51 field offices who had followed 1,879 leads and undertaken 1,551 interviews that required 14,098 man-hours.25

  Following the breakfast the president met with Haldeman and Colson in the Oval Office and, with Watergate still on his mind, asked Haldeman, “Any more new thoughts regarding the lawsuit?”26 Haldeman asked whether he had gotten the memo I had prepared, and when Nixon answered, “Yeah, yeah,” Haldeman nonetheless walked him through a few key points: Mitchell, who had learned of O’Brien’s tax audit, had suggested areas the committee lawyers might explore when deposing O’Brien. Henry Rothblatt, who represented the Cuban Americans, had learned that the DNC surveillance had revealed that both married men and women at the committee were having office affairs; he wanted to leak this information to embarrass them over the lawsuit. After Haldeman reviewed these points, the president was doubtful much would come from this litigation.27 Still concerned that the indictments would lead to accusations of a cover-up, they discussed an idea of Colson’s to create a special commission headed by former chief justice Earl Warren to examine the FBI’s and Justice Department’s Watergate investigations and establish that there had been no concealment. When Colson later joined the conversation, they continued exploring this problem, but no solution emerged.

  The subject of the commission came up again the following morning at Camp David.28 “I talked to Kleindienst about it, and he just burst out laughing,” Haldeman explained. “And I said, ‘What’s so funny?’ And he said, ‘That’s been my idea for three weeks, but John Mitchell pisses on me every time I start to raise it. And he won’t even listen to it.’ And he said, ‘I didn’t have a commission in mind. What I had in mind was one man, and the one man I had in mind was—” “Earl Warren?” the president injected. Haldeman said that Kleindienst was suggesting former associate justice Tom Clark. Kleindienst felt that, rather than getting a commission, which would require staff and funding, they just appoint Clark, as
an individual. When the president said he would feel better about these ideas if Mitchell supported them, Haldeman reported that he had already spoken to Mitchell, who was not opposed. Neither the president nor Haldeman was sure of Ehrlichman’s opinion of these proposals. “When it comes to making the judgment as to what you do or don’t do, Ehrlichman’s advice is often coy,” the president observed.

  September 15, 1972, the White House

  The president’s morning news summary reported that on the preceding evening the television networks had given Nixon a 63 percent to 29 percent lead over McGovern. All had reported that Maurice Stans had filed a five-million-dollar libel lawsuit against Larry O’Brien. Both the networks and The Washington Post reported that the Democrats had found another electronic bug in the telephone of Spence Oliver, the executive director of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen and whose office McCord had bugged, at the DNC, and showed photographs of it. (Earl Silbert, the original Watergate lead prosecutor, correctly believed that the FBI had simply failed to discover the bug during its initial investigation. The FBI rejected this idea, however, and opened a new investigation of Oliver and the DNC, a gesture the committee found nothing short of harassment, believing the Nixon White House was behind it. Years later James McCord acknowledged that it was his bug, which the FBI had missed; he revealed yet another bug to prosecutors in April 1973.29)

  As anticipated, on September 15 the Department of Justice released the grand jury’s indictment, naming the five men arrested in the DNC and two former Nixon White House aides. The five were James W. McCord, former security coordinator for the reelection committee; Bernard L. Barker, president of a Miami real-estate business; Frank Sturgis, an anti-Castro activist; Eugenio Martinez, a real-estate broker in the Barker firm; and Virgilio R. Gonzales, a Miami locksmith. The former White House aides were G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt. The indictment charged the seven defendants with conspiracy, interception of oral and wire communications, second-degree burglary and unlawful possession of intercepting devices.30 While the public was generally indifferent to this development, Larry O’Brien stated, “We can only assume that the investigation will continue, since the indictments handed down today reflect only the most narrow construction of the crime that was committed.” O’Brien added, “We will continue to press for a far more thorough explanation of the funding of the crime that led to those indictments” and for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Although no one at the reelection committee celebrated the limited scope of the indictments, Magruder was extremely relieved.

  Haldeman briefed the president during their morning meeting before the indictments were publicly announced and provided him with what information was known about the alleged new electronic eavesdropping bug found at the DNC. The White House had been assured by Pat Gray that they had not missed it the first time and that the FBI was opening a new investigation.31 September 15 was a slow schedule day for the president, who spent much of the afternoon in the Oval Office discussing his reelection campaign; then he had an unusual conversation with me in the late afternoon. Notwithstanding the fact that I had been at the White House for over two years, I really did not know the president, nor did he know me, apart from ceremonial encounters. In hindsight it is clear that we both were misjudging each other.

  During a conversation earlier that afternoon Haldeman had reported that Clark MacGregor was proceeding as planned: He would announce that, since the indictments had now been handed down, it was time to “quit all this playing games” with Watergate and “hanging innocent people by innuendo.”32 After Haldeman gave the president the information I had received from the FBI about the new bug, he replied, “And Dean [has] been a real strong man in this, hasn’t he?” Haldeman confirmed this, adding, “It’s been interesting to watch. He’s, you know, very low-key and cool about things.” Nixon repeated, “He doesn’t get all excited.” Haldeman explained, “Well, he’s good at keeping other people calmed down, which has been important in this one. Probably the most key thing of all, because keeping the Hugh Sloans, and the Maurice Stanses, and the Mardians—who has been his big cross.” Nixon was horrified to learn that Mardian was still involved with Watergate, believing that he had been put out in the field to work. Haldeman explained that Mardian had “tiptoed back in.”

  After the president talked on the telephone with Peter Dailey, who headed his campaign advertising group in New York City, and Ron Ziegler, who wanted guidance on how to address the Watergate indictments—the White House would not comment but would leave the matter to the Department of Justice—the president complained to Haldeman how impossible it was as president to simply drop in on his staff to say hello or be “buddy-buddy.” He then asked, “Is Dean here today?” Haldeman indicated that I was in my office. “Okay, why don’t you have him come down.”

  “John’s on his way over,” Haldeman reported, after summoning me.33 The president can be heard writing as Haldeman continued. “Yeah, he is one of the quiet guys that gets a lot done. That was a good move, too, bringing Dean in,” he said, referring to Watergate. “He’ll never gain any ground for us. He’s just not that kind of guy. But he’s the kind that enables other people to gain ground while he’s making sure that you don’t fall through the holes. Between times he’s moving ruthlessly on the investigation of McGovern people, Kennedy stuff, and all that, too. I just don’t know how much progress he’s making, because I—” Haldeman then turned the conversation in a direction he knew the president liked to hear, continuing, “—Chuck [Colson] has worked on the list, and Dean’s working the thing through IRS and some other things. He’s turned out to be tougher than I thought he would.”34

  When I entered the Oval Office at 5:27 P.M., the president expressed his appreciation for my work on the Watergate situation. Although I had expected it would last five or ten minutes, the meeting lasted nearly fifty. I could sense at the time that my presence was something of a catalyst for Nixon, who was playing president just for me, as he began to discuss his thinking about his second term. What I thought at the time might be a bad-day mood was actually his norm, involving a lot of tough talk about what he was going to do to his enemies and how he was going to go about it. As the conversation proceeded, I could not resist giving him what I knew he wanted. While I could not play the sycophant, as Colson did, nor could I be a brittle and nasty son of a bitch, like Tom Huston, both of whom I knew Nixon admired, I could play the admiring staffer in my own way, which I did with a couple of appreciative remarks, such as “That’s an exciting prospect,” and later, “That’s an exciting concept,” when he talked about making government responsive to the White House.

  When Nixon first released the transcript of our September 15 conversation, he claimed it showed that he was not participating in a cover-up.* It is true that I raised the cover-up rather elliptically, and he responded metaphorically, but we each understood exactly what was being said. There was no doubt in my mind about Nixon’s awareness of the cover-up after our exchange, relatively early in the conversation, when I told him, “Three months ago I would have had trouble predicting where we’d be today. I think that I can say that fifty-four days from now that not a thing will come crashing down to our surprise.” The president had not been listening, or had missed my “three months ago” reference to June 17, the date of the arrests at the DNC, and the fact that it was fifty-four days to Election Day. “Say what?” he asked, in response to which I was a bit more direct, clarifying: “Nothing is going to come crashing down to our surprise, either—” rather conspicuously, I believed, referring to Watergate.

  “Well, the whole thing is a can of worms. As you know, a lot of this stuff went on. And, and the people who worked in the thing are awfully embarrassing. The way you’ve handled it, it seems to me, has been very skillful, because you put your fingers in the dikes every time that leaks have sprung here and sprung there,” he said. I understood his metaphor perfectly.

  Toward the end of the conversation I alerted the president t
hat he might hear from George Shultz regarding the request I had passed on to Johnnie Walters, the head of the IRS. He suggested that he would fire Shultz if he did not follow up. When the conversation was over I figured the president probably viewed our exchange for what it was—a young aide trying to please the boss. But I was wrong: It had a very different impact on him, and it probably explains why, five months later, he called on me to deal directly with Watergate when the problems refused to go away.

  September 16, 1972, the White House

  The next morning, when meeting with Haldeman in the Oval Office, the president was still thinking about our conversation.35 There was a discussion about the CIA’s leak of information to CBS News and Nixon’s impulsive reaction to fire everyone on the CIA distribution list who received the documents containing that information. The president injected me into that conversation. “I’d also like you to know that I am damn impressed with John Dean. I was far more impressed with him than John Ehrlichman. As far as him being a playboy, he realizes that he’s good, despite being a playboy. But Dean is more steely than John [Ehrlichman],” the president declared. “More steely than John, no question with Dean, and Bob, I can’t tell you how strongly I feel you’ve got to be steely and mean. This handout [referring to the leak], I’m sure if I’d have given it to Dean, or that stuff on O’Brien, of course he’s not as busy as Ehrlichman. But something would have gotten out there,” meaning some sort White House reaction. Nixon is clearly using me as a bit of a foil to Ehrlichman, so Haldeman protested, “Well, it’s going to with John,” noting that Ehrlichman had “narrowed it down to—”

  Nixon continued, “My point is, I find that if John is too busy, also John is damned honorable, he is an honorable man—” Haldeman again protested—it was not good to be honorable in Nixon’s eyes—and said, “But not like that,” suggesting that Ehrlichman was not honorable when it was a matter of going after Nixon’s enemies. “And Dean is not honorable,” Nixon declared. “He’s a crook, he is a snake. But he is good, he’s good.” Haldeman responded, “The key difference, the critical difference between John Ehrlichman and John Dean in the context that you’re talking about is that Ehrlichman is not a hater.” Haldeman repeated, “Ehrlichman is tough, but he is not a hater.” Nixon then said of Ehrlichman, “He’s an executer, and a very good man, he’s decent.”