Death Before Glory

by Martin Howard

  The colony was gripped by panic. It was feared that the Trelawny Maroons would be supported by other Maroon townships and the island’s slaves. The magistrates in the parish of St James wrote to the British governor, Major General Lord Balcarres, on 18 July.

  We are sorry to find that a very serious disturbance is likely to break out immediately with the Maroons of Trelawny Town. They have obliged the [newly appointed] superintendant to quit the town. They have threatened the destruction of the two plantations nearest them. All the people belonging to them have been called in; the women are sent into the woods; and, between this and Monday, they propose to kill their cattle and their children, who may be an encumbrance.

  An imminent attack was anticipated. At first, the House of Assembly made placatory moves, distributing money to the Maroons and offering to discuss their complaints. This lull was short-lived. The constant dread of insurrection was fuelled by the rumour that French agents from Saint Domingue were supporting the Maroons. The colonists demanded strong action; on 4 August, Balcarres was given the powers of martial law.

  Fortuitously, Balcarres’s hand was strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements in mid-July. The governor had recalled the 83rd Regiment bound for Saint Domingue and a further detachment, originally heading for the same island, now landed and was detained on Jamaica. The total extra force, including the 83rd and 400 Light Dragoons, amounted to close to 1,500 men. To this could be added the depleted 60th and 62nd Regiments of the Line and the 20th Light Dragoons, all already on the island and together perhaps 500 strong.22

  Balcarres’s plan was to intimidate, outmanoeuvre and isolate his adversary. On 9 August, the governor sent an ultimatum to the Maroon leaders.

  Every pass to your town has been occupied and guarded by the militia and regular forces. You are surrounded by thousands. Look at Montego Bay, and you will see the force brought against you. I have issued a proclamation ordering a reward for your heads.

  Balcarres had underestimated the Maroons’ determination. Although confronted by 2,000 regular troops supported by several thousand local militia, they resolved to fight and were encouraged by an early success. On 12 August, a small British force of dragoons and Trelawny militia under the command of Colonel Sansford attempted to surprise the Old Maroon town (see map 10). Falling into an ambush, the officer and around 40 men were killed. The disorganised remains of the party made their way back to Balcarres’s Vaughansfield headquarters; some were so relieved to have escaped alive that they fired their guns into the air.

  The Trelawny Maroons took refuge in the Cockpits, mountainous country ideal for defence and ambush and opportunistic raiding. It was desperately difficult terrain for the operations of European regular forces, particularly cavalry, and Balcarres responded by trying to surround the whole area including the Old and New Maroon Towns and the Cockpits around Petty River Bottom. Reinforcements of regulars and militia, the latter unreliable, were called up to destroy the provision grounds and the two towns. Balcarres believed that starvation was his best weapon. The governor’s correspondence reveals increasing frustration as this strategy failed to produce the desired results. On 8 September, he writes to Major General Taylor, ‘…I am sorry I cannot close my letter as agreeably as I could wish. None of the Maroons have come in, and they seem determined to inveterate war.’ Four days later, Colonel William Fitch, entrusted to carry out operations by Balcarres, walked into a Maroon ambush. Eight men, including Fitch, lost their lives. A month of warfare had cost the British more than 70 fatalities whereas, as the contemporary historian Robert Charles Dallas points out, not one Maroon was known to have been killed. The enemy had retired to their fortresses and the loss of the popular Fitch had ‘cast a gloom over the whole island’. The regular troops were becoming exhausted and disillusioned. Captain Oldham of the 62nd had perished of nothing more than fatigue. Supplies were running out. The air of apprehension was not relieved by Balcarres’s hopeful speech at the Assembly.23

  The turning point was the appointment of Colonel George Walpole to the rank of Major General to succeed Fitch. In mid-September, Walpole left Accompong Town and rode hard through dangerous country to Fitch’s old headquarters at Trelawny Town. Here, he found Fitch’s men living in poor accommodation and disillusioned by the torrential rain and the apparent hopelessness of their task. Walpole quickly realised that their morale was such that any further defeat would be disastrous. He abandoned Balcarres’s attempts at encirclement and instead pursued a determined strategy of land clearance and the building of outposts to guard nearby settlements. Whilst slave gangs chopped at the covering bush, Walpole trained his soldiers to emulate Maroon tactics, taking maximum advantage of available cover to fire and reload. Using howitzers to fire shells into the inaccessible ravines, he gradually dislodged the Maroons from their main stronghold into the more northerly mountains. As Maroon morale sagged, the spirits of the British troops began to recover.

  By early October, Walpole was in the ascendancy; reinforced by detachments of troops under the command of Colonel Skinner, there were now thousands of well-armed and supplied regulars and militia at his disposal. In contrast, the Trelawny Maroon warriors numbered only around 250 men divided into two groups, one of them a raiding party under the command of a man called Johnson who imposed an iron discipline. It was probably Johnson’s men who had ambushed Fitch and, despite their limited numbers, they remained a danger to unwary Europeans. Balcarres explained the threat to the Duke of Portland in a letter of 16 November.

  As it is impossible to get up with these savages without first receiving the fire of their ambush, our loss in every affair is constantly from eight to twelve men killed and wounded; and as the ambuscade is generally formed within a few yards of the track the return of killed is often, unfortunately, greater than the wounded.

  Walpole appears to have had a talent for jungle warfare and he methodically transformed the Cockpits from a Maroon refuge into a trap. He used local knowledge to cut off the Trelawnys from their meeting places. Maroon morale was further damaged by the arrival of dog handling chasseurs from Cuba. Balcarres had great expectations of the ‘Spanish dogs’ and he was not disappointed, exaggerated accounts of the size and ferocity of the animals soon reaching the enemy, who were left in no doubt that they would be employed if no peaceful settlement was reached.

  Although no single great victory had been achieved, Walpole had succeeded in restricting Maroon movements and denying them food and water. Many were sick and they had become alienated from the local slaves, their normal suppliers. It was now only a matter of time. One group of Maroons surrendered to Walpole in December. They agreed to ask the King’s pardon on their knees. Their lives would be spared and they would not be deported. Balcarres demanded a cessation of resistance by the remaining Maroons on 1 January 1796; at the end on the month, he wrote to Dundas.

  Three weeks having elapsed without any apparent Intent on the Part of the Maroons to fulfil the Treaty, I ordered the Honourable Major General Walpole to move forward, on the 14th instant, with a strong Column of Regular Troops. He had only advanced some Yards when a Message was delivered from the Maroon Chief [Johnson] begging that no further hostile step should be taken. As we had experienced Duplicity and Evasion, it was judged expedient to move slowly on, and the line of March was so arranged as to give the Maroons an Opportunity of coming in with safety. This had the desired effect. The Maroon Rebellion I think is drawing to a close.

  The governor estimated that 500 Maroons had surrendered with only a handful of warriors still at large. They would capitulate within weeks. More than 20 actions had been fought to crush ‘a most daring, unprovoked, and ungrateful Rebellion’.

  There remained the question of the fate of the defeated Maroons. Against Walpole’s wishes – he had originally agreed in his December treaty that they would not be deported – the island’s Assembly voted for their removal from the colony. The majority had surrendered after 1 January and were not covered by the treaty and even th
ose who were chose to accompany their comrades. They were transported to Nova Scotia in June 1796 where, unsurprisingly, they failed to adapt to the working conditions and climate. The British Government finally relented to their demands and, in 1800, they were moved on to the colony of ex-slaves formed at Sierra Leone. The Jamaican colonists had been placated. The number of Maroons remaining on the island was small and, daunted by the fate of the Trelawny Maroons, those to windward took an oath of allegiance to the King.24

  We must now return to Saint Domingue where, at the end of 1794, Tiburon had disastrously fallen to Rigaud and the country was wracked by internal strife (see Chapter 3). The number of fit British troops on 1 January 1795 was less than 1,100 and their hold on parts of the colony – Môle St Nicolas, Jérémie, Irois, Léogane, Fort Bizothon, Port au Prince and an area to the north of the capital around the Bight of Léogane – was at best precarious. The loss of Saltrou in the south to insurgents was not in itself of great strategic significance but an ominous sign of British vulnerability.

  Brisbane continued his heroic operations against Toussaint in the Artibonite acting in concert with forces from Arcahaye and Mirebalais. The region was crippled by the combination of continuous warfare and drought and, by February, there was famine. Many locals fled to the Republican zone. Toussaint was hampered by lack of ammunition and the Anglo-Royalist forces’ stubbornly maintained posts on the left bank of the Artibonite. The death of Brisbane on 4 February, shot in the head during a reconnaissance on the river, was a blow to British hopes; this officer was hugely admired and was seen as crucial to the defence of the area around St Marc. A second highly respected British soldier was killed the following month at Fort Bizothon. Lieutenant Colonel Markham fell making a sortie against Rigaud’s besieging army. Montalembert’s cavalry caused numerous casualties in Rigaud’s ranks but the siege continued. Naval attempts to make a diversion at Léogane came to nothing and St Marc remained under attack by Toussaint. There was serious consideration of pulling all British forces back to the Môle.

  A number of factors prevented the evolution of this perilous situation into catastrophe. Firstly, some reinforcements arrived from England; around 1,700 troops on 17 April. This relieved some of the immediate pressure and, most notably, Rigaud abandoned the siege of Fort Bizothon. Williamson left Jamaica at the end of the month to take personal command, reaching the Môle on 12 May. The second factor working in Williamson’s favour was his successful raising of colonial corps with the cooperation of Royalist planters. It was Dessources’s 200 chasseurs who repulsed Toussaint’s attack on St Marc in April, routing the rebel forces who were forced to evacuate the Artibonite. A further pro-British factor was the Spanish presence on the east side of the island (Santo Domingo). Although the two countries collaborated only loosely, Spanish attacks in early 1795 distracted the Republicans. Finally, the discord which had compromised British operations in Saint Domingue equally affected their adversaries. There was friction between mulattoes and blacks and the loyalty of apparently pro-Republican factions could not be assumed. Their leaders were often unwilling allies; Rigaud was able to work with Toussaint but failed to gain help from Dieudonné and Pompé.

  These mitigating elements gave the British some respite. The most likely short-term outcome was a period of stalemate. Williamson could not have been cheered by his first inspection of his small army. Predictably, many were sick and even those on the fit list were exhausted by endless duty, sleep deprivation and the climate. At St Marc, almost every soldier in five British companies was hospitalised. On 1 June, of the 3,000 soldiers on the colony, only 1,300 were registered fit for duty. Williamson could derive some encouragement from reports of further reinforcements from home and the increasing number of black troops in British service. The arrival of Major General Forbes with a detachment from Jamaica might have brought relief, but the erosive effect of disease, mostly yellow fever, was relentless and, at the end of June, the number of fit men had actually fallen to around a thousand, approximately half of the force.25

  A month later, the Spanish were expelled by a local uprising in the area around Mirebalais and the nearby mountains of Grand Bois and Trou d’Eau. This remained a fertile region containing over 400 plantations worked by local blacks. The other inhabitants were largely mulattoes, but there were also around 500 whites who had emigrated from the north. Toussaint nominally controlled this territory but it is probable that only a minority of the locals actually supported the Republican cause. When Williamson received more reinforcements − the 82nd Regiment on 9 August – he was confident enough to sanction the easterly advance of his colonial forces. On 15 August, the whites under the leadership of the Creole Lavergne capitulated without resistance. Toussaint immediately responded by sending his colonial ally Christophe Mornet to ‘exterminate’ the Royalists, but the colonial troops, led by Montalembert and Lapointe, pressed on through the mountains in pouring rain gaining local support. The campaign was not entirely successful – Mornet escaped with his plunder and Dessources’s column was largely destroyed by Toussaint’s counter-attack at Verrettes – but Mirebalais was captured. This had immediate implications. A productive region was secured, Toussaint had suffered a setback, and the communication between enemy forces in the north and south was broken. Montalembert was given the local rank of brigadier general in acknowledgement of his achievement.26

  The raw recruits of August had little formal training and even less immunity to the prevailing diseases. A fresh epidemic during September and October sent another thousand men to their graves. Potential reinforcements from Jamaica, where Balcarres was fighting the Maroon War, failed to materialise. News that Spain had surrendered Santo Domingo to France was alarming, although it was possible that the Spanish planters would side with the British. On a more positive note, Dundas announced that the futile trickle of reinforcements would stop and that a substantial army was about to be sent to launch an offensive in both the Windward and Leeward Islands. This was the long-awaited expedition of Sir Ralph Abercromby, the subject of the next chapter. Sixteen thousand troops were promised for Saint Domingue, to arrive before the end of the year; these were to be commanded by General Forbes, Williamson being allowed to return home although he did not depart until the following March.27

  Encouraged by the prospect of significant help, Forbes made plans for the conquest of Cap Français, Port de Paix and the Northern Province. There was growing appreciation that military aggression might not be enough to pacify Saint Domingue and Dundas granted Forbes £15,000 to win over the black and mulatto leaders. This financial incentive was joined to legislation favouring the mulattoes and the promise of eventual emancipation for black soldiers fighting as British corps. The latter initiative was vital to recruit black troops and was taken locally by Forbes against Dundas’s orders. There was already dissension in the Republican factions. Reports of the imminent arrival of a large British expedition in the region exaggerated pre-existing splits and there was extensive fighting between mulattoes and blacks in the north and south of the colony. In the south, black bands led by Pompé and Pierre Dieudonné defected from the Republican cause. Forbes won over black auxiliaries formerly attached to Spain; two of their leaders, Titus and Gagnettes, committed the support of their 5−6,000 followers. The combined effect of skilful British negotiations and Republican disorder was such that, in February 1796, Williamson declared himself more secure than ever at Port au Prince, despite having only 200 men fit for duty. Forbes, who had sailed from the Môle with the hope of meeting the expected convoy from Cork and leading an attack against Cap Français, was less optimistic. As was so often the case, the actual reinforcement fell well short of ministers’ promises. In early January 1796, the 66th and 69th Regiments, under General Henry Bowyer, landed at the Môle and, by 15 February, the 1,600 men transferred to Port au Prince were ready for action. A week later came the news that the larger force of 16,500 men had been detained by storms and that, in reality, there would be no more than 4,500 extra troo
ps, largely foreign and with an uncertain arrival date.

  This was bitterly disappointing for the British commanders. Williamson’s assessment of their security suddenly appeared complacent. The spreading news that a large British force was not about to appear only served to spur on the enemy; Rigaud remained active, negotiations with Dieudonné broke down, leaving some of his men to throw in their lot with Toussaint, and a number of lesser chiefs attached themselves to the Republican flag. Neither side had a clear advantage; in early March Toussaint complained that he was cornered by his enemies on land and sea. In this maelstrom of shifting loyalties, it was crucial to grasp the initiative. Following the failure of the talks with Dieudonné, Williamson used the extra troops at Port au Prince to attack positions held by black troops overlooking the capital. On 28 February, Dessources’s 500 chasseurs clambered up the mountain and cleared the enemy, destroying 2,000 huts. Camp Turgeau was captured and a strongpoint established to guard the town.28