Death Before Glory

by Martin Howard

  With Williamson’s final departure on 14 March, Forbes was left in sole command. Williamson had achieved as much as could be expected and his successor, commander by default in the absence of a more able candidate, struggled to maintain his position. He decided to attack Léogane. Geggus argues that this was a mistake and that Gonaives, Toussaint’s link to the outside world, was a better target. To be fair to Forbes, a number of others including Williamson, Montalembert, and the commander of the squadron, Admiral Hyde Parker, all strongly supported the operation. In the event it was a debacle. Parker related the outcome to Evan Nepean.

  On the 21st [March 1796], the Army was landed, in Two Divisions, to the Eastward and Westward of the Fort and Town, covered to the Westward by the Ceres and Lark, and to the Eastward by the Iphigenia, and Cormorant and Serin Sloops, with the Africa and Leviathan placed against the Fort, and the Swiftsure to cannonade the Town. The Fire of the latter [ship] was interrupted in the Course of Half an hour from the situation of the Army on shore, but the Two former kept up an unremitting Cannonade for nearly Four Hours, against the Fort until Dark, and the Land Wind coming Fresh, the Ships were moved off to a proper Anchorage. The Day following, the Army were chiefly employed reconnoitring, and the next Day, from what they had observed and the Intelligence gained, the Enemy were found so exceedingly numerous that it was resolved best for His Majesty’s Service to re-embark the Army, &c and postpone the Operations for the present.

  The admiral understates the ignominy of the retreat and the friction between the services. Commodore John Duckworth, his second in command, described the expedition as ‘blundering and undigested’. Léogane was much stronger than had been anticipated, surrounded by a palisaded ditch. Forbes had insufficient artillery for a siege and his suggestion that his 750 troops be supported by 4,000 seamen and heavy guns brought ashore received short shrift from Parker, who had already had two ships disabled by enemy artillery. The force returned to Port au Prince to be eaten away by inactivity and yellow fever.

  Forbes’s next reinforcement, reaching the Môle on 1 May, was the remnants of the Cork expedition. This was the largest single body of men ever to reach Saint Domingue and it raised the total British force to 7,500. The new additions were in poor shape, effectively the men Abercromby did not need to windward. Many of the 1,800 troops were had been sick on the voyage and were destined to die within a few months. More soldiers arrived in June under the command of General Whyte; these included a regiment of British Light Dragoons, some Dutch artillery, Hompesch’s Hussars and Montalembert’s Legion. The foreign cavalry had no horses and were unprepared to fight on foot. Despite this influx, the toll of yellow fever was such that, by 1 July, the number of men fit for duty had actually fallen to less than 6,000 with 2,500 reported sick. Two tropical months had claimed 1,300 British lives. One consequence of the mismanaged attack on Léogane was that the damage to the Leviathan and Africa meant that the navy were unable to maintain sufficient strength off Cap Français to prevent the French landing their own reinforcements. On 11 May, a squadron of 10 Republican warships brought nearly 3,000 troops and National Guards in addition to ample supplies of arms and powder. Toussaint Louverture was able to bolster his army to 10,000 infantry and two cavalry regiments, whilst Rigaud now commanded over 5,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry. More French reinforcements, perhaps as many as 10,000, were expected.29

  Forbes’s situation had deteriorated but he still hoped for help from Abercromby. Forced on the defensive for most of May and June, he decided to make a second foray targeting the town and fort at Bombarde on the road to the Môle. This settlement was important both for the security of the Môle and for food supplies. The march on Bombarde highlighted Forbes’s unsuitability for command. Three thousand men were readied on the evening of 7 June but, for reasons that are unclear, their departure was delayed until the next day which was exceptionally hot. Harry Ross-Lewin was a major in the 32nd Regiment.

  The troops were disembarked with the least possible delay. Brigadier-General Forbes, with part of the 13th Light Dragoons, and the 32nd, 56th, 67th and 81st Regiments of the line proceeded to take the fort of Bombarde, distant sixteen miles. We had the option of approaching this point by either of two roads; the one was crossed by streams in two or three places, while along the other there was no water, and the latter unfortunately was chosen. The General’s reason for preferring it I have never heard: all I can say is, that the consequences were very disastrous. The troops only moved off at 9 A.M. and before that the greater number of the men had emptied their canteens; for a considerable distance, we had to pass through a deep and close ravine, and were half suffocated by clouds of red dust; we had not advance above two miles when the sergeant-major and thirteen privates of the 67th expired…

  Ross-Lewin notes that the general was ‘fortunately well supplied’ with drinks. The force reached Bombarde in a desperate state but the garrison, only 350 strong, was intimidated by the British arrival and they surrendered on the condition that they be allowed to escape to Republican territory. It was to be a hollow victory, Bombarde actually absorbing resources from the Môle. Whyte, commander of the Môle since June, struggled to maintain communications by land, due to ambushes, or sea, due to swarms of French privateers, and the isolated settlement won with so much suffering was evacuated after a few weeks.30

  Despite poor military leadership, the situation in Saint Domingue in the late summer and early autumn of 1796 was quite positive for the British. Forbes had almost 7,000 British and European and 10,000 colonial troops at his disposal. His adversaries had a significantly larger force, perhaps 25−30,000 men, but they were mostly untrained and racked by internal divisions. The arrival of white troops from France fanned these flames; André Rigaud now despised the French more than the British. Indeed, the Republicans found themselves under attack from all parties – the British, blacks, mulattoes and Spaniards. There was fighting between mulattoes and blacks and the two Republican commissioners, Rochambeau and Sonthonax, quarrelled, the former leaving the colony. Pitted against such fractured opposition, the British had some notable successes. During August, Rigaud’s attacks on Irois and other posts were driven off by General Bowyer. Although October brought heavy rain and this, combined with sickness, halted operations, Forbes was optimistic, writing to Dundas on the 9th:

  I am happy to have the power of assuring you that our situation in St. Domingo [Saint Domingue] is by far more favourable at this Time than since His Majesty has been in Possession of any Part of It.

  At the end of the month, the general claimed that with 8−10,000 troops he might gain complete control. ‘Now would be the time to strike a blow’. This chance, if it existed, was soon lost. Between the summer of 1796 and February 1797, the British and allied foreign forces dwindled to around 1,500 men, mostly unfit for active duty. When Spain declared war in October a number of regiments had been removed to other islands. The Government, and public opinion, had tired of the constant drain of lives and money demanded by the occupation of Saint Domingue. It was obvious at the outset of 1797 that more progress would entail prohibitive cost. Geggus well describes the dilemma.

  The irony therefore, was double. The British Government gave up hope of the reconquest of Saint Domingue just when the military situation was at its most favourable and the occupied zone was showing signs of prosperity. Now that success seemed within Britain’s grasp, however, it was increasingly certain that the colony would prove a profitless, if not untenable, conquest.

  Saint Domingue was neglected, in large part, because there were no available troops. Britain was on a path of economy which would eventually lead to withdrawal. Manpower was now required elsewhere, not least to supply the great expedition to the Windward and Leeward Islands.31

  Chapter 6

  Winds of Change: The Abercromby Expeditions, the Loss of Saint Domingue and the Peace of Amiens, 1795–1802

  In the summer months of 1795 a new great expedition was planned. Under the command of Sir Ralph Abe
rcromby, it was to consist of an army of 30,000 men – the largest military force ever to sail from Great Britain – to be carried to their destination in 100,000 tons of shipping, more than 200 vessels. As the redcoats gathered on the south coast of England and at Cork, instructions were sent ahead to the West Indies for the raising of extra black corps and the construction of hospitals.

  Abercromby was a sensible choice to lead the second great push in the Caribbean. The 62-year-old general had fought with distinction in the Netherlands in 1793. He was to build a reputation for utter integrity, intelligence and humanity. He demanded high levels of discipline and training, writing to Dundas in 1794, ‘If we are to have another campaign, order, discipline and confidence must be restored to this army’. His faults, such as his poor eyesight and a tendency to command too close to the front, were only likely to endear him to his officers. Sir Henry Bunbury remembered him as ‘a noble chieftain: mild in manner, resolute in mind, frank, unassuming, just, inflexible in what he deemed to be right, valiant as the Cid, liberal and loyal as the proudest of Black Edward’s knights’. John Moore, one of his ablest lieutenants, was close to Abercromby in the coming West Indian campaign.

  Sir Ralph is very short-sighted. Without a glass, he sees nothing, but with it he observes ground quickly and well. He has the zeal and eagerness of youth, and for his age has much activity of mind and body.

  Henry Clinton agreed that their leader ‘bore fatigue better than younger men’.

  This respected army commander was to have Hugh Cloberry Christian as his naval colleague in the combined operation. Christian had only been promoted to rear-admiral in June but, crucially, he had both experience of the Transport Board and the West Indies. Like Abercromby, he was popular. Mariner William Richardson describes him as ‘good, brave, and persevering’. However, his appointment to naval command of the expedition was complicated by issues of seniority; Christian was inferior in rank to the ageing Sir John Laforey who would have nominal command in the wider Caribbean. Following army complaints at this confusing arrangement, practical considerations trumped naval etiquette and Laforey was recalled.

  Abercromby received his initial instructions on 9 October. These ran to several pages, with a number of contingencies, but his first objectives were to be the capture of Guadeloupe and St Lucia. To achieve this, he was to remove as many troops from the garrisons of the Windward and Leeward Islands as he judged necessary and feasible. His secondary objectives were to quell the lingering unrest on Grenada and St Vincent (see Chapter 5) and to acquire the Dutch settlements of Surinam, Berbice and Demerara. Once all these opportunities had been seized, he might then dispatch forces to leeward to intervene in Saint Domingue. Abercromby reported to Dundas on the 27th.

  I have now had an Opportunity of considering the Instructions you sent me, and of Comparing the Means given me, with the Ends proposed. The Number of Troops required for the Windward and Leeward Island Service, has been furnished; in general, they are well equipped, and are healthy. The Transports on which the Troops are embarked are, in general, unexceptionable. The Hospital Staff is nearly complete. Regulations for the Care of Men on Ship Board, and on their arrival in the West Indies, have been framed by Military and Medical Men of Judgement and Experience, and no pains or Experience have been spared to furnish the Troops with every Article for their Accommodation and Comfort, in Health and in Sickness. The Artillery and Military Stores now embarked will prove Sufficient for the Service. I have the fullest Confidence in the Temper and Professional Abilities of the Naval commander with whom I am to act.

  With all these Prospects and Advantages, it would be too presumptuous to count on the Certainty of Success, some of those Accidents and Disasters that have befallen other conjunct Expeditions may attend us.

  The general was doing everything in his power, but his final words proved to be prescient. The launch of a large combined expedition was a daunting task and some delays borne out of the interactions of the numerous civil, army and navy departments were almost inevitable; on this occasion, the Ordnance Department attracted the most criticism. The damage caused by human frailty was soon to be dwarfed by elemental forces. On 16 November, the transports set out from Portsmouth under the protection of Christian’s squadron, but on the evening of the following day a violent storm struck the fleet. It continued through the night with hurricane-like fury and, by the following afternoon, many of the ships were aground or driven back to seek refuge. Several were lost; on one Dorset beach the bodies of 250 soldiers were washed up on the pebbles. This was catastrophic enough, but when the rapidly repaired fleet attempted a second voyage on 3 December, it was again afflicted by a gale and widely dispersed. By the end of the year, a hundred transports were still unaccounted for; how many were sunk was impossible to know. The admiral had been three weeks at sea but was only three days from the British coast and still failing to make much progress against the relentless storms. The seasick troops were in a miserable state and even seasoned sailors were prey to the doubters. William Richardson was one.

  Varying were the reports in England about our second time being driven back: some said it was a judgement from God, for sending so many men to the West Indies to die; others said it was a judgement against the nation for going to war with France, which we had no right to do…

  Midshipman William Dillon complained that when he was forced to return to shore he heard ‘nothing but sad tales of woe and distress’. This pessimism was fuelled by the news that the convoy from Cork taking troops to Saint Domingue had also been scattered by bad weather.

  The steadfast admiral, now regarded by many superstitious sailors to be unlucky, finally got the main part of the expeditionary force away at the end of February 1796. By this time, Abercromby had departed for Barbados in the frigate Arethusa and, in his absence, there was a lack of proper organisation. Brigadier General John Moore found Southampton to be in a state of confusion; ‘…everything is in disorder and the expedition will sail in as bad a state as ever an expedition did sail from this country’. The extensive damage sustained in the storms and the attendant delays meant that both the scale of the expedition and its objectives had to be repeatedly reassessed. Despite taking the best troops from units destined for the Mediterranean and India, Dundas struggled to raise the planned force of 30,000 men. The first sailing in November had carried nearly 19,000 troops and the second in December a few hundred more soldiers. After the second storm, about 12,000 troops were forced back to Portsmouth and, at the start of February, it could only be hoped that many of the 7,500 missing had gone on to the West Indies. Individual regiments were broken up with significant numbers stranded in England whilst their compatriots had sailed for the Caribbean.

  A new plan was needed. Dundas agreed with Abercromby that a concentration of available manpower would be made at Barbados prior to a campaign targeting the Windward Islands. The priorities were now judged to be St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada and Demerara. It was expected that at least 5,000 troops would have reached Barbados. To these, Dundas undertook to add the remnants of the six regiments of whom the majority of men were presumed already in the Caribbean, the Cork force of 7,300 men, and 6,000 foreign troops. Abercromby would have to decide how many men to spare, predominantly cavalry and foreign infantry, to pursue British aims in Saint Domingue. When the general arrived in Carlisle Bay, Barbados on 17 March, he found that a third of the 6,000 troops who had preceded him had been sent on to the beleaguered colonies of St Vincent and Grenada. This meant that he had a paltry 3,700 British regulars at his disposal. The number and nature of the local forces was also a disappointment. Attempts to raise West India Regiments had failed and there were only around a thousand under-trained temporary black corps (including Malcolm’s and Druault’s Rangers) and a few thousand pioneers (largely unwanted slaves) brought together with great difficulty by Quartermaster General John Knox. The arrival of the first transports of the Cork contingent coincided with that of Abercromby, but these filled the hospitals more q
uickly than the ranks. The general would have to wait for the promised convoys from Portsmouth to launch his major offensive.1

  The help sent to Grenada included a first reinforcement of approximately 600 men of the 10th, 25th, 29th and 88th Regiments, followed by detachments of the 3rd, 8th and 63rd. Their arrival allowed Nicolls to retake the offensive and he attacked fortified enemy posts south of Port Royal (St Andrew’s Bay) on 25 March. After initial failure, the 88th and a black corps (Loyal Black Rangers and Captain Brander’s Company) being forced to retreat, the attack culminated with Brigadier General Campbell leading the 3rd, the 8th, 63rd and 29th Regiments against enemy positions.

  They soon gained the top of the ridge, the enemy then ran towards their redoubt, and were followed by our people, who scrambled in at the embrasures, Captain [Joseph] Clary of the 29th being the first that entered. The enemy then fled in the utmost terror in all directions some throwing themselves down precipices, whilst others tried to escape down the hill through brush and other wood; but there was so heavy a fire kept upon them by our people that they endeavoured to escape along a bottom, where the detachment of the [17th] Light Dragoons under Captain [John] Black and the St George’s troop of Light Cavalry under M. Burney (that had previously been formed under the hill to profit of any occasion that offered) seeing the enemy fleeing rushed on them…

  According to Nicolls, few of the enemy in Port Royal, mostly ‘Sans Culottes companies’ from Guadeloupe, escaped. British losses were 20 regulars killed and 95 wounded and eight killed and 32 wounded among the colonial troops. The enemy, who had suffered losses five or six times as great, promptly evacuated Pilot Hill and Nicolls now occupied the ports, thus blocking Republican help from Guadeloupe. The insurrection was effectively crushed and further active operations could wait until later in the year.2