by Jack Beatty
34 Kokovtsov. For Sukhomlinov, see Fuller, The Foe Within, 242–50.
35 Wohlforth, “The Perception of Power,” 362. “In no other country (with the possible exception of Germany) was the assessment of Russian lower than in Russia herself.” Wohlforth, 365. For Bethmann Hollweg, see Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 64. “Bismarck was not an exponent of preventive war. It was, he once remarked, equivalent to shooting yourself in the head because you are afraid to die.” Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 549.
36 For “the last crisis,” see Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (New York: Norton, 1975), 332. A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 507.
37 For Russia’s trade, see Fischer, “War of Illusions,” 330–31. For “Sazonov,” see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 416.
38 For “Nicholas,” see McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy, 202. On Russia’s source in Vienna, see Alex Marshall, “Russian Military Intelligence 1905–1917: The Untold Story Behind Tsarist Russia in the First World War,” War in History 4, no. 4 (2004): 393–423.
39 The discussion of the von Sanders mission draws heavily on Robert L. Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. I. Its Origin,” Slavonic Review 6, no. 16 ( June 1927): 12–27; also “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. II. The Crisis,” Slavonic Review 6, no. 17 (December 1927): 344–62; also “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. III.” Slavonic Review 6, no. 18 (March 1928): 533–60; and “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. IV. The Aftermath,” Slavonic Review 7, no. 19 (June 1928): 90–112. For other views of Liman’s mission, see Ulrich Trumpener, “Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 4 (October 1966): 179–92, and H. S. W. Corrigan, “German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of World War in 1914: A Reassessment,” Past and Present no. 36 (April 1967): 144–52. For background on the Balkan Wars, see Syed Tanvir Wasti, “The 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and the Siege of Edirne,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 4 (July 2004): 59–78. For Sazonov’s prewar diplomay, see Ronald Bobroff, “Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912–13,” Russian Review 59, no. 1 (January 2000): 76–95.
40 Kaiser’s gloss on the cable is from Fay, Origins of the World War, 506.
41 For Liman, see Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. IV. The Aftermath,” 111. Summary of consequences of closing the Straits is from Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1918), 7. For Turkey’s entrance into the war, Robert J. Kerner, “Russia, the Straits, and Constantinople, 1914–1915,” Journal of Modern History 1, no. 3 (September 1929): 400–15. For “Liman Pasha,” see The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré 1914 (London: Heinemann, 1929), 26. Quotation about Bolshevism is from A. J. P. Taylor. Seen in Peter Vansittart, Voices from the Great War (New York: Franklin Watt, 1984), 45.
42 Scenes with Bethmann and the kaiser are from Kokovtsov, 384–94.
43 For Bethmann’s being out of the loop on the von Sanders decision, see Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 337, n. 106. For “I sensed,” see Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 83. For “private joke,” see Rodrick R. McLean, Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, 1890–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 37.
44 For the kaiser on the “racial struggle,” see Keith Wilson, “Hamlet—With and Without the Prince: Terrorism at the Outbreak of the First World War,” Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no. 2 (2007): 5 (electronic form). For “mad,” see McClean, Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, 1890–1914, 44. Wilhelm’s effect on Nicholas is the subject of Lamar Cecil, “William II and His Russian ‘Colleagues,’ ” in Carol Fink, Isabel V. Hull, and MacGregor Knox, eds., German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890–1945 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 106–33. For British reaction to Liman, see the London Times, November 29, 1913.
45 For Russia’s growth, see Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Penguin, 2003), 14.
46 For arrival in Constantinople, see Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1927), 3.
47 “Von Strempel” is from Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. II. The Crisis,” 348; “sop” is from Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. III,” 556.
48 Novoe vremia and the Russian military attaché are from Fischer, “War of Illusions,” 348, 338.
49 For Britain’s adviser to the Turkish navy, see Samuel R. Williamson Jr., “German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 210. “Zabern” is from Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. III,” 556.
50 McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 190: Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (Spring 1978): 93–107.
51 Bismarck spoke to Russia’s dilemma in a parable about two travelers in a carriage. One reaches for his pistol, and the other must respond. See James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), xviii–xix.
52 This account follows Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 541–50. Kokovtsov gave a version of the January 13 meeting more favorable to Sazonov to a writer in Foreign Affairs in 1929: “[Sazonov’s] report was in the nature of an academic discussion of future preparations, and was absolutely remote from the idea of directing Russia along the path of immediate and aggressive policy in the Turkish question.” See Michael T. Florinsky, “Russia and Constantinople: Count Kokovtzov’s Evidence,” Foreign Affairs (October 1929): 139. During the July Crisis, German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg made a similar argument to Sazonov’s above. Whereas Sazonov posited the worst-case scenario of France, persuaded that Russia would not fight, jumping its Dual Alliance traces and allying with Germany, the Riezler diaries quote Bethmann maintaining that if Germany failed to support Austria in its confrontation with Serbia over Sarajevo, Austria would seek “a rapprochement with the Western powers whose arms are wide open, and we shall lose our last military ally.” See V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 192.
53 For Tsaritsyn, see Gregory L. Freeze, “Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia,” Journal of Modern History 68, no. 2 ( June 1996): 340, n. 130. Rasputin’s misdeeds are from Edward Radzinski, The Rasputin File (New York: Doubleday, 2000) and Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf ), 199.
54 Kokovtsov, 293. Incident combines Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, 200; Alex De Jong, The Life and Times of Grigori Rasputin (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1982), 190; Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy (London: Cape, 1939), 148–49.
55 For “Moscow journal,” see Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, 216; “Rasputinschina,” see Freeze, Subversive Piety, 339.
56 Radzinski, The Rasputin File, 265.
57 Scene follows Kokovtsov, 295–300.
58 For Kokovtsov’s testimony, see Radzinski, The Rasputin File, 205.
59 For snub, see Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, 149. Kokovtsov, 220. For Alexandra’s antagonism toward Stolypin, see Greg King, The Man Who Killed Rasputin: Prince Felix Youssouprov and the Murder That Helped Bring Down the Russian Empire (Secaucus: Citadel Press, 1995), 40.
60 For Nicholas’s trip, see Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 5. For “financial aversion,” see M. Loukianov, “Conservatives and ‘Renewed Russia,’ 1907–1914” Slavic Review 61, 4 (Winter 2002): 775.
61 Patricia Herlihy, “ ‘Joy of the Rus’: Rites and Rituals of Russian Drinking,” Russian Review 50, no. 2 (April 1991): 131–47.
62 Patricia Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial R
ussia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 138ff.; Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 35–43, 124–25, 220–21, 226–27, 285–89.
63 Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire, 159–60; David R. Costello, “Novoe vremia and the Conservative Dilemma, 1911–1914,” Russian Review 37, no. 1 (January 1978): 46–48.
63 Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire, 138–45. For bread riot, see Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, 130. For concoction, see Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 298. History repeated itself in 1985, when Mikhail S. Gorbachev “restricted vodka sales to get Russians back to the assembly line.” Vodka taxes provided 25 percent of the entire Soviet budget. “The Kremlin tried to patch the budget hole by printing more money, which worsened the hyper-inflation that hastened the downfall of the communist state.” See Mark Lawrence Schrad, “Moscow’s Drinking Problem,” New York Times, April 17, 2011.
64 This discussion of Kokovtsov’s firing follows Fay, Origins of the World War, 512–31, and Kokovtsov, 407–31. For “greasy pole,” see Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 278.
65 Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of All the Russias, 178.
66 For anti-German party, see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 11, 182. For Bethmann, see Fritz Fischer, “Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Back on the ‘Fischer Controversy’ and Its Consequences,” Central European History 21, no. 3 (September 1988): 215. For Baron Taube on removal of the restraining brake, see David M. McDonald, “The Durnovo Memorandum in Context: Official Conservatism and the Crisis of Autocracy,” 494. Fay, Origins of the World War, 536–38. For Sazonov, see Robert J. Kerner, “Russia, the Straits, and Constantinople, 1914–1915,” Journal of Modern History 1, no. 3 (September 1929): 402. For Taube, see Albertini, 550, n. 2. Abraham Ascher ventures that had he lived, Stolypin, “given his previous insistence that Russia must avoid war,” would “have tried to keep Russia at peace” in 1914. From the State Council, “Durnovo might have sided with Stolypin in pressing for the avoidance of war, and they, supported by other rightists fearful of war, might have made an impact at the court. This is all speculation, to be sure.” Ascher, P. A. Stolypin, 392–94. Kokovtsov “had neither the force of personality nor the political skills” to have performed that role.
67 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 11, 294. For Sazonov and partial mobilization, see Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990–1991): 180, n. 101. For “all-or-nothing choice,” see Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 104. David Stevenson argues that the “Period Preparatory for War” measures, “applied in the military districts opposite Germany as well as opposite Austria-Hungary”—purchasing “horses, food, and fodder,” clearing the “frontier railways of rolling stock,” and “under the guise of maneuvers mov[ing] up extra forces to the border”—“to some extent were mobilization,” were seen as such by the Germans, and if continued would have “obliged Germany to mobilize” even if Russia had not openly proclaimed mobilization. See Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” 152–53. For scene with Alexandra, see Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914 (London: Gollancz, 1935), 553.
68 For “criminologists,” see David R. Costello, “Novoe vremia and the Conservative Dilemma,” Russian Review 37, no. 1 (January 1978): 47.
69 For strike, see the accounts in Leopold Haimson, “The Problem of Social Stability in Russia, 1905–1917” (Part One), Slavic Review 23, no. 4 (December 1964): 619–642, esp. 635–42; Robert B. McKean, St. Petersburg Between the Revolutions: Workers and Revolutionaries, June 1907–February 1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 308–14; Hans Rogger, “Russia in 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 4 (October 1966): 98–101.
70 For Potemkin crowds, see Rogger, “Russia in 1914,” 107. For Pourtalés, see Fay, The Origins of the World War, vol. II, 306; details also taken from the London Times, July 20–26, 1914.
71 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” Political Psychology 4, no. 2 (June 1983): 336. For declining numbers of executions, see S. S. Oldenburg, Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1975), 75.
72 For strikes after August 1, see Rogger, “Russia in 1914,” 108. For Cambon, see Fay, Origins of the World War, vol. II, 305. For “drown in blood,” see Wohlforth, “The Perception of Power,” 360.
73 Follows D. W. Spring, “Russia and the Coming of War,” in R. J. W. Evans and Harmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), esp. distinction of “publics” on 58, also 80–86. For “according to a colleague,” see Rogger, “Russia in 1914,” 109. For trade figures, see Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 308. For “literate,” see Fay, The Origins of the World War, 265. For newspaper circulations, see Thomas Riha, “Riech: A Portrait of a Russian Newspaper,” Slavic Review 22, no. 4 (December 1963): 663–82.
74 For “liberal review,” see Rogger, “Russia in 1914,” p. 109; also on liberal views, Leopold Haimson, “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917 (Part Two),” Slavic Review 24, no. 1 (March 1965): 1–22. For centrist member, see Geoffrey A. Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 240–41.
75 For “Kurchernigo,” see Josh Sanborn, “The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation: A Reexamination,” Slavic Review 59, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 272–73. For Russian casualties, see Melissa K. Stockdale, “My Death for the Motherland Is Happiness,” American Historical Review 109, no. 1 (February 2004), 89, n. 32, total deaths, and Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 773.
76 Nicolas de Basily, The Abdication of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1984), 95–96. I elided a word in the final quotation—“not”—between “Germany” and “allowed,” for ease of reading.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
1 The Asquith quotation above seen in David French, “The Edwardian Crisis and the Origins of the First World War,” International Review of History 4, no. 2 (May 1982): 218. For the Times quotation, see David Powell, The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901–1914 (New York: Palgrave, 1996), 162. On the danger of civil war, Powell writes, “There can be little doubt that if the Liberals had gone ahead with their Home Rule Bill without securing agreement on [excluding Ulster from it] a violent rebellion in Ulster would have resulted, with every likelihood of national para-militaries becoming involved in a virtual civil war,” 161.
2 For spy, see Samuel R. Williamson Jr., “German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 205–14.
3 For hostility to Germany, see Michael Ekstein, “Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 3 (1971): 9. Hobhouse, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904–1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 145. For “economy of truth,” see Cameron Hazlehurst, “Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908–1916,” English Historical Review 85, no. 336 (July 1970): 519. For balance, see John W. Coogan and Peter F. Coogan, “The British Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1905–1914: Who Knew What and When Did He Know It?” Journal of British Studies 24, no. 1 ( January 1985): 110–31.
4 For Churchill, see Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesman, 1901–1914, Volume 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 578–79.
5 For Hötzendorf, see Solomon Wank, “Some Reflections on Conrad von Hötzendorf and His Memoirs Based on Old and New Sources,” in Austrian History Yearbook, vol. 1 (1965): 82.
6 On July 4 is from French, “The Edwardian Crisis and the Origins of the First World War,” 218. Niall Ferguson, “The Kaiser’s European Union,” in Niall Ferguson, ed.
, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 276.
7 See Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War, 1914–1918 (New York: Pearson, 2001), 386.
8 Alvin Jackson, Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9, 23. For “English bayonets,” see Elizabeth A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991), 3. Parnell quotation is taken from a John Redmond speech seen in the Times, April 9, 1914. For seven centuries, see David Gardner, “Royal Visit Will Dispel Ghosts of Once-Troubled Irish Relationship,” Financial Times, May 16, 1911.
9 For Parnell’s deal, see Patrick Buckland, Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland 1886–1922 (New York: Barnes & Noble Books), 7. For more see F. S. L. Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), and for Parnell on “march of a nation,” see 351.
10 For background on the budget and elections, see R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (London: John Murray, 1999), 38–9. For election and the Liberals’ bargain, see Keith Jeffrey, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 113. For Redmond, see George Dangerfield, The Damnable Question: A History of Anglo-Irish Relations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 55. For Redmond in Limerick, see Pembroke Wicks, The Truth about Home Rule (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1913), 5.
11 Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912–1918 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 44.
