Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical

by Sciabarra, Chris

  43. B. Branden 1962T, Lecture 3; N. Branden [1969] 1979, 81–82.

  44. N. Branden 1990, 15. See also Wieder (1988–89), who views the left-brain/right-brain dichotomy as rooted in “the age-old dichotomies of mind versus body.” Allan Blumenthal provides an interesting parallel in his discussion of musical conducting. He stresses the notion of the right hand as the “doer” and the left hand as the “dreamer.” Blumenthal and Blumenthal 1974T, Lecture 12. If the left side of the brain controls the right side of the body, and vice versa, one can see in the union of right and left hand direction a synthesis of linear and emotive components.

  45. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in Romantic Manifesto, 18.

  46. N. Branden [1969] 1979,99–100. Branden’s original articles on psycho-epistemology appear in The Objectivist Newsletter, October–November 1964.

  47. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 195.

  48. Rand (6 March 1974), “Philosophy: Who needs it,” in Philosophy, 20–21.

  49. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.4.

  50. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 87–88; [1971] 1978, 105.

  51. N. Branden 1983b, 141–46. N. Branden (1980, 92n) argues too, that there are “biological forces deep within our organism that speak to us in a wordless language we have yet barely begun to decipher.” Though Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 7) has dismissed Eastern philosophy, and though Rand and Branden never formally examined such holistic medical concepts and techniques as chi, biofeedback, or psychosomatic medicine, these perspectives offer interesting nondualistic parallels on the mind-body unity. See Moyers 1993.

  52. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 17–18; Saint-Andre 1993, 161–63.

  53. Rand (April-June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in Romantic Manifesto, 60.

  54. For Branden, psychology provides the crucial link “on ‘how to get there from here,’ meaning: how to learn to live the Objectivist morality.” His post-Randian work “provides something missing [from] and badly needed” by the philosophy of Objectivism. He has “been concerned with devising the means that would enable a person to live consciously, responsibly, productively—and happily.” N. Branden, 14 January 1994C; 21 June 1993C; 1994.

  55. Redressing the balance of reason and emotion is by no means the chief aim of Branden’s post-Randian work. In a personal correspondence (15 June 1993C), Branden explains: “In the years since I left New York, I have had three principal goals which my writing reflects: (1) to develop further my theory of self-esteem; (2) to explore the psychology of romantic love; (3) to design a psychotherapeutic technology for facilitating change and growth.”

  56. Peikoff 1983T, Lectures 2, 6, and 10, and 1991b, 159–62.

  57. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 2; N. Branden and E. D. Branden 1983, 99.

  58. Rand (July-August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 173–74.

  59. Rand did not repudiate all of modern feminism, only its “collectivist” elements. She responded positively to Friedan’s Feminine Mystique. Edith Efron (July 1963), “Books,” in Objectivist Newsletter 2:27. Despite her hostility toward “Women’s Lib,” several commentators have written of Rand’s positive contribution to feminism. Riggenbach argues that Dagny Taggart, the heroine in Atlas Shrugged, is an extraordinary female role model, great at everything from engineering to sex. Riggenbach maintains that Rand’s message of individual autonomy influenced those whom she would have “disowned,” including militant feminists, gay activists, and student rebels. Riggenbach 1979, 1982. Gladstein (1978) explores the “unlikely,” but positive alliance between Rand and feminism. Landrum (1994) characterizes Rand as among the most important “creative women who changed the world.” And Taylor (1992), who knew Rand in the 1960s, incorporates a number of significant Objectivist themes in her feminist work. See also Gladstein and Sciabarra 1999.

  60. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 206–8. In Rand’s fiction, especially The Fountainhead, there is a pronounced emphasis on the male as sexual aggressor. This aggressiveness, however, is not a sanction of rape. Rand uses explosive imagery in her description of sexual acts that are always consensual and mutually desired.

  61. N. Branden 1983b, 174. Like other psychologists, N. Branden (1983b, 1986, 1987, 1994) argues not only for the integration of the “male” self and “female” self, but of other “sub-selves” or “sub-personalities,” including the “child-self,” “teenage self,” “intuitive self,” and “sage self.” Livingston (1994, 10) observes that this doctrine was originated in the “therapeutic movement known as Transactional Analysis.”

  62. Glennon (1983), “Synthesism: A case of feminist methodology,” in Morgan 1983, 260.

  63. On a woman president, see Rand (December 1968), “About a woman president,” in Voice of Reason. Peikoff (1985T) claims that Rand’s opposition to a woman presidential candidate was not a philosophical issue. Rand wrote the article based upon her personal view of masculinity and femininity, not as a philosophical distinction. On homosexuality, Rand never wrote an article, but in several instances, exhibited definite homophobia: Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 175; and Rand 1971T. See also Sciabarra 2003a.

  64. On the “nature-nurture” debate, see Rand (1972), “The stimulus and the response,” in Philosophy, 175, and Peikoff 1991b, 204. On the “determinist” premises shared by behaviorism and psychoanalysis, see Locke (February 1980), “Behaviorism and psychoanalysis: Two sides of the same coin, “in Binswanger 1.1.11.

  65. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 11, and 1988aT; and Packer 1985T.

  66. N. Branden 1982T and 1983T.

  67. N. Branden 1983T; Blumenthal 1992T. Blumenthal argues too that there are certain biochemical factors and physiological complexities that must be taken into account in our understanding of emotions. Since clinical depression and chemical imbalances are not alterable by a therapeutic articulation process, aspects of Rand’s theory may need further modification.

  CHAPTER 8. ART, PHILOSOPHY, AND EFF ICACY

  1. See Romantic Manifesto for these more specific applications. For Rand’s discussion of music, which employs Helmholz’s theories, see Rand (April–June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in Romantic Manifesto, 50–71, and Blumenthal and Blumenthal 1974T. Though not considered as a component of Rand’s aesthetics, a discussion of the nature of beauty is provided by Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11 and 1991b, 448. The best critical presentation of Rand’s aesthetics is provided by Torres and Kamhi 2000.

  2. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in Romantic Manifesto, 16–17.

  3. Compare Hayek (1948), who similarly argues that our efficacy is largely a result of how well we perform certain activities without thinking about them.

  4. Rand (May–July 1969), “What is romanticism?” in Romantic Manifesto, 101.

  5. Rand (April-June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in Romantic Manifesto, 46–47, 73.

  6. Rand 1958T, Lectures 1 and 7. On the nature of “creative thinking,” see N. Branden [1969] 1979, 81; Smith 1993; and Rand (1940), “The simplest thing in the world: A short story,” in Romantic Manifesto, 173–85. In this stream-of-consciousness narrative, Rand depicts the inner workings of the mind of Henry Dorn, an author, in his attempt to write a story. Dorn’s subconscious integrations direct his conscious thoughts with lightning-like speed.

  7. Peikoff 1991b, 446. Though Lossky was not an aesthetician, it was he who taught Aristotle to Rand. Lossky himself argued that each art work is an organic unity in which all elements are “in harmony with, and exist for, one another.” Lossky [1917] 1928, 48, 160. Tolstoy was another Russian writer who championed the “completeness, oneness, the inseparable unity of form and contents” in a work of art. Tolstoi [1899] 1913, 96.

  8. Rand, in N. Branden (1962), “The literary method of Ayn Rand,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 135–40. Cox (1993) examines the extensive integration that Rand
achieved in The Fountainhead.

  9. I use the word “responder” to include viewers (for the visual arts), readers (for the literary arts), and listeners (for music). Thanks to Torres and Kamhi for this suggestion.

  10. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 35.

  11. In her concept of “style,” Rand merged two tacit dimensions: “sense of life” and “psycho-epistemology.” As she put it: “Style conveys what may be called a ‘psycho-epistemological sense of life,’ i.e., an expression of that level of mental functioning on which the artist feels most at home.” Romantic Manifesto, 42.

  12. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 35.

  13. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in Romantic Manifesto, 24.

  14. Rand (April–June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in Romantic Manifesto, 63.

  15. For raising this issue, thanks to Saint-Andre (5 January 1993C).

  16. Rand (January 1965), “Bootleg romanticism,” in Romantic Manifesto, 129–30.

  17. Rand (October–November 1963), “The goal of my writing,” in Romantic Manifesto, 169.

  18. See Cox 1986, in which Cox relates Rand’s aesthetic theories to her own literary craft.

  19. Rand (May–July 1969), “What is romanticism?” in Romantic Manifesto, 99.

  20. Rand (October–November 1963), “The goal of my writing,” in Romantic Manifesto, 167. Among Russian writers, Yuri Karlovich Olesha has also been identified as both a Romantic and a Realist. Guerney 1960, 375.

  21. In Anthem Rand experimented with futuristic themes. Atlas Shrugged also contains elements of science fiction and fantasy.

  22. Rosenthal 1975, 15–18, and (1986), “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 46–47.

  23. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in Romantic Manifesto, 22–23. In this context, Rand argued: “The greater a work of art, the more profoundly universal its theme.” Thus, while her own fictional works have a strong propaganda element, they also incorporate themes that transcend a particular time or place.

  24. Rosenthal (1986), “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 36–37; Steele 1988, 41. For additional parallels between the “God-builders” and Rand, see Chapter 13.

  25. Rand quoted in N. Branden (1962), “The literary method of Ayn Rand,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 97.

  26. Rand (1943–44), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: A speech to architects,” in Binswanger 6.6.13.

  27. Rand (4 May 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Schwartz 6.1.5.

  28. Rand (4 May 1946), quoted in Peikoff 1991a, xiv.

  29. Rand 1961T. Childs (1993, 46) observed correctly that Rand’s writings do not make a single reference to—and that the N.B.I. has never carried a single book written by—Hayek.

  30. Hayek (1968), “The confusion of language in political thought,” in Hayek [1978] 1985, 81. The notion of a “tacit” dimension does not originate with Ryle, Polanyi, or Hayek. Livingston (1991, 174) argues that Aristotle’s discussion of the “topic or commonplace is roughly the same as Hayek’s tacit dimension or tradition.”

  31. There are many other differences between Rand and Hayek. For example, Rand would have disagreed with Hayek’s endorsement of Popper’s falsifiability criterion. Gray (1984, 12, 19–21) notes, however, that Hayek’s acceptance of a “falsificationist methodology” comes with “massive qualification.”

  32. In this regard, N. Branden (1994, 288) has suggested a closer affinity with the Hayekian-Polanyian perspective. He argues that every person has a tendency to accept certain cultural beliefs that are never “the subject of explicit awareness.… It is not possible for anyone, even the most independent, to make every premise conscious or to subject every premise to critical scrutiny.” Each of us is a being of our time and place. “None of us can entirely escape the influence of our social environment.” I discuss these issues further in Chapters 11 and 13.

  33. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 30.

  34. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in Philosophy, 99. Even a thorough “materialist” such as Engels argued for the primacy of philosophy over science: “Natural scientists may adopt whatever attitude they please, they will still be under the domination of philosophy. It is only a question whether they want to be dominated by a bad, fashionable philosophy or by a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.” Engels 1882, in Selsam and Martel 1963, 171.

  35. Rand (6 March 1974), “Philosophy: Who needs it,” in Philosophy, 6.

  36. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in Philosophy, 246.

  37. Rand (June 1970), “The chickens’ homecoming,” in New Left, 107.

  38. Smith (1979) provides a Rand-influenced defense of atheism.

  39. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 127–28. On reciprocal causation, see N. Branden 1987, 41, and 1983b, 60, and Peikoff 1974T, Lecture 9.

  40. N. Branden 1994 is Branden’s most detailed treatment to date of the impact of cultural institutions on the development of self-esteem and efficacy.

  41. See Emmons 1971, and Barry 1983 and 1986.

  42. Aside from some references to rationalism and empiricism in For the New Intellectual, Rand did not write much on the subject. The material herein discussed is primarily from Peikoff’s lectures, which derive from Rand’s teachings and from the oral Objectivist tradition.

  43. Rand (28 January–11 February 1974), “Philosophical detection,” in Philosophy, 19.

  44. Rand (25 February 1974), “Ideas v. goods,” in Ayn Rand Letter 3:296.

  45. New Intellectual, 39. Though there are many different meanings attached to rationalism and empiricism, Rand does not make any distinction between “concept-empiricism” and “judgment-empiricism,” or “concept-rationalism” and “judgment-rationalism.” “Concept-empiricism” sees all concepts as arising out of experience, whereas, “concept-rationalism” denies this. “Judgment-empiricism” views all propositions as either verifiable-in-principle or analytic, whereas “judgment-rationalism” views propositions as synthetic and a priori. Thanks to Hospers (17 July 1993C) for these qualifications. Rand would have prohably rejected each of these incarnations.

  46. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 7. This course is described by Peikoff as a product of his own struggle with methodological rationalism. Peikoff (1983T, Lectures 1, 3, and 12) argues that Objectivism cannot be filtered through the dualism of mind and body without causing interpretive distortions. He offers useful guidelines against “rationalist Objectivism.”

  47. Introduction, 76; Rand (30 July 1973), “Perry Mason finally loses,” in Ayn Rand Letter, 225.

  48. Rand (28 January–11 February 1974), “Philosophical detection,” in Philosophy, 15.

  49. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.3.

  50. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 45–46.

  51. Smith (1979, 133) uses this phrase.

  52. Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 6. For Objectivism’s contextual view of “certainty,” see Peikoff 1991b, 171–82.

  53. Hollinger (1984), “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 42, 49.

  54. Binswanger 1990, 30–32. Both Rand and Branden argued that human rationality required responsibility—a willingness to accept the intended and unintended consequences of one’s actions. They were fond of the old Spanish proverb, “God said; ‘Take what you want and pay for It.’” Rand (July 1970), “Causality versus duty,” in Philosophy, 122; N. Branden 1980, 188; N. Branden and E. D. Branden 1983, 148.

  55. On the Marxian view, see Flacks 1982, 16. Rand’s resolution actually lies somewhere between the optimism of Marx and the conservatism of Hayek. Marx believed that capitalism perpetuated and was constituted by unintended consequences. To focus purely on unintended consequenc
es reified characteristics that were historically specific to capitalism. He envisioned a future society in which people conquered the unintended consequences of their actions. Although Rand did not exhibit such intellectual hubris, her resolution required the emergence of a degree of cognitive efficacy hitherto unseen in human history.

  56. Sciabarra 1988a; 1995b.

  57. Hayek (1970), “The errors of constructivism,” in Hayek [1978] 1985, 20.

  58. Hayek (1946), “Individualism: True and false,” in Hayek 1948, 15.

  59. In Hayek (1965), “Kinds of rationalism,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 85, he cites Gladstone as the first person to use the term “constructivism” to describe the “engineering type of mind.”

  60. Hayek 1981, 129; 1988.

  61. Hayek (1965), “Kinds of rationalism,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 93.

  62. Hayek (1962), “Rules, perception and intelligibility,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 62.

  63. Hayek (1964), “The theory of complex phenomena,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 39.

  64. Lavoie (1982, 21–22) has a provocative insight when he writes: “Both Marx and Mises pointed out that rationality as we know it is itself a product of the emergence of market relations.” The belief that rationality is internal to capitalism is one held by thinkers as diverse as Marx, Mises, Weber, and Rand. I further explore Rand’s conception in Chapters 9 and 10.

  65. See her New Intellectual. Also see Peikoff 1982. Rand added that it was this fallacious view of pure reason that Kant criticized in a “straw man” argument that undermined a proper understanding of the rational faculty. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in Philosophy, 77–78; Rand 1972T.

  66. “Appendix,” 148–49. On the concept of infinity, compare Aristotle, Physics 3.4.204a34–5. 206a7, in Aristotle 1941, 260–64.

  67. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 175. Compare Shaffer 1976, 14.

  68. Rand (April–May 1966), “Our cultural value-deprivation,” in Voice of Reason, 102.

  CHAPTER 9. ETHICS AND HUMAN SURVIVAL