Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical

by Sciabarra, Chris

  1. Among those articles on Rand’s egoism that appeared in the Personalist: N. Branden 1970a and 1970b; Emmons 1971 and 1972; Machan 1971; Hospers 1970; Mack 1971; Den Uyl 1975; Dwyer 1972, 1973, and 1974; Bold 1973; and Lugenbehl 1974. Also see Nozick (1971), “On the Randian argument,” and Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1978), “Nozick on the Randian argument,” both reprinted in Paul 1981.

  2. Many Western philosophers, as well, have criticized the fact-value distinction. Peikoff (1970T, Lecture 8) argues that Dewey developed a contextualist ethic that opposed both subjectivism and rationalism as mystical and intuitivist. Despite his disagreements with Dewey, Peikoff acknowledges his effective denunciation of the dichotomy between body and mind and fact and value. Veatch (1992) also discusses the similarity between Rand’s critique and the critiques of the “old-line analytic-linguistic philosophies” of MacIntyre, Williams, and Nussbaum.

  3. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in Romantic Manifesto, 16; (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 34.

  4. Rand (August–September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in Unknown Ideal, 313–14, and (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 163; and N. Branden (July 1962), “Benevolence versus altruism,” in Objectivist Newsletter 1:27.

  5. N. Branden (October 1963), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in Objectivist Newsletter 2:39.

  6. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in Philosophy, 96.

  7. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in Philosophy, 75.

  8. Peikoff 1972T, Lectures 2 and 10; 1970T, Lecture 5.

  9. Kaufmann, in Nietzsche [1886] 1966, 138 n. 35, and 228 n. 35.

  10. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s rediscovery of classical antiquity was foreshadowed by Hegel. Copleston ([1963] 1985, 208) maintains that in Hegelian thought, “the moral agent has a right to seek his own welfare, the satisfaction of his needs as a human being.” Hegel appropriated this view from “Greek ethics as represented by Aristotle.” He rejected “the Kantian notion that an act loses its moral value if performed from inclination.”

  11. Rand (15 May 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.6.

  12. Rand (6 October 1949), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.42.

  13. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in Unknown Ideal, 21–22.

  14. Rand (June 1982), “To the readers of The Fountainhead,” in Binswanger 3.3.5.

  15. The phrase “counterfeit individualism” is actually used in N. Branden (April 1962), “Counterfeit individualism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 135. Though not in the individualist tradition, there are several Russian thinkers who attempted to transcend the egoist-altruist distinction, including Fedorov and Chernyshevsky, who defended a form of psychological egoism. See Chapter 1, and Lossky 1951, 61–62, 78. Even such nonindividualists as Marx and Engels ([1845–46] 1970, 104–5) projected a transcendence of egoism and altruism. They recognized “that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals.” Though Marx shows humanistic tendencies, especially in his early works, he is apt to condemn capitalism precisely for its “selfishness.”

  16. Rand (January 1963), “Collectivized ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 81.

  17. O’Neill [1971] 1977, 201. Whereas O’Neill criticizes Rand’s redefinition of “altruism,” Steele (1988, 43) criticizes Rand’s redefinition of “selfishness” for much the same reason. For Steele, Rand’s definition leaves “most of traditional bourgeois morality … unscathed.”

  18. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 35.

  19. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in Unknown Ideal, 21–22.

  20. Rand (8 March 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 5.2.4.

  21. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 14.

  22. Atlas Shrugged, 1012–13. This is Rand’s description of life. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 10) explains that Rand never offered a definition of life because this was outside the domain of philosophy.

  23. Binswanger (August 1986), “The goal-directedness of living action,” in Binswanger 7.4.4–5. I do not discuss Binswanger’s application of Objectivist principles to the theory of natural selection. Peikoff (1991b, 476 n. 19) explains that because Darwin’s theory was a special science, Rand took no philosophical position on it. Nor do I discuss Binswanger’s defense of emergentist teleology against the vitalist-teleological and mechanistic positions. See Binswanger 1990, 6, 132, and Binswanger (1992), “Life-based teleology and the foundations of ethics,” in Smith 1992, 84–103. Binswanger’s “emergentist teleology” is offered as an alternative to the dualism of vitalist teleology versus mechanism. Interestingly, Lossky ([1917] 1928, 154–55) himself rejected mechanistic explanations in favor of teleological ones.

  24. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 17.

  25. Aristotle Metaphysics 9.8–9, in Aristotle 1941, 828–33. Rand (“Appendix,” 285) argued that though she never wrote on the subject directly, she has “referred to actual and potential in any number of ways in any number of articles.”

  26. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 21.

  27. Later in this chapter, I argue in favor of the eudaemonic interpretation as consistent with Rand’s dialectical approach. In conjunction with the idea that our survival as human beings is no mere, momentary survival, Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1983) maintain that the “eudaemonic individual” does not “view life as a linear succession of discrete moments,” rather he or she “lives a time-integrated life, whereas the dysdaemonic individual lives a time-differentiated life” (115).

  28. O’Neill [1971] 1977, 88; Nozick (1971), “On the Randian argument,” in Paul 1981, 206–31.

  29. N. Branden (1962), “Objectivism and psychology,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 72; Hospers 1967, 594; Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1978), “Nozick on the Randian argument,” in Paul 1981, 232–69; Mack (1984), “The fundamental moral elements of Rand’s theory of rights,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 123, 128.

  30. Rasmussen 1990b; Den Uyl (1992), “Teleology and agent-centeredness,” in Smith 1992, 31 n. 18.

  31. Gotthelf 1990, 6. Though Gotthelf (5 March 1994C) does not now accept all the formulations of his unpublished paper on “The Choice to Value,” I appreciate his permission to cite its key arguments.

  32. Binswanger (1992), “Life-based teleology and the foundations of ethics,” in Smith 1992, 99–100.

  33. As I discussed in Chapter 6, Rand’s epistemology endorses a form of contextual internalism. In what sense, then, did Rand define life and value as internally related? For Rand, the concept of “life” serves the same function in ethics as does the axiomatic concept of “existence” in ontology. Even though “existence” is the “ultimate” context for every concept imaginable, Rand did not speculate on the “ultimate” constituents of existence. And even though “life” is the context for value and the ultimate value, Rand did not speculate on the “ultimate” constituents of life either. She did not define life, since this is a scientific task; she merely described it. Hence, her identification of a link between life and value occurred on a broad level of generality. By rejecting metaphysical (or “cosmological”) conjecture, Rand retained contextuality.

  34. Rand does not explicitly make this argument, but N. Branden (1987, 79) suggests it.

  35. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 25.

  36. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 25–26.

  37. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 4) explains that Rand did not provide an exhaustive list of virtues.
Rand focused on basic, broad abstractions. In Peikoff (27 February 1989), “Why should one act on principle?” in Schwartz 4.20.4–5, he remarks that these broad principles serve the epistemic need for unit economy; they reduce the complexity of human choices “to simple, retainable units, telling us which actions support human life and which ones destroy it.”

  38. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 1, in Aristotle 1941, 689–93.

  39. Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 12; Ridpath 1988T; Peikoff 1991b, 195; Kelley 1990, 40. Interestingly, Peikoff (1987bT, questions, period 2) hints at moral relativism. He maintains that because of the contextual nature of knowledge, it is wrong to condemn a primitive person for knowledge that he does not possess. In passing moral judgments, one must take account of the knowledge that is available to a person living within a certain cultural context.

  40. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 26; Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 8, and 1983T, Lecture 10. Like Rand, Peikoff suggests that the scope of productive work is wide; even motherhood constitutes a profession.

  41. Rand (May 1964), “Patents and copyrights,” in Unknown Ideal, 130.

  42. Rand (November-December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in Unknown Ideal, 16. Reason as a theoretical and practical activity suggests Rand’s implicit awareness of phronesis or prudence (practical reason). For an interesting quasi-Aristotelian examination of this virtue, see Den Uyl 1991 and Rasmussen 1992.

  43. N. Branden (February 1964), “The psychology of pleasure,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 62; Rand (1971), “Why I like stamp collecting,” in Column, 120.

  44. An Objectivist discussion of Marx is provided by Walsh [1985] 1990T, Lecture 2. Though Rand had some respect for Marx as a thinker, there are times (e.g., New Intellectual, 37) when she grossly simplifies and distorts his project.

  45. Ollman 1993, 63. Gould (1978) explores Marx’s quasi-Aristotelian view of the efficacious character of labor.

  46. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 27.

  47. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 161.

  48. Rand (August 1962), “The ‘conflicts’ of men’s interests,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 53.

  49. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.9.1109a20–23, in Aristotle 1941, 963; Copleston [1946] 1985, 337.

  50. Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 4.2.1123b21–27, in Aristotle 1941, 991–92.

  51. Ibid. 4.3.1124a3–4; 4.3.1125al–2; 9.8.1169al2, in Aristotle 1941, 992, 994, 1087.

  52. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 5, and 1985T.

  53. Also see Wheeler (1984), “Rand and Aristotle: A comparison of Objectivist and Aristotelian ethics,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 87.

  54. On the relationship of “self” and “mind,” see N. Branden 1983b, 29, and Atlas Shrugged, 1030, 1057.

  55. N. Branden 1980, 124; Peikoff 1991b, 307; Locke (December 1982), “Ayn Rand and psychology, part two,” in Binswanger 3.6.13.

  56. N. Branden ([1969] 1979, 110 n.31) credits Rand with having provided “a partial anticipation” of the concept of self-esteem he develops at length in his books.

  57. Initially, N. Branden ([1969] 1979, 114) identified self-esteem with the two interrelated aspects of “self-confidence” and “self-respect.” His most recent formulations (1994) are more fully developed.

  58. Branden’s identification of six pillars of self-esteem is an expansion of his earlier discussion ([1971] 1978, 155) of the “four pillars of self-esteem,” which he identified as: self-awareness, self-acceptance, self-responsibility, self-assertiveness. Branden’s newest work identifies these six pillars as both ethical and psychological, involving the virtues of rationality, honesty, independence, productiveness, and integrity. Interestingly, by book’s end, Branden (1994, 308) embraces a seventh “pillar” of self-esteem, which he defines as “the motive power” of the others: “the love we have for our own life.” These seven interacting principles duplicate—on a psychological level—many of the themes encapsulated by Rand’s seven basic virtues: rationality, productiveness, pride, honesty, integrity, independence, and justice. See also N. Branden 1991T.

  59. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 31.

  60. Branden echoes Rand’s contention. He argues that in modern culture, the equating of “selfishness” with evil leaves people no way of characterizing as noble that which is self-focused. Branden suggests that by controlling the content of language, modern intellectuals invariably control how people think. N. Branden (n.d.T), The Psychology of Individualism, and 1983b, 205–9.

  61. Rosenthal (15 November 1993C) suggests that Rand’s preoccupation with the integration of love and sex was a major issue for Silver Age thinkers, especially Rozanov. On Rozanov, see Anna Lisa Crone, “Nietzschean, All Too Nietzschean? Rozanov’s Anti-Christian Critique,” in Rosenthal 1986, 95–112.

  62. Rand (February 1963), “The ethics of emergencies,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 46.

  63. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 31–32. In his critique of Rand, Emmons (1971, 96) argues that Rand’s belief in self-value as a prerequisite to valuing others is rooted in Nietzsche. In fact, this perspective is as old as Aristotle.

  64. In later years, Branden criticized a number of Rand’s beliefs in the area of love and sex. But he remains in general agreement with her view that love, sex, and values are intimately connected. As has been suggested, Branden sees our sexual choices as far more complex than Rand supposes. He is also far less likely to moralize on issues of sexual psychology. In Branden’s view, sex can be a valuable activity in the absence of romantic love. What he objects to is “sex without personal involvement, sex between two people who do not relate to each other as persons and do not care for each other as persons and are not interested in each other as persons.” N. Branden 1971b, 9–10; 1983T.

  65. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 202. Neither Rand nor Branden explicitly trace the parallel between psychological visibility, productive creativity, and aesthetic experience. This is my own interpretive analogy.

  66. Ibid., 200. The Muttnik principle is still employed by orthodox Objectivists. Packer 1988T.

  67. N. Branden (1980) remarks: “Biologists have discovered that every person possesses an inherent biological rhythm, determined genetically and only slightly modifiable within the first two or three years of life, almost never thereafter” (118). Two people who are romantically involved and in “sync” with one another, may in fact exhibit the same “bio-rhythm.”

  68. One of the most poetic statements of this romantic credo occurs in The Fountainhead, when Roark tells Wynand, “I could die for you. But I couldn’t and wouldn’t live for you” (609). Though there are many different kinds of love, such sentiment might lend some credence to Baker’s dubious contention (1987, 55–56) that the Roark-Wynand relationship has a “nonphysical homoerotic” element. Rand denies this; see her letter to Gerald Loeb (3 June 1944) in Rand 1995, 137. Nathaniel Branden (12 October 1994C) argues persuasively that Rand most probably endowed Roark and Wynand with her own “female” perspective. He adds that, to his best recollection, in an earlier draft of the novel, Wynand tells Roark: “I love you—in every sense except the one a fool would think of first.” Rand eventually cut this line. On these issues, see Sciabarra 2003a, 45–48, Wilt 1999, and Hardie 1999. It should be noted too, that Rand, in Atlas Shrugged, 1091, and in 44–45, (February 1963), “The ethics of emergencies,” in Virtue of Selfishness, accepts the possibility of rational suicide, or dying for the one you love. In extreme circumstances, these actions are not self-sacrificial if one’s values have been fatally threatened or thoroughly obliterated.

  69. Thanks to Saint-Andre (28 February 1993C) for emphasizing the importance of these issues.

  70. Mack (1984), “The fundamental moral elements of Rand’s theory of rights,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 136.

  71. Veatch 1992, 64. Though Veatch is critical of
Rand, he shares many of her Aristotelian premises. Some Objectivists have praised Veatch’s work. Binswanger 1989T, Lecture 1.

  72. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 25–27.

  73. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 29.

  74. N. Branden (February 1964), “The psychology of pleasure,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 61.

  75. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 29.

  76. Peikoff 1991b, 337; Packer (March 1993), “Happiness skills,” in Schwartz, 7.2.

  77. Peikoff 1991b, 349; 1972T, Lecture 5.

  78. Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1984), “Life, teleology, and eudaimonia in the ethics of Ayn Rand,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 68; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991, 1993; Saint-Andre 1993. Interestingly, Kellner (1989, 32) argues that the Frankfurt school theorist, Max Horkheimer, also embraced a “eudaemonistic ethics.” In Chapter 11, I discuss important parallels between Rand and Habermas, who can be considered a member of the Frankfurt tradition.

  79. Den Uyl and Rasmussen are among the foremost “flourishers” in this debate. The survivalist argument can be found in Kelley 1992c; Kelley, in Stata 1993; Mozes 1992; Khawaja 1992. For an interesting discussion of the “survivalist” vs. “flourishers” controversy within Objectivism, and an attempted reconciliation, see Bidinotto 1994, Saint-Andre 1993, and Scuoteguazza 1993.

  80. However, Kelley (in Stata 1993, 7) argues that flourishing has validity “in certain contexts, but we need to work out the concept exactly and how it applies.”

  81. Rand 1964b, 9; (June 1964), “The cult of moral grayness,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 75.

  82. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 25.

  83. Rand (31 July 1950), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes, 1949–1958,” in Binswanger 5.4.4.

  84. Rand (July 1962), Doesn’t life require compromise?,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 68; (January 1964), “The anatomy of compromise,” in Unknown Ideal, 147.