Victoria's Generals
Page 8
The obvious target for Wood was the Zulu mountain stronghold of Hlobane, from which local Zulus had been staging their raids, yet Evelyn had no idea of the number of Zulus on the summit, or of the terrain. His desire to assist Chelmsford seems to have blinded him as to the difficulties of attempting such an operation without proper intelligence. Furthermore, his Zulu spies had already informed him that the main Zulu army had been directed to attack his command. Although correct that Evelyn was to face the main Zulu assault, his spies incorrectly reported that the army had left Ulundi on 27 March and would not be in the vicinity of Hlobane until 30 March at the earliest. In fact the Zulu army had left on 24 March and would reach the mountain on the same morning as Wood’s men were attacking it, on 28 March.54
Wood devised a two-pronged assault on Hlobane, with mounted troops under the command of Buller and Cecil Russell. This plan soon met with difficulty as the terrain did not facilitate the easy passage of horses. Indeed Russell’s men were unable even to reach the summit. To compound these difficulties, Wood had no idea that the main Zulu army was rapidly approaching his position. While at Khambula, Wood always insisted that mounted scouts were placed at least 6 miles out from the camp to learn of any impending Zulu attack, yet on the morning of 28 March he took no such precautions, despite the fact that he was aware that the Zulu army was on the move. This must be considered a serious failing on Wood’s part.
When colonial forces, under the command of Colonel Weatherley, sighted the approaching Zulu impi of 20,000 men and reported the fact to Wood, he would not believe them, so sure was he of his own intelligence sources. One of Hamu’s scouts finally convinced Wood that the Zulu impi was on a collision course with his escort party and he immediately dispatched a staff officer to Russell with the following order: ‘There is a large army coming this way from the South. Get into position on the Zunguin [Zungwini] Nek.’55 It was apparently Evelyn’s intention that Russell’s force assume a defensive position on the neck of land between the lower plateau of Hlobane and the Zungwini Mountain and from where he would be able to support Buller’s retreat.
Russell had seen the approaching Zulu army, and his men had already withdrawn off the mountain to the position where Wood had intended them to be. However, when giving his order, Wood had confused the place names; he had actually wanted Russell to move to the Zunguin range, where he was now located, not the Zungwini Nek, which was to be found 6 miles to the north-west. Russell decided to accept Evelyn’s instruction without question and moved his force to where it could be of no conceivable help to Buller and his men, whose retreat was soon to become a rout.56
Wood made no further contribution to the defeat at Hlobane. In his official report, written two days later, he stated that he and his escort had assumed a position on Zunguin Nek – that being his incorrect version of the nek’s location. However, it is now considered that he occupied an elevated position at the southeastern end of the range, about 2½ miles from the bottom of the plateau. From here he could view the dramatic life-and-death struggles of Buller and his men as they tried to make their escape down the slopes of Hlobane, via what was to become known as the ‘Devil’s Pass’. Wood claimed that he remained in his position until 1900 hours, when he then returned to Khambula.57
Hlobane was a disaster for Wood: 15 officers were dead and a further 80 men out of a total European force of 404 were killed. Further losses included well over 100 Hamu warriors and Wood’s Irregulars. However, the fight had delayed the main Zulu army from their attack on Khambula, and Evelyn had thus been given vital time to prepare his defences for the imminent attack. Khambula allowed Wood the opportunity to redeem his failures at Hlobane, as well as conveniently to hide the true scale of the defeat.
The overwhelming threat from the 20,000-strong Zulu army to the entrenched position at Khambula certainly inspired Wood. The Zulus had spent the night just 10 miles from Khambula and in the morning they marched steadily, in five separate columns, towards the camp. Around midday, the Zulu commander, Chief Mnyamana, reminded his warriors of the King’s instruction not to attack the British behind their entrenched position, but to seize the camp cattle, which, it was hoped, would lure the soldiers away from their defences. The attack began at around 1300, with the Zulu army in its customary ‘horns of the buffalo’ formation. The simple plan was for the right and left horns of the army to surround the camp and join forces to raid the cattle kraal. However, the left horn was stalled by the need to cross swampy ground and Wood made a brave and inspired tactical decision to provoke the right horn into an attack before the left horn could join them.
Wood ordered Buller, and 100 of his mounted men, to ride out from the protection of the camp to within 100yd of the right horn and pour volley fire into the mass of warriors, before retreating back to the safety of their laager. This action had the desired result, and the right horn lost its discipline and charged forward into a killing ground of rifle and artillery fire. Evelyn had earlier positioned range-markers, so this British fire was particularly effective.
The survivors of the right horn were in retreat before the left horn could muster its attack. Eventually the left horn managed to mass within 100yd of the cattle laager and Zulu snipers, using British rifles captured at Isandlwana, began to pour a persistent, if somewhat inaccurate, fire into the camp, which forced the British to seek cover. It was at this crucial moment that Private Banks of the 90th saw Evelyn among his men and he described Wood’s actions,
I do not think there are many like him in the army. He is as cool and collected in action as if he were in a drawing room. Walking down from the fort to the laager under a heavy fire, swinging a stick and whistling, then going past the wagons he has a pleasant look and a smile of encouragement for every one he meets, let him be private or officer, it matters not. The men here I am sure would follow him anywhere, they are so fond of him.58
Plan of the battle of Khambula, 1879. (From Sir Evelyn Wood, British Battles on Land and Sea, London: Cassell & Co., 1915)
Wood experienced several near misses as he exposed himself to enemy fire, ‘I … lost all sense of danger, except momentarily, when, as on five occasions, a plank of the hoarding on which I leant was struck. This jarred my head.’59 Wood ordered his young infantrymen to fire volley after volley into the warriors. His men responded and this attack was blunted.
Zulu riflemen now sought cover behind anthills, in ravines and in any ‘dead’ ground that would provide some degree of safety from the British fire. From their cover, the Zulus fired back into the laager. Under intensive fire, Evelyn was forced to withdraw a company of the 13th, and this encouraged a large body of warriors, who had sought refuge in a nearby ravine, to make the 100yd dash to occupy the laager. The remaining British troopers in the cattle kraal were forced to depart hastily and Wood rushed forward to try to save one British infantryman who had fallen in front of the advancing Zulus. He had to be physically restrained by three of his officers, including Lieutenant Lysons, who told his commanding officer, ‘Really it isn’t your place to pick up single men!’60 The soldier was saved, although one of the rescuing officers was severally wounded during the sortie. This was the crucial moment of danger for the British during the battle and Wood could see that he could not let the Zulus maintain a hold on the cattle laager. Within a few moments, the number of Zulus there could have swelled to thousands, and it was only a 50yd rush to the main British redoubt.
Evelyn selected two companies of the 90th to charge the Zulus in the laager at bayonet point. In bitter fighting, the British drove the Zulus back to the ravine. Wood now became actively engaged in supporting his men. One Zulu chief, holding a red flag, was standing at the top of the ravine trying to encourage his warriors forward. Wood borrowed a rifle from a nearby trooper and, with his second shot, he hit the Zulu chief who fell back into the ravine. On three further occasions a Zulu warrior picked up the red flag and waved it in defiance and encouragement, only to be shot by Evelyn.61 Despite this success, the Zulus continue
d their sniping from the ravine and soon casualties began to mount. Evelyn, realising their position was untenable, ordered the withdrawal of the 90th.
Wood knew that the Zulus snipers must be silenced and he directed his artillery to pour shells into the ravine. This action nullified the enemy riflemen at a vital moment in the battle, as the warriors of the head and centre of the Zulu attack had massed for a direct attack on the main laager. Without the hindrance of sniper fire, Wood was able to repeat the tactic of the bayonet charge, so as to break the Zulu advance before it had a chance to gain momentum. A company of the 13th was sent out to engage the enemy, only to be beaten back by the rushing warriors. However, this retreat brought the now-disorganised Zulus under the British artillery guns and, loaded with case shot, they carved swathes through the warriors, who fled back down the hill. The battle had been raging for nearly 4 hours and still the Zulus had strength and reserve for two more charges, both of which were stopped by rapid and accurate infantry fire.62
The day’s slaughter was not yet over. At around 1730, the Zulu army seemed, individually, to decide to retreat and Evelyn used this opportunity to unleash his mounted troops under the revengeful command of Buller. This act ensured the retreat became a bloody rout. Buller’s men gave no quarter as they pursued the Zulus for over an hour, until darkness ended the mayhem. Over 800 dead Zulus were found within 800yd of the camp. However, the pursuit is estimated to have cost a further 1,500 lives. British casualties, killed and wounded, numbered 83.
Edited copies of Wood’s official report of the events surrounding Khambula were to appear in the newspapers of Britain from around 17 April. Evelyn’s report, as published in major and many provincial newspapers, read,
DESPATCH FROM COLONEL WOOD. Kambula Camp. March 29th 9.00pm. We assaulted the Kholobana [Hlobane] successfully yesterday and took some thousands of cattle but while on top about 20,000 Zulus coming from Ulundi attacked us, and we suffered considerable losses, the enemy retaking the captured cattle. Our natives deserted. Our camp was attacked today from 1.30pm to 5.30pm in the most courageous manner by about 20,000 men. We have lost about seven officers and seventy killed and wounded, but we have entirely defeated the enemy who were pursued for a considerable distance.63
What Wood did not make clear in this initial report was that the casualty figures referred only to those that occurred at the battle of Hlobane. This ambiguity in the report continued in the press reporting of the events surrounding the two battles. For example, both The Times and the Daily News of 17 April listed Captain Ronald Campbell, Mr Lloyd and Piet Uys as among seven officers and seventy men killed at Khambula, although both men had been slain at Hlobane. Such losses could be accepted if they were linked with a crushing victory. Although the confusion as to casualty figures was finally resolved in May 1879, by then Wood was viewed as the hero of Khambula and his military reputation was assured.
It is clear that both Wood and Buller pursued a policy of ‘total war’ against the Zulus, in which Zulu civilians and property were targeted, and it is certain than many Zulus were killed in their flight from Khambula. Whether Wood could have stopped, or would have wanted to stop, this slaughter is open to doubt. Certainly, by today’s standards, the actions taken by many of his men, including Wood’s Irregulars, would be considered as war crimes, for which, if such events occurred today, he would be held ultimately responsible. On the field of battle Evelyn was a determined and clear-sighted professional soldier of his age, sure of what needed to be done to overwhelm and defeat the enemy. It is certain that he would have viewed the slaughter of fleeing Zulus as a necessary measure that would bring about the defeat of the enemy and the end of the war. There exists no concrete evidence that Evelyn knew of, or actively encouraged, the slaughter of wounded Zulus.
Bibliography
Stephen Manning, Evelyn Wood VC: Pillar of Empire (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007) is the first modern re-assessment of Wood. Previously, the principal sources for Wood were his own autobiographical writings: Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, 2 vols (London: Methuen & Co., 1906) and Winnowed Memories (London: Cassell & Co., 1918). He was also the subject of a chapter in Byron Farwell, Eminent Victorian Soldiers (London: Viking, 1985). Controversial aspects of his role in the Zulu War are covered in Ron Lock, Blood on the Painted Mountain (London: Greenhill, 1995) and in the Anglo-Transvaal War by Joseph Lehmann, The First Boer War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) and John Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion – The First Boer War 1880–81 (London: Pearson/Longman, 2005).
Chapter 3
Redvers Buller
Stephen M Miller
During a heated discussion on biblical military leadership at an evening dinner party, William Ewart Gladstone, the towering Liberal leader of the late nineteenth century, was reported to have exclaimed, ‘Joshua! Joshua! Why, he couldn’t hold a candle to Redvers Buller as a leader of men.’1 And yet, Sir Redvers Buller, distinguished winner of the Victoria Cross, key figure in the ‘Wolseley Ring’, veteran of campaigns in China, Canada, the Gold Coast, South Africa, Egypt and the Sudan, Adjutant General, and one-time choice for Commander in Chief of the British army, would be forced to resign in great ignominy after his failure in the South African War (1899–1902) and his utterance of a few unwise comments at a Volunteer luncheon in 1901.
The second son of James Wentworth Buller, a distinguished Member of Parliament and wealthy landowner, and his wife Charlotte, Redvers Buller was born at the family seat of Downes, Crediton, on 7 December 1839. After graduating from Eton, he chose not to follow his father into politics but instead opted for a career in the military, something most Bullers had traditionally shunned. In May 1858, James Buller purchased for his son a commission in the 60th (King’s Own Rifles) Regiment. In 1859, Ensign Buller joined the 2nd Battalion of his regiment for a brief stint in Benares where the Indian Mutiny was winding down. The following year he joined an Anglo-French expeditionary force sent to Hong Kong and took part in the actions at Taku (Peiho) Forts and Peking (Beijing). Some have described the young Buller during this period as an unlikable figure, known to argue with his fellow officers, whose speech and appearance were altered for the worse by an unfortunate run-in with a horse in China.2 All agree, whether they liked him or not, that Buller, even as a young man, was full of conviction. After returning to England, he refused to wear his China medal because he viewed the campaign as unjust.
It was in Canada, where he had been posted as a lieutenant in the 4th Battalion, that the young Buller was transformed into a talented officer under the aegis of his commanding officer, Colonel R B Hawley. Hawley was a great believer in cultivating the qualities of junior officers; delegating responsibility, emphasising the importance of staff duties, making each take charge of the training and leading of his own men. It was also Hawley who gave Buller a great appreciation for the need to maintain the welfare of the rank and file. Buller thrived in this environment for seven years and Hawley’s impact was lasting. To the end of his service, Buller continued Hawley’s practices of always treating the men with respect and providing them with adequate food, shelter and rest. As a result, even in the most difficult times, Buller always retained the warm feelings of his troops. A young (later Lieutenant General) William Francis Butler, whose career for nearly forty years paralleled Buller’s own, described Buller as ‘the best type of regimental officer possible to be found. Young, active, daring, as keen for service as he was ready to take the fullest advantage of it, he stood even then in the front rank of those young and ardent spirits who might be described as the ruck of army life which is waiting to get through.’3
Chronology
7 December 1839
Redvers Henry Buller born at Downes, Crediton, Devon Educated at Harrow and Eton
23 May 1858
Purchased commission as Ensign, 60th Rifles
1859–60
Service in India and China
9 December 1862
Purchased Lieutenancy
1862–70
Service in Canada including Red River Expedition (1870)
28 May 1870
Purchased Captaincy
1871–73
Attended Staff College without completing course
1873–74
Service on Gold Coast
1873
Appointed DAAQMG, Gold Coast
1 April 1874
Promoted Brevet Major
1 April 1874
Appointed DAAG, Horse Guards
30 January 1878
Appointed Special Service Officer, South Africa
22 April 1878
Took command of Frontier Light Horse
11 November 1878
Promoted Brevet Lieutenant Colonel
28 March 1879
Won VC at Hlobane
27 September 1879
Promoted Brevet Colonel
13 March 1880
Promoted Substantive Major
29 March 1880
Appointed Local Major General, South Africa
April 1880
Appointed AAQMG, Scotland