Victoria's Generals

by Steven J Corvi

  July 1880

  Appointed AAQMG, Aldershot

  10 August 1882

  Married Lady Audrey Jane Charlotte Howard

  1 September 1882

  Appointed DAQMG, Intelligence Department, Egypt

  22 July 1883

  Appointed AAG, Horse Guards

  1884

  Service at Suakin as Chief of Staff

  21 May 1884

  Promoted Major General

  26 August 1884

  Appointed Chief of Staff, Gordon Relief Expedition

  1 November 1885

  Appointed DAG, Horse Guards

  16 August 1886

  Appointed Special Commissioner for Clare and Kerry, Ireland

  15 October 1887

  Appointed Quartermaster General

  1 October 1890

  Appointed Adjutant General

  1 April 1891

  Promoted Lieutenant General

  24 June 1896

  Promoted General

  9 October 1898

  Appointed GOC, Aldershot

  9 October 1899

  Formally appointed C in C, South Africa

  14 October 1899

  Sailed for South Africa

  25 November 1899

  Assumed personal command in Natal

  18 December 1899

  Superseded as C in C by Roberts

  24 October 1900

  Departed South Africa after requesting he be relieved

  January 1901

  Resumed as GOC, Aldershot

  21 October 1901

  Dismissed from Aldershot Command

  2 June 1908

  Died at Downes

  Appointed CB, 1874; CMG, 1879; KCMG, 1882; KCB, 1885; GCB, 1894; GCMG, 1900

  In 1870, Buller returned briefly to Canada to rejoin his regiment for what would be his last service with it. The 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment, along with militia raised in Quebec and Ontario, was assigned the daunting task of traversing some of North America’s most difficult terrain to restore authority over Fort Garry, the former chief outpost of the Hudson Bay Company in Prince Rupert’s Land, which had just been transferred over to the Canadian government. By rail, steamer, canoe and foot, the Red River Expedition would cover some 1,200 miles. Captain Buller quickly caught the eyes of his commander, Colonel Garnet Wolseley, who described him as ‘full of resource, and personally fearless, those serving under him always trusted him fully’.4 When the campaign was over, Wolseley put Buller in for a promotion. Although nothing came of it, Buller had won himself a powerful supporter.

  Shortly after his return to England, Buller entered the Staff College. He opted out early, however, to tour the Franco-Prussian War battlefields and never returned to take his exams. While busy on the continent, trouble brewed in West Africa. The Ashanti (Asante) King had rejected the Dutch transfer of the fort at Elmina on the Gold Coast (Ghana) to British control. An Asante advance toward Cape Coast Castle led to a general panic among the Fante Confederation and a flood of refugees. Commander John Glover, RN, a former administrator in West Africa, proposed a counter-march on the Asante capital of Kumase and requested Buller’s services. The British government accepted Glover’s recommendations in part but supplemented his plan with an army operation commanded by Wolseley. Buller was appointed Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General and arrived at Cape Coast Castle in October 1873. During the Second Asante War 1873–74, he was primarily responsible for intelligence and ‘from the beginning, show[ed] a skill and judgement worthy of a trained detective’.5 He enlisted interpreters, met with local traders, examined prisoners and organised a corps of scouts. He also assisted Wolseley in choosing the path of advance into the interior. It was in this campaign that Buller honed his logistical skills and became a full member of Wolseley’s ‘Ring’.6

  After convalescing from a fever that sent him home early from the expedition, Buller was promoted to major and took a position as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at the War Office.7 There he remained until 1878. In that year, Lieutenant General Frederic Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford, was dispatched to the Cape Colony as Commander in Chief, and took Buller with him. Buller participated in the Ninth Frontier War against the Ngqika-Gcaleka as a staff officer and also commanded the Frontier Light Horse, an amalgamation of locally recruited Britons, Boers and others. The Frontier Light Horse was his first independent command. Upon the conclusion of the war, Buller did not return to the Cape with his men but instead was ordered up country where trouble was brewing with the Mpondo. It was against the Zulu, however, that recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Buller would next command his men in battle.

  By late 1878, Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, had come to the conclusion that the Zulu needed to be eliminated as an independent people capable of threatening British influence in the region. Border violations provided Frere with the ammunition he needed, and despite resistance from London, he issued an ultimatum in December to Cetshwayo, the Zulu chief. Unable to meet the demands that would have disbanded the Zulu army and seriously curtailed his authority over his people, Cetshwayo had no choice but to allow the ultimatum to lapse and accept the inevitability of war. The Anglo-Zulu War began in January 1879.

  Even before the start of the conflict, Buller and the Frontier Light Horse, as part of the more than 2,200-man column commanded by Brigadier General Evelyn Wood, had crossed the Ncome River and moved into north-west Zululand. Buller had developed a close relationship with Wood in the Asante campaign and the two would remain on good terms throughout their careers. Buller’s primary responsibilities were patrolling and leading the irregular horse in reconnaissance operations. While Chelmsford’s centre column was being surprised at Isandlwana, Wood’s column operated without major obstacles through most of January. With Buller’s able assistance, Wood was able to advance on the White Mfolozi gathering livestock, clearing the area and inducing lesser Zulu chiefs to surrender. Buller led the mounted forces in a number of successful skirmishes during this movement. After Isandlwana, however, Wood cautiously took his forces back across the Mfolozi River.

  With the ruin of the centre column and the inability of another column to move forward from Eshowe, Wood provided the only offensive operations for the British in early February. Chelmsford relied on Wood and Buller to turn the war around. ‘You two will have to pull me out of the mire,’ he optimistically heliographed to Wood.8 And, indeed, they did. Throughout February and into mid-March, Wood continued to press the Zulu by authorising Buller to conduct several successful punitive raids around Hlobane. Seizing cattle hurt Cetshwayo’s ability to conduct operations and weakened his people’s resolve, which led to a number of defections. Buller assisted in the movement and protection of these growing refugees.

  In late March, Wood decided to strike at Hlobane, a site where the Qulusi chief had taken up a defensive position. If he could not directly engage the Qulusi, he would still satisfy himself by taking the hundreds of cattle grazing on Hlobane’s two plateaux. Buller and Lieutenant Colonel J C Russell were put in charge of the two advancing parties. On 28 March, at 0330, under the cover of a thick mist, Buller began his ascent of the eastern slope of the mountain, while Russell, shortly afterwards, moved on the western slope.9 The terrain, sheer cliffs, crevices and a narrow winding foot path, was difficult to traverse to say the least, but to make things worse for the British, it also allowed for as many as 3,000 Zulu to keep their positions well hidden.10 Buller was able to reach the summit and, after a brief attack led by Piet Uys and Captain Robert Barton, the Zulu fled. Most of Buller’s men immediately began gathering cattle on the higher plateau, while Barton was ordered to take a few men down the hill and bury the dead. Russell, likewise, was able to make it up the western slope, although with greater difficulty, and he too gave orders to seize the Zulu cattle. Neither Buller nor Russell had realised that they had walked into a trap.

  Although the Zulu on the summit had been surprised by the timing of the British adva
nce, they had expected that an eventual attack would come and had prepared for it. The terrain atop Hlobane provided perfect cover for them. Increasing pressure was put on Buller’s party as the morning went on. To make matters worse, Cetshwayo had also prepared for a British attack and had ordered an army from Ulundi (oNdini) to move against Wood’s column. He had expected to meet Wood at Khambula. Some of Wood’s irregulars had seen Zulu campfires the night before but had not alerted their officers.11 That army had now caught up with the British having been redirected to Hlobane. Wood spotted the advancing Zulu in force, perhaps as many as 20,000 strong, moving in from the south and sent runners up the mountain to warn Buller and Russell.12 Buller and Russell did not need to read Wood’s message. They both spotted the approaching Zulu and ordered their men to descend the mountain. The Qulusi had also seen the Zulu and more came out of their hiding places to engage the British, sometimes coming within a hundred yards.13 Russell was ordered to position his men to cover Buller’s retreat. He misinterpreted those orders, however, and moved westward toward Zungwini Nek.14 Buller would eventually reach the same position but not until after coming close to utter disaster. He had gathered most of his men together and had retreated across the long plateau. As difficult as the ascent had been, the descent was much worse. The narrow cattle track that he and his men followed often had jumps downward of 5ft at a time. Barton, with his burial party, was ordered to retreat down the right side of the mountain.15 He and most of his men were killed.

  Buller was one of the last to come down Hlobane. Piet Uys was with him, but returned to the mountain when he learned his son had yet to make it. Uys was killed. Buller also returned at least twice and was credited for personally saving the lives of four of his men, acts of supreme bravery that earned him the VC. Wood learned of the details of the rescues only with great difficulty because Buller refused to discuss them.16 The British retreat was only salvaged by the Zulu decision to regain their cattle and rest rather than pursue them. In all, 15 British officers and about 80 men were killed, in addition to as many as 100 auxiliaries.

  As the bulk of the British force escaped to Khambula, Buller was put in charge of the evacuation of the wounded. Even after that was accomplished, he still could not rest. At 2100, he learned that there were still some soldiers trying to find their way to the camp. He and some volunteers from the Frontier Light Horse rode out at once to meet them and brought in the last survivors from Hlobane. It may be true, as Waller Ashe and E V Wyatt-Edgell wrote in their 1880 account of the Anglo-Zulu War, that Buller ‘did all that a skilled general could effect to bring off his men with small loss’, and, as Wood’s report details, that because of Buller’s ‘grand courage and cool head that nearly all the dismounted men were saved’.17 Yet, if it were not for the events of the next day Buller’s actions would only be remembered as one bright spot in a dismal battle and Wood and Buller’s decision to attack Hlobane would have met with serious scrutiny at the top levels.

  Wood had anticipated that the Zulu would move on Khambula and had ordered his 2,000 men and 6 guns inside the camp’s perimeter. With a fort already situated on the high ground, Wood took decisive defensive measures: a laager was thrown up and reinforced with bags of mealies, an earthwork redoubt was hastily built, the cattle were secured, ammunition boxes were distributed and opened and range-markers were placed all around the approaches to the camp. In his report on the battle of Khambula on 29 March, Buller wrote ‘as we were sadly musing over the events of the day before, our scouts came in to say that the Zulu army we had left in the valley below were on the move, and about 10 they came in sight, moving in five very heavy columns. We at once commenced preparations for defence’.18 For his part, Buller was happy to encourage the attack, riding out to meet the Zulu as they arrived, pulling them towards the British defences, and then retreating to the safety of the laager. Buller wrote,

  They stood our advance a little, but they could not stand our attack as I pressed home, and the advance of their right column, about 2000 strong, turned and charged us. I need not say that the eighty or ninety men I had got on their horses pretty quick, and we scampered back to camp … Our attack succeeded. It was evident it upset their plans.19

  Khambula is a battle that should never have taken place; Cetshwayo had given clear directions to his commander, Chief Mnyamana, to avoid it. Why the Chief defied his King is not known for sure, but as John Laband has argued, it probably occurred as a result of the competition among young Zulu warriors who eagerly sought glory on the battlefield. They probably forced their general into making the change in plans.20 Buller was also right in stating that his tactic had upset the Zulu plans. A traditional Zulu formation on the battlefield took the shape of a bull’s horns. The bulk of the attacking warriors would walk in tight formation, several ranks deep. Once they came into contact with the enemy, smaller groups of men on both sides would extend around and gradually close in. At Khambula, Buller provoked the right horn into attacking prematurely. As it chased him back to camp across open ground, it was hit by overwhelming British firepower without any cover to seek. Within 45 minutes, before the Zulu centre and left horn could be brought into the fight, the right horn was annihilated.

  Despite this setback, Zulu morale remained high and the remaining troops moved on the British right and centre. This attack was better co-ordinated and sustained. Armed with many Martini-Henrys, the Zulu unleashed a devastating firepower of their own. Although it required two sorties, the British managed to repulse the left horn’s attack on their cattle laager and kept the Zulu centre from reaching their trenches. Canister fire was particularly effective against the densely packed advancing Zulu. Wave after wave of assaults was checked and after more than three hours, this attack ended in defeat as well.

  As the sun was setting, Wood sensed victory and prepared Buller and his mounted troops for pursuit. What followed next was a massacre. Buller was ‘like a tiger drunk with blood’, wrote the commander of the Kaffrarian Rifles, F X Schermbrucker.21 Commandant Cecil D’Arcy, Frontier Light Horse, one of the men Buller had saved at Hlobane, reputedly yelled to his men, ‘No quarter, boys, and remember yesterday!’22 The retreating Zulu were in no condition to offer any organised resistance. Many were too tired even to raise their rifles. Although a few prisoners were taken, true to D’Arcy’s exclamation, most of the Zulu did not receive quarter. The pursuit continued all the way back to Hlobane. Nearly 800 bodies were found the next day, but perhaps as many as 2,000 Zulu were killed in the onslaught. The British lost just eighteen men and suffered sixty-five additional casualties at the battle of Khambula.

  For the next two-and-a-half months, Wood’s column remained in and around Khambula. Wood’s success in late March, thanks in part to Buller’s role, allowed Chelmsford to renew his offensive. However, it was not until mid-June that the reconstituted column began its advance toward the Zulu capital of Ulundi. During this period of relative inactivity, Buller’s responsibilities included overseeing daily patrols, seizing Zulu cattle and keeping the Zulu occupied. He was also assigned, for a time, the task of keeping a celebrity visitor out of harm’s way. Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial, had made his way to South Africa in a British uniform thanks to his family’s connections. Chelmsford did what he could to keep him out of any real danger. Buller allowed the Prince Imperial to accompany him on several patrols. However, during one such reconnaissance mission with the Frontier Light Horse, he found him to be too reckless and refused to take responsibility for his safety again.23 A few days later, on 1 June, while on patrol with Lieutenant J B Carey, the Prince Imperial was killed by the Zulu. Buller and Wood were riding ahead of the column when they were approached and told the news by Carey. Buller was furious with Carey and accused him of abandoning the Prince Imperial. Carey was later court-martialled and found guilty, but, thanks to the intervention of Empress Eugénie and Queen Victoria, the sentence was never ratified.

  With his impending supercession by Wolseley, Chelmsford was determined to move quic
kly and finish the campaign. Upon receiving no reply from his 30 June ultimatum, he put Buller in charge of reconnaissance and ordered him to advance as far as he could toward Ulundi, selecting the best ground from which to attack, and determining the location and size of the Zulu force. Not only did Buller gather all the information requested but he wisely avoided a Zulu trap. Chelmsford later called Buller’s operations, ‘one of the finest episodes in this eventful war’.24

  Confident from the day’s activity and aware of the Zulu force, its position and the likely strategy that it would employ, Chelmsford ordered an attack the next morning, 3 July, at 0645. Buller’s mounted troops would be the first to cross the White Mfolozi before holding up to take their place near the front of the forming square. As at Khambula, Buller provoked the Zulu to come within firing range by engaging them in two ranks and retiring alternately. Once his force had returned to the safety of the square, Chelmsford left it to the infantry’s volley fire to finish off the Zulu. For most of the battle, the Zulu failed to come within 65m of the British force. And, as at Khambula, once the attack had faltered, orders were given for pursuit. ‘Buller had posted the mounted infantry so as to fire within the flank of the retiring enemy, and the remainder of his mounted men, making for the country beyond, killed some 450 in the pursuit.’25 All fleeing Zulu were hunted down and killed or left to die from their wounds. Only two prisoners were taken.26 Ulundi was burned to the ground before noon.

  It was left to Wolseley to hunt down Cetshwayo and to develop a strategy that would prevent future Zulu challenges to British authority. Wolseley wanted Buller to remain in South Africa, but he simply was too tired and veldt sores had crippled his hands.27 He returned home with a CMG, was promoted to Colonel, and was appointed aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria. Buller refused to join the celebrations that followed the end of the war, even snubbing an invitation by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli because Chelmsford was not offered the same.