Alexanders Heirs
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Hellespont to block any such attempt (Diod. 18.72.2).
While Antigonus remained concentrated on the Hellespont, in the summer
of 318, another Diadoch was more concerned with the presence of Eumenes
in southwest Asia Minor. With the death of Antipater, there were a number of
Macedonian commanders who apparently decided to increase their holdings.
Eumenes’ presence in this general area threatened Ptolemy’s recent acquisition of both Syria and Phoenicia. Ptolemy seized these lands from the lawful satrap
Laomedon, whom he briefly imprisoned, in the spring of 318 (Diod. 18.43; [Parian
Marble] FGrH 239 B F-12). The Egyptian satrap had also garrisoned the Phoenician cities with forces loyal to himself (Diod. 18.43.1–2). With all threatened by the presence of Polyperchon’s al y, and Ptolemy associated with Cassander and
Antigonus, the satrap of Egypt sailed to Zephryion, a port in Cilicia near Cyinda,23
and from there continual y sent his own commanders to the argyraspids attempt-
ing to undermine their support of the Cardian (Diod. 18.62.1). Ptolemy’s envoys
attempted to sabotage Eumenes’ authority by reminding Alexander’s old guard
of their earlier condemnation of him in Egypt. Moreover, Ptolemy had on four
occasions during the reign of Alexander commanded all or part of the hypaspists/
argyraspids (Arr. Anab. 3.27.5; 4.24.3, 8–10, 29.1–2; 5.23.7). In addition to his cal s
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for the argyraspids to repudiate Eumenes, Ptolemy also protested to the garrison
commanders in Cyinda concerning their granting Eumenes access to the royal
funds. All of these attempts to subvert the loyalty of Eumenes’ troops and allies failed. Similar attempts by the agents of Antigonus also failed (Diod. 18.62.3–4).
Antigonus had sent Philotas, the former governor of Cilicia, with a letter to be read to the “Macedonians” in Eumenes’ army (Diod. 18.62.4). These Macedonians
would have been primarily, if not exclusively, the argyraspids. The Cardian had
emerged from Nora with 500 “friends” (Diod. 18.53.7), some of whom may have
been Macedonians, but his army had surrendered the previous year to Antigonus
(Diod. 18.41.4). In the letter, Antigonus ordered that Eumenes be seized and put to death. If this was not done, Antigonus threatened war. Philotas was accompanied
by thirty “meddling and talkative persons” who made contact with Antigenes and
Teutamus and attempted to organize a plot against Eumenes. When the letter was
read, the Macedonians were thrown into a state of confusion; the soldiers wished
to obey the kings, but feared a war with Antigonus (Diod. 18.63.3). While the letter was still being discussed, Eumenes arrived on the scene. After he read it, he urged the troops to ignore Antigonus, who, he declared, had rebelled against the kings, and follow the royal decree ordering them to serve him. For the moment the argyraspids remained loyal to Eumenes (Diod. 18.63.3–5). The kings, Olympias, and
the regent Polyperchon, had all written that they were to serve Eumenes (Diod.
18.62.1–2). For the present at least among these Macedonians the old traditions
of loyalty to royal authority held. Their identity was tied to their service to the kings; the unit had been the royal infantry bodyguards of both Philip II and
Alexander the Great. It is interesting to note, however, that these provocateurs
were permitted access to the camp and apparently were also permitted to depart
freely. This was certainly another example of the argyraspids’ corporate identity.
While they served Eumenes as loyal Macedonians, this was a loyalty that could
be changed in an instant, if that was their consensus.
The significance of these Macedonians would not appear to be commensurate
with their numbers in Eumenes’ army. As noted, the forces under the command
of the royal general were more than 15,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod.
18.59.1, 61.5). Of these, the 500 cavalry and many of the 2000 infantry who
accompanied him from Cappadocia were likely native Cappadocians (Schäfer
2002: 65, 123); after the argyraspids, the remaining 10,000 infantry were merce-
naries (Diod. 18.61.4–5). Admittedly, the argyraspids had been the best unit in
Alexander’s army; they had anchored the Macedonian phalanx and had been
used on numbers of separate military operations requiring expertise in other
aspects of warfare and skill in the use of a variety of weaponry (Markle 1977:
323, 329; Anson 2010a: 82–4). These abilities certainly made them the best
troops that Eumenes possessed in an army that in terms of numbers was far
outdistanced by the forces of Antigonus. However, their importance, and hence
their power, also derived from the aura of legitimacy they gave Eumenes. That
commander now had in addition to the letters from the king, the regent, and
Olympias, the title and authority of royal general in Asia, but also the support
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of Alexander the Great’s old elite infantry guard, the argyraspids. With so many
virtual y independent satraps, garrison commanders, and imperial treasurers,
owing their power and independence to their professed allegiance to the “kings,”
these aspects of royal authority were essential for Eumenes if he was to build a
coalition that could challenge Antigonus.
Eumenes, in the late fall or winter of 318, ordered his soldiers to break camp,
and he led them into Phoenicia (Diod. 18.63.6), where, using part of the Cyindian treasure, he planned to gather a fleet to help Polyperchon secure control of
the Aegean. He occupied the northern section easily. Ptolemy, who had seized the
area in the spring of 318, did not try to block his advance. Here, in Phoenicia, with the use of his newly acquired war chest, Eumenes assembled a considerable
number of Phoenician ships under the command of the Rhodian and former
Perdiccan admiral, Sosigenes (Polyaen. 4.6.9).24 Since it is doubtful that Ptolemy would have permitted large numbers of warships to be captured by Eumenes, it is
likely that the bulk of the Phoenician fleet not operating in the northern Aegean had sailed with the satrap back to Egypt, making it necessary to construct a fleet from whatever resources were still available. Later in 314, when Antigonus invaded Phoenicia, he had to build a fleet, since the Phoenician fleet had retreated to Egypt with Ptolemy (Diod. 19.58.2–6; Billows 1990: 112). It is likely that Ptolemy had
withdrawn the navy in a similar fashion to forestall its falling into Eumenes’ hands in 317. As a result, Sosigenes and the newly created fleet only set sail in the summer of 317, stopping in Cilicia on their journey north (Polyaen. 4.6.9).25
At about the same time Eumenes’ fleet set sail from Phoenicia, the royal fleet
under the command of Cleitus was defeated by Antigonus in the waters near
Byzantium. Cassander’s fleet commander, Nicanor, who had been placed in overall
command of both Cassander’s and Antigonus’ fleets, had previously engaged
the royal Macedonian navy, losing a significant number of his ships either to
destruction or capture (Diod. 18.72.3–4; Polyaen. 4.6.8). Polyaenus states that
the battle was lost due to the inexperience of Nicanor, who got his fleet caught in an unfavorable current.26 The remaining ships fled to Chalcedon. It was in the
evening of this disaster that Antigonus arrived on the scene. He ordered the crews of the remaining sixty ships to be ready to do battle. He summoned from his al y
Byzantium across the Bosporus whatever ships they had av
ailable suitable for
transport and ferried across the channel numbers of archers, slingers, and other
light-armed troops (Diod. 18.72.6). At dawn the light-armed troops attacked the
beached enemy fleet, causing panic. Nicanor, who had put to sea earlier in
the night, now, with ships loaded with marines, fell upon the enemy ships. The
previous defeat now was redeemed in an overwhelming victory from which only
the enemy commander escaped (Diod. 18.72.5–8; Polyaen. 4.6.8). Cleitus was
subsequently killed by those loyal to Lysimachus while attempting to flee across
Thrace (Diod. 18.72.9; Polyaen. 4.6.8). The Parian Marble ( FGrH 239 B 13) dates the engagements to the archon year 317/16. As a result of these battles, the
Athenians abandoned their alliance with Polyperchon and, in the summer of
317, opened negotiations with Cassander. Peace was concluded after several
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99
conferences on the following terms: the government would once again be an
oligarchy, with those eligible to vote in the assembly restricted to the possessors of at least “ten mina” (1000 drachma) and the government would be overseen by
an Athenian of Cassander’s choosing. The individual chosen was Demetrius of
Phalerum. While the Athenians were now to become his allies and their government
overseen by his agent, Cassander promised that the Athenians would have complete
control of their revenues and territory, with the exception of Munychia, which
at the conclusion of the current war would be returned (Diod. 18.74).
The numerous failures of Polyperchon, not only turned the Athenians to
Cassander, but “most” of the Greek cities that had after the decree moved to support the regent now made their peace with Cassander (Diod. 18.74.1). In the midst of
these successes, Cassander launched an invasion of Macedonia in the late summer
of 317. Clearly there would have been rumblings of dissatisfaction with the regent in his homeland, as there were throughout the Greek world. Cassander hoped to
build on Polyperchon’s recent defeats and his own and his allies’ successes. This campaign is not described, but only hinted at in our sources. Diodorus 19.35.7
(cf. 18.75.1) states that Cassander had acquired some of Polyperchon’s war elephants
“in his previous expedition into Macedonia.” The reference comes in Diodorus’
description of what then must be the second invasion of Macedonia by Cassander
that occurred in the following year. Justin (14.5.4–5) likewise, in describing the second invasion of 316, al udes to an earlier invasion (Just. 14.5.4–5). This first invasion has led to a great deal of speculation with regard to the location of
Polyperchon. Where was he when this invasion took place? Justin (14.5.1) states
that the regent was returning from Greece, but it is unclear in this section whether this statement refers to the first or to the second invasion. The epitomator may even have col apsed events to the point that the reference is to Polyperchon’s return from the Peloponnesus that preceded the sea battles in the Hellespont (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 195–6). Justin had ignored events in the Greek world since
the death of Perdiccas and only returned to them in 14.5.1. It has also been sug-
gested that Polyperchon had crossed to Hellespontine Phrygia in order to ensure
that the debacle in the Hellespont would not be followed by an invasion from Asia of Macedonia (Paschidis 2008: 233–46), but given that Lysimachus controlled
Thrace and Nicanor the sea, and that the Macedonians were likely apprehensive,
this appears doubtful, although certainly not impossible. With Antigonus engaged
against Eumenes and Lysimachus not in a position to invade Macedonia (Lund
1992: 56), Polyperchon may have believed himself free to cross to Asia. The most
plausible scenario, however, is that Polyperchon was in Macedonia at the time of
the first invasion. Cassander attempted to follow up Antigonus’ victory in the
Hellespont with a quick dash to Macedonia, and that, while he enjoyed some
initial success, as the capture of part of the war elephants would suggest, he stil had to retreat back to Greece. Cassander’s first invasion, although obviously
repulsed, given the need for the subsequent one, was to have serious ramifica-
tions. It then took place in the late summer of 317, soon after the col apse of
the democracy in Athens.
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While Eumenes’ fleet under the command of Sosigenes was still in Cilicia on its
voyage to the Hellespont to assist Polyperchon, and was apparently unaware of the events that had taken place in the north, Antigonus’ victorious squadrons appeared.
Sosigenes’ Phoenician commanders immediately seized much of the fleet treasury
and deserted to the enemy (Polyaen. 4.6.9). With the naval victory over Cleitus
and the acquisition of Eumenes’ fleet, Antigonus was now the undisputed master
of the sea. Sosigenes escaped the desertion of his fleet (Polyaen. 4.6.9) and disappears from the historical record (Heckel 2006: 253). There was now no longer any
great danger of Polyperchon interfering in western Asia, and Antigonus shifted his attention to Eumenes. After his naval victory, Antigonus selected from his army
20,000 light-armed infantry and 4000 cavalry (Diod. 18.73.1), and set out rapidly for Phoenicia. The rest of his forces were to follow. Eumenes, in late September of 317, quickly departed Phoenicia and moved east with the intention of making
contact with the governors of the eastern satrapies (Diod. 18.72.2). His only option after Antigonus’ great victory in the Hellespont was to seek new allies in the east.
With Antigonus dominating Asia Minor and his al y Ptolemy, Egypt, and with
the path west cut off, Eumenes’ only opportunity lay in the east. Eumenes’ 15,000
infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod. 18.61.3) would be no match for Antigonus’
superior forces. After his defeat of Alcetas in Pisidia, Antigonus’ army contained 10,000 cavalry and 60,000 infantry (Diod. 18.50.3), of which the latter may have
included close to 30,000 heavy infantry (cf. Diod. 19.27.1, 29.2–5). Eumenes had
no choice but to hope that the satraps in the east would respond to the letters from the kings and the regent ordering them to obey the royal general “in every way”
(Diod. 19.13.7). Having trusted Eumenes once, Antigonus was not likely to trust
him again (cf. Diod. 19.44.2). Eumenes and his army, therefore, marched rapidly
through “Coele Syria” (the Bequaa Valley) and into Mesopotamia (Diod. 18.73.2–3).
Here, Eumenes was joined by Amphimachus (Anson 2004: 158 n. 33), the satrap
of Mesopotamia and Arbelitis (Diod. 18.39.6).27 The union with Amphimachus
eliminated any supply problems Eumenes might have encountered in Mesopotamia.
Indeed, prior to this alliance Eumenes may have planned on following Alexander’s
course, bypassing Mesopotamia proper and traveling along the northern bank
of the Tigris and proceeding directly to Susa. While this latter route was longer, it passed through areas with a steppe climate, as opposed to the desert climate
along the Euphrates, thus providing fodder for the animals. With ready access to
supplies, Eumenes took the more direct path east.
Eumenes advanced into Babylonia with 15,000 infantry and 3300 cavalry (Diod.
18.73.4). Upon his arrival he sent emissaries to Seleucus, the satrap, and to Pithon, the satrap of Media, who was then in Babylon, requesting in the name of the kings that they join him (Diod. 19.12.1). Neither accepted. Their refusal in one sense
might
appear unusual. Of the two commanders approaching from the west,
Antigonus would appear to be the clearer threat, having already replaced satraps
with his personal allies in Asia Minor. Of course, he did have the more impressive force, and Seleucus’ and Pithon’s involvement in the death of Eumenes’ then patron Perdiccas may have made them leery of cooperating with someone who might
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101
consider revenge for their betrayal and murder of the former regent (Diod. 18.36.5; Nep. Eum. 5.1). Antigonus may even have appeared a less dangerous interloper, because of his stated purpose to suppress Eumenes. Moreover, his power base
was back in Asia Minor; those who supported him now might benefit later with
extended satrapies in the east.
Pithon’s presence in Babylon at this time was the result of his failed attempt to gain power over the upper satrapies (Diod. 19.14.1–3). After his brief tenure as a joint regent, Pithon had been appointed satrap of Media at Triparadeisus (Diod.
18.39.6), and subsequently had tried to assert his authority over all the provinces east of Babylonia. Diodorus 19.14.1 declares that Pithon had been declared general of the upper satrapies. While such a position is not mentioned earlier by this author in his account of the distribution of satrapies at Triparadeisus (18.39.6), nor is it referenced in Photius’ summary of Arrian ( Succ. 35), it is possible that at the meeting the now former co-regent Pithon had been given the task of removing all
former Perdiccans from these provinces (Goukowsky 1978: 307 n. 82), or, perhaps,
given a supervisory command over those satrapies east of Babylonia (Bosworth
2002: 104). However, the simplest and most probable explanation for Pithon’s
“generalship” is that Pithon reclaimed the command he had held under Perdiccas
in 323 (Heckel 1988: 74 n. 7; 2006: 195–6), even though at that time the position had been only temporary and, with the crushing of the Greek revolt in the upper
satrapies, the command ended and the troops and their commander returned to
Babylon (Diod. 18.7.3). The Median satrap was likely given, in compensation for
the loss of the regency, a contingent of heavy infantry to complement the forces he could raise in his province. His colleague in this short-lived regency, Arrhidaeus, is later found with a force of 10,000 mercenaries, 1000 Macedonians, 800 cavalry, and 500 Persian bowmen and slingers (Diod. 18.51.1). It is very likely that at the least 1000 Macedonians and 500 Persians were separated from the royal army and