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given to Pithon in compensation for his lost regency. However, whatever the basis of this claimed authority, Pithon had put to death Philotas, the general of Parthia, and placed his own brother Eudamus in the latter’s place (Diod. 19.14.1). This
murder caused all the other satraps in the area to join forces (Diod. 19.14.2). Their combined army, under the overall command of Peucestas, the satrap of Persis
(Diod. 19.14.4), had defeated Pithon (Diod. 19.14.2). Following his defeat, Pithon retreated back to Media and from there, not long before the arrival of Eumenes
and his forces, to Babylon, where he encouraged Seleucus “to share in his expectations” (Diod. 19.14.3). Pithon’s operations and the resulting war with the satraps must have taken place recently. Diodorus (19.13.7, 14.4; cf. 19.15.1) states that when Eumenes later arrived in Susiane he found that the forces of the up-country
satraps were still united from their previous actions against Pithon. That Pithon was offered sanctuary by Seleucus suggests that Seleucus must not have been
adverse to Pithon’s actions, and they now acted in concert with respect to rejecting Eumenes’ overtures (Diod. 19.12.2). This cooperation may have originated in the
plot that resulted in Perdiccas’ death in 320. Moreover, since both were assigned satrapies in the east at Triparadeisus, Seleucus a satrap for the first time and Pithon
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reconfirmed in Media, it is likely that the two journeyed to their assigned satrapies together. Although there is no such reference in our sources, it is also possible that Pithon assisted Seleucus in expelling the previous satrap, who had been appointed by Perdiccas (Mehl 1986: 40). Official y, Seleucus responded to Eumenes’ request
by asserting his allegiance to the kings, but declaring that he would not support someone who had been condemned by the Macedonians (Diod. 19.12.2).
Failing to secure an alliance, Eumenes and his army continued beyond Babylon,
encamping in the “Carian vil ages” (Diod. 19.12.1), located about 20 miles to the northeast of the city. Eumenes did, however, enjoy a notable success during his
passage through Babylonia. The commander of one of the two citadels in Babylon,
loyal to the letters from the kings and regent, gave his support to Eumenes, but
the two forces were unable to make contact (Anson 2007: 195–7; see Chronology
section at the end of this chapter; contra Boiy 2010). For their part Seleucus and Pithon sent an envoy to Antigenes and the argyraspids, requesting that they
remove Eumenes from his command, a request that was ignored (Diod. 19.12.3).
Seleucus had even commanded the argyraspids under Alexander (Arr. Anab.
5.13.1, 4; Heckel 2006: 246), but, as in the case of Ptolemy’s earlier appeal to these same troops as a former commander, these troops remained loyal to Eumenes.
While in winter quarters Eumenes sent the letters given him by the kings and the
regent to the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies (cf. Diod. 19.13.7).28 In Susa, Eumenes planned to summon the forces of the upper satrapies already
alerted to his presence, and also collect funds from the royal treasury there
(cf. Diod. 19.15.5).
Seleucus and Pithon attempted to halt his passage through Babylonia to give
Antigonus time to arrive on the scene. An ancient canal was opened and the area
through which Eumenes and his forces were moving was flooded (Diod. 19.13.1–4).29
The spring was the time of the year when the flooding rivers would be at their swiftest and highest levels. Even though Eumenes’ entire camp was surrounded by water, the ships that had been collected to cross the Tigris river were used to transport the army to safety (Diod. 18.73.3; 19.12.5). Failing in their purpose, Seleucus proposed a truce whereby he would concede the crossing, if Eumenes would evacuate Babylonia.
While giving up his own efforts to stop Eumenes, Seleucus did send messengers
to Antigonus in northern Mesopotamia, where he had wintered (Diod. 19.15.6;
cf. 18.73.3), informing him that Eumenes had passed successful y through Babylonia (Diod. 19.13.5).
Once across the Tigris, Eumenes passed into Susiane. Here he sent envoys again
to the up-country satraps ordering them to join him with their armies (Diod.
19.13.6–7). Unknown to Eumenes, the satraps were mobilized and had left winter
quarters themselves in response to his first summons. Even before Eumenes could
reach Susa they joined him with their forces (Diod. 19.15.1, 5). There was now
added to the troops brought east by Eumenes, 8700 infantry, most of whom were
light-armed, but also including 3000 men “of every origin equipped for service in the Macedonian array” (Diod. 19.14.5); 10,000 Persian archers and slingers, 4600
cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19.14.2–8).30 However, the division in Eumenes’
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command, which had been troublesome before, was now compounded by the
addition of Peucestas and his forces and allies. While these governors were willing to join Eumenes, there was again rivalry concerning the overall command of
the army (Diod. 19.15.1; Plut. Eum. 13.5). Peucestas argued that because of his high standing with Alexander, having been one of the elite somaphylaces, the large contingent of troops he led, and his leadership of the forces of the upper satrapies, he deserved the chief command. Antigenes argued that the right to choose
belonged to “his Macedonians” alone, meaning the argyraspids (Diod. 19.15.1–2).
To prevent the rivalry for command from destroying the newly combined army,
making them all an easy prey for Antigonus, Eumenes encouraged his new allies
to join with his previous forces in the Alexander Tent. The proposal met with
immediate approval (Diod. 19.15.3; Plut. Eum. 13.10–13; Nep. Eum. 7.2). While theoretical y, as at Cyinda, democracy was to rule this council of the commanders, Eumenes still was the royal general of the kings with access to the royal treasuries (cf. Diod. 19.15.5).
In late May of 316, the army arrived in Susa where, using the royal treasury to
which he alone had official access, Eumenes paid his troops six months’ wages.
He also gave 200 talents to Eudamus,31 the satrap of India, for the maintenance
of his 120 elephants and to win his favor. Each of the other satraps had to provide for his own troops (Diod. 19.15.5). Eumenes, in consequence, was the paymaster for only that part of the army which had followed him east, but through his gifts to
other commanders, many others were likewise obligated to him. Eumenes remained
in Susa for a considerable time refreshing his troops.
Antigonus left winter quarters in northwestern Mesopotamia early in the spring
in hopes of catching Eumenes before he could rendezvous with the forces of the
up-country satraps (Diod. 19.15.6). But when he learned that Eumenes had already
joined with the satraps he slowed his pace, rested his troops, and enrolled addi-
tional ones. During the winter the rest of his forces, including his heavy infantry and his war elephants, had joined him. When Antigonus arrived in Babylon, likely
in late May or early June, he arranged for common action against Eumenes with
Seleucus and Pithon. After incorporating their forces into his own, he proceeded
to cross into Susiane (Diod. 19.17.2). With the overwhelming number of troops
under his direct command, Antigonus, unlike Eumenes, did not face any rivalry
from his new allies. Pithon and Seleucus, in light of their inferior numbers, were clearly subordinates.
When Eumenes learned of the approach of Antigonus, he ordered Xenophilus,
who commanded the citadel and the treasury in Susa, not to give any assistance to Antigonus (Diod. 19.17.
3). In company with the other commanders, he marched
for four days to the Pasitigris river, the modern Karun, where he wished to await the enemy (Diod. 19.17.3). The river was not fordable, and after having crossed it by means of a pontoon bridge, Eumenes prepared to await the arrival of Antigonus
behind this natural barrier.
Antigonus reached Susa in July of 316. The time is fixed by Diodorus’ (19.18.3)
reference to the “season of the rising of the dog star,” which corresponds to the
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latter part of July (Bickerman 1968: 144). He appointed Seleucus satrap of this
country in addition to his satrapy of Babylonia, and gave him troops to besiege
the citadel, where Xenophilus and his forces remained loyal to Eumenes as the
representative of the kings. Antigonus, however, with the rest of his army pushed on after the enemy. On this march the heat was so oppressive that Antigonus was
forced to travel at night, but despite this precaution he still lost many men (Diod.
19.18.2). In this region of Iran the temperature in the day is typical y in the high 90s low 100 s, or higher, with the night temperature only dropping about 10–15°
(Naval Intelligence Division 1945: 591–2, 595–6; Ganji 1968: 223–5). On reaching
the Coprates river, the modern Dez, which flows south into the Pasitigris,
Antigonus made preparations for a crossing.32 This river was approximately 400
feet in width and possessed a swift current (Diod. 19.18.3). As a result, it could not be forded but required that the army be ferried across, which Antigonus began to do using small boats acquired from those living along the river. In this manner, roughly 9000 soldiers had crossed (Diod. 19.18.4) when Eumenes, alerted by
scouts, appeared with a force of 4000 infantry and 1300 cavalry and attacked
those troops who had crossed to the eastern shore and were scattered about
seeking provisions (Diod. 19.18.2–4; cf. Plut. Eum. 14.3). Eumenes’ forces fell on these unsuspecting troops and routed them easily. Many drowned attempting
to flee back across the river. Few escaped back to Antigonus; 4000 were taken
prisoner, and likely added to Eumenes’ forces (Diod. 19.18.5–7). With Eumenes
firmly entrenched on the opposite shore of the Coprates, Antigonus regarded
the crossing as impossible and set out for Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) in Media
(Diod. 19.19.2), Pithon’s satrapy, where he could replenish his forces and also
gain funds from the treasury in the city. From Ecbatana he could avoid the river
and easily descend into the upper satrapies.
There were two roads to his Median destination. The first was a long, forty-day
journey, through the hot plain, but the second was much shorter through the
mountains (Diod. 19.19.2). Antigonus had already lost additional troops on his
march away from the failed river crossing (Diod. 19.19.1) and was not about to
suffer longer in the heat. He consequently proceeded to march his army on the
shorter, more mountainous route north. While shorter and cooler, this road led
through the territory of the Cossaeans. It was not easy for an army to follow this course without the consent of these mountaineers. They had exacted payments
from the Persian kings whenever they passed between Ecbatana and Babylon.
They attempted a similar extortion from Alexander the Great in the winter of
324/23, but Alexander attacked them and forced their submission (Arr. Anab.
7.15.2–3; Diod. 17.111.4–6; Plut. Alex. 72.3). Antigonus may have wished to emulate Alexander’s ferocity for the benefit of his recently defeated troops. Diodorus
(19.19.4) states that Antigonus “regarded it as beneath his dignity” to pay tribute to these people. It is also possible that the Cossaeans were allies of the satrap of Persis, Peucestas (cf. Olbrycht 2013: 169). In Babylon in 323, prior to Alexander’s death, Peucestas led a force containing units from this region (Arr. Anab. 7.23.1).
After suffering heavy casualties, eight days after he had set out Antigonus and his
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troops fought their way through to Ecbatana, arriving in August (Diod. 19.19.6–8; cf. 19.19.2). Diodorus (19.20.1) relates that in “forty days” Antigonus’ army had met with three disasters: the march from Babylon to Susa and the deaths due to the heat, the battle on the Coprates, and the crossing of the country of the Cossaeans.
As a result of these various calamities, there was much dissatisfaction in the army (Diod. 19.20.1). Antigonus eliminated the danger by mingling with his troops
and making supplies available in abundance. Unlike Eumenes, the majority of
Antigonus’ troops were loyal to him personal y. Moreover, most of his Macedonians were not the jaded veterans of Alexander’s campaigns, but those given him by
Antipater before that commander’s return to Europe, nor, unlike Eumenes, was he
beholden to subordinate commanders who had significant loyal forces of their
own. In Media, Antigonus did partial y offset his losses by sending Pithon out to recruit 2000 additional cavalry; Pithon also acquired more than 1000 horses and
a large number of baggage animals whose numbers had been severely diminished
by the recent ordeals (Diod. 19.20.1–4; cf. 19.27.1).
Antigonus’ retreat to Media created an opportunity for Eumenes and his allies.
If the army turned to the west, they might secure Asia Minor and perhaps obtain
support from Polyperchon in Macedonia. The satraps and generals of the upper
satrapies, however, wished to remain in the east; they feared to leave their lands, lands now very much threatened by Antigonus. After it became clear to Eumenes
that he was not going to dissuade those who wished to remain, he gave way (Diod.
19.21.1–2). A divided army would fall prey to Antigonus as the previous divided
Perdiccan forces had. As before, the nature of Eumenes’ command compromised
that commander’s ability to deal effectively with promising circumstances. Eumenes now reluctantly led his army to Persepolis. It is tempting to speculate on what
would have been the result of a return to Asia Minor. It is likely that the one place where such a return might have proven pivotal was Macedonia.
In Europe, after Cassander was repulsed in his invasion of Macedonia in the
summer of 317, Polyperchon, concluding that he needed to shore up his support,
again invited Olympias to return to Macedonia, and, this time, she came. She
returned to Macedonia as guardian for the young Alexander, her grandson (Just.
14.5.1; Diod. 18.11 1; cf. Diod. 18.49.4, 57.2, 65.1). Polyperchon would retain his guardianship of Philip, but would relinquish similar authority over Alexander IV
to Olympias (Diod. 18.49.4; Just. 14.6.1). Moreover, Olympias was acknowledged
as having superior power through the bestowal on her of the prostasia, the regency (Diod. 18.49.4; Euseb. Chron. 231; Anson 1992: 40–1; 2009: 284–5, and chapter 2).
While Polyperchon was away in Epirus preparing to escort personal y the former
king’s mother to Macedonia, Eurydice announced that her husband, King Philip
III, had dismissed Polyperchon and that she had taken over the regency, ordering
the now proclaimed former regent to turn over the Macedonian army to Cassander
(Just. 14.5.1–3; Diod. 19.11.1). Polyperchon was notified by letter (Just. 14.5.3).
Philip was ill and may not have been aware of his wife’s activities (Just. 14.5.2).
Eurydice likely feared that Olympias would favor her grandson at the expense of
Philip and hence limit even further Eurydice’s authority (Carney 2006: 72–4).
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When she seized the regency, the royal wife had also sent emissaries into the
Peloponnesus to Cassander requesting that he come to Macedonia as quickly as
possible (Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.3), and a letter explaining the change was also sent to Antigonus (Just. 14.5.3), although it is curious that, if this was indeed true, there is no notice of it being used as propaganda against Eumenes. However,
Eumenes later fabricated a letter supposedly written by the satrap of Armenia, the Persian Orontes, that reported that Cassander was dead and that Polyperchon had
crossed to Asia and was already advancing into Cappadocia (Diod. 19.23.1–3).
Even though Diodorus supplies a different reason for the letter, it is possible that Antigonus had received the letter from Eurydice and did attempt to influence
Eumenes’ commanders (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 200). The fabricated
letter would then be an attempt to counter this claim.
Cassander, occupied in the Peloponnesus and having been repulsed the previous
year, did not respond, but Polyperchon did. There was apparently, although our
knowledge of Cassander’s operations is based on little more than brief notices,
an ongoing contest between Cassander and Polyperchon’s son Alexander, and
perhaps earlier with Polyperchon himself, that had been underway for some time
in the Peloponnesus (cf. Diod. 19.35.1). Justin’s (14.5.1) reference to Polyperchon returning from Greece might suggest that the regent was engaged with his son in
this campaign and from there proceeded to Epirus to retrieve Olympias, but see the earlier discussion of this controversial passage. After Eurydice’s announcement,
Polyperchon, who was now in Epirus and acting in concert with Aeacides, the king
of Epirus, invaded Macedonia with Olympias and Alexander IV (Diod. 19.11.1; Just.
14.5.9).33 He apparently had taken Roxane and the young Alexander IV with him