Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  André had a phobia about the Selous Scouts in general and Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly in particular. This led to a very unnecessary incident when, following two failed callouts by Scouts pseudo callsigns, André flatly refused to respond to a third one on the same day. Whilst all hell was breaking loose between Ron Reid-Daly, COMOPS and André Dennison, I arranged for Territorial soldiers operating fairly close to the Scouts callout position to prepare for immediate uplift for a Fireforce action. For this I had first sought COMOPS approval from Harold Griffiths, who was then working under Norman Walsh.

  Away went the empty helicopters from Mtoko with their accompanying Lynx to pick up the TF troops who, though inexperienced in the Fireforce role, thoroughly enjoyed a small but successful action in the Msana Tribal Trust Land. André’s frustrated anger switched from the Selous Scout CO to me for having “taken away my aircraft without my permission!” Such was the nature of the man as Fireforce commander! But with gun in hand and feet on the ground, André was a great soldier and leader of troops.

  Bold actions—007 ideas

  THE SAS CONTINUED WITH THEIR successful operations using minimum manpower for maximum results. During May 1978 eight SAS men made a parachute descent with canoes and plenty of explosives to take out a ZANLA barrack block in the FRELIMO stronghold town of Tete. In a typical SAS-styled night action involving moments of threat and doubts, they paddled heavily laden canoes down the Zambezi River right up to their target set high on the bank of the river. There they set the charges that blew the barracks and its occupants to hell and back. Upon their return to Rhodesia the participants described the operation and spoke of their passage under the huge Tete bridge spanning the great river. They said how awesome the illuminated bridge appeared as they passed silently below FRELIMO guards and vehicles on the bridge deck high above them. The business of blowing bridges had become quite fashionable so it was not surprising that these men were considering how the Tete bridge might be dropped, if the need arose.

  I was fascinated by the problems involved and went away with the subject turning over in my mind. As the SAS had said, dropping the bridge could be done easily enough if it was not located at a garrison town containing hundreds of well-armed troops. The question that exercised my mind was how the Air Force might deal with the problem, if given the opportunity. Looking forward in time and considering friendly Malawi’s future interests in the bridge, there seemed no way Rhodesia would ever consider destroying such a vital road link. Nevertheless I could not get the subject out of my mind.

  Tete bridge is a huge suspension bridge with two high support towers on each bank of the river. Over these towers two suspension cables pass from their deep anchor points on the south side to those on the north. These two enormously thick and powerful cables support the entire road platform by means of many vertical drop cables.

  No available bomb or rocket would have any meaningful effect on this type of structure because assured destruction could only come from cutting through one or both of the suspension cables. The question was how this might be done. So far as I was concerned great accuracy would be required, so low delivery at high speed would be essential against this target sited at the edge of a highly defended town. It also meant that our fastest aircraft, Hunters, could make only one pass.

  The system I conceived may sound too James Bondish but I have no doubt the project team could have developed it given time to perfect the explosive shearing device I refer to as a ‘cable cutter’.

  None of our team had any experience in high-energy shaped charges and explosive shearing devices so I went to Cambridge-trained ex-British Royal Engineers Captain Charlie Small with whom I had worked on the odd inter-force project. One of these projects had been to design a bridge and culvert destruction device to be mounted on a self-propelled vehicle that could be lifted by helicopter and placed on a safe section of the Maputo to Malvernia railway line. Once on the rails the vehicle was to be controlled remotely from the air and run to the target, bridge or culvert and usually defended, where it would be brought to a halt at the selected position for command detonation.

  Charlie, who was then working with Selous Scouts, was experienced in the destruction of bridges as recently proven during Op Virile. His approach to dropping a bridge was to calculate the amount of explosive required for the job then double the quantity. Because of this, the rail vehicle became too heavy for carriage by one or two helicopters. Charlie’s explosives alone required two Alouettes, another to carry the vehicle and a fourth one to transport engineers to assemble the unit on site. Though the feasibility work and designs were completed, the device was never put to the test.

  Charlie’s reaction to my plans to drop the Tete bridge was “it can be done”. But he needed the cutting charge, 100kg minimum, to be in direct contact with the suspension cable and oriented so that the explosive ‘cutting’ wave faced the cable.

  Arising from Charlie Small’s advice, my concept involved two Hunters each carrying two 150kg bomb-shaped cable cutters under slung, and partially imbedded, within and under, 500kg inert bombs. One Hunter would approach on a line just inside the bridge towers at one end of the bridge whilst another did the same at the other end of the bridge approaching from the opposite direction. Both pilots would have to aim to pass thirty meters above the suspension cables at the relatively slow speed of 300 knots

  To give them safe passage, another pair of Hunters would precede them by a few seconds flying at maximum speed directly over Tete town. This pair would then pull up into a steep, noisy, full-powered climbing turn away from the river to draw attention from the slower-flying Hunters approaching each other at low level along the river.

  At half a kilometre from target the cable cutters would be released. As they fell away they would draw out a heavy twenty-metre length of super-strong stranded steel cable from a drum mounted inside the inert bomb. Just before the cable was fully withdrawn, as measured by the number of rotations of the drum, the 500kg inert bomb would release automatically from the aircraft.

  The requirement was for the inert bomb to pass above the suspension cable and the cable cutter below it. Both units would have passed the suspension cable before their linking cable came taught against the bridge cable. The heavier bomb would continue on and the shock load on the cable (the reason for the slow attack speed) would be slightly damped by the inert bomb’s flight line being drawn down. The cable cutter would pitch steeply upwards as it was brought to a rapid halt before changing direction back towards the suspension cable. As each cable-cutting device slammed up against the suspension cable it would fire its cutting charge.

  If all four cable cutters succeeded in cutting right through their respective section of suspension cable that would be fine but it only needed one severed cable to drop the bridge. However, if neither cable was completely severed, the damage done would render the bridge unsafe, thereby necessitating many months for disassembly of the entire bridge before replacement of the custom-designed suspension cables was possible.

  There was another unusual project explored but never put to the test. This was to have been a Hunter-borne, non-explosive, man-killing device. It all started with an article I read in some scientists’ magazine reporting the potential of low-frequency noise to subdue riotous crowds or to actually kill large numbers of people if applied energy levels were high enough. The article told of a French scientist and his four assistants who were all killed in the wee hours of the morning when they conducted their first-ever test on an oversized, low frequency, ‘whistle’. Disaster struck when they passed large volume airflow from a compressed air tank through the sound generator. Not only were buildings for some distance around subjected to severe damage, the autopsies carried out on all five victims revealed that their vital organs had been pulverised by the high energy, four cycles per second, sound force.

  I was intrigued by this information and looked into the possibility of towing a suitable ‘whistle’ through the air behind a Hunter flying at high
speed. Calculations, or should I say guesstimations, showed that the required amplitude of sound waves oscillating at four cycles per second could be achieved without danger to the pilot or anyone on the ground. Only in a sustained steep turn at the right speed would ‘killer sound waves’ focus for the few lethal seconds needed to cover a fair sized area within the orbit.

  Had we had the time and found a suitable way of testing such a device, we might have produced an ideal low-cost weapon for a large variety of CT targets. I am left wondering if the concept was realistic, or not.

  Katoog

  DURING MY VISITS TO CSIR in Pretoria I became very interested in an aeronautical division project known as Katoog, which is Afrikaans for ‘cat’s eye’. This project looked to the future when a helicopter gunship pilot would be able to aim his power articulated guns by simply placing an illuminated spot in his helmet visor onto a target.

  When I had checked on the project, back in February 1978, no noticeable progress had been made since my previous visit many weeks earlier. The South Africans were obviously in no great hurry as they knew that helicopter gunships and their rotating ‘chin turrets’, for which Katoog was intended, lay a long way off in the future.

  For my part I could see immediate use for the Katoog system in a side-firing mode, so I asked if it would be possible to let me take the equipment, as it was, for a short-duration trial in Rhodesian operational conditions. The CSIR engineers were especially keen because this would give them early technical feedback; so a signal was sent up to Air HQ in which I made a proposal to borrow the equipment. Authority was given for me to pursue the matter with the South Africans.

  Because Katoog was a top-secret project there was much to-and-fro communicating in Pretoria before the request was accepted in principle. However, the South Africans insisted on finishing an incomplete mounting for four .303 Browning machine-guns and conducting ground-firing trials before passing the system over. The gun mounting incorporated hydraulic servos to traverse and pitch the guns in direct response to Katoog’s sighting sensor.

  There was no hope of finalising a pilot helmet sight before the gun system itself was ready. So I requested that CSIR produce a simple mounting post on which to fix their angle-sensing device with a collimator-reflector gunsight affixed between two handgrips incorporating a firing button. The idea was that the guns would be operated by one of our helicopter gunners sitting in a sideways-facing seat set central to the front doorway of an Alouette. On his left side, the multiple-gun platform would be wholly accessible to him with gun barrels projecting through the rear doorframe.

  By early May the system was working well and was transported with the senior project engineer to Salisbury on six weeks’ loan. As soon as the whole unit had been fitted to an Alouette, firing trials were conducted with the CSIR project engineer making suitable adjustments to allow for direct aiming at targets with the guns offset for normal attack speed. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt and Corporal Thompson conducted these tests.

  Ted Lunt.

  Ted Lunt was the Squadron Commander of 8 Squadron, which had only just been created, ostensibly to lessen the burden on No 7 Squadron. Initially 8 Squadron operated Alouette IIIs, though none of us knew then that the true purpose of creating this new unit was to prepare for the on-take of larger helicopters.

  We moved to FAF 4 at Mtoko and commenced work right away. The Alouette with the Katoog system was referred to as ‘K-Car Alpha’ to distinguish it from the 20mm K-Car gunships. The plan was for Ted to position at a safe place that was nearest to the area I was searching and wait for my call. In this way, and acting entirely on his own, he could respond very quickly.

  We struck luck immediately when I called him to a large CT camp near an abandoned farmstead southeast of Mtoko. As Ted arrived, over thirty CTs broke cover and started running and splitting into small groups. I called for Fireforce as Corporal Thompson’s first long burst downed six CTs. Five stayed where they fell.

  Ted’s specific instruction was to remain at 1,200 feet above ground so that the Katoog aiming system and the four-gun mount could be compared directly with the established 20mm cannon performance. Whereas the first burst had been made from the correct height I could see that Ted was progressively dropping height to get at small groups now scattered and snivelling from cover to cover. So far as I could see CTs were dropping every time the guns fired but some rose again, staggering noticeably.

  K-Car Alpha had run out of ammunition before the Fireforce took over. Most of the seventeen CT’s accounted for had either been killed by Katoog or were so severely wounded that they were unable to escape the attention of the troops. Katoog had proven itself on its first live outing.

  This poor-quality photo of K-Car Alpha shows how the four-gun fit looked when it came into squadron service with the name Dalmatian Fit. The essential difference from prototype is that, to make way for an airborne Army commander’s seat (in which one armourer is seen sitting) the gun control yoke with gunsight was set high above and to the rear of the gun platform. Also seen in this photo is the pilot’s armoured seat designed to protect head and body against enemy fire entering from the port side.

  Ted was directed onto a number of unoccupied places before I put him onto a group of fourteen terrorists. Corporal Thompson knocked hell out of these guys who attempted to fire back at the helicopter until they realised they came short every time they stopped running in zigzag fashion. By the end of the action Ted had dropped right down to about 300 feet to get at three remaining survivors who made the mistake of going into cover under a small clump of bushes. They did not stand a chance. The whole group lay dead before troops arrived to sweep the area.

  At this stage I brought in Hamie Dax, our successful PRAW recce pilot, to help cover more ground in an endeavour to locate a particular CT gang that was giving Centenary farmers a bad time. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt with Corporal Thompson responded to a call from Hamie.

  This is what Ted wrote in his ASR of 23 June 78:

  Gun trials on the Alpha fit continued daily with K-Car prepositioning in areas as required in support of air recce.

  PRAW crew (Dax and McCay) reported a likely camp at US400294 and requested a check out. No movement or signs of occupation were visible to the PRAW but in view of the pattern of camps found thus far, Dax indicated good possibilities. Run was made from NNE at tree top height in view of wind and terrain with last few hundred meters under direction of PRAW.

  As the camp central complex was approached, K-Car Alpha observed an armed CT at very close range and opened fire. Immediately 8-10 CTs broke from the area scattering in all directions.

  Targets were engaged with great difficulty and of necessity from close quarters at slow speed in view of the thick vegetation and rapid departure of CTs.

  There being no Fireforce immediately available and PRAW not having seen CT’s from height, many CTs unfortunately made good their escape. Several CTs were observed hiding in bushes and these were engaged and killed with very little trouble—indeed of those killed only two managed to get off a few rounds.

  Upon initiation of the contact FF (from Mtoko) was called for and arrived within 30 mins or so. By this time no more CTs could be found and, having briefed K-Car 1 on the set-up and indicated the whereabouts of the 6 dead, K-Car Alpha withdrew to carry on with recce reactions, there being other camps to check in the area.

  Under direction of FF Mtoko, paras were dropped to the East (1.5 km) then carried in by G-Car. A sweep line was formed consisting of 4 sticks (16 men) which moved from E to W towards a stop-line of 4 men. The camp was searched but only 6 dead located. No blood spoor was found and stops were uplifted and FF returned to Mtoko at last light.

  ENEMY ACTION:

  Nothing unusual—CTs remained within camp and only broke once engaged by K-Car Alpha. No attempt made to fire upon PRAW it seems, even though he was circling for some time prior to heli arrival.

  DETAILS NOT FORMING AND INTEGRAL PART OF NARRATIVE:

  4 of the 6 kil
led were fleeting targets—Alpha fit proved amazingly effective against these. This weapon proved itself to be far superior to the 20mm in this respect. 3 guns only were used, the 4th having jammed in the initial firing period.

  Superb handling of the situation by the gunner Cpl Thompson.

  I was asked to insert comments for the field commander and wrote this:

  a. This report is written on behalf of OC FAF 5 at his request.

  b. I was operating an area with PRAW pilot Dax. The Alpha K–Car was close at hand at Madziwa Mine with Lynx at immediate readiness at Mtoko.

  c. This was another trial at air recce with immediate response, made possible by the need to test Katoog. Previously, recce information would be checked out the day after its attainment. This was failing as terrorists were obviously moving off after recce aircraft cleared the area. The plan on this day was to recce until a suitably fresh camp was located. Upon location the aircraft would remain overhead to keep CTs static and call for K-Car Alpha and the Lynx.

  d. When Hamie Dax called, I moved over to him arriving some 4 minutes after K-Car Alpha. I then descended to 400 ft over the helicopter. All six terrorists had been accounted for before arrival of the Lynx, which was only 9 minutes after K-Car Alpha’s first strike.

  e. This action by an unsupported helicopter was not intended as the plan was for Lynx to link up with K-Car Alpha before moving to target. However, Squadron Leader Lunt moved quickly and being satisfied with my presence and the closeness of Lynx he proceeded to do battle. This type of action must be avoided in the future by adoption of a more flexible approach by the Fireforce. I am responsible for this situation, as I could have held K-Car Alpha back until the Lynx reached him.