Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  f. Initial representation has been made to COMOPS (Gp Capt Walsh) requesting a follow-up by providing recce with immediate support. However, the potency of the Alpha K-Car is an essential ingredient if good opening results are to be achieved by a small element responding immediately to recce calls.

  g. The stereotype employment of Fireforces has not produced acceptable results for over four months, making an altogether more aggressive approach essential. Recce will provide good results if Fireforces are positioned close to an area being covered by one or more recce aircraft; for instance Benecke and Dax. In turn, recce must work on the best intelligence available—as happened in today’s work. Full Fireforce should not be used to make the initial checkout as this is cumbersome and slows down the whole procedure. One K-Car, a G-Car and a Lynx are all that is needed. If an action breaks, the remainder can be brought in at short notice. This system would also allow simultaneous check out on two camps, should the situation arise.

  h. Another aspect that bears consideration is identifying specific terrorist leaders or terror groups requiring elimination. In today’s strike we identified the terrorist group we wished to locate. The group was responsible for many actions against Centenary farms and this was having an adverse effect on farmers, their families and workers. The group contacted proved to be the very one we sought. Its leader, with size 10 boots and a frame to match, was amongst those killed.

  j. Cost of ammunition expended—a mere $172.80.

  On the night of 23 June 1978, probably whilst Ted Lunt was writing the ASR quoted above, a gang of CTs committed dreadful murder of seventeen innocent white missionaries and four of their children. This took place at the Elim Mission in the Vumba. The mission had previously been the Eagle Preparatory School that my brother Tony and I attended as founder pupils thirty years earlier. Rhodesians of all races were horror-struck by this senseless action, yet the rest of the world simply laughed it off, as they would do again when Air Rhodesia Viscount airliners were shot down.

  The Katoog system continued to be used with considerable success, either acting alone or used as a component of Fireforce. Apart from the success of the sighting system, the density of fire from four guns using .303-ball ammunition proved many times more efficient, and a great deal cheaper, than single-barrel, slow-firing cannons with explosive 20mm shells.

  Katoog was returned to South Africa at the conclusion of the six-week trial period. Six long months then passed before 7 Squadron received two systems, now referred to as either Dalmatian Project or Alpha Fit, for permanent use. Some of the 7 Squadron crews loved the weapon. However, most preferred the 20mm cannon because of the irritatingly high stoppage rate of .303 Browning guns.

  Philippa Berlyn

  PHILIPPA BERLYN (MARRIED NAME—CHRISTIE) was a Salisbury journalist who spoke fluent Shona. She was short, stocky and very plain in dress and looks but when it came to writing she was brilliant. Philippa had a very special interest in the wellbeing of black women and was particularly troubled by the hard times they were facing in the rural areas. However, since CTs disallowed newspapers in the areas they worked, Philippa could not get her messages and advice through to them. Because of this, she decided that she had to go to the women, and to hell with the risks that went with doing so.

  I cannot remember the date she came to me at FAF 5, asking to be dropped off at a village some thirty kilometres northeast of Mtoko. She had already arranged to meet with a large number of local women and had been given clearance, in writing from Minister P.K. van der Byl, to make the visit. However the Army was unable to assist immediately and the Air Force had not been notified. Nevertheless, I sorted things out with Air HQ and clearance was given to deliver her at sunset for her all-night indaba, and collect her at sunrise.

  The location to which Philippa was going happened to be a particularly hot spot, so the G-Car in which she flew was accompanied by a K-Car to cover the landing. The G-Car pilot who delivered Philippa was very relieved when he saw the large crowd of expectant women rushing to meet her as she climbed out, skirt flying, to meet them. But, like all of us, the pilot could not help being deeply concerned for the safety of this very brave white woman.

  When the war ended, I learned from ZANLA that the local ZANLA commander had been fully aware of Philippa’s impending visit and had instructed CTs not to fire at the helicopter but to keep a low profile. After dark and unbeknown to Philippa, ten CTs crept forward and remaining in the shadows surrounded the meeting place to listen to every word she spoke. So impressed were they by her fluency in Shona and the advice she gave the women that her departure by helicopter at sunrise went unchallenged.

  Philippa’s husband, law Professor Dick Christie, was not only good-looking, he differed a great deal from his softly spoken and very well-mannered wife. Whenever distanced from his professional environment he always let his hair down. Dick was an Air Force Volunteer Reserve officer who flew second ‘dickey’ in Dakotas. His favourite place for call-up was FAF 7, Buffalo Range. Dick Christie always celebrated his last night at FAF 7 by mixing a strange alcoholic concoction that included mashed bananas. There were never many takers for Dick’s ‘free drink’ that went by some catchy name. In consequence, he drank more than he bargained for and got very happy, noisy and quite sloshed. It was in this condition that he became involved with others in ‘roof-rattling’ sleeping helicopter crews. Late drinkers often annoyed tired crew who had gone to bed at a sensible hour by throwing stones onto the noisy tin roofs of their billets. Dick joined in but, instead of throwing small sized stones, he heaved a brick that failed to make the height of the roof. Instead, it went through a window and broke the leg of a sleeping helicopter pilot. Next morning, a very sombre Dick was particularly embarrassed as he walked up the sloping deck of the Dakota past the unfortunate pilot who was lying strapped to a casevac stretcher. To add to his embarrassment, the pilot asked Dick if he was in a fit enough state to fly the Dakota.

  Final tracker dogs trial

  I HAD JUST BEEN AWARDED THE Defence Cross for Distinguished Service (DCD) for my project work when I was approached to try out dogs in a genuine track-down of CTs.

  I learned that Flight Sergeant Terry Rubenstein, under direction from Wing Commander Rex Taylor, had resuscitated the radio tracker dog project. Rex and members of the Air Force Dog Section at New Sarum had been very annoyed by the Police Dog Training Centre’s inability, or disinterest, in progressing the system to full operational status, so they trained two African handlers and their Alsatians for the task. Wing Commander Peter Cooke had tried them unsuccessfully in April 1978. The problems Peter encountered then were resolved but it was considered that I was the best man to make a final test.

  DCD presentation by acting President Pithy.

  Later with Beryl and son Paul who had, much to my astonishment and delight, successfully passed the gruelling selection process to become a member of the elite SAS.

  I could not expect to be given an Alouette III for this task so Ted Lunt converted me onto an Alouette II because there were some spare at New Sarum. I had not flown this aircraft before even though most of the earlier helicopter pilots had undergone their initial helicopter training on this machine.

  The Alouette II was not as pleasant to fly as its big sister, the Alouette III, but for me it was so much nicer than any fixed-wing aircraft. With two handlers and two dogs on board there was hardly room to move. Again I chose to base at Mtoko where I arranged ten ‘volunteers’ to walk a trail in the late evening. Next morning the dogs followed the trail without difficulty. Having satisfied myself that the dogs and handlers appeared to know their business it was just a matter of waiting for someone to come up with CT tracks to follow.

  When a radio call came through reporting a night attack on a farm with fresh CT tracks confirmed, I called for the handlers and their dogs. Almost immediately I noticed how nervous the handlers were. As we lifted off one or both of them made their nervousness known by releasing wind which filled the cabin with an unwe
lcome stench.

  The moment the dogs were put on the trail it became obvious to me that they were not going to run. After a number of failed attempts I landed back at the farm and questioned the two trackers. Neither one had ever seen action and both had heard horrifying stories of soldiers and airmen being killed in helicopters. I decided then that the dogs must have sensed their handlers’ fear and that this was the reason they had reacted badly. I needed to prove this.

  With JOC Hurricane’s approval I arranged for a group of black soldiers to lay a trail from the same farm at the same time as the CTs had attacked it. Next morning I put down on their trail at the same time we had landed on the CT trail the day before. The dog handlers knew there would be no shooting at the end of the run and the dogs reacted normally, easily running down the soldiers ten kilometres from the start point.

  The handlers’ fear of potential CT fire and the adverse effect this had on their dogs had been proven. However, to give dog handlers airborne combat experience was an impossibility that threw the whole radio tracker dog concept out of the window. My own very biased opinion is that had I spent another year on helicopters back in 1969 this situation would have been foreseen and many successes might have resulted. The obvious solution was to train Air Force dogs to be handled by combat-experienced helicopter technicians or soldiers.

  More enemy reversals

  ZIPRA HAD BEEN PRETTY INEFFECTIVE inside the country because sporadic RSF actions had disallowed them from establishing themselves in the N’debele tribal areas as effectively as their ZANLA opponents had done in the east. So troubled were ZAPU’s leaders about their waning image that they even resorted to claiming one of ZANLA’s notable successes. This was an attack against the large fuel storage depot in Salisbury’s industrial sites.

  During the night of 11 December 1978, a small ZANLA sabotage unit fired RPG 7 rockets into three fuel-storage tanks, setting them alight. Such surprise was achieved that the CTs were gone before the Police protection detachment realised what had happened. The resulting fires radiated such intense heat that the tanks partially collapsed, spilling fuel in a chain reaction that destroyed twenty-two of the twenty-eight tanks in the complex. This attack dealt Rhodesia a near-crippling blow and it took three long months before the country’s precious fuel reserves were restored.

  In the meantime, ZIPRA agents and operatives in Rhodesia, obviously following ZANLA’s lead, had been very busy recruiting in Matabeleland causing JOC Tangent great concern for the sudden high outflow of youngsters to Botswana. Most were being taken out at gunpoint! Nevertheless ZIPRA was still considered to be in a state of disarray following earlier SAS activities in Zambia. So, for the time being, ZANLA remained our primary concern.

  During the latter quarter of 1977, the SAS was moved into the Gaza Province in an attempt to subdue that region in the manner they had tamed Tete. Unfortunately SAS was too small a unit to handle both provinces at the same time and the replacement troops sent to Tete did not operate in the same effective manner as SAS, simply because they were not trained for such specialised work. Consequently FRELIMO and ZANLA in Tete Province were let off the hook. Instead of being the hunted, they became the hunters again, which allowing CTs to pour into the Op Hurricane areas virtually unchecked.

  In Gaza the SAS had good successes but they also had a very hard time. The FRELIMO Government had given greatest priority to assisting ZANLA with its main thrust into the southeast of Rhodesia. Because the Selous Scouts, SAS and air operations into Gaza had not been sustained on an ongoing basis, FRELIMO had been given the breathing space needed to build up substantial force levels to maintain the infiltration line for ZANLA.

  Just before SAS was temporarily withdrawn from Gaza for the Op Dingo attacks on Chimoio and Tembue, a larger than normal SAS team dropped into Gaza Province on 1st November 1977. In an endeavour to mislead FRELIMO about the purpose of the para-Dakota’s presence, the Dakota crew descended to low level to hand-launch Alpha bombs through the open cargo door along the general line of the railway. A very bad moment was experience when the Dakota inadvertently passed directly over heavily defended but blacked-out Mapai. The pilot bunted the aircraft in his endeavour to escape enemy 12,7mm, 14,5mm and 23mm fire that was ripping through his aircraft. In so doing, loose Alpha bombs and bodies floated in the air until forcibly dumped onto the floor when the aircraft levelled-off sharply too close to the ground for comfort.

  Two days later, on 3 November, the SAS team brought a large convoy of FRELIMO vehicles to a halt when the lead vehicle struck the land mine SAS had laid as an initiator to their planned ambush. However, a series of explosions from ordnance on this vehicle made it impossible for the rest of the column to continue forward. Fearing air attack, the convoy backtracked a short distance and moved off the road.

  The SAS had inadvertently hooked a much larger fish than the ZANLA convoy they had been expecting. They backed off immediately because the FRELIMO force was much too large and angry to engage. Through Giles Porter, (callsign C4) flying a Lynx with the SAS airborne liaison officer, Captain Bob MacKenzie, Air Force Hunters were called in for a dawn attack to destroy the vehicles, now hidden in the cover of dense trees and out of sight of the SAS men on the ground.

  Vic Wightman and Dave Bourhill came in as Red Section. John Annan and Spook Geraty followed later as White Section. The term ‘Bingo’ in Vic Wightman’s ASR means ‘minimum fuel remaining’.

  Vic’s ASR reads:

  Red Section arrived in the target area at approx. 0540B. C4 pointed out the burning vehicle which was about one kilometre up the road from where the hidden vehicles were believed to be. As no vehicles were visible either to C4 or Red Section, C4 suggested that Red Section descend to low level and have a look. Red Lead declined the offer on the grounds of fuel consumption and poor spotting capability at low level, whereupon C4, with a commendable display of moral fibre, descended to 50 feet and flew up the road from South to North. When he reached the assessed position of the hidden convoy a large number of twinkles from intense enemy fire appeared from the bush to his left with airbursts assessed to have come from 37mm. As he broke away to the right Red Section turned in and fired long bursts of 30mm into the AA positions. After Red Section’s first attack something (possibly a vehicle) was seen to be burning.

  During the dive for the second attack, Strela smoke was seen heading northeastward. Another Strela was fired at Red Lead as he pulled up to perch for the third attack and the airburst was seen some way behind the aircraft. Red 2 also had a Strela fired at him as he pulled up. This is not the first time Red Lead has had Strela fired at him and there is no difficulty in identification.

  Red Lead’s third attack was guns only at the Strela site—Red 2 used 24 Matra. Since all 30mm ammo was used up and, at most, one vehicle was burning, Red climbed to FL 200 and called for another pair. While in the holding pattern several glints were seen which might have been reflections off windscreens. The position of one of these was noted. Red 2 ran short of fuel before White Section arrived but Red Lead was able to place 6 Matra at the position at about 0645B just as fuel reached Bingo for Buffalo Range. It was a lucky guess for the unseen vehicle burst into flames and started exploding.

  At 0615B White Section was airborne. En route they were briefed by Red Lead and C4 on the situation and the AA. As they arrived overhead they observed Red Lead’s final strike. C4 asked White Lead to strike along the left of the road in a northerly direction and White 2 along the right. Both used Matra and 30mm and were on target as observed by C4 who was by this time overhead at FL 120. As White 2 was pulling out of his attack he saw a group of vehicles just to the left of and about 2/3 along his line of strikes. He attempted to get White Lead’s eyes onto target by clock reference from the burning vehicle.

  White 2 observed White Lead’s second strike to be at the left of the assessed position of the (unseen) group of vehicles and while pulling out White Lead also noticed them. Both he and White 2 attempted another strike but only saw the ve
hicles after ceasefire though White 2’s second and third attacks appeared to rake through them. His subsequent attacks were to no avail as a 7.62 round had severed his armament circuits. White Lead was also having difficulty with intermittent firing. At this stage C4 assessed the targets as severely damaged and he recommended that no further Hunters be called for. White Lead was streaming fuel from his port 230 tank so diverted to Buffalo Range. White 2 returned to base.

  As can be seen from the ASR, the Hunter pilots did not fully realise what damage they had inflicted. Giles Porter and Bob MacKenzie had been extremely lucky to survive the low pass in which unbelievably heavy fire, including flak and missiles, was directed at them; but this brave action had succeeded in finding the convoy. The SAS on the ground said the Lynx passed through the heaviest fire they had ever witnessed, making it all the more amazing that the Lynx suffered no hits.

  During the night two days after the attack, a close-in reconnaissance revealed that the SAS had halted a mobile brigade including Russians who were aiming to establish this brigade’s HQ in Mapai. Thirteen brand-new transporters and specialist vehicles had been destroyed along with spares for Russian tanks that were already in position at Mapai

  Actions such as this should have been sustained but, with the SAS withdrawal from Gaza for Op Dingo, breathing space was again given to FRELIMO and ZANLA, allowing the rate of incursions into the Op Repulse area to increase. By now FRELIMO, incensed by Rhodesian forces’ actions against them, increased their own numbers entering Rhodesia.

  The SAS had expected to return to Gaza immediately following Op Dingo but their expertise was needed in Zambia and Botswana to counter renewed threats from ZIPRA’s attempts to establish an effective front in Matabeleland.