Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Four white abductees were being held prisoner by ZANLA in this new base when Operation Snoopy was launched on 20 September 1978, again by SAS, RLI and Air Force. Photos of the base showed it to be more widespread than the original Chimoio base but an attack plan similar to Op Dingo was put into effect. Heavy haze conditions, covering Mozambique from ground level all the way up to 30,000 feet, had set in earlier than usual, but the jet pilots managed to find their targets for the opening strikes. When the troops and K-Cars moved in, it became obvious that the camps they were dealing with contained nothing like as many CTs as had been expected.

  Then a Lynx pilot, conducting reconnaissance in depth, attracted very heavy fire from positions over thirty kilometres south of the attended area. Only then was it realised that ZANLA camps were spread within an elliptically shaped area exceeding 200 square kilometres in extent. Immediately the whole complex became known as the ‘Chimoio Circle’.

  Troops were moved down from the northern sector of Chimoio Circle to the south where they came into contact with ZANLA in many different positions, resulting in some serious but unco-ordinated firefights. Jet and K-Car strikes criss-crossed over a multitude of targets that were surrounded by extensive trench systems incorporating many AA guns. Fighting and camp destruction operations continued into the second day before FRELIMO decided to enter the area with tanks, but apart from making a lot of noise and bumbling around in the dark, they were of no value to ZANLA who, though taking many casualties, were offering stiffer resistance than had been experienced on any previous occasion.

  The haze problem worsened progressively due to huge amounts of smoke generated by hundreds of burning structures. So dense was the haze that an SAS-controlled Hunter strike, directed against the highest point of an adjacent granite hill, ended up on the same hill as the SAS callsign. Fortunately the Golf bombs detonated on the highest point over 100 metres from the callsign, but even this was too close and shrapnel mortally wounded Trooper Donnelly. The pilot, Vic Wightman, was very distressed by this unfortunate incident but, considering the amount of ordnance being put down in response to calls from the ground, it says much for the efficiency of pilots that no other soldiers were hurt in the awful conditions that prevailed. The error Vic Wightman made arose from the fact that the whaleback granite feature he was asked to attack looked much the same as any other of a number of such features within the Chimoio Circle, and they were all aligned in the same direction. Had the haze not so severely restricted visibility of the ground to a small patch directly below the aircraft, cross-referencing on river-lines would have eliminated any chance of this pilot error. The SAS quickly put the Air Force at ease by letting it be known that they fully understood the jet pilots’ problems and accepted the attendant dangers.

  Dave Bourhill.

  For the Hunters and Canberras there were other dangers. Strela missiles were being launched and two of these found their mark. One Canberra crew was aware of a substantial bump on their aircraft as they were clearing target for New Sarum. Back at base they discovered this had been from a missile that detonated at the very rear of the jet pipe and sent a shower of shrapnel into the fuselage, rupturing one fuel tank. Dave Bourhill was in a climbing turn for re-strike when a missile narrowly missed his Hunter’s jet pipe but exploded under the starboard mainplane leaving a huge hole in it. Back on the ground the damaged Hunter drew attention away from the damaged Canberra parked on the next concrete hard standing.

  There was considerable disappointment in not finding the four white abductees the troops had hoped to rescue. However, amongst piles and piles of captured documents, SB came upon records dated three weeks earlier in which the four captured whites were listed as:

  John HERNLEY. Place of residence—Bulawayo. Date of capture—5.2.78. (Note: ZANLA had erred in their spelling. It should have been Kennerley.)

  Johannes Hendrik MAARTENS. Place of residence—Maringoyi Farm, Headlands. Date of captured—18.5.78.

  Thomas WIGGLESWORTH. Place of residence—Odzani, Umtali. Date of capture—2.8.78.

  James BLACK. Place of residence—Martin Forest, Melsetter. Date of capture—19.8.78.

  Military ribbons and medals belonging to Thomas Wigglesworth were recovered from the personal belongings of a CT in Nehanda camp; the location known to have been where the abductees had been held. Fortunately, sufficient evidence was obtained for Red Cross International to bring about the release of these men from the Tembue area where they had been taken.

  Here I divert for a moment. The Rhodesian’s lack of knowledge concerning its enemy, particularly ZANLA, has already been touched upon, and I have told of my absolute fear and certainty of being killed if downed in Mozambique. The release of these men made me wonder if I might have been wrong in believing the press and some political statements that conveyed to Rhodesians the awful hardships the abducted men must be facing. Upon their release all these men said that they had been well treated, particularly by Josiah Tongogara. Since first news of their release came from press interviews in the Polana Hotel in Maputo, obviously attended by ZANU and FRELIMO officials, no notice was taken of their good reports. But then the Rhodesian Foreign Minister, P.K. van der Byl, introduced Maartens and Black at a press conference in Salisbury. This backfired on him to some extent because he was fully expecting to hear from these men what had been fed to the public. Instead Maartens, who was under no pressure to say the ‘right thing’, repeated what he had said in Maputo.

  When relating to the return of his medals in a book he wrote about his time with ZANLA, Thomas Wigglesworth records that “truth is certainly stranger than fiction…”

  Returning to Op Snoopy. On Day Three of this operation all forces returned to Rhodesia. The Air Force was quite unable to sustain a longer stay and sufficient death, destruction and disruption had been imposed on ZANLA, for the time being.

  World reaction to our external operations was nothing like as damaging to Rhodesia as had been expected, and for the most part FRELIMO had not become involved. The benefits of going external, so long delayed, were proving to be much more cost-effective and infinitely more disruptive to both ZANLA and ZIPRA than internal operations. For the moment ZANLA was on the back foot, so attention switched back to ZIPRA.

  Operation Gatling

  BEFORE OCTOBER 1978, OPERATIONS INSIDE Zambia had not involved Air Force in anything more than a supporting role. The SAS had conducted superbly executed disruptive operations that succeeded in forcing ZIPRA to move away from the Zambezi River and ever deeper into Zambia. In the meanwhile Selous Scouts-controlled spies and SB agents had been very active inside Zambia gaining intelligence on ZIPRA because this was more difficult to gain than from ZANLA through scores of captured CTs. A clearer picture had emerged and Canberras were able to photograph defined positions for photo-interpreters to study.

  With specific targets confirmed, and considering the experience gained in joint-force operations in Mozambique, it was time for the Air Force to become directly involved against ZIPRA in Zambia. It was payback time for the first Viscount disaster, which had occurred seven weeks earlier.

  On 19 October, the Air Force engaged in three separate operations in Zambia, the first of which did not include any troops. This was because the target, previously white-owned Westlands Farm, was too close to the Zambian capital Lusaka. Lying just sixteen kilometres to the northeast of the city centre, this farm had become ZIPRA’s military headquarters and training base. ZIPRA called it Freedom Camp (FC Camp). Being so close to Lusaka, ZIPRA considered the location to be immune to attack. However, with senior ZIPRA staff there and 4,000-odd CTs undergoing training in a relatively compact area, FC Camp made an obvious and very inviting target for airstrikes.

  One thing that had to be taken into account was the possibility of Zambian Air Force fighters interfering with Rhodesian aircraft. There were also the matters of British Rapier missiles known to be somewhere in Zambia and civilian air traffic movements in and out of Lusaka Airport. To deal with the former i
ssue, it was decided that the lead Canberra would forewarn Lusaka Airport by passing a message through the duty Air Traffic Controller to the Station Commander at the Zambian Air Force base, Mumbwa. This was to let him know that Hunters were over his base with orders to shoot down any Zambian fighters that attempted to take off.

  Timings were crucial because Canberras, Hunters and K-Cars allocated to the FC raid had to turn around after their strikes and link into a combined operation with the SAS against ZIPRA’s Mkushi Camp. The third target, known to us as CGT 2, was to be handled by Vampires, Lynx, four K-cars, G-Cars and RLI paratroopers. CGT 2 was one of at least four ZIPRA bases established in rough country south of the Great East Road that ran eastward from Lusaka to Malawi. Not knowing ZIPRA names for these bases, they were named Communist Guerrilla Training (CGT) bases with identification numerals 1–4.

  Diverting for a moment back to my JPS days. During the late 1960s South African, Portuguese and Rhodesian teams had been established for the Alcora Planning groups to consider mutual support in both regular and counter-insurgency warfare. Whereas I had been a member of the mapping committee, I was in the picture on most of the other committees’ work. One of these dealt specifically with plans for strategic airfields. These plans involved the upgrading of existing air bases and the building of new ones suitably sited in South West Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa.

  Each air base was to incorporate underground hangars and immediate-readiness fighter pens with intricate taxiways leading to two primary runways. The design allowed two whole squadrons of sixteen fighters to scramble simultaneously. However, the costs involved were so great that it was necessary to build the bases in stages. The first stage was to build one half of a total base with the end-plan taxiway serving as the first operational runway.

  In Rhodesia, Thornhill and New Sarum needed no work as they both exceeded the needs of Phase 1, but three other sites had been selected. These were Wankie National Park, Fylde Farm near Hartley and Buffalo Range at Chiredzi. Buffalo Range already existed as an active airfield, needing only limited work to get it to Phase 1 status. Fylde had become operational before Op Gatling was mounted on 19 October and served as the base for Hunters and Vampires during this operation. At this stage work at Wankie was still in progress.

  Green Formation of four Canberras left New Sarum a little after four K-Cars had taken off from Mana Pools on the Zambezi River. A total of six Hunters were involved. Two with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles headed directly for the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa and the other four followed a prescribed route to FC camp.

  Squadron Leader Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie as his navigator led Green Formation. Ted Brent with Jim Russell, Greg Todd with Doug Pasea, and Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan followed. The Canberras, flying low under Zambian radar, were loaded with a total of 1,200 Alpha bombs. The four Hunters of Blue Formation, led by Squadron Leader Vic Wightman with wingmen John Blythe-Wood, Ginger Baldwin and Tony Oakley, were also approaching target at low level and were some way behind the slower Canberra formation when they crossed the Zambezi River. Their speed would place them ahead for first strikes.

  White Section, the Hunters orbiting Mumbwa, were flown by Rick Culpan and Alf Wild, who listened in to the attacking force transmissions whilst hoping the MiG 19 fighters would take to the air. In this they were to be disappointed because nothing stirred. Orbiting at height near the Zambezi River in the Command Dakota were General Peter Walls, Group Captain Norman Walsh and their communications staff who would remain airborne throughout the day to cover all three operations.

  The Hunters struck dead on 08:30 taking out the FC headquarters buildings. The huge Golf bombs’ plumes were not needed as markers to give Chris Dixon’s bomb-aimer final confirmation of his line-up because Mike Ronnie could see the target during the formation’s acceleration to attack-speed.

  FC Camp. The Canberra Alpha strike was to cover the area from the treed camp area on the right, along the double path lines and beyond the parade area. Hunters were given HQ targets amongst the trees to the left of the parade ground. No anti-aircraft gun positions existed within the limits of this photograph.

  Hidden under smoke in this photo taken by a Hunter after re-strike are most of the destroyed HQ buildings.

  Chris’s radio system was linked to a tape recorder in the cockpit for possible post-strike public relations purposes. On playback of the tape, we all heard the deep breathing of the crew building up during run to target and their comments about the precision of Hunter strikes. This was followed by excited shouting between Chris and Mike when they saw hundreds of CTs running in the treed and open areas through which the Canberra formation’s bomb loads would run. On completion of their strike, Chris and Mike continued to communicate excitedly as, in the background, the calm voices of the Hunter pilots could be heard as they called, “turning in live” for their restrikes.

  When the Hunters cleared, the voice of Pink Formation leader, Squadron Leader Graham Cronshaw, showed that the K-Cars had arrived over FC camp. They were lucky that none of the anti-aircraft guns were manned as they set about attacking scattered survivors.

  Chris Dixon had been instructed to contact Lusaka Tower before his strike, but something had gone amiss with frequency selection. He only made this call to a remarkably calm African controller whilst the K-Cars were active over FC camp. This was Chris’s prepared message:

  Lusaka Tower this is Green Leader. This is a message for the Station Commander at Mumbwa from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands Farm at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no quarrel—repeat no quarrel—with Zambia or her Security Forces. We therefore ask you not to intervene or oppose our attack. However, we are orbiting your airfield at this time and are under orders to shoot down any Zambian aircraft that does not comply with this request and attempts to take off. Did you copy that?

  In response to a query from Lusaka Tower, Chris suggested that the departure of an aircraft be withheld for a short while. The controller was happy to oblige and even asked a Kenyan airliner, incoming from Nairobi, to hold off.

  Chris had flown out of range when Dolphin 3, Norman Walsh in the Command Dakota, established contact with Lusaka Tower. Immediately after this the irritated Kenyan Airways pilot asked Lusaka “Who has priority here anyway?” to which the Zambian controller calmly replied, “The Rhodesians, I guess!” The Kenyan did not have long to wait. Norman Walsh returned Zambia’s air space to the thankful controller once the K-Cars were well clear of the target.

  Shortly after the air action, Lusaka’s hospital became inundated with the inflow of wounded and dying ZIPRA personnel. All forms of transport kept bringing in more and more casualties way into the night. Zambian patients were incensed for being kicked out of their sick beds when all floor and bed space was taken up by the ZIPRA flood. Unbeknown to the Zambian medical staff, a Selous Scouts officer was sitting calmly in the waiting room, claiming to be there for an anti-cholera injection. He watched the never-ending stream of serious casualties in satisfied amazement having, himself, been responsible for locating FC camp. According to a ZAPU delegation report to a Pan African Congress held at Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979, 226 CTs were killed and 629 were wounded, most seriously.

  The K-Cars returned to Mana Pools and the jets to their bases. The gunners, preparing their helicopters for the attack on Mkushi Camp, were full of enthusiasm having just returned from FC Camp. For the technicians at New Sarum and Fylde there was no time to find out how the Zambian raid had gone; and anyway the aircrew were too tied up to share their war stories. In spite of this the armourers, engine fitters, airframe fitters, electricians, radio men and refuellers went about their business with no less enthusiasm than their colleagues way up on the Zambezi River.

  In most respects, the attack on Mkushi was conducted in the manner of the first attack on Chimoio with jet-strikes leading the action at 11:40. In this case six Dakotas drop
ped 120 SAS paratroopers in a semi-circle around the western and northern flanks of Mkushi base with K-Cars patrolling the Mkushi River, which formed the eastern and southern boundaries of the target. Forty-four SAS were landed by eleven G-Cars behind the cover of a small feature in the camp’s southeastern corner. Eight kilometres southeast of target lay the Admin Base into which an RLI protection force was para-dropped with fuel and ammunition.

  It was only when the ground fighting was underway, that the SAS realised Mkushi camp was occupied by women CTs with only a few male instructors. Our intelligence people had not known this. The women looked just like men in their camouflage uniforms and they bore their weapons with efficiency. Although some attempted to hide and take advantage of grass fires initiated by the air strikes and heavy firing, most fought back. The SAS could not help but be impressed by female aggression and fighting ability that kept the soldiers busy till late afternoon.

  With the RLI protection force at the Admin Base was one unusual character. He was Sergeant-Major Standish who, as a grey-haired Territorial Army soldier on call-up with SAS, had managed to wangle his way onto Op Gatling. Stan Standish, who had been a paratrooper at Arnheim, claimed that only the Dakotas that had brought the force to Mkushi had seen longer service than he had. He thoroughly enjoyed his parachute descent into the Admin Base and gained the admiration of the aircrews who saw him set a great example to the RLI youngsters in matters of collecting parachutes and rolling fuel drums.

  There had been some concern for the safety of helicopters parked on the Admin Base dambo (Zambian word for a small open grass area) because they presented a perfect target for any Zambian MiG 17 or MiG 19 pilot who might choose to attack them. As it happened, one MiG 19 did appear over the Admin Base but either the pilot did not see the exposed choppers or turned a blind eye and disappeared into the blue.