Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Mkushi was by far the best-organised base the troops had seen with many more facilities than in any ZANLA base. A red hammer and sickle emblazoned in red on one of the buildings emphasised ZIPRA’s Russian orientation. When the fighting was over, the troops left everything just as it was for members of the press to view the next day.

  The SAS referred to reporters as ‘vultures’ because they only turned up when the killing was over. There were certainly plenty of dead bodies, piles of captured matériel, stacks of ZIPRA documents and many Soviet manuals for the vultures to photograph and inspect. The SAS also had five ZIPRA prisoners for them to interview. Once the press had done their work and were on their way back to Rhodesia late on Day 2, all equipment and buildings were destroyed.

  On Day 3 the SAS were in the process of recovering to Rhodesia when a lookout warned of the approach of a large armed force sweeping towards the main group. Hurriedly the SAS got into position and waited for the force to come to close range. They then opened fire on Zambian Army, Zambian Police and ZIPRA in a short sharp action that left forty-seven dead. Fortunately they captured a Zambian Army man and, incredibly, ZIPRA’s senior Logistics Officer. His name was Mountain Gutu and his importance will become apparent. These two prisoners, together with the other five captives, were all flown back to Salisbury.

  Well to the south of Mkushi, air attacks on CGT 2 were launched by four Vampires firing 60-pound squash-head rockets and 20mm cannons and four Lynx dropped Mini-golf bombs and fired 37mm boosted Sneb rockets. The RLI followed up in double Fireforce strength. I cannot recall any details of the ground action other than it occurred in difficult bush conditions resulting in the death of about sixty CTs. But this target turned out to be the toughest nut of the ZIPRA targets because it contained many very effective large-calibre anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Cocky Benecke took hits immediately, which forced him to withdraw with a holed fuel tank.

  Nigel Lamb wrote, “huge easily visible shells arched lazily upward, then seemed to accelerate past us”. Even climbing to 2,500 feet above target did not help so the helicopters beat a sensible retreat; but not before Mark Dawson’s K-Car received an explosive hit which knocked out the instruments and wounded Mark in the leg.

  The K-Cars split into two pairs running low level either side of a high ridge when Chaz Goatley was heard to shout to Mark Dawson that his tail rotor was slowing down. Mark knew his tail rotor drive-shaft had been severed before his machine started to spin in the opposite direction to the main rotor blades and, arching downwards, crashed through high trees which turned the aircraft upside-down. Fortunately there was no fire. The three K-Cars grouped over the downed machine before Nigel Lamb put down as close to the crash site as possible. Nigel stopped his rotors but left the engine running and hurried to the crashed aircraft with his technician-gunner Finch Bellringer. Immediately they found Mark’s techniciangunner Roelf Oelofse who, having been thrown from the helicopter, was alive but completely incapacitated with a spinal injury. Mark was still in his seat, inverted, unconscious and blue in the face because his flak jacket was pressed tightly into his neck. Nigel quickly released Mark from his seat and, with his technician’s help, moved him to his own helicopter. He wound up his rotors and climbed to join Ian Peacock’s K-Car to give top cover whilst Chas Goatley and his technician, Mike Smith, landed to recover Roelf. Roelf recovered quickly but for six agonising weeks Mark Dawson lay unconscious in St Giles Nursing Home. After recovery it became clear that brain damage would disallow the frustrated young pilot from ever flying again.

  Three operations in one day had ZIPRA reeling and the Zambian Government in a dither. ZIPRA’s total casualties, according to figures given to the Pan African Congress in Tanzania, were 396 killed, 719 wounded and 192 missing. This had cost Rhodesia the loss of an SAS soldier, Lance-Corporal Jeff Collett, fatally wounded at Mkushi, and one helicopter that had to be blown up where it had crashed.

  The Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation gave news of the FC Camp raid as its lead report on the 8 o’clock evening news, but little was said about the other two operations in Zambia. Squadron Leader Alan Cockle, the Air Force PRO, arranged for the communiqué to include Chris Dixon’s ‘Green Leader’ taped message to Lusaka Tower together with the controller’s responses. Fresh in memory was ZIPRA’s downing of the first Air Rhodesia Viscount sixteen days earlier, so news of the action against Nkomo’s forces came as a much-needed tonic for waning morale, and ‘Green Leader’ became a national hero though few knew that he was Squadron Leader Chris Dixon.

  Chris Dixon (left) with Rob Gaunt.

  Mulungushi and Mboroma

  MOUNTAIN GUTU, THE LOGISTICS OFFICER from Mkushi, turned out to be a vital man because he personally knew all the top rankers in ZAPU and ZIPRA as well as the location of ZIPRA’s headquarters units, their camps and logistics sites. He was also able to confirm that most of ZIPRA’s activities were geared to preparing for conventional warfare, though he could not give the reason for this. To us the Russian influence on ZIPRA was obvious.

  A location that immediately drew special attention was ZIPRA’s prison camp at Mboroma deep inside Zambia. Apart from ZIPRA dissidents and alleged spies, Gutu claimed that a number of Security Force personnel who had been abducted in Rhodesia were also held there. He willingly offered evidence and provided details of the ZIPRA personalities in charge of the prison camp. He not only gave the names and places in Rhodesia from which they originated but, in the typically African way, described their physical peculiarities. Whereas they were probably pretty average people, Gutu’s descriptions made them appear to be a bunch of oddballs. Here are extracts of his written descriptions:

  Camp Commander—Samson Dube. He originates from Kezi.

  Has a large scar on forehead as result of a knobkerrie blow prior to training. Approximately 35 years old.

  Camp Commissar—Hobo Maqula. Originates from the Plumtree area. Approximately 42 years old and limps on left leg.

  Chief of Staff—Takarayi Mbvizi. Has a very high-pitched voice and originates from Sinoia. Approximately 37 years old.

  Medical officer—Kenni Malungu. After faction fight in Mozambique deserted and proceeded to Zambia. Is cross-eyed. Originates from Chipinga and approximately 31 years.

  Logistics—Ndwini Sibanda. Subject is five foot five inches and bow-legged. Approximately 28 years old.

  The Selous Scouts were given the task of moving on Mboroma with the prime objective of bringing all the prisoners back to Rhodesia. A close-in recce of the camp, conducted from high ground right next to its southern boundary, confirmed the presence of prisoners and established routines within the camp. Ron Reid-Daly wanted to conduct a pure ground action to simultaneously ensure the safety of prisoners and to allow the right moment to be selected before launching the operation. It would have been a simple enough matter to parachute the entire force into the remote countryside for an approach on foot to the target to meet Ron’s objectives, but COMOPS disallowed this.

  Instead, Scouts paratroopers enveloped the prison camp following a limited Hunter airstrike, but it resulted in the timing of the action being wrong—just as Ron had feared. Most of the prisoners were away on various foraging tasks, well away from target. In consequence only a quarter of the prisoners, thirty-odd, were flown back to Rhodesia a couple of days before Christmas 1978; so the Dakota effort allocated to uplifting troops and prisoners from a nearby Zambian airfield way exceeded demand.

  The press had a royal time learning about the horrors of ZIPRA torture, starvation and general maltreatment of their unfortunate prisoners. Arising from this rescue mission, Selous Scouts, always maligned by the world press, were hailed as heroes and spirits were raised on that hot sunny Christmas Day.

  Mountain Gutu had also confirmed that a main ZIPRA base for conventional forces existed in the old Federal Cadets Training Centre (later the Zambian National Service Training Centre) on the west bank of the Mulungushi Dam situated north of Lusaka. Selous Scout recce specialists, Schulie Schul
enburg and his African partner, made a detailed closein reconnaissance of the base to confirm what Gutu had said. This was done during the lead-up to the Mboroma rescue operation.

  By the time he was uplifted back to Rhodesia, Schulie had set a record by being in hostile territory for two weeks without resupply. He reported that there were over two hundred men in camp who did not seem to have any concerns following the attacks on FC Camp, Mkushi and CGT 2 because they were so well dug in. Because of this, it was decided not to pursue the joint-force approach again, as we were likely to suffer unacceptably high casualties. Instead a Canberra formation attack was launched at the same moment that the Hunters were striking Mboroma on 22 December 1978. Results were pleasing.

  Moatize hangar

  EVER SINCE BUSH COVER STARTED receding in July the success rate of Fireforce actions had been mounting. It was in one of these in late November 1978 that a CT was captured by RLI troopies of the Mtoko Fireforce. Those who nabbed him did not know that ZANLA’s High Command had made a big error in sending their high-ranking Secretary for the Tete Province on a staff visit to the Takawira Sector in Rhodesia.

  SB was delighted to have this man alive considering that most of the CTs in the contact had been killed. Included in the wealth of information gleaned from him, SB learned of huge ZANLA weapons and explosives holdings in an aircraft hangar at the Moatize Airfield near Tete town. The information was passed to the SAS who came to the conclusion this was a job best suited to Air Force.

  Five Hunters piloted by Squadron Leader Vic Wightman, Ginger Baldwin, Jim Stagman, Tony Oakley and Dave Bourhill were tasked to take this and other targets out in a single sortie. Though ZANLA’s primary weapons holdings constituted the main target, a long ZANLA barrack building in Tete town was assigned for attention by Golf bombs after which vehicles and AA gun sites were to be destroyed.

  On 8 December, four Golf bombs flattened the barrack block completely. Firing at the hangar had to be conducted from long range to avoid the chaos that tons of explosives detonating spontaneously would spew into the path of an attacking jet. It was the second pilot to fire at this target who had the satisfaction of seeing it mushroom in a truly massive explosion that necessitated a maximum ‘G’ turn to avoid flying through the cone of rising debris. When they had taken out assigned targets and had run out of ammunition, the aircraft climbed to 30,000. There the pilots looked back with satisfaction at the vertical pillar of smoke and dust rising more than 10,000 feet above Moatize Airfield where the hangar’s shattered girders and cladding lay widely scattered.

  Following this, the SAS moved in to blow up the Mecito bridge to ensure that ZANLA would not easily replenish their lost stocks or continue to move men to Tete by rail. This they timed to occur as a train passed over it on 15 December. Only five days later, with the railway line now out of action, ZANLA attempted to move ammunition up to Tete along their alternate route which was the main road running northwards from Chimoio along the low ground fairly close to the Rhodesian border. News of this impending movement was intercepted on the FRELIMO radio network.

  An SAS ambush party struck the lead vehicles, forcing following ones to high-tail back the way they had come. Two pairs of Hunters flown by Vic Wightman, Jim Stagman, Ginger Baldwin and Brian Gordon destroyed the vehicles found hidden in an orchard by Cocky Benecke who had called for and directed their strikes. Following these, Cocky conducted a post-strike recce and confirmed that six vehicles, including a petrol bowser, had been destroyed, thus accounting for the entire resupply column.

  Chapter 9

  Posting to COMOPS

  IN LATE NOVEMBER 1978, I was promoted to the rank group captain and replaced Norman Walsh as Director of Operations at COMOPS Headquarters. Of all the postings I might have been given, this was the only one I dreaded. Almost every man in the field thoroughly disliked this command unit and I did not relish the idea of serving under Bertie Barnard, now a major-general and still Director-General of Operations at COMOPS.

  Lieutenant-General Peter Walls and his deputy, Air Marshal Mick McLaren, called me to their respective offices to welcome me but neither one gave me any specific direction other than to say I must start off by familiarising myself with COMOPS routines. At the time, General Barnard was away on long leave.

  Unfortunately Wing Commander Dag Jones had also been posted out of COMOPS, leaving his replacement Squadron Leader Terence Murphy and me as new boys. We anchored on SAS Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Robinson who helped us settle in. Major Peter Burford, son of my old boss when I was an apprentice in Umtali back in 1956, was very helpful in running us through COMOPS procedures.

  SAS Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Robinson with Ian Smith.

  The tempo of external operations was increasing and occupied much of our attention, though Terence and I were little more than observers during lead-up planning for the Mulungushi and Mboroma actions. My first authoritative input came with the Moatize hangar strike. However, whenever time permitted Terence Murphy and I focused our attention on the internal scene.

  For some months a force of auxiliaries (armed militiamen) had been building up as a counter to ZANLA and to provide protection for civilians in the rural areas. The black politicians, Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole both claimed that they had huge support amongst ZANLA personnel who would willingly come over in support of the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government. Their claims proved to be little more than wishful thinking, because only a handful of genuine CTs responded to their much-publicised calls to ‘come in from the bush’.

  In an attempt to save face, both Muzorewa and Sithole gathered in many out-of-work loafers and crooks, claiming them to be ZANLA men. They fooled nobody but had succeeded in persuading COMOPS to arrange for the rabble to be given rudimentary training in arms. The task initially fell to Ron Reid-Daly’s Selous Scouts who were horrified by the whole affair. Nevertheless they commenced training hundreds of undisciplined ruffians using old farmsteads as training bases.

  Many dangerous situations were faced by the men assigned to training the auxiliaries, known as Pfumo re Vanhu (Spear of the People), because of a belligerent attitude induced in them by the few genuine CTs in their midst and by the black politicians who were, as always, vying for power. On one occasion a life-threatening situation developed necessitating the full Fireforce action that destroyed one fully armed group of the Sithole faction.

  Listed here are only those whose names appear in this book. Seated: (from left) Mike Edden SB, Colonel Mac Willar (3), Major-General Bert Barnard (4), Lieutenant-General Peter Walls (6), Air Marshal Mick McLaren (7), Major-General Sandy McLean (8), PB (10). Standing middle row: (from left) Squadron Leader Terence Murphy, Squadron Leader Dag Jones (4) Squadron Leader Jock McGregor (8). Not present in this line was Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Robinson. Back row: Major Peter Burford (8th from left), Mrs Anne Webb (extreme right).

  By the time I entered COMOPS, there were Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliary forces in many of the collective villages and responsibility for training new auxiliaries had passed to Army and Police units, releasing Selous Scouts for to their rightful duties.

  Some groups worked well whereas others treated the tribesmen in the same manner as CT thugs. On the whole, however, Pfumo re Vanhu succeeded in achieving many of their objectives. Only when our war was over did we learn of the very real threat they had posed to ZANLA.

  Squadron Leader Terence Murphy, an ex-British Marine helicopter pilot, came to COMOPS fresh from Fireforce operations. With no specific task given to us, he and I conducted a joint study of internal operations and this led us to focusing on the auxiliaries.

  Knowing the force levels already deployed and those in the pipeline, we worked out what we considered to be the optimum distribution of Pfumo re Vanhu forces to create maximum disruption and hindrance to ZANLA. Having done this, we put our thoughts and plans to an assembly of Army officers and SB men. Also attending was Squadron Leader Jock McGregor. All agreed there was good sense and merit in our proposals. We had only just done
this when General Barnard returned from leave.

  Nobody seemed to have missed him whilst he was away but Bert Barnard had no time to listen to our plan claiming he had more important matters to attend. When eventually he did find time, he made continuity of our presentation almost impossible by interjecting after every statement we, the ignorant Blue jobs, made.

  At one point a very irritated Terence Murphy, referring to his own Army training and experience, but without actually being rude, made it known that he had never known such arrogant interference from any senior officer during any of many staff presentations he had attended. Though surprised and somewhat taken aback by Terence’s clever wording, I was pleased that he had made it possible for us to pick up on our thoughts and continue the briefing without further interruption.

  At the conclusion General Barnard thanked us for what we had done but said our plan would not work. So it came as a surprise to learn from Squadron Leader Jock McGregor, who was one of two secretaries who attended all NATJOC meetings, that General Barnard had presented NATJOC with his personal plan for the deployment of Auxiliaries. Jock said it was identical to the presentation he had attended when Terry and I put our plan to him and other Officers. I realised immediately that we should be pleased that the ‘Barnard Plan’ had been adopted rather than become thoroughly fed up with the whole affair. Nevertheless Barnard’s underhandedness was galling.