Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  Only once, then, on 14 November 1950 was there any physical contact between ground troops of Eighth Army and X Corps, although there had been persistent, repeated efforts to establish such contact. Such was the nature of the gap between Eighth Army and X Corps.

  To deny the myth of the military importance of the gap between Eighth Army and the X Corps is not to justify the existence of the two separate commands or to approve the separate missions assigned to them. These are separate and different matters. In them lay the fundamental military errors of judgment.

  The decision to try to pacify all of Korea south of the border and to unify the country again was unsound, given the UN forces available to do it. Even if there had been no Chinese crossing of the Yalu, it is hard to see how the UN forces could have secured the border and have handed it over to the South Korean government and expected the latter to administer this land. For one thing, the X Corps in northeast Korea was scattered too thin and its units too distant from each other to accomplish the objective of truly gaining control of the long border there, for any length of time. At that time hostile remnants of the defeated North Korean Army were being reorganized and rehabilitated just south of the border in the Kanggye area, and they were anxious to resume the conflict. In the west, Eighth Army would fate the same prospect of renewed North Korean hostilities.

  Sound analysis and common sense would have resulted in a unified Korean command over the Eighth Army and the X Corps, deployed to defend and hold a line from Wonsan on the east to Chinnampo on the west, including a defense position above Pyongyang. This line would have passed through or north of Yangdok, Kangdong, and Pyongyang. It would have been anchored on its east and west ends on good ports for logistic and supply purposes, with a railnet south of the defense line-at the waist of Korea. This line would have utilized the best available lateral road running east-west across a narrow part of the peninsula, which could have been improved with engineering work. The rail- and roadnet north of this line was poor or nonexistent, except along either coast, and would not have offered the enemy an adequate communication and transport system for promising military operations.

  Logistic Problems Delay Army Attack

  General MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 9 November that General Walker planned to launch the Eighth Army attack toward the border on 15 November. Both X Corps, under Almond, and Eighth Army, under Walker, were still operating under MacArthur's 24 October order to advance to the North Korean border and, once it had been reached, to turn over its defense to the South Koreans. Pursuant to this continuing order, General Walker on 6 November issued his Eighth Army Operational Plan for a renewal of the offensive-just about the time the CCF broke off their 1st Phase Offensive at the Chongchon River line and faded away into the timbered northern hills. The date for resumption of the attack was set for 15 November, nine days away.

  Walker would have three corps in the attack: the US I Corps, the US IX Corps, and the ROK II Corps. It had been estimated that 3,000 tons of supplies would be needed daily by these forces for passive defense but that a minimum of 4,000 tons daily would be required for offensive combat. Before the Eighth Army attack could begin, this level of supply would have to be achieved at the Chongchon front. It had not been reached when Walker issued his order of 6 November, nor had it been reached by 15 November. Therefore, D-day had to be postponed. On 14 November, Walker issued a supplementary order that the attack would be started on a day and hour to be announced later.

  The Far East Command and Eighth Army had to use sea, air, and all forms of land transportation to accumulate the necessary supplies at the Chongchon front to support a resumption of the advance. The daily requirement of 4,000 tons of supplies was achieved finally by bringing 2,000 tons by rail up to the south side of the Taedong River at Pyongyang from Pusan; by unloading another 1,000 tons at the newly reopened port of Chinnampo, which was to Pyongyang what Inchon was to Seoul; and by bringing in another 1,000 tons daily by emergency airlift.

  Chinnampo was situated ten miles upstream from the mouth of the tidal Taedong River, on the north side of its estuary, and more than 30 miles by rail and highway southwest of Pyongyang. The entire Yellow Sea approach was mineable. The approach through to the Taedong River had to be swept for mines for 30 miles, and then another 40 miles to the Chinnampo docks. Because the US minesweeper force had been wholly occupied in clearing Wonsan harbor on the east coast, it was not until 29 October that the first ships arrived to begin the Chinnampo sweep. By 2 November the Navy had learned the pattern of the minefield. It comprised 217 moored and 25 magnetic mines. Five lines of mines had been laid across the main channel north of Sok To Island, and one line south of it. Large jellyfish, more than four feet in diameter, floating a few feet beneath the surface, added to the difficulty of locating the mines, as they often created false alarms.

  A small South Korean craft made a safe passage through the cleared channel to Chinnampo on 3 November. Some tugs and barges made it up the Taedong channel on succeeding days, and when an LST reached the Chinnampo docks on 10 November, the western approach and southern channel were considered cleared. By 17 November, 14 ships had reached Chinnampo, and by 20 November 40,000 tons of supplies had been unloaded there. That same day the hospital ship Repose arrived. The clearing of the channel to Chinnampo and the use of that port greatly improved the logistic situation for General Walker's Eighth Army during the third week of November. In contrast to Wonsan, no lives or ships had been lost in clearing the minefields from the long, twisting approach to Chinnampo.10

  All elements of Eighth Army were either short of, or entirely without, winter clothing on the eve of the advance. The temperatures were already freezing or below in North Korea. On 13 November the 27th Regiment of the 25th Division made its first issue of shoepacs, but only about two-thirds of the regiment received them. The remainder of the regiment could not be fitted-the shoes were too large. Six pairs of wool ski socks were issued for each pair of the shoepacs. As late as 17 November, the 2nd Infantry Division had been out of petroleum products for two days, and half its vehicles were "deadlined" (inoperative) for lack of spare parts. On 19 November, 17 planeloads of 33,000 field jackets arrived from Japan for the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry divisions, and six more planes brought 40,000 pairs of mittens and 33,000 mufflers." The overseas supplies division of the Quartermaster Corps in the United States was already understocked, and it was not prepared for the large amount of winter clothing needed for fighting the Korean campaign in subarctic weather.

  By 17 November however, the supply situation at the front had improved enough for General Walker to instruct the Eighth Army to begin its attack on 24 November. MacArthur then notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the new date. In the same message, MacArthur optimistically reported that, in the past ten days, intensified air attacks had isolated the battlefield from enemy reinforcements. On 21 November, Eighth Army advised its three corps that H hour for the attack was 10 A.M. on 24 November. Word of this had filtered to front-line units by 23 November-Thanksgiving Day.

  By 22 November, Eighth Army units in jump-off positions were nearly all in place for the 24 November attack. On the army right, the ROK II Corps had reached its lines of departure on 21 November. On the same day, the 25th Infantry Division of the US IX Corps established its CP at Kunu-ri, and the next day it relieved the 1st Cavalry Division in the center of the line north of the Chongchon River in the area of Yongbyon known as the Walled City. The 1st Cavalry Division thereupon went into army reserve.

  The 25th Division CP had one of the longest moves of any Eighth Army unit to reach its frontline position. It left Kaesong on the morning of 19 November and arrived in Kunu-ri on 21 November, after a journey of 187 miles. The Turkish Brigade, newly arrived in Korea, was detached from the 25th Division at this time, and on 20 November became part of the US IX Corps reserve. The 24th Infantry Division and the ROK 1st Division on the army left had only slight adjustments to make in their dispositions to be re
ady for the jump-off.

  During preparations for the army attack, the Eighth Army CP had remained at Pyongyang. But General Walker was seldom there. It was vaguely understood by many that he had established a small forward CP in the vicinity of Sinanju or Anju on the Chongchon River at the western end of the front. According to Brig. Gen. William A. Collier (a senior colonel and Eighth Army deputy chief of staff in November 1950), General Walker, near the end of October, when the British 27th Brigade and the US 24th Infantry Division had first crossed the Chongchon River, made plans to establish his forward CP at Anju for the drive to the border. General Milburn, US I Corps commander, had his headquarters at Anju during the CCF 1st Phase Offensive. The army records generally are silent as to where General Walker was during the attack toward the border, but when he was not on the go, he was probably at the army advance headquarters on the Chongchon River with a very small staff. Probably the best authority on this subject is General Collier, who wrote, "Between the 15th20th of November the Advance Headquarters actually moved to Anju and set up for operations adjacent to General Milburn's I Corps-this Advance Hq actually remained there until I Corps withdrew and just did manage to get the radio and various trucks etc. out."'

  Kunu-ri became something of a magnet for Eighth Army activity in the days before the army attack toward the border on 24 November. On 18 November, the US 2nd Infantry Division established its CP in a draw about a mile northeast of the town. At the same time, the 2nd Division's regiments moved to their assigned jump-off positions north and northeast of Kunu-ri. On 22 November, the US IX Corps moved its CP from Chasan to Unhung-ni, which was a few miles west of Kunu-ri on the road to Anju.

  Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, commanding general, US IX Corps, Eighth Army, serves the first piece of meat at Thanksgiving dinner, 23 November 1950, in the enlisted men's mess at Kunu-ri. National Archives 111-SC 355612

  Thanksgiving Day fell on 23 November in 1950-right in the midst of Eighth Army's final preparations for its attack to end the war. Thousands of frozen turkeys were moved to the Chongchon River front. Everyone was to have the traditional feast-from those who had it served on a white tablecloth in rear headquarters areas to those who took it from a container and ate it standing beside their tank or sitting just outside their foxhole. But many did not get their turkey on the date planned. Some units did not get the turkey thawed out in time to roast it for Thanksgiving Day dinner. They had to wait until the next day for it. Many soldiers said it was the best meal they had had in Korea.

  On Thanksgiving Day the Australian Battalion, in slit trenches north of Pakchon on the west side of the army line, was on the point of going into an army reserve position. One of its members spoke admiringly of the dinner and recorded what the battalion menu was for that day. He said they had "roast turkey and cranberry sauce, shrimp cocktail, asparagus, fresh tomatoes, stuffed olives, tinned pineapple, nuts, sweets, fruitcake, fruit cocktail.."'

  Pfc. Arthur J. Cohen of Headquarters Company, 2nd Infantry Division, on the Chongchon River near Kunu-ri, wrote in his diary for 23 November that the army had furnished "the best meal we had in Korea up to that time." He also added that he and the others had been informed that the division was jumping off the next morning in the offensive to "end the war." He said, "Home by Christmas and Germany by spring was on all our minds and morale was high "3

  Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, commander of the US IX Corps, and Maj. Gen. John Kean, commander of the US 25th Division, visited Col. Henry K. Fisher's 35th Infantry Regimental CP for turkey on 23 November. While there, Coulter gave Fisher the impression that he was overly optimistic about ending the war in a few days. Coulter, who had just visited Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser, commander of the US 2nd Infantry Division, added that "Dutch" Keiser was "raring to go." Fisher did not share this degree of optimism. He said that, when his regiment relieved the 19th Infantry of the 24th Division in the front lines for the big push, Colonel Moore of the 19th Infantry told him that his patrols had had trouble in going beyond a certain point-enemy turned them back. Thanksgiving Day had perhaps special omens for K Company, 35th Infantry. One of its patrols that day found a wounded Chinese soldier, the 25th Division's first Chinese prisoner in the war.`

  Although Eighth Army reported on 20 November that there had been a noticeable increase in enemy reconnaissance patrols, the lack of enemy contact, except in the ROK II Corps area on the army right flank, led to a general feeling that things were going to be easy. The Far East Command Daily Intelligence Summary covering 24 November reflected something of this euphoria in saying, "There are some indications which point to the possibility of a withdrawal of CCF to the Yalu River or across the border into Manchuria.."s

  Eighth Army Order of Battle, 24 November

  A comparison of the front lines as they existed from 26 October to 24 November across all of Korea indicated that they had changed least in the area immediately around Tokchon. Here the ROK II Corps held the right flank of Eighth Army, and here the enemy had shown the least inclination to yield ground.

  Eighth Army was drawn up for its big attack on a line running a few miles north of the Chongchon River from Anju eastward for about 35 air miles. There the line crossed to the south side of the Chongchon River and held generally eastward to Tokchon. From there it continued on southeasterly into the everhigher mountains, with the extreme eastern flank at Maengsan.° At that point began the much talked about "gap" between Eighth Army and the X Corps.

  On 24 November, Eighth Army consisted of four US infantry divisions, the US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT), four ROK infantry divisions, the British 27th and 29th brigades (the latter replacing the former a week or two later), the Turkish Brigade, and smaller battalion-sized contingents from Belgium, Thailand, and the Philippines. Not all the UN contingents were at the front. The British 29th Brigade, for instance, had just arrived at Pusan and was in the act of moving north to join the army. In the army line, the US I Corps was on the left, the US IX Corps was in the center, and the ROK II Corps was on the right (see table 1).

  Gen. Douglas MacArthur talking with Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, commanding general, US IX Corps, Eighth Army, Korea, 1950. National Archives SC 352940

  Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, commanding general, 25th Infantry Division, Eighth Armv, talking with Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, commanding general, Eighth Army, in his jeep at a forward headquarters, Korea, 1950. US Army photograph SC 345544

  On the left, or western, flank, I Corps had only the 5th RCT on line, at the army's extreme left flank, with the 21st Infantry Regiment scheduled to take the lead in an advance up the west coastal road. The 19th Regiment was in division reserve. I Corps's second division, the ROK 1st Division, had its 12th and 11th regiments on line, with the 15th Regiment in reserve, to the east of the 24th Division. The I Corps line was entirely north of the Chongchon River.

  To the east of I Corps, in the center of the army line, IX Corps had the 25th Division on its left next to the I Corps boundary and the ROK 1st Division. It had the 35th Infantry Regiment next to the ROKs at the division boundary; in the center it placed a special task force, known as Task Force Dolvin, and on the 25th Division right was the 24th Infantry Regiment. This division, like all of I Corps, was north of the Chongchon River. The IX Corps's second division, the US 2nd Infantry Division, was the right-flank division, and at its rightflank boundary met the ROK II Corps near Tokchon. The 2nd Division was mostly along the Chongchon River road, but the 9th Infantry Regiment slanted to the north of the river near Won-ni, although one battalion remained on the river road. The 38th Regiment entered the hills south of the river and extended the army line southeastward toward the ROK II Corps. The 23rd Regiment at first was in reserve.

  The ROK II Corps picked up the Eighth Army line near Tokchon, southeast of the 2nd Division. Its ROK 7th Division was on its left flank adjoining the 2nd Division boundary, and near Tokchon; its ROK 8th Division was on its right flank and held the easternmost positions of the Eighth Army line. The ROK 6th D
ivision was in corps reserve. The ROK 7th Division CP was at Tokchon; the ROK 8th Division CP was at Maengsan; and the ROK II Corps CP was at Pukchang-ni, about 15 miles south of Tokchon on the main road leading south.

  With regard to this army line for the 24 November attack, mention must be made of a special situation at the boundary of the IX Corps with the ROK II Corps near Tokchon. When the 38th Infantry Regiment, on the 2nd Division's right flank, took its jump-off positions, it relieved four battalions of ROK troops from the 3rd, 5th, and 19th regiments. These ROK troops shifted to new positions farther east. In its new positions northwest of Tokchon, the US 38th Regiment was not comfortable tactically. On 23 November, it asked for authority to move to other positions, in attack if necessary, that were north of the Tokchon-Kujang-dong road. The authority was granted. Col. George B. Peploe then moved hastily to the newly authorized positions, where he thought he had a better chance to secure the Tokchon-Kujang lateral road. This road ran from the Chongchon River southeast through the mountains to the ROK II Corps front in the vicinity of Tokchon. On the IX Corps's right flank, the 38th Regiment placed its 1st Battalion on its left flank, east of the river road, and its 3rd Battalion in the hills around Somin-dong and extending toward the ROK II Corps boundary. The 2nd Battalion was in regimental reserve.

  Table 1. Eighth Army Strength, 24 November 1950

  SouRCE: EUSAK, War Diary, 23 Nov. 1950, G-4 Sec., Anncx A to PLR No. 133.

  Noce: This table does not include US naval units actively engaged along the west coast of Korea in support of Eighth Army. It also does not include infantry battalions recently arrived in Korea from Belgium, Thailand, and the Philippines but not involved in the November fighting.