Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  'South Korean troops attached to Eighth Army.

  i"The entire ROK Army at this time numbered 203,807, approximately half of which was attached to Eighth Army.

  Maj. Gen. John H. Church, commanding general, 24th Infantry Division, Eighth Army, Korea, 1950. US Army photograph SC 349842

  Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser, commanding general, 2nd Infantry Division, Eighth Army, Korea, 1950. US Army photograph SC 347647

  In taking its positions on the 38th Regimental right flank, I Company of the 3rd Battalion discovered an abandoned mine. In it the company found more than 500 tons of American-made mortar shells and small-arms ammunition-a large enemy ammunition dump in the mountains.'

  .-.... , ,....... ~ . ......b...... ............

  It should be mentioned that the British 27th Brigade, at Pakchon in I Corps reserve, had been ordered to move to Kunu-ri to become part of IX Corps for the ensuing operations.$

  The Eighth Army artillery officer calculated Eighth Army had considerable superiority over the Chinese and North Korean forces in artillery firepower. He evaluated the enemy artillery firepower at about three-tenths that of the Eighth Army command. He concluded: "The artillery personnel of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces are poorly trained with techniques inferior to our own. It is further believed that the enemy's signal and motor equipment are inadequate and of poor quality and that their ammunition resupply capabilities are much less than our own."9 He also believed that American air forces had inflicted a crippling loss on CCF motor transport during November. The CCF supporting artillery was thought to be mostly of 75-mm and 76-mm howitzers of varied manufacture, originating in the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and China, together with a considerable number of 45-mm and 57-mm antitank guns.

  Of the total 789 artillery-support weapons listed in Eighth Army on the eve of the attack, 257 were in the US I Corps, 478 in the US IX Corps, and only 54 in the ROK II Corps. Each of the four American infantry divisions had 52 105-mm howitzers and 18 155-mm howitzers. The 2nd Infantry Division had in addition 12 8-inch howitzers attached to it, the only weapons of this caliber then in Korea. In assessing American and South Korean combat capabilities, it must be kept in mind that the ROK forces' artillery and tank support was always far less than that enjoyed by the American units. The ROK II Corps artillery support at this time consisted of 42 105-mm howitzers and 12 75-mm pack howitzers. The ROK 1st Division in the US I Corps had more artillery support than any other ROK division-at least double that of the others-and it also had a greater variety and range of weapons. Overall, the Eighth Army and attached troops were rated a RFP of 18,735, as against a RFP of 5,500 for the enemy. This was a superiority of nearly 3'h to 1. Eighth Army estimated it had sufficient artillery ammunition on hand to support an attack for five days and, with normal resupply, to sustain the attack for at least ten days.10

  Eighth Army issued its Operational Plan No. 16 on 23 November. It called for the army to resume the offensive, destroy the enemy, and seize the ground within an established phase line and to be prepared then to resume the attack to the northern border of Korea.

  From right to left along the line (from east to west), the missions were assigned as follows: the ROK II Corps mission was to advance through Huichon to Kanggye and hence to Manpojin on the Yalu. The US IX Corps would be in the center on the ROK II Corps's left as far as Huichon. Both US IX Corps and the ROK II Corps would use the main supply road (MSR) northeastward up the Chongchon River to Huichon and then cross the divide over the mountains to Kanggyc. After the initial advance, this road was to be the main supply road for the ROK 11 Corps. If everything went according to plan, the ROK II Corps would meet elements of the US X Corps at or near Kanggye in its attack toward Manpojin from Yudam-ni and the Chosin Reservoir. The US I Corps on the west was to drive north to the border in its sector. No troops were to go beyond the south bank of the Yalu River, nor would fire be exchanged with enemy troops on the north bank. Rigid control of troops was to be exercised so that they did not damage or disrupt power plants or their operation near or at the border. tt

  The Eighth Army plan of operations called for a general advance that would reach the border at the Yalu from its mouth in the west where it emptied into the Yellow Sea and extend eastward as far as Manpojin on the river. The US X Corps attack from the Chosin Reservoir toward Kanggye with the 1st Marine Division and an RCT from the 7th Division was designed to help Eighth Army and to protect its right flank as it neared the border.

  General Walker's plan called for a closely coordinated attack so that he would have the army under control at all times. There was to be no wild dash in a race for the border. His plan reflects a respect for the way the Chinese executed their 1st Phase Offensive. He did not want to be caught off guard again.

  The CCF Order of Battle on 24 November

  In front of Eighth Army in northwest Korea on 24 November 1950 were six Chinese armies with 19 divisions (see table 2). On the west flank and north of the Chongchon River-generally opposite the US I Corps-were the Chinese 50th and 66th armies; the 50th with four divisions, the 66th with three divisions. In the center, directly opposite the main UN concentration of the US IX Corps, were the Chinese 39th and 40th armies, each with three divisions. On the Chinese left flank, and opposite the ROK II Corps, east of the Chongchon generally and south of Huichon, were the Chinese 38th and 42nd armies, each with three divisions. These last two armies were poised to strike the ROK II Corps at Eighth Army's right, or east, flank.

  Table 2. Chinese XIII Army Group Order of Battle, 24 November 1950

  SOURCE: FEC, Daily Intelligence Summary No. 3207, 21 June 1951.

  'Thc 167th Division came on®nally from the 56th Army.

  The Chinese tactical plan, as it later developed, was to penetrate the ROK II Corps front, then get into its rear areas, rum westward and roll up that corps, and at the same time attack the IX Corps frontally all along its front, including the eastern part of the US I Corps front in this same attack. The 50th and 66th armies on the western end of the line, in front of I Corps, were to assist the frontal attack against the UN center as needed. The plan was designed to turn the UN right flank and then roll up the Eighth Army from east to west and pin it against the west coast or force it to retreat southward.

  The Chinese forces, then, all 19 divisions, were in place on 24 November, ready to meet and then counterattack the Eighth Army. They comprised about 150,000 light-infantry troops, virtually all of them available as front-line fighters. The Chinese divisions had very little tail (logistic and support service units) in contrast to what the American and UN units had."

  On 24 November, the day Eighth Army launched its troops northward once more, MacArthur's intelligence officer, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, in communications to the Department of the Army, said the UN forces were opposed by 82,799 North Koreans and between 40,000 and 70,935 Chinese soldiers." This estimate was grossly in error. In the Chinese 2nd Phase Offensive there were no North Korean forces in the attack. Only relatively small groups of North Korean soldiers, cut off behind the lines and acting as guerrillas, contributed anything to the Chinese attack. The remnants of the decimated and disorganizcd North Korean divisions that survived the fighting of the Inchon landing and the battle for the possession of Seoul had retreated to the vicinity of Kanggyc and the Manchurian border. At the time of the Chinese 2nd Phase Offensive, they were still there in late November, taking in replacements and reorganizing. The North Korean guerrillas behind Eighth Army were a threat only in the vicinity of Chorwon, where their activities seem to have been coordinated with the Chinese attacks."

  The Scene of Battle

  The Chongchon River drainage was the arena where military events of farreaching importance took place in the last week of November 1950-events totally unexpected by Eighth Army and the Far East Command-and so devastating in their results as to constitute one of the great surprises of military history. This arena encompassed the valley of the Chongchon River, its tributa
ries, and the finger ridges that ran down between them from the high ground on both sides. The Chinese troops lay in hidden assembly areas, carefully camouflaged, generally about 10 to 12 miles north of, and out of contact with, the bulk of Eighth Army when the latter began its movement north on the morning of 24 November. For this reason, the initial advance of the UN forces was unopposed. Because of their importance in controlling the tactical movements of both forces, the physical features of the terrain should be described.

  Korea is a land of unending hills and valleys, and nowhere is this feature more pronounced than in the northern part of the peninsula. In the northwestem part, where Eighth Army stood poised to begin its attack, the Chongchon River and its tributaries, with their interlocking hills and mountains, constituted the last remaining major physical barrier between Eighth Army and the Manchurian border. The Chongchon River and its two major tributaries, the Kuryong and the Taeryong, all flow from the north. These rivers drain the western face of the high mountains that rise in the almost trackless highlands south of the Yalu in the north-central part of Korea. South of the Chongchon River, the Taedong River, also running from northeast to southwest, parallels it generally at an air-mile distance of from 20 to 25 miles, with an irregular divide separating their respective drainages. The Taedong River runs through Yongwon and Tokchon at the northeast of the Eighth Army sector and flows southwest through Sunchon to Pyongyang and on to the Yellow Sea below Chinnampo. Beyond the Chongchon drainage to the northeast, the Northern Taebaek Range gives way to the high, cold Yangnim Range, which borders the Yalu River and continues on northward across the trough of the river into Manchuria.`s

  A railroad and a highway bridge cross the Chongchon River at Sinanju, and five miles upstream from these another highway bridge crosses the river at Anju. In the valley of the Chongchon a railroad and a vehicular road follow along the south bank of the river within the area of operations. At Huichon, 65 air miles upstream from the mouth of the Chongchon, the river breaks up into a number of tributaries that fan out in a semicircle where they drain down from the high mountain mass of a divide. The Chongchon River runs generally parallel to the Yalu, about 65 miles south of it. Both flow southwest into the Yellow Sea. The main railroad and highway on the west coast run from Seoul to Pyongyang and northward, crossing the Chongchon at Sinanju. From there they continue west and northwest to Sinuiju at the Chinese border and cross the Yalu to Antung.

  Inland from the west coast, mountainous spines extend southward from the Yalu to the valley of the Chongchon, and as the distance inland eastward increases, they become ever higher, rougher, and more forbidding. These mountains reach their greatest heights and become almost trackless wastes between the Chosin Reservoir and the Yalu, where the Yangnim Range continues on into Manchuria. The Yalu itself, except for its lower coastal reaches, runs through a gorgelike channel rimmed by high mountains on both sides. The large Suiho hydroelectric dam on the middle Yalu impounds a reservoir of the same name that extends upstream for 60 miles, pushing water into scores of little lateral fjordlike valleys.

  Above the Suiho Reservoir there is a major highway crossing of the Yalu River from Chian in Manchuria. Eight miles farther upstream in Manpojin on the Korean side, there are both railroad and highway crossings. Twenty-five air miles southeast of Manpojin, on a major road from it, lies Kanggye, situated in the very heart of a mountain fastness. There both North Korean government offi cials and ranking military commanders had assembled during the long retreat northward after the Inchon landing. From Kanggye a quick withdrawal could be made across the boundary into a Manchurian sanctuary if it became necessary.

  About 20 air miles east and upstream from Sinanju, on the south bank of the Chongchon, lies the town of Kaechon and a village on its northern edge called Kunu-ri. Kaechon absorbed Kunu-ri after World War II, and newer maps do not show the latter. But in this narrative the name Kunu-ri will be used for this Korean town because that is how it was shown on the old maps used by the American soldiers who became so familiar with the place. That name is repeated a thousand times in the United States Army records of those last days of November 1950.

  From Kunu-ri an important secondary roadnet ran northward beyond the Chongchon River through the ancient walled town of Yongbyon to Ipsok and Unsan and on to the Yalu River. From Kujang-dong on the Chongchon, 15 air miles northeast of Kunu-ri, a road ran southeasterly across mountainous terrain to Tokchon, 18 air miles away. From Kunu-ri still another dirt road ran almost due east to Tokchon, a distance of 25 air miles, but farther by road. Tokchon was deep in the mountains, situated on the north side of a bend in the Taedong River. Much was to happen in the Kunu-ri-Kujang-dong-Tokchon triangle of land. Also from Kunu-ri, and destined to be of unusual military importance, was another dirt road that went south through hill country across a divide between the Chongchon and Taedong rivers to Sunchon, 30 miles away.

  The configuration of the valley of the lower Chongchon in relation to the mountain ridges that approach it from the Yalu should be noted. On the north side of the lower Chongchon for a distance of some miles, the ground varies from flat to low hills, with shallow valleys between the hills. Beginning about 15 air miles north of the Chongchon, the ground rises more sharply into rough, mountainous terrain. A road ran northeastward and generally parallel to the Chongchon River from Taechon on the west through Unsan and Onjong, and from there curved in a loop east to Huichon, following this topographical cleavage along the base of the higher hills.

  The towns ofTaechon, Unsan, Onjong, and Huichon stand at the entrances to the narrow valleys in the mountain ranges that extend northward to the Yalu. These limited corridors of advance form a natural defensive barrier to any military movement from the valley of the Chongchon to the Yalu border. Here, along this topographical cleavage line connected by the Taechon-Huichon road, the Chinese had established their major troop assemblies, unknown to Eighth Army. They used this terrain in a masterly way, first to draw the Eighth Army into a dispersed advance, and then to launch a surprise attack upon it.16

  Friday morning, 24 November 1950, broke clear, with near freezing temperatures along the Eighth Army line at the Chongchon. By midafternoon the temperature had risen to 57 degrees-a warm day for that time of year. The sky was clear in the west, but scattered clouds hung over the central and eastern parts of the army front.'

  Troop movements were everywhere in evidence as the sun rose. The British 27th Brigade moved southward across the Chongchon, where it found ice floes drifting sluggishly. After crossing, the brigade turned eastward on the south side toward Kunu-ri, where it would pass from I Corps to IX Corps control in reserve. A north wind blew clouds of yellow dust from the crowded road. The journey was uncomfortable.' As anyone who has been on Korean roads knows, they are mud when it rains, rough and slippery when frozen, and thick with choking dust at other times.

  Some of the thousands who moved out of their bivouac areas that morning could reflect on changes the past month had brought. Before the Chinese 1st Phase Offensive near the end of October, the Department of Defense had planned a cutback in the number of troops scheduled to go to Korea. It had also taken steps to reduce reinforcements from UN allies. Prior to 6 November more than 8,000 South Korean troops attached to Eighth Army (KATUSA) had been released. It was all part of the prevailing opinion that the war was about over and that the attached South Koreans would no longer be needed. On 6 November Eighth Army hastily canceled the order for release of KATUSA troops.

  In one of the last-minute shuffles of troops in preparation for advance, Eighth Army on 24 November, placed the Turkish Brigade under IX Corps control, with its 2nd and 3rd battalions ordered to move north from Kaesong to join the brigade at Kunu-ri the next day. The Turkish Brigade had not yet seen action in Korea.

  Eighth Army also seemed optimistic that the war would end soon. But in a conversation with General Walker, Colonel Fisher of the 35th Infantry said that General Walker did not seem to have the overoptimism that most did. In commenting
on the impending attack toward the Yalu, Walker said to Fisher, "I have been there once before; this time we are going to take it easy."' Col. Albert K. Stebbins, the Eighth Army G-4 and a close friend of Walker, told the author that Walker did not really want to make the attack to the border but reluctantly carried out orders.

  Walker's order for the attack reflected caution and the intention to proceed with a closely coordinated advance so that he would have the army under control at all times. While there is no documentary evidence that Walker was wildly optimistic about the impending attack, it would seem on balance that he did not officially oppose it. He expected opposition but seemed to think Eighth Army could drive to the border. His chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, shared this view.`

  On the army's extreme left, the 21st Regiment of the US 24th Division passed through the 5th RUT and struck out north on the morning of 24 November along the coastal road leading from Sinanju toward Chongju. In the late afternoon I and K companies received a few rounds of small-arms fire. From Chongju the regiment was to continue northwest along the coastal road toward Sinuiju at the mouth of the Yalu. On this first day, it met virtually no opposition. Civilians along its line of advance, however, reported that enemy were in front of it but constantly withdrawing before contact was made.'

  East of the 21st Infantry, the ROK 11th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division relieved the 5th RCT of the 24th Division and attacked north across the Taeryong River toward Tacchon. The 5th RCT then relieved the 2nd Battalion of the ROK 12th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division, whereupon the ROK 12th Regiment moved up on the left of the ROK 11th Regiment, both receiving enemy small-arms fire in the afternoon, but no real opposition. Up ahead of the advancing ROK 1st Division, the Air Force bombed and napalmed Taechon and vicinity. At dark the two ROK regiments stood three to four miles southwest and southeast of Taechon. During the day both regiments had encountered several undefended enemy roadblocks. Again, there were many signs that enemy forces were withdrawing in front of them.' It had been an easy day for I Corps.