Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  12. Appleman, South to the Naktsng, North to the Yalu, p. 751.

  13. Xenophon, The Anabasis (The march up-country), trans. W. H. D. Rouse (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947). There are several editions of Xenophon's famous work. For Roman Legion performances, see Flavius Vcgetius Rcnatus (Vegetius), The Military Institutions of the Romans, ed. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing, 1944); William Duncan, Caesar (London: Jones, n.d.), includes Caesar's Commentaries and A Discourse Concerning the Roman Art of War. Many editions of Caesar's Commentaries are available in English.

  14. The movement and marches of the Chinese soldiers in the example given are fully documented in Applcman, South to the Nakmng, North to the Yalu, p. 770n.65. The figure of 210,000 Chinese soldiers in position to confront the UN forces in Korea by mid-Nov 1950 is based on an average division strength of 8,000. Intelligence gained from prisoner interrogation and captured enemy documents subsequent to Nov 1950 justify this figure. This estimate of enemy strength omits some supporting groups of service and cavalry reconnaissance units and one Chinese army of four divisions that at first remained in reserve at Linchiang, Manchuria.

  15. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, interview with author, 21 Oct 75.

  16. The discussion of the CCF in 1950 and the leaders of the Chinese "Volunteer" forces that entered Korea is based on many sources, including the following: Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army, September 1952 (Washington, D.C., 1952); Far East Command (FEC), "Chinese Communist Military Operations in Korea," Intelligence Digest 35 (1-15 Nov 52): 44-51, National Archives, Federal Records Center, Record Group 407, Box 766 (hereafter, similar citations give box number only); ibid., 6 (16-31 Aug 51), Box 513; Edgar Snow, Red Star oar China (New York: Random House, 1938); idem, Red China Today; Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

  17. Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army, September 1952, pp. 28-29. This handbook was prepared from a vast array of intelligence information and material captured in the first six months of the Chinese intervention in Korea, including the interrogation of Chinese prisoners, and it is supported by hundreds of detailed combat reports of American and UN units.

  18. Information regarding the movement of the XIII Army Group into Korea is based primarily on a captured enemy document that was reproduced in FEC Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) No. 3207, 21 June 51, Box 473. The document carries the heading "Volunteer Headquarters." There are many intelligence summaries throughout Nov and Dec 1950 that give the same information as to the enemy order of battle for the Chinese units in front of Eighth Army, based largely on the testimony of Chinese prisoners captured in the fighting. They identified their units without hesitation. The only question concerns the 167th Division of the 50th Army. It may not have been with the 50th Army when it first crossed the Yalu but may have joined it at a later date.

  19. Appleman, South to the NakwV, North to the Yalu, pp. 667-716, gives the story of the Chinese 1st Phase Offensive in detail. This summary is based on that account.

  Chapter 2

  1. Lt. CoI. James F. Schnabel, Ret., and Direction the First Year: The United States Anny in the Koran War (Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Military History, US Army, 1972). Lt. Col. Schnabel's work is a study of the official records of the Far East Command in Tokyo and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington, together with other related materials, bearing on the policies, command methods, and high-level political and military decisions of the United States in conducting the Korean War during its first year. It is documented in detail and relies heavily on the cable traffic between the two command centers. My treatment of this subject is based largely on Schnabel's work.

  2. See ibid., pp. 182-83, for the 27 Sept 50 directive from the JCS to MacArthur.

  3. Ibid., pp. 250-56, gives a detailed account of the exchange of messages between MacArthur and the JCS, of discussion in the National Security Council, and of exchanges between the JCS and the president on this issue.

  4. Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, Reminisunces (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 359-60; Almond testimony before the Judiciary Committee, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 23 Nov 54, pt. 25, pp. 2103-2104. MacArthur held that the "terrain was such that there was little prospect that any enemy might drive an effective wedge between the two forces and initiate flanking operations against either or both, and no such attempt was ever made."

  5. Map of Korea, 1950 and later editions, 1:50,000 scale; JANIS, Study of Korea, Apr 1950, and map "Mountain Ranges of Korea."

  6. The discussion of the so-called gap between Eighth Army and the X Corps is based in part on Applcman, South to the NaktorK, North to the Talu, pp. 745-48, which is documented in detail from official records of military units on the edges of the gap. Additional studies on the subject since that work was published have only confirmed my stated conclusions.

  7. 2nd Inf. Div. Comd. Rpt., G-3 Act. Rpt., Nov 1950, Box 2435.

  8. Some of the specific information on this ROK patrol will be found in Lt. Col. Robert C. Cameron, KMAG advisor to the ROK 10th Regt., in "The Lost Corps," Military Review 33, no. 2, (May 1953): 10-18.

  9. This sketch of efforts by both Eighth Army and X Corps to establish contact in the gap between them is based on the following documentary evidence: 3rd Inf. Div. WD, G-3 Jnl., Msg. CG X Corps to Eighth Army, at 1500 [3:00 P.m.], and journal entries at 1020 [10:20 A.m.], 2220 [10:20 P.m.], 13 Nov 50; ibid., G-3 Jnl. entries at 1330 14 Nov 50; X Corps PIR No. 49, 14 Nov 50; 65th Inf. Regt. Comd. Rpt., Nov 1950, p. 4; Eighth Army WD, G-3 Sec., 14 Nov 50; Eighth Army POR No. 379, 15 Nov 50; 2nd Inf. Div. WD, POR No. 315, 18 Nov 50; 38th Inf. WD, 16-18 Nov 50. (Subsequent references to the time of messages, journal entries, telephone conversations, etc., may appear only in the 24-hour system used by the military.)

  10. James A. Field, Jr., Historyaf United States NavalOpcmtions in Kona (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962), pp. 237-42; 24th Inf. Div. WD, Narr., Nov 1950, Box 3512. Field's book is an excellent work, based on official primary US Navy sources.

  11. Eighth Army WD, Summ., Sec. 1, 17-19 Nov 50, Box 1122.

  Chapter 3

  1. Brig. Gen. William A. Collier, review comments on "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu" MS, Dec 1957, and letter to author, 10 Mar 58. During the time Gen. Walker was at the advance CP near Anju, Collier seems to have been in charge of the Pyongyang Army CP. Collier was well known in Eighth Army and highly respected for his efficient performance of duty. During the army attack toward the border, Milburn may have had his I Corps Headquarters (HQ) at Sinanju, or at its outskirts. This seems to be indicated in the I Corps records, but I am not clear on this point. In any event, Sinanju and Anju are only four or five miles apart, and some confusion as to exact location may have arisen from this fact.

  2. Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp. 44-45; 3rd Bn., 27th Inf., 25th Inf. Div. WD, Box 3764.

  3. Pfc. Arthur J. Cohen (HQ Co., 2nd Inf. Div.), "Diary of a Week," 23 Nov1 Dec 50, Kunu-ri, Korea (copy in author's possession); Col. Robert K. Sawyer, letter to author, 14 June 74.

  4. Col. Henry G. Fisher, commander of the 35th Inf. Regt., interview with author, 5 Jan 52. Also, Sawyer, letter to author, 14 June 74. In Nov 1950 Sawyer was a platoon leader of the 25th Recon. Co., 25th Inf. Div.

  5. FEC DIS No. 2999, 25 Nov 50, Box 99.

  6. Eighth Army WD, 24 Nov 50, G-2 PIR No. 135, and G-3 Sec.

  7. 38th Inf. Comd. Rpt., Summ., Nov 1950, Box 2473; Eighth Army WD, Summ., Sec. 1, Nov 1950, pp. 16-23; 2nd Inf. Div. WD, Summ., Nov 1950, Box 2435; 35th Inf. WD, Nov 1950, Box 3764.

  8. Eighth Army WD, G-3 Sec., 23-24 Nov 50; Operations in Korea (25 June 1950 to 1 April 1951) (West
Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy, Dept. of Military Art and Engineering, 1951), Map 8; Bartlett, With the Australians in Kona.

  9. Eighth Army WD, 22 Nov 50, G-4 Sec., Annex A to PLR No. 133, Arty. Rpt. No. 15. The relative firepower figure is determined by the formula: RFP=D+W+R, where D is the range, in thousands of yards; W is the weight of the projectile divided by 5; and R is the normal number of rounds per minute of the weapon fired.

  10. Eighth Army WD, 23 Nov 50, G-4 Sec. See Sec. 3, par. 5, Operations, for organization of artillery with Eighth Army, pursuant to Operational Plan No. 15.

  11. Eighth Army WD, G-3 Sec., 23 Nov 50; ibid., Opn. Plan No. 16, 23 Nov 50. The UN concern about the power plants was grossly exaggerated, as it turned out. Many that were captured were found to have had all the machinery removed, and some of the plants had never been completed.

  12. Sec table 2. The most important document relating to the Chinese order of battle for the 2nd Phase Offensive against Eighth Army is translated and reproduced in FEC DIS No. 3207, 21 June 51. It was issued by the CCF Volunteers HQ, giving the composition of that headquarters and including the organization of the XIII Army Group. It is noteworthy that the document is headed "Volunteer Headquarters." The Chinese placed much importance on the fiction of their forces in Korea being "volunteers."

  13. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 273.

  14. The exact number of troops in the Chinese order of battle cannot be determined. At full strength a Chinese infantry division was supposed to number 10,000 men. The X Corps and the 1st Marine Div. in the Chosin Reservoir campaign reached the conclusion that the divisions of the IX Army Group there numbered, on average, about 7,500-8,000 men. It seems likely that the divisions of the XIII Army Group in the west were similar in strength. The POW interrogation intelligence on this subject is conflicting.

  15. JANIS, Mountain Rangrs of Korea, Map of Korea, 1:50,000 scale, April 1945. Certain place-name suffixes on maps of Korea indicate "river," "island," "village," or "mountain." River names usually carry the suffix ch'on, gang, or kang (Chongchon River, for example). Mountains have a suffix of bong, pong, or ran. An island usually has a suffix of do. A settlement may be indicated by one of several suffixes, such as dong, gal, kol, li, ni, or ri (such as Kunu-ri or Hagaru-ri).

  16. Appleman, South to the Nakmng, North to the Yalu, pp. 670-72; Map of Korea, revised 1950 edition, scale 1:50,000 (1'b inches to 1 mile) (Washington, D.C.: US Army Corps of Engineers, 1950), is used throughout this work in discussions of topography, except where otherwise noted. Numerous war diaries and other records of combat units of Eighth Army have also contributed much to this brief generalized analysis of the key terrain where Eighth Army and the CCF had their initial engagements and ensuing combat in the last week of November 1950. These will often be cited in discussing these particular events.

  Chapter 4

  1. Eighth Army WD, 24 Nov 50, G-2 PIR No. 135.

  2. Eric Linklatcr, Our Men in Kona (London: HMSO, 1952), p. 28.

  3. Col. Henry G. Fisher, interview with author, 5 Jan 52; Col. Albert K. Stebbins, Jr., interview with author, 4 Dec 53.

  4. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 773-74.

  5. 24th Div. WD, 1-30 Nov 50; 21st Inf. WD, 24 Nov 50, Box 3538; Col. Gines Perez, CO, 21st Inf., interview with author, 6 Aug 51.

  6. 5th RCT Unit Rpt., Nov 1950, Box 4691; IX Corps WD, Vol. 2, G-2 Spot Rpt., Boxes 1769 and 1767, G-2 Act. Rpt., 24 Nov 50 in I Corps WD; IX Corps WD, G-3 Spot Rpt., 24 Nov 50; FEC DIS No. 3000, 26 Nov 50, Box 99.

  7. Col. John T. Corley, commander of the 24th Inf. Regt., interview with author, 4 Jan 52. Col. Corley had commanded the 24th Inf. since Sept 1950. He told the author that Gen. Kean, 25th Div. commander, usually placed the 24th Inf. in the least critical part of the division's zone of action. The regiment's record in the early part of the Korean War was not good, and it was considered unreliable. There was only one other all-black infantry unit in Eighth Army-the 3rd Bn., 9th Inf., 2nd Inf. Div. The personnel of both the 24th Regt. and the 3rd Bn., 9th Inf., were integrated into other units of Eighth Army in the fall of 1951.

  8. 25th Div. Hist., Bk. 2, Nov 1950, Unit Hist., HQ, 89th Med. Tank Bn., p. 3.

  9. 25th Inf. Div. Hist., Bk. 2, Nov 1950, Narr., Task Force Dolvin, p. 2; IX Corps WD, Bk. 1, 24 Nov 50, and G-3, Msg. No. 1479, Annex 2, Vol. 6; Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, CG 25th Div. Arty., "Tropic Lightning and Tam Leaf in Korea" (Mimeographed MS with sketch maps [n.d., but apparently written in 1951], copy in author's possession), pp. 40-41; Eighth Army WD, Sec. 2, 24 Nov 50, G-3 Jnl. entry No. 1, and msg. at 1710, Box 1130; I Corps WD, G-3 POR, 24 Nov 50, Box 1500.

  10. ATIS, Enemy Documents, Korean Operations, Issue 29, No. 202051, p. 117, Item 36. Apparently the interrogation was conducted by a North Korean. The document said there were 452 American prisoners in the stockade and that, in the period 5-25 Nov, three of them had died.

  11. IX Corps WD, Vol. 2, G-2 Spot Rpt., 24 Nov 50, Box 1769. One of the released prisoners, a Sgt. Kiechncr, said that Pyoktong, on the south bank of the Yalu, was bounded by the river on three sides and was guarded by about two companies of North Koreans and few Chinese. He said the town was heavily bombed and burned on 19 Nov, and many civilians killed. He added that there were about 30 Americans in the camp who had been wounded so badly they could not walk and that nine needed amputations. He estimated there were about 320 American prisoners there who had not been wounded. The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) at the 7th Cav. Rcgt. HQ made the Klechner interrogation. Sec 1st Cav. Div. WD, Nov 1950.

  I2. Col. Robert K. Sawyer, letter to author, 14 June 74; 25th Div. WD, Bk. 9, Annex 10, 25th Recon. Co., 24 Nov 50, Box 3765.

  13. IX Corps WD, 24 Nov 50, Box 1767.

  14. 38th Inf. Comd. Rpt., Summ., 24 Nov 50, Box 2473.

  15. The discussion is based primarily on Cameron, "Lost Corps," pp. 9-18. Cameron's is the best account I know of what happened to the ROK II Corps in the vicinity of Tokchon in the last days of Nov 1950. But there arc also many references to the ROK action in the Eighth Army, IX Corps, and 2nd Inf. Div. WDs, and in the FEC DIS for the period. Many of these references are cited in later parts of the narrative. There are virtually no South Korean Army records for the first part of the Korean War. Most of the extant information about ROK actions is to be found in KMAG advisor reports to the US Chief of KMAG, Eighth Army. These arc normally included in the Eighth Army WD for the day. The Republic of Korea's Army chief of staff subsequently requested permission from the Department of the Army and from me to translate South to the Naktang, North to the Yalu into Korean and publish it for their use and reference because it had more information, they said, about their own army's military action in 1950 than their own existing military records possessed.

  16. The 12-in-1 ration consisted of the following items: biscuits (600 gm.); two cans of two different kinds of fish-mackcrcl, mackcrcl-pike, sardines, herring, sukesotara, or Alaskan pollack (200 gm.) -or canned tuna flakes (200 gm.), dried prunes (30 gxn.), roasted soybeans (30 gm.), roasted peas (40 gm.), hard candy (60 gm.), salt (10 gm.), red pepper (10 gm.), green tea (8 gm.), chewing gum (15 gm.). Sec QM Review, Sept-Oct 1951, p. 121.

  17. Eighth Army WD, 23 Nov 50, G-3 Sec.; IX Corps WD, Vol. 4, G-3 Spot Rpt., 24 Nov 50, Box 1770.

  18. Cameron, "Lost Corps."

  19. 25th Inf. Div. WD, Ord. Off. Rpt., 24 Nov 50, Box 3769; 1st Cav. Div. WD, 24 Nov 50, Box 4446; Eighth Army WD, Summ., Sec. 1, Nov 1950.

  20. GHQ FEC Communique No. 11, 6 Nov 50.

  21. "Msg. CINCFE to JCS, NR 68572, 9 Nov 50," in joint Senate and House Hearings, Pertinent Papers on the Korean Situation (8 vols.), II, 341.

  22. Eighth Army WD, 24 Nov 50, EUSAK Daily News Bulletin.

  23. Reginald William Thompson, Cry Korea (London: MacDonald & Co., 1951), p. 236.

  24. Eighth Army WD, 24 Nov 50, G-3 Sec.; IX Corps WD, Bk. 1, 24 Nov 50; I Corps WD, Nov 1950, p. 31; Gen. Milburn, statement to author, in South to the Nakto,, North to the Yalu, p. 776; Brig. Gen. Edw
in K. Wright (a member of MacArthur's party), interview with author, 7 Jan 54; Maj. Gcn. Garrison H. Davidson (asst. div. com., 24th Inf. Div., Nov 1950), interview with author, 28 Jan 54. Davidson said in this interview that he and most of the division staff thought that Eighth Army should have stopped at the Chongchon River.

  25. Brig. Gcns. Edwin K. Wright and Garrison H. Davidson (ranks in Nov 1950), in interviews with the author (7 and 28 Jan 1954, respectively), asserted that they heard General MacArthur's comments and that they were as reported here. See New York Her aid Tribune, 25 Nov 50, p. 3, col. 1; New York Times, 29 Nov 50, p. 4, col. 4, for MacArthur's claim that he was misquoted.

  26. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 373. Courtney Whitney, one of MacArthur's party from Tokyo on this trip, has also written about this flight over the Yalu on 24 Nov 50. He confirmed that the party could see no sign of activity on the snow-covered roads. See Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 416-17.

  27. "From CINCUNC Tokyo, Japan, sgd MacArthur to DEPTAR for JCS, NR Radio C 69808, CM in 14393, 25 Nov 1950," in Pertinent Papers on the Konsan Situation, II, 347-49; Schnabel, Polity and Diration, pp. 270-71, paraphrases much of this long message. MacArthur contended in his message to the JCS (1) that the UN and US had repeatedly stated a policy that saw "destroying all en forces south of Korea's boundary as essential to the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea" and (2) that such a statement implied a policy of carrying the war to the border. MacArthur's contention cannot be supported.

  28. Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings befonr the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Fortign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second C,mtgrrss, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951), IIi, 1834, citing MacAqrhur's communique (hereafter cited as MacArthur Hearings); Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 764-65.