The Omega Covenant

by Richard Holcroft

  “Because they’re at the front line,” the admiral said, “and they know what a nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran or a surrogate would mean. What else are they supposed to think?”

  General Miller thought for a moment and then continued, “We may all agree there’s little room for debate on the subject, but our duty now is to carry out the mission as directed by the Joint Chiefs and president, not question who’s right and who’s wrong.”

  Marine Major Tom Cahill from Joint Chiefs’ intelligence nodded. “So I assume Arak is no longer a primary target, since it’s incapable of producing nuclear weapons under terms of previous international agreements?”

  The general nodded. “Correct. UN inspectors have verified its core vessel has been removed, so we’ll have to take their word for it.” He pulled up a detailed map of Iran on the monitor to his right. “We considered the two reactors south of Bushehr as targets but ruled them out, also, because of Russia’s close involvement in the project. They built, operate, and continue to supply fresh fuel to the reactors, so for obvious reasons, the state department wants the Bushehr reactors off-limits.”

  “Too bad,” Admiral Simmons said in disgust. “It’s time Sokolov joined the twenty-first century and started cooperating with us.”

  “No big loss,” one intelligence analyst said. “Those reactors are crap anyway. They’re old and damaged by earthquakes; one of the primary pumps failed a couple of years ago and shed metal particles into the cooling system. They’re having all sorts of problems. New ones being built at the site will eventually be okay, but the two existing reactors aren’t worth the powder to blow them up.”

  “Fordow, near Qom, was also to be modified under previous agreements,” Simmons said. “Iranian leaders promised to convert the facility into a physics and technology research center.” He saw eyes roll among the seated officers. “Recent satellite photos indicate those reactors are still up and running, however, with no sign they’ll be modified anytime soon.”

  “Of course,” a seasoned air force colonel from Defense Intelligence added. “I’ve never trusted the bastards and never will. The Israelis are right: a nuclear Iran is far more dangerous than ISIS or al-Qaeda ever thought about being.”

  Miller added, “The thought of Iran building only nuclear power plants and not nuclear weapons is absurd. If it builds the plants, it will have the weapons... simple as that.”

  Most in the room agreed. “So after pussyfooting around for so long,” Simmons wondered, “why are we finally getting hardnosed about it now?”

  “It’s all about the smallpox outbreak and possibility of another attack–or something equally bad. Radical Islamists in Hamas and Hezbollah have fallen in love with bioweapons, preferring them now to missiles and aircraft. They know full well the thought of thousands dying from a virus is far more terrifying to Americans than nearly any other option.”

  “And easier to transport and use.”

  “Right,” General Miller said. “So we’ve concluded our primary target will be the nuclear facility at Fordow.” He used his laser pointer to identify its location a half hour south of the ancient city of Qom and two hours south of Tehran. “It’s not Iran’s largest facility but the best fortified. It holds three thousand-plus centrifuges, enough to enrich all the uranium it needs for a nuclear weapon, and capable of containing ten thousand or more, if necessary.”

  “Also one of the facilities at the heart of Iran’s dispute with the UN Security Council,” the analyst explained.

  “And since it’s constructed four stories underground in a hardened bunker, it precludes a conventional or small-to medium-size nuclear attack,” Simmons said. “Although we’re not about to drop a nuke on them–at this time, anyway.”

  General Miller nodded toward the two officers seated across from him. “Which is why I’ve asked Colonel Pete Durham and Major Andrew Hart from the Air Force Flexible Strike Group at Barksdale to update our profiles for a B-2 strike on the Fordow facility.”

  Colonel Durham picked up a laser pointer and focused it on a satellite photograph of the plant. “Since the Fordow reactor is the most hardened of Iran’s nuclear facilities, a B-2 stealth bomber with bunker buster ordnance is our best option.”

  Major Hart explained, “We believe a night strike would be preferable, since on-site casualties would be fewer. The facility is not near a major urban center, so civilian casualties will be minimized as well.”

  “What will cause the majority of casualties?” Miller asked.

  “Mostly thermal and chemical injuries from the blast itself. Workers on site will likely not survive. But prevailing winds this time of year are toward the north and east, so toxic fumes should spare the cities of Natanz and Kashan.”

  Colonel Durham said, “They’ve got two small hospitals in Natanz, but the region lacks sufficient medical facilities to treat seriously injured scientists and workers. Undoubtedly, there’ll be other public relations and environmental consequences to deal with, as well.”

  “We’d have better photos of the complex if they hadn’t shot down one of Israel’s drones a while back,” one analyst said.

  “Yes, that was very unfortunate, but we can work with what we have.”

  Major Hart continued, “Our proposed scenario has us using a single B-2 out of Diego Garcia.”

  “Not England?” Durham asked.

  “No. Using Fairford as a launch point would give us a shorter flight plan, but we won’t get over-flight approval from the necessary governments: France, Austria, Turkey, Italy, et cetera. We think a Diego Garcia departure with a single outbound refueling would be easier and a much wiser choice.”

  “Have you worked up a scenario from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri?” Miller asked.

  “Yes, and that still remains an option, but it would require multiple inflight refuelings, and we’d still have the overfly problems–with Russia, China, and several other countries, some of which remain close buddies with Iran and want no part of this operation.”

  Major Hart clicked a link to a map of the Middle East. “Thanks to its stealth characteristics, the B-2 will be able to fly across the Arabian Sea and Iran at fifty thousand feet. Iranian controllers with their pitiful radar will never even know we’re in the area until it’s too late.”

  Durham added, “The B-2 will be armed with two, thirty-thousand-pound massive ordnance penetrator bombs, one in each internal bomb bay. With its GPS-aided targeting system, we should have a precise hit with relatively little collateral damage. In fact, this aircraft and its bombs were specifically designed for this type of mission. I have no doubt we’d be successful.”

  One junior naval officer seemed bothered by the proposal but hesitated a few minutes before speaking up. “I know the B-2’s unique design–carbon-graphite composition, curved surfaces, and concealed engines–make it virtually undetectable by radar, but isn’t it likely vulnerable to detection when the bomb bay doors are open?”

  “Yes–for a short period of time. But most of Iran’s high altitude anti-aircraft missiles are useless above thirty thousand feet. Their best missile, the SA-2, is operational to sixty thousand feet or more, but its tracking abilities are quite limited.”

  “The B-2 is vulnerable to intercept by other aircraft, though,” General Miller pointed out.

  Colonel Durham shook his head. “We don’t see that as a problem, either. In the event Iran is even able to get several of its aging aircraft off the ground, we’d scramble F-18s off the Teddy Roosevelt in the Gulf, and they’d be there within minutes. Iran’s beat-up F-4s and MIGs would be no match for the Super Hornets.”

  “Either way, though, it might spark a broader war,” the naval intelligence officer said.

  General Miller nodded. “And that’s the last thing President McHugh wants. In fact, he’s trying now to negotiate an acceptable agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear capabilities, while the DOD and Joint Chiefs feel strongly the effort will prove counterproductive and an exercise in futility.”<
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  “I agree,” Durham said. “As long as Iran continues supporting terrorist groups and attacking us with smallpox, they’ve crossed our red line. At that point, the US must either send a clear and powerful message those actions will not be tolerated, or be viewed as powerless in the Gulf region.”

  32

  The White House, July 12th

  The president called a meeting with law enforcement and health officials in the Situation Briefing Room for two o’clock that afternoon. The unexplained and sudden outbreak of smallpox in the eastern half of the country was now topic number one on the Sunday morning talk shows, prime-time evening news programs, and in newspaper op-eds. Clearly, citizens and politicians were becoming increasingly concerned about what appeared to be the beginning of an epidemic and were starting to panic.

  The president began, “I thought it important we meet one more time before I leave for Hawaii. I wish we were meeting under more pleasant circumstances, but things are getting serious enough I thought it time to take stock of where we are, where we’re going, and the multiple problems we face getting there.”

  Each pair of eyes was focused on the president with an air of concern rarely seen in White House meetings outside wartime preparedness. In fact, most of them felt this was as close to war as they were going to get in their lifetimes, and they were worried.

  He continued, “Some of you have worked together before, but for others and the record, I’ll quickly go around the table to make sure we know who’s on board.” He started with the middle-aged woman to his left and nodded at her and then each of the others when he spoke the name. “Deputy Director Beverly Mason from CDC; Richard Walters from the Office of Public Health and Preparedness; Special Agent Robert McGraw from FBI’s counterterrorism division; Michael Knapp from Health and Human Services’ Office of Emergency Preparedness with Deputy Assistant Secretary Dr. Sidney Ross; and Dr. Catherine Collins, CDC’s Deputy Director of the Office of Infectious Diseases. All experts in your fields and experienced in dealing with infectious diseases.” He looked to his right. “Dr. Collins, if you’d start by giving us an update on the number and location of cases.”

  “Certainly,” Dr. Collins said and looked down at her notes. “Thirty-five confirmed cases so far in ten states, mainly in New York City and surrounding counties, but also in New Orleans, Boston, Memphis, Little Rock, Atlanta, and a few other cities. Geographically, mostly in the Southeast, but our newest one, interestingly, is in Montana. The patient had been visiting his daughter in New York’s Brooklyn borough a week to ten days ago, so it appears we’re beginning to pick up secondary cases.”

  President McHugh nodded. “Any commonality found between our infected patients?”

  “We’ve looked at everything and found one significant connection,” Dr. Collins said. “All initial cases, including the daughter of the Montana case, were aboard a cruise ship in Hawaii named the Fair Winds owned by a Norwegian company registered as Tropic Star Lines. It sails the Hawaiian Islands exclusively, from Honolulu to Kauai, Hilo, Maui, the Big Island, then back to Honolulu the seventh day.”

  “What specific days are we talking about?” Walters asked.

  “This particular cruise left Honolulu on June 11th and returned to port on June 17th.” She paused for a moment once she noticed several members taking notes. “A few days ago, one of our physician-investigators flew to Honolulu and met with an FBI agent from their local office and Tropic Star’s port manager. They went over the manifest and verified all initial cases were indeed onboard that ship on those dates.”

  “How many aboard total?” the president asked.

  Dr. Collins again checked her notes. “Figures from the cruise line show 960 passengers and 420 crewmembers–a total of 1,380.”

  “Then we have relatively few cases compared to the total number on board at risk.”

  She nodded. “Which leads us to believe that only a few people became exposed at a specific location and specific time. Since the FBI assures us this could not have been an unfortunate or unlucky circumstance but rather a terrorist attack, we conclude it was a deliberate act aimed at non-specific passengers. A waiter serving tables during a particular meal, for instance, or a crew member passing it on during a shipboard emergency drill.”

  “Nothing says it had to be a crew member,” McGraw added.

  “Absolutely,” she agreed. “It could certainly have been transmitted by one of the other passengers or happened on one of the land tours. We’re still looking at ground excursion aspects of the case, as well.”

  “And how would it have been transmitted?” McHugh asked.

  “With smallpox, typically it’d be a face-to-face transfer,” Collins explained. “A cough or sneeze, generally. But there are other possibilities, as well: an atomizer spray, for example, or infected drinking glass.”

  “How much of the virus would the terrorist need?”

  “Very little. A quarter-teaspoon could infect a hundred people.”

  The president dropped his head and let the figures sink in. “So we’ve got it narrowed down to a particular ship–the Fair Winds–in a specific seven-day period. How close are we, then, to getting the disease contained?”

  “Right now, results are mixed,” Walters said. “The ring containment strategy is working, but the actions of private citizens will be critical in controlling the outbreak. Some people are already starting to flee those cities affected–New York and New Orleans, in particular. We’ve got food shortages developing due to truck transportation problems, with multiple store closings in some of our more populated cities. Canada and Mexico are even discussing closing their borders until the threat passes.”

  Knapp added, “Mayor Fuller in New York reported this morning they had several small riots in the city last night. Some residents are starting to panic, and an increasing number of hospital workers are opting to stay home.”

  “Mr. President,” Dr. Collins said, “we have to decide at what point we abandon the ring containment strategy and begin a mandatory, mass immunization program. A second wave of infections is starting to show up now, which fits within the expected time frame–in fact, is happening more quickly than we originally thought.”

  “I agree,” Knapp said. “We could have several hundred more cases in a matter of days. I fear that because our cases are spread so far apart geographically, mass immunization may be the only truly effective strategy at this point.”

  President McHugh sat silent for a few minutes, reviewing the situation in his mind. “How long would it take to get the vaccine distributed to all major cities in the eastern US?”

  Doctors Collins and Mason huddled, briefly, then looked back at the president. “The stocks are already on pallets ready to go in Atlanta.” Mason said. “It all depends now on aircraft and crew availability–and whether staff and facilities are set up to receive the stocks at designated smallpox hospitals in those cities. Best guess is, four to five days.”

  McHugh shook his head. “That’s too long. Once again, this shows how ill prepared our healthcare system is to deal with such a major crisis. We can game plan all we want, but when reality hits, it’s another matter.”

  “I agree, Mr. President,” Collins said. “If it gets out of hand, and we have to deal with mass casualties, the whole healthcare system could become overwhelmed. Failure to stop it early and fast could prove disastrous.”

  Knapp said, “We also need to establish priorities. Governors in states affected may argue that healthcare workers should get immunized first. But the Pentagon may have other ideas: they may want the military to have highest priority.”

  “DOD has already advised us it doesn’t want all the vaccine to go to the states, considering the number of troops we keep deployed in the Middle East. Canada and Mexico may also request the vaccine be supplied to them, highest priority.”

  Knapp added, “Another problem is the number of illegal immigrants we’ve got in our Eastern cities. Texas, Arizona, and California get most of the publi
city, but we have our own substantial population of illegals to deal with, and they’re going to be reluctant to identify themselves for fear of getting deported. So I don’t see them walking into a clinic in Manhattan, for instance, to get immunized–not right away, certainly.”

  “Absolutely,” Mason agreed. “Or we could end up with the reverse problem: If the smallpox outbreak is identified and publicized every night on the evening news, anyone with a stuffy nose is going to rush to the hospital. The ERs will become swamped with routine, non-smallpox cases.”

  Dr. Ross said, “In that case, we’ll also have a significant number of false positives with no choice but to treat them as if they were infected until we can confirm otherwise.”

  “We’re going about it the right way, though,” Collins added. “The few models we have to draw on show that contact tracing and quarantine, combined with ring immunization, is considerably more effective than either strategy alone.”

  “But we need to act decisively,” Mason said. “Further delays will make containment impossible. Effective control is dependent on other variables that need to be in place: an effective public health system, a compliant public, and tough politicians willing to make necessary but unpopular decisions for public safety regarding quarantine and vaccination.”

  “And only time will tell whether we’ll get those or not,” Walters said. “It’s certainly not a slam-dunk for damn sure. Studies suggest the average US city is less prepared to support ring immunization than is an African village.”

  “Okay,” the president said out of frustration. “Let’s get the vaccine to those cities with confirmed cases as soon as possible–enough to immunize ten percent of the population anyway. We’ll wait to see what the defense department needs. By then we’ll know whether the disease is spreading slowly, contained, or out of control.” He again looked around the room. “I’ll remind you, however, this is considered a terrorist act, so the FBI will be in charge of the operation to the extent it is part of its ongoing investigation. CDC and local health departments still have primary responsibility for identifying individuals who may be infected or at risk, and for setting up immunization sites.”