Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Of greater controversy than overall army strength is the size of the contributing contingents. This is especially so for the Spartans. For while most who've looked at the battle would probably be comfortable with 3,000-4,000 hoplites in the muster from Thebes itself, there is a wide range of opinion on Spartan numbers. This stems from great uncertainly about the mora, the largest organizational unit in Sparta's army. This element is frequently cited by ancient authors instead of giving a precise figure for manpower. Granted that it's often stated that the Spartan army consisted of six morai, it seems clear that four of these were present at Leuctra, since we're told elsewhere (Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.17) that the Spartans called up "the remaining two moral" in the battle's aftermath. The controversy therefore lies in the exact size of the mora. Our estimates range from about 500 hoplites to just over 1,000. Plutarch, for example, offered the lower of these numbers (Vol. I Pelopidas, 395), citing Ephorus. However, he showed a degree of uncertainly in this by acknowledging that other respected authors used different figures (700 for Callisthenes and 900 for Polybios). The impression is that we're dealing in all these varying ancient references with possible generalized use of the term "mora" for what was really a "lochos" (half a mora) as well as parade complements (the actual number of men counted in the field). This suggests that true establishment strength was at least a bit above even the highest of these citations in line with a mora of around 1,000 spearmen and close to Lazenby's proposal (1989, 63-64) of a nominal strength of 1,120 (about 25 percent above our top ancient "parade" number). This estimate is based on Thucydides' detailed description of the Spartan army at Mantinea I in 418 (5.68.3) and that of Xenophon for a sub-unit at Leuctra (Hellenica 6.4.12). The issue of Spartan manpower will doubtless remain forever in dispute, but other indications at Leuctra lend indirect support to the idea that the Spartans deployed their morai at around 1,000 men strong consistent with there possibly having been a muster of 6,000 hoplites in six morai at Nemea River (394).

  The first item favoring a Spartan total of about 4,000 hoplites is Pausanius' note (9.13.9) that "the Lacedaemonians themselves and the Thebans were not badly matched adversaries." While this can be taken as a statement about relative quality of the troops, it might well have referred to quantity as well. Pausanius otherwise made no comment on manpower. The idea of last-minute reinforcements arriving directly from Sparta (Diodorus 15.54.6) also backs the idea of half the army being Spartans. Citizens were much easier to gather on short notice than farther flung and reluctant allies. As a result, they could very well have made up an overwhelming majority of this second "large army." Diodorus clearly made an error in assigning this force to Archidamus (the son of Agesilaos, who actually later commanded troops gathered on the home front), yet otherwise may have been accurate in reporting the sending of considerable manpower by the Spartan assembly. Finally, the best indication that the Spartans might have been around 4,000 in number comes from their casualty figures. These range up to exactly 4,000 (Diodorus 15.56.4), and even the lower estimates are consistent with a total force of that size (see "Casualties" below).

  OBLIQUE ORDER • Epaminondas designed a formation to attack the enemy at its strongest point with superior manpower drawn from a select portion of his complement while keeping the rest of it out of combat. Diodorus said that he did this by "arranging his phalanx in oblique formation" (15.55.2) and the term "oblique order" for such an approach is often employed today. While exact details of the Theban's technique are subject to debate, it's widely accepted that he withheld the right side of his formation (perhaps even withdrawing this a few paces as indicated by Diodorus) after filling its ranks with men of lesser quality at a more modest depth than that of the other wing (possibly even below that of normal practice). At the same time, the left side of his formation (whether relatively broad or confined to just a very small stretch at the flank end) deployed with unusually deep files containing the army's highest quality troops. He thus hoped to use greater othismos and any other advantages accruing from his overly deep, left-side array to best the opposition's more thinly aligned right wing. And this is precisely how it all seems to have worked out at Leuctra. Less clear is the role of the Sacred Band. Plutarch's account indicates a station for this unit behind the left wing, from which it moved out to make a surprise attack against the Spartans' standard ploy of extending their right to envelop opponents on that side of the field. This is a change from that elite unit's past practice of forming the Thebans' leading rank(s), yet seems reasonable all the same. Accepting such a post for the Sacred Band, Stylianou (1998, 402-403) has made an interesting proposal for how the rest of the Thebans set up at Leuctra. He offers that the left wing wasn't 50 shields deep, but just 25 as at Delium (and, maybe, Tegyra). However, the Sacred Band made it appear deeper by standing in the back at the same 25 shields in a dozen files. This intriguing idea provides yet a third (and perhaps the best) variant for the Theban deployment.

  CASUALTIES • Losses among the victorious Thebans were apparently minimal. Xenophon gave no account, but Pausanius cited 47 (presumably all hoplites) while Diodorus allowed for a rather more believable 300. The former would represent just over 1 percent of a 4,000-man Theban contingent and falls within the bounds of the sort of small losses often associated with the winning side in a phalanx battle. However, the kind of extended action described, featuring stiff Spartan resistance and back-and-forth fights (one waged over the fallen Cleombrotus is described in detail) would seem more in accordance with the higher figure and a 7.5 percent loss.

  As for Spartan losses, we have the 4,000 listed by Diodorus, which seems impossible for an actual count of the dead and is almost surely a tradition on the total number of hoplites defeated (per the foregoing "Manpower" discussion). Fortunately, we have two other casualty reports for the Spartans from Xenophon (Hellenica 6.4.15) and Pausanius (9.13.12). These are more or less in agreement, with the former claiming "almost a thousand had been killed" and the latter "more than a thousand." Based on a likely 4,000-man deployment, these hover around 25 percent of the total strength exposed in the engagement, quite in keeping with typical damage done to a force broken after a long fight and suffering the level of chase cited at Leuctra. Xenophon elaborated on the Spartans' losses by saying that 700 of those killed (over 70 percent) were spartiates. This is quite astonishing in light of that uppermost class of citizen surely making up a much smaller percentage of the army overall. At the very least, this means that the spartiates present were heavily concentrated in the first few ranks and/or within the rightmost moral, those postings likely having suffered the heaviest casualties. It's also highly likely that Xenophon used the term "spartiate" to distinguish all those that were not from the perioecian class (he seems to have used just this formula in describing Spartan forces the next year [Hellenica 6.5.21] ). This combination of higher classes might indeed have approached half of the hoplite pool and, added to the foregoing conjecture on positioning, would much better explain such a high representation among the dead.

  Lastly, given that contingents other than those from Thebes and Sparta had not really come to action, these would have incurred very few casualties of any sort. Losses were probably limited to just a few men that fell to missiles either along the periphery of the cavalry action or in connection with any light infantry skirmishing that was going on. (This latter is not reported in any of our sources, but was nearly always present around the edges of a phalanx battle.) We thus hear from Pausanius (9.13.12) that among some of the Spartan allies "not a man of them had fallen" and for others there was "but slight loss to report."

  Those on the Spartan side who had escaped the battlefield fell back on their camp. They stood to arms there in defiance, the site offering a strong defensive position on a hillside with a ditch in front. Epaminondas was of no mind to launch a disadvantaged attack on such a strong point and gave leave instead for the beaten men to go out and gather their dead. Finally, the Thebans were dissuaded by their allies from making any further atte
mpt on the Spartans at Leuctra and allowed them to depart under a truce. Meanwhile, back in Sparta, news of the defeat had spawned a whirl of desperate activity. The two morai remaining at home were mustered and the reserves were called out as well as any other men who had for some reason escaped serving with Cleombrotus' column. Agesilaos was still hobbled, so Archidamus took command of these citizen levies. He was then able to add allied troops from Tegea, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Achaea and others to form a sizeable new army. It was his intent to confront the Thebans and rescue what remained of his defeated countrymen. However, upon marching into the Megarid, Archidamus meet the Leuctra survivors coming from Boeotia and, leading them home, he dismissed his allies in route.

  War Comes to Sparta

  The Spartans found their former authority greatly diminished in the aftermath of Leuctra. Jason, the dictator of Pherae, had grown strong in recent years and made it clear now that his region was fully independent of Sparta, going so far as to attack the Spartan colony at Heraclea. Even in the Peloponnese there was rebellion. The recently scattered Mantineans felt free to lay claim to the autonomy promised by renewal of the Peace of Antalcidas' terms and rebuild their city. And when Sparta conceded this but asked that they do so with at least its nominal consent, they haughtily rejected even this relatively minor, face-saving gesture. Such resistance inspired others to do the same and there was soon trouble at Tegea as well. A movement to unite all the Arcadians arose there that led to a fresh round of warfare.

  Tegea II and Elymia (371/70 B.c.)

  Calibius and Proxenus of Tegea were leaders of the Arcadian union movement and, when their proposals were rejected by the city council, they gathered their followers under arms outside the walls to settle the matter by combat. The unionists took the precaution of sending to nearby Mantinea for help; yet believing themselves to be in the majority, they were willing to enter battle when the opposition took the field under Stasippus. But though those opposing union were indeed fewer, they were victorious. Proxenus fell in the engagement alongside a few others and Calibius fled with the rest. This action would have involved 3,200 or so hoplites at most if the entire citizen roster (including reservists) took part. We might thus propose that these were split something like 1,700 to 1,500 against the winners (Diodorus [15.59.2] indicated that after very minor combat casualties and later executions some 1,400 of anti-unionists would eventually flee into exile) with a few horsemen on either side.

  Despite their success in the engagement, Stasippus and his party were to lose in the end. This came about after those defeated gathered near the gates facing Mantinea and let troops arriving from that sympathetic polls into the city. Still having large numbers and now united with these reinforcements, Calibius' forces were able to seize control of Tegea. They then joined with other Arcadians to plan a confederation for their region. Meanwhile, some 800 of Stasippus' followers had reached Sparta to alert it of this threatening development. In spite of the winter season, Sparta's leadership reacted immediately, putting the now healthy Agesilaos in command of an army for a punitive expedition against Tegea. This was to include both Spartan troops and some of the still loyal Arcadians. The king marched to Eutaea on the Arcadian border to await some mercenary peltasts and Phliasian horsemen that were stationed in Corinth near the Peloponnesian frontier. Meanwhile, things were heating up farther north at the polls of Arcadian Orchomenos.

  The Orchomenians were among those opposed to an Arcadian League and this stance drew an attack from the League's chief supporters at Mantinea. However, an assault on the walls of Orchomenos failed and the Mantineans under Lycomedes had drawn back to the city of Elymia. It was here where Agesilaos' reinforcements marching down from Corinth came into contact with them. The mercenary commander, Polytropus, set up a screen in front of his spearmen and cavalry and descended on the Mantineans to initiate a sharp action. Fending off swarms of javelins, the Arcadian hoplites (perhaps 1,000 strong) advanced at speed against their foes (likely around 800 peltasts) and managed to get them within spear-length. How they did this is puzzling, as the much fleeter javelinmen should have been able to withdraw and keep a safe distance - perhaps they had crossed over some sort of barrier in their eagerness to get at the enemy that then hampered their retreat. At any rate, the results were decisive. Polytropus' peltasts were no match for the heavy-equipped spearmen at close quarters and the mercenary commander was killed to send his men running for their lives. There would have been a great slaughter at this point had not the Phliasian horsemen ridden past their hoplite line and come up just in time. They were able to threaten the Mantineans' rear and cause them to break off pursuit. (Note that the foregoing follows Xenophon's description of this action [Hellenica 6.5.13-14]; Diodorus alternatively outlined a major hoplite battle [15.62.1-2], which seems much less consistent with surrounding events.)

  Agesilaos now advanced to Mantinea and united there with the Phliasians and javelinmen from Orchomenos. He sat pat as the Mantineans joined with the rest of the Arcadian League proponents, eschewing confronting these elements in detail toward letting them gather that he might eliminate all in a single, grand action. However, he had camped in poor position within a narrow valley behind the city and was obliged to retreat when the enemy began to muster above on one of the enclosing slopes. Forming his army up in a column, the king turned his men into battle formation facing the enemy. He then executed an anastrophe movement and pulled the distal wing of his formation away from the opposing front. With his entire force now at double depth, he spun toward the valley mouth and exited at quick pace. Agesilaos reformed his men into a phalanx once they gained the plain, setting them up at a depth of nine or ten shields. The Arcadians at this point refrained from engaging him, waiting in hopes of gaining help from Thebes, that city having already accepted some funds from Sparta's old foes at Elis toward financing a foray into the Peloponnese. But this was long in coming and Agesilaos withdrew in the meantime to disband his troops for the season.

  Oeum, Tegeatis Pass and Amyclae (370/69 B.c.)

  The Arcadians had to content themselves with spoiling the land of Sparta's local allies for a while. But as winter wore on, the Thebans under Epaminondas and Pelopidas finally reached Mantinea to collect a large armament. Plutarch (Vol. I Pelopidas, 399; Vol. II Agesilaos, 62) put this force at 40,000 fighters and another 30,000 in support. Diodorus (15.62.5) clamed over 50,000 (probably combatants only) and elsewhere repeated Plutarch's 70,000 total (15.81.2). Yet the lowest figure here for fighting men would seem high by a factor of roughly two times. The Thebans most likely sent 10,000 per past complements. This would be 7,000 hoplites (the presence of all seven regimental commanders is implied) plus 2,300 light footmen (25 percent of the infantry total) and 600 in cavalry. (They would bring this same armament on their next incursion into the Peloponnese the following summer.) Add in 1,500 spearmen, 500 skirmishers and maybe 200 cavalry from Locris and Phocis and you get some 12,000 soldiers in all with about 8,500 of them hoplites. As for the Peloponnesian allies, estimates of their strength based on past deployments and common region practice might be as follows: (1) 6,000 hoplites from Arcadia (possibly including a standing body from the its new confederacy 5,000 strong and paid by the state-the eparitoi) with 1,500 light footmen; (2) 3,000-4,000 hoplites and 750-1,000 foot skirmishers from Argos; and (3) 2,000-3,000 hoplites and 500-750 light infantry from Elis. Cavalry variously supplied by these less horse-strong states might have come to 300-600 riders at a quarter to half relative to the supply from Boeotia. This suggests a total fighting force closer to 28,000 including 20,500 spearmen. This was a huge army to be sure, but no greater than the largest that the Spartans had marshaled during the recent Boeotian War. And the smaller deployment makes much more sense of Xenophon's comment that the invaders were at this time "by no means eager to proceed into Lacedaemon" (Hellenica 6.5.24).

  Despite such initial reservations, the Thebans began to gain courage from intelligence being gathered on their enemy's current condition. It was growing
ever clearer that the Spartans had much fewer of their own men than usual and had still to gather their allies. Moreover, the invaders were approached by people willing to rebel against Spartan rule, most importantly including some of the perioeci. Deciding now to risk a march on Sparta, the Thebans, Locrians and Phocians headed directly south down the valley floor toward Caryae on the Laconian border. At the same time, their local allies set out as well, with the Arcadians, Argives and Eleans (these last with all the Peloponnesian cavalry in tow) moving along separate tracks.