Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  The Arcadian column came up against a Spartan garrison that guarded the pass at Oeum (Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.26). Ischolaus commanded this outpost with half the exiled Tegeans (400 hoplites), a body of freed helot spearmen (maybe 500-600 strong) and at least a few younger Spartans. In addition, he could call upon local men, perhaps adding another 100-200 spearmen and some foot skirmishers (probably less than 50). As the Arcadians neared, Ischolaus made the mistake of not descending to meet them in a narrow part of the pass where his modest force might have prevailed. Instead, perhaps assessing the situation as being more desperate than it actually was, he dismissed his youthful Spartan charges to fight another day (Diodorus [15.64.51, possibly getting them past an advance enemy force by means of a ploy ascribed to him in Polyaenus [2.22.21). He then set up the rest of his command in phalanx at the edge of town with the intent of insuring that the locals would fight at his side in order to defend their own homes. The Arcadians closed on him there in a confined space that might have permitted them to conventionally deploy at no more than equal strength. Taking advantage of this fair match in numbers, the Spartan's hoplites were able to beat back their attackers for a brief victory in the opening phase of the battle. However, though the opposing spearmen were limited in arraying before Oeum by terrain and (perhaps) man-made features, this was not the case with their light infantrymen. Those, being numerous, were able to overwhelm the handful of lightarmed opponents set against them and take possession of surrounding high ground and rooftops. They then used this advantage to pour a deluge of missiles down on the town's defenders. Swarmed by men and darts from either flank as well as the rear, Ischolaus and his troops were slaughtered to the last man. The Arcadians pushed on and descended into Laconia.

  Meanwhile, the Argives climbed Mount Parnon through the pass above Tegeatis, where they met a garrison in that entry as well (Diodorus 15.54.2). Alexander of Sparta held this outpost with a complement that might have counted around 1,000 hoplites if it was on a par with Oeum. These apparently also included a group of exiles, this time from Boeotia. We have no details on how the action played out here, but the Argives broke through, killing the Spartan officer and some 200 of his men including all of the Boeotians. Possibly Alexander and the latter had stood on the right wing of an array that was penetrated by much deeper files to send the rest of their formation into flight, with a hard pursuit then running the body count up to a hefty 20 percent. The Argives now moved down the mountain to join the Arcadians and Eleans (who'd traveled with the horsemen via a gentler route) to link up with the Theban column at Caryae. This combined force then marched south on course for the Spartan capital.

  The Thebans and their allies arrived on the east side of the Eurotas River across from the Spartans' un-walled city and began to spoil the neighborhood. Spartan hoplites held post at high points and narrow places along their side of the river in relatively small numbers. Shorn of allies and the perioeci for the moment, they probably counted 2,500 citizens of all classes between the ages of 20 and 50 plus another 600 or so older men and youths. There were also 400 remaining Tegean exiles, 200 Boeotian refugees and some light-armed support in the form of the mercenaries from Agesilaos' recent expedition that had remained on the payroll. Given such limited strength, it would have been tactical folly of the highest order for the Spartans to chance an open battle, since that would pit them against a foe with better than four times as many spearmen and all of prime age. Instead, Agesilaos kept his troops within strong positions that acted as significant force multipliers in discouraging any attempt to storm them. He was also able to call upon 6,000 helots, who took up arms in return for a promise of freedom. Some 1,000 of these (Diodorus 15.65.6) must have been outfitted as hoplites while the rest formed a corps of light-armed auxiliaries, though Plutarch claimed that many of the latter ultimately deserted (Vol. II Agesilaos, 63).

  Avoiding a potentially costly assault on the Spartan defenses, the invaders ranged about and plundered the countryside for several days before moving to ford the Eurotas at Amyclae. This led to a clash which the descriptions of Diodorus (15.65.2), Polyaenus (2.1.27) and Frontinus (1.10.3) combine to paint as a major hoplite action. It seems that the choice of this crossing site was prompted by deception on the part of Agesilaos, who openly displayed a very weak guard there and had these men run away when Epaminondas and his van moved into the stream. The Theban procedure seems to have been to send the heavy elements from the Boeotian and Arcadian brigades across first to set up a beachhead that would then cover passage by the rest of the army. The river was running high, fast and cold in this winter season and proved difficult to wade. Waiting on the other side, Agesilaos sprang from cover to catch his foes by surprise as they emerged from the water in some disorder. His phalanx boasted around 4,700 hoplites (including citizen regulars and reserves, Tegean and Boeotian exiles and helots) along with a strong screen of light footmen off its flanks. The attack closed against maybe 13,000 spearmen under Epaminondas, bringing the 4,000 Thebans that spearheaded the crossing into action first. Fortunately for these veterans, they were well-trained and must have quickly shuffled according to their standard drill into an array filed eight-deep. Advancing that they might cover for their comrades still emerging from the river, they then moved out to engage the fast closing enemy.

  Sparta's formation seems to have been the more coherent one as the battle opened, which is understandable given the opposition's initial disarray and short preparation time, and it badly bloodied the Thebans early on in what Diodorus called a "heavy slaughter." Doubtless this claim is somewhat hyperbolic (it isn't repeated in Polyaenus or Frontinus); nonetheless, the invading spearmen took significant damage before their Arcadian and remaining Boeotian companions in the rear could organize and move up to join the fight. These fresh troops were then able to turn the action in Epaminondas' favor, extending his line off either flank to slowly begin encircling both ends of the Spartan front. Agesilaos must have called upon elite troops in his forward ranks and heady old-age reservists at the back to lead the way in now reversing his phalanx's heading (for a description of the disengagement procedure involved see the battle of Chaeronea in 338) and execute a withdrawal. Discouraged from pursuit by his foe's superior light-armed forces, Epaminondas held the battlefield for a technical victory; all the same, Polyaenus said that he'd lost 600 men, nearly 5 percent of those that had crossed the Eurotas. The Spartans' casualties are unreported, but were probably no more than half or less of those they inflicted.

  Sparta's Peloponnesian allies were now beginning to arrive and soon had gathered to the number of 4,000 hoplites, and a column was on the way from Athens under Iphicrates as well. In contrast, the army of Epaminondas was shrinking as his local partners broke off for the rest of the winter. With supplies running short and opposing forces having grown to around 8,500 spearmen to rival his own manpower, the Theban elected to leave Laconia. Yet he didn't go back to Boeotia straight away. He instead helped the Messenians found the city of Megalopolis (around which they would federate) and left it with a garrison. When Epaminondas finally did head for home in early spring 369, he thus left behind budding unions in both Messenia and Arcadia as powerful hedges against the prospects for a Spartan recovery.

  Corinth and Sicyon Plain (369 B.c.)

  Epaminondas' return to Thebes proved brief. Within months he was again marching an army to aid the Arcadians, Argives and Eleans in resuming their war on Sparta. The Spartans and Athenians had in the interim put forces in place across the Isthmus of Corinth, strengthening their positions with earthen and stake field works in hopes of blocking entry into the Peloponnese. Chabrias of Athens had command of some 10,000 men for this task (Diodorus 15.68.1), drawing them from his own polls as well as Megara, Pellene and Corinth. These probably represented 8,000 hoplites backed by 2,000 peltasts and horsemen. The Spartans had joined him with an equal force that was similar in its mix of arms, bringing all the men that had been gathered in Laconia that spring prior to the Theban withdrawal save f
or the old age/youth citizen reservists. With only 7,000 spearmen and 600 in cavalry plus a likely 2,000 or so foot skirmishes, Epaminondas was therefore facing more than twice his number; however, he saw opportunity in his foes being spread thinly over a fairly broad line of separate outposts. He scouted these and determined that one manned by a mixed contingent from Sparta and Pellene was weakest. Timing his approach to arrive just at dawn when the enemy would be changing watches and least alert, he launched a concentrated assault. The defenders were taken unaware and abandoned their post to make a stand on a nearby hill. They then departed under a truce as the Thebans passed through to join their allies.

  Epaminondas now carried out a series of raids against poleis allied to Sparta. In addition to Phlius, these included Pellene and Sicyon, with the campaign being so successful as to bring the latter across into the Theban camp. He also invaded the territory of Epidaurus to the southeast. It was during the return from this foray when a small action took place as his column passed just to the southwest of Corinth. A party of peltasts (perhaps around 800 mercenaries) under Chabrias charged from a gate and attacked the Sacred Band, which had separated from the rest of the army to march very close to the city wall in a foolhardy display of distain for their foes. As the Thebans set up in phalanx to meet the emerging threat, their opponents got atop nearby burial monuments and hurled javelins to deadly effect from these elevated positions, killing "a very considerable number" (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.19) of the hoplites. Lacking lightarmed support of their own, the Thebans were unable to retaliate and fled when Chabrias and his men descended to swarm them on open ground. The peltasts pursued for a fair distance before returning to set up a trophy and carry away the enemy dead. The victors gave back the corpses later under a truce that the Thebans requested in formal acknowledgment of their defeat.

  Despite this set back, Epaminondas' operations inflicted significant damage; however, Dionysius of Syracuse had thrown in on the Spartans' side and now sent them reinforcements. These sailed on more than 20 triremes (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.20) that included transport conversions, landing some 2,000 foot soldiers (Diodorus 15.70.1) while a horse-carrier provided 50 riders and their mounts. These troops were mostly Iberian and Celtic shock fighters carrying swords and equipped predominantly with large shields. The Spaniards (and some of the Celts as well) would also have had throwing spears to provide longer-distance strike potential, and inclusion of cavalry indicates a balanced mix that might also have had some light footmen (maybe 25 percent of the infantry). These last would have been Iberian caetrati very similar to Grecian peltasts. Dionysius' horsemen, despite their paltry number, proved a great nuisance to the Thebans with general harassment. They also probably contributed greatly along the flank of an engagement at Sicyon. The Sicilian's men claimed a triumph there, besting what was probably a similarly sized force of local hoplites (per the city's contingent at Nemea River in 394). Perhaps turning a flank to break up an otherwise superior front of overlapping aspides, they killed 70 of the Greek spearmen. At around 5 percent, this would have been very typical losses for a beaten phalanx of 1,500 hoplites.

  Epaminondas returned to Thebes at summer's end having managed to bloody his foes, yet not able to report a telling blow. Back in Sparta, the hired men from Sicily went home as well, but other foreign help arrived with a delegation from the Persian king Artaxerxes. Philiscus from Abydos led this effort with intent to broker peace between the warring Greek factions. When this unsurprisingly failed to materialize, he provided funds and helped the Spartans gather a force of 2,000 select mercenaries before returning to Asia.

  Phlius Crossing, the Tearless Battle (Malec) and Pherae Road (368 B.c.)

  The Thebans replaced Epaminondas as army commander after his political rivals successfully advertised the results of his last effort as disappointing. And being then distracted by events in Thessaly, they spared the Peloponnese an invasion in 368. Still, the war there continued as the Arcadians and Argives marched again into Phliasian territory. This time, however, the defenders didn't wait for their foes to reach town; moving out to meet the invaders' vanguard as it crossed a river, the city cavalry attacked in the company of Athenian horsemen and support from a picked unit of hoplites (Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.10). The troops caught across the river took a beating and were forced to retire onto high ground for fear of mounted envelopment. They spent the rest of the day there as the horsemen continued to harass even as they kept their comrades from crossing to their aid. This was undoubtedly a small action, involving no more than 300-600 spearmen in the elite lochos from Phlius, while the leading Arcadian and Argive elements are unlikely to have been more than twice that else they probably would have been able to push the Phliasians aside horsemen or not. Pulling back at nightfall, the locals and Athenians retired behind the city walls and had no problem in fending off any subsequent attempts on those stout ramparts.

  Meanwhile, the Spartans, taking advantage of their relief from the predations of Epaminondas, were now able to assume a more aggressive stance. The result would be an engagement that forever became part of their lore. This happened when Archidamus (who'd succeeded his elderly sire in command of the polls' army) set out to reclaim Caryae at summer's end. His forces included not only Sparta's citizen hoplites (around 2,500) and maybe 600-700 light-armed men, but also a fresh contingent from Dionysius. The latter might have numbered 1,500 heavy infantry and 500 light plus 50 in cavalry if the tyrant's second sending had matched the first. Taking Caryae, Archidamus shifted next into the Arcadian-Messenian frontier region. He ravaged the countryside there for some time, but upon arrival of a relief force from Arcadia and Argos retired onto a strong position in the hills above an otherwise unknown location called Malea. After a time, the commander of the mercenaries, Cissidas, announced that his men's term of employment was up and they would be departing. He and his troops then headed for Laconia to take ship: however, they found their path blocked at a narrow pass by a force of Messenians. Cissidas was apparently unsure of the opposition's strength and followed a prudent course of sending back for help. But just as Archidamus was coming to his assistance, the Arcadians and Argives suddenly appeared. Their manpower is speculative, but might have included the standing army of Arcadia (5,000 hoplites) and some 2,000 spearmen from Argos (like those later joining the eparitoi in Elis). Typical light support would have been 1,500 in foot skirmishers and 300-400 horsemen.

  This convergence of forces led to a battle at a road junction where a broadening of the valley allowed for wide deployment. Archidamus had 4,000 in heavy footmen, with Spartan hoplites occupying his right wing, Iberians likely standing in the middle and Celts on the far left with the light forces arrayed off the flanks. Across the way, the Arcadians would have formed the right wing and center of their formation and set the spearmen from Argos to hold the left end with their light troops outboard either side. The Spartans undoubtedly stood four shields deep against opponents in files of eight, while the foreign heavy footmen adjusted per their own customs to create fronts of near equal length. What followed (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.30-32) seems to have been a classic example of Spartan reputation and demeanor so cowing a foe that they gave way almost without a fight. As the enthusiastic Spartans drew near in their intimidating slow march to pipes, most of the Argives panicked (perhaps still aligning and unready to fight), with those at the rear leading the way in a rush from the field. This left no more than a few brave souls standing their ground to be speared down by the advancing, crimson-clad steamroller. The rest of the enemy array was immediately caught up in the collapse on its left wing and soon joined the mob streaming rearward. Giving chase, Archidamus' allied cavalry and light footmen cut down many of the fleeing men, as did the Celts whose lighter gear allowed good speed.

  In light of an ardent pursuit by the Spartans' allies, casualties in this engagement must have run very high among the losers. Xenophon reported "vast numbers" of their slain and we might estimate this at a crippling 20-30 percent. (We can discount he
re as hyperbole the claim by Diodorus [15.72.31 that 10,000 Arcadians lost their lives. This is probably a reference to the "Ten Thousand," which was the ruling assembly of the Arcadian League. Indeed, this title itself was probably exaggerated, being at best a nominal accounting of total hoplite residency in the region.) Such a cost was in strong contrast to that on the other side, where not a single Spartan had fallen. As a result, there was no need to grieve in Sparta and this victory came to be known most popularly as the "Tearless Battle."

  Back in Thebes, the focus in 368 was on Thessaly and Macedonia to the north. The Macedonian king, Alexander II, had been assassinated by his brother-in-law, Ptolemy, who then claimed the throne. Pelopidas, having in the past conducted missions to Macedonia, set out to convince this new king that he should continue his predecessor's alliance with Thebes. But the Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherae captured and imprisoned Pelopidas and a companion in route. Incensed at this, the Thebans dispatched (per Diodorus 15.71.3) 8,000 hoplites (probably including at least 1,000 mercenaries provided by Thessalian foes of Alexander, who initially aided the expedition) and 600 horsemen to get their man back. Alexander sent for help from Athens and got 1,000 mercenaries under Autocles, marshalling these with his own forces (possibly 10,000 hired hoplites and 6,000 horsemen if Xenophon's claim is to be trusted [Hellenica 6.1.8], though this is probably overstated) in preparation for a pitched battle. However, after marching to the gates of Pherae, the Boeotian commanders saw their Thessalian support evaporate and elected to retreat.

  A large body of Alexander's cavalry came up to assault the rear of the Theban column as it moved down the road from Pherae, flinging clouds of javelins to wound and kill some of the hoplites. The heavy-armed spearmen were not only too slow to catch and engage the attacking riders, but their same lack of speed also made it impossible to escape. In the distress of the moment, the Thebans turned to Epaminondas (who was serving in their ranks as a private soldier after his recent removal from office), electing him general again on the spot. He quickly set about trying to extricate the army from its predicament. He succeeded by organizing his own cavalry and light infantry into a trailing screen that could counterattack and then safely retire as needed behind a rearward facing phalanx of hoplites. Fighting off charge after charge and withdrawing by stages, the Boeotians could thus cut their losses while handing out some damage in return. In the end, the Thessalians gave up and Epaminondas was able to lead his Boeotians home without further difficulty. And though this expedition was a failure, Epaminondas would continue to threaten Alexander and the tyrant eventually released Pelopidas and his companion unharmed.