Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  This took place per Diodorus (15.93.4-5) and Plutarch (Vol. II Agesilaos, 69) after Agesilaos and his men found themselves caught by the Persians in a fortified town. Noting that the enemy's encircling wall and ditch weren't yet complete, the Spartan put his men into a broad column and charged out under cover of night to force his way through the gap in the Persian lines and escape. His foes marshaled their forces the next day and set off in pursuit. However, Agesilaos maneuvered about until he had them following up a narrow route between two canals. He then turned around, formed up his phalanx and advanced to the attack. Caught between the waterfilled barriers on either side, the kardakes (perhaps two baivaraba) couldn't use their greater manpower to envelop the Greeks' flanks and had to endure a head-on fight against superior heavy infantry. As Grecian hoplites had done so many times in the past, Agesilaos and his troops broke through the Asian front-fighters and then routed their light-equipped after-ranks in short order to send the entire opposition force into flight with severe losses (likely in the 10-15 percent range) at very little cost to themselves. The geriatric Spartan king thus managed to complete a successful tour in Egypt, but would pass away from natural causes on the way home.

  Tactical Discussion: 385-360 B. C.

  Theban tactics at Leuctra (371) are far and away the most oft cited example of military revolution in this period. The winning approach to that battle had four prominent elements: (1) exceptionally deep files; (2) concentration of elite manpower on the left wing; (3) refusing of the right wing; and (4) probable semi-detachment of a select unit (the Sacred Band) to counter an enemy attempt at envelopment. In fact, use of exceptional file depths by Theban armies was nothing new, since the tactic dated back at least to 424 at Delium (Thucydides 4.93.4). This practice is noted again in our sources at Nemea River in 394, where the Thebans violated pre-battle planning by stacking well in excess of the agreed upon 16 shields (Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18). It's thus quite possible that similar alignment was a factor in Theban victories at Thespiae and Tanagra III (both 378); what we know for sure is that this method was used with great success in 375 at Tegyra. As for concentration of effort on the left wing rather than the more traditional right, our sources for Thespiae, Tanagra III and, especially, Tegyra can be taken to suggest that this could have been the case in those engagements, but they are not explicit. However, at least one such deployment is attested prior to Leuctra, and Theban troops were on the scene to observe it. (It's likely, in fact, that the Thebans commanding at Leuctra [Epaminondas and Pelopidas] were present as hoplites.) This was in 382 at Olynthus I, where Sparta's Teleutias concentrated his best troops on the left.

  Deliberate refusal of the right wing appears to have been something new, perhaps addressing a weaknesses exposed at Olynthus I. The Thebans there probably held the right end of the line and nearly fell to the enemy before victory was achieved on the other wing. Tegyra had proven that you could win a battle without committing your off-wing to combat (or, indeed, even having an off-wing), suggesting that one good way to avoid losing a fight on that side of the field was simply to never engage. As for detachment of the Sacred Band elites (if they did indeed maneuver to extend their army's attack wing and head off a Spartan cyclosis maneuver), this certainly resembled what Cleandridas did c. 433. That Spartan was commanding at Thuria in Italy against Lucanian tribesmen and hid a picked unit behind his phalanx (likely in back of the left wing). Wheeling it out at the last minute, he frustrated an enemy envelopment to carry out one of his own (Polyaenus 2.10.4; Frontinus 2.3.12). Overall, Leuctra was a clever mixing of a little that was new and a lot that was old, making it best considered a case of evolutionary experimentation rather than a revolutionary advance.

  This era saw greater and more aggressive use of cavalry by the Greeks. While there was not a single case of Grecian mounted troops being decisive elements in actions from 400 through 383, there were eight examples (22 percent of all engagements) between 382 and 362. Whether Greeks deployed overland or by ship (as to Pyrgi in 384), much greater attention was paid to taking an adequate force of horsemen along. And the use of cavalry in battle was becoming more sophisticated as well, with horsemen maneuvering behind cover (Olynthus I) and from reserve (Mantinea 11 in 362) and providing thinly arrayed frontal screens (Tegyra and Leuctra).

  Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes are the best known military stars of this time by a wide margin, leading their polls to its brief interval of hegemony over most of Greece. It's impossible to tell whether one or the other of these men was the prime source responsible for any particular item among their army's successful tactical adoptions, adaptations and innovations. Maybe these were all largely products of mutual collaboration. What we can say is that most of what they did was drawn from past traditions (as per the discussion above on Leuctra), yet was brilliant all the same. Nevertheless, this famed pair probably had less impact on future tactical practices than Iphicrates of Athens. While the Thebans' methods largely fell out of favor after their deaths, Iphicrates' necessity-driven invention of the "Iphicratean pikeman" in the late 370s for the short-lived Egyptian campaign would inspire a major step in the evolution of Greek heavy infantry, sending it down a new path that other great generals would both follow and help blaze for the next two hundred years.

  Greece was now a land deeply divided and without a dominant power among its competing city-states. Sparta was badly hurt, having lost all hope of regaining its former influence and struggling just to hold onto a corner of the Peloponnese. Thebes was still strong, but any prospect for establishing a farther flung hegemony had died along with Pelopidas and Epaminondas. It was, in fact, Athens which had prospered most, rebuilding its maritime league to become best situated of the major poleis. Still, even the Athenians were weak by past standards. Strained finances along with a decade and a half of continual bickering and fighting had gone far to wear them down. Fortunately for Greece, the Persians were in just as bad a shape, with all of their own internal disorders killing any enthusiasm for reaching into Europe as they had done in the previous century. However, a threat to Greek freedom more serious than any before was about to arise from a most unexpected source.

  Rise of Macedonia; Sacred, Persian and Sicilian Wars; Conquest of Greece (359-336 B.C.)

  "Freedom ... do you not see that Philip's very titles are irreconcilable with that? For every king, every despot is the sworn foe of freedom and of law. Beware ... lest, seeking to be rid of war, you find a master."

  Demosthenes (Second Philippic, 25)

  Macedonia sat at the northern fringe of the Greek world, forever fighting an array of barbarian invaders for its very survival. This near constant state of peril served to push its people into accepting a hereditary line of warlord kings. Marshaling all of the land's wealth and arms, they were responsible for both the borders and internal peace. This proved a very hit and miss proposition, with Macedonian fortunes shifting along with the quality of each monarch. So things stood in early 359, when the current ruler, Perdiccas III, took on the Dardanians of Illyria along his western frontier. In a grand action that might have featured 10,000 fighting on either side, the barbarians killed Perdiccas and also took out 4,000 others, including both actual casualties and manpower lost from areas now under Illyrian control. The Macedonians were in the direst of straits, but luck was with them. An untested new king would quickly turn things around and lead them on to unprecedented heights.

  Macedonia Reborn

  It was Philip II, younger brother of Perdiccas, who came forward during the crisis of 359; acting at first as regent for an underage nephew, he soon claimed the throne for himself. Only 24 years old, Philip was literally facing danger from every quarter. Not only had his western provinces fallen, but Paeonian tribes to the north were threatening as well. And of even greater concern to his personal safety, other aspirants to the kingship had sponsors to the east in Thrace and to the south at Athens, the most powerful Greek state of the day. With barely time to secure his position (slaying or driving away a
trio of half-brothers and gaining recognition from the aristocracy), Philip gathered what remained of the national army to his seat at Pella. He then set out to meet the most immediate menace: the pretender Argaios, who had once challenged his father and now sought to seize power with help from mercenary hoplites in Athenian pay.

  Methone (359 B.c.)

  Macedonia's army was based upon tribal groups spread across a number of geographic districts. Each territorial division yielded an allotment of men, who then served under their own nobles. Suffering from a crippling combination of casualties and the loss of upland levies, Philip could probably gather only some 6,000 foot soldiers and 400 horsemen; yet, small as this force might appear, quality rather than quantity was actually his most pressing concern.

  The lowlanders that made up Philip's infantry were unsuited to shock combat. Many carried pelte and javelins for fighting in open order from a distance, while those that had spear and shield lacked both experience and any significant tradition as close-order fighters, at best having been recently organized into some semblance of rank and file by Philip's brother (Alexander II) prior to assassination (Bosworth 2010, 98-99). Philip knew that these men would have no chance leading a pitched battle against the sort of phalanx that Argaios could deploy with a cadre of 3,000 hired hoplites. They probably couldn't even buy enough time to allow his cavalry to be decisive on the flanks. Though Argaios wasn't rich in light arms, he might have fielded at least 1,000 skirmishers and riders - more than enough to delay a decision and allow his heavy footmen to carry the day in the center of the field. Mindful of all this, Philip wisely eschewed conventional engagement in favor of a surprise attack.

  Argaios had sailed aboard an Athenian fleet, which landed at Methone, a Greek city at the head of the Thermaic Gulf and allied to Athens. He had then marched his hired men some 28km inland through ridge country to Aegae (Vergina), the old capital of Macedonia. But an attempt to recruit local support there proved fruitless and Argaios headed back toward Methone to consult the senior Athenian on hand, the general Mantias, who had stayed aboard ship. Alerted to these moves, Philip hastened his forces across the 40km between Pella and Aegae and slipped undetected into the hills. He rapidly skirted Argaios' path and (as suggested by Justin [7.6.61 and Diodorus [16.3.61) got into position for an ambush within the pass to the coast.

  Argaios' column moved through the uplands strung out along a narrow track that let his men align just a few abreast. This put the cavalry and some light infantry in the lead, followed by the hoplites and with the remaining foot skirmishers bringing up the rear. This procession made it about halfway to Methone (Hammond 1995, 25) before falling into Philip's trap. The king's troops charged from hiding, hurling their missiles as they poured down to surround Argaios and his men. Taken unprepared, the pretender's van and rear guards disintegrated amid a riot of panic and confusion. The mercenary spearmen, however, proved to be of sterner stuff. Caught out of formation, they somehow drew together and battled their way onto a nearby hill, taking heavy casualties in the process (perhaps 30 percent, including 5-10 percent killed or fatally wounded). Once on high ground, these veteran fighters circled to fend off further attacks.

  The tactical situation was a stand-off. Philip didn't have the shock fighting capability to drive these spearmen from their high ground, while they in turn lacked mobility for either a counter strike or escape. The strategic state of affairs, on the other hand, was clearly in the young monarch's favor. All he had to do was sit pat while his foes weakened. But Philip was keenly aware that time spent on such a siege might boost his risks elsewhere; he therefore elected to negotiate. The mercenaries quickly agreed to put Argaios and his fellow exiles into Philip's hands in return for an uncontested withdrawal. The Macedonian leader then applied similar diplomacy to his other problems, signing a treaty with the Athenians and buying off the threats from Thrace and Paeonia. Though these fixes were no more than temporary, they let him settle in at Pella to upgrade his army that winter.

  Reforms of 359/58 B.C.

  Philip's transformation of Macedonia's military was an exercise in mixing and matching the best martial practices from Greece with unique indigenous virtues. As it turned out, this enterprise also benefited greatly from fortuitous timing that allowed incorporation of important new developments from Asia Minor.

  Philip had gained respect for heavy infantry during a hostage stay in Thebes as a teen (probably 368-365). He saw how that polls' hoplites could descend from one side of their phalanx and turn a flank to secure the entire battlefield. Ability to carry a fight from a single wing meant that the rest of their array need only stand on the defensive as shown at Leuctra (371) by Epaminondas, the most outstanding Greek tactician of the day and friend to Philip's Theban host, Pammenes (Plutarch vol. I Pelopidas, 401). Philip was now determined to create an infantry juggernaut that could take a similar approach. Moreover, though Epaminondas had employed light riders effectively enough as a screen for his spearmen, Philip, who had grown up a horseman and was well aware of the latest mounted techniques from neighboring Thessaly (Sekunda and Warry 1998, 9), sought to go the Theban one better. Rather than confine his own heavier cavalrymen to a supporting role, he would have them take direct part in enveloping attacks. Not only could they thus add combat strength, but their speed might well allow him to turn a targeted flank faster than he could with foot troops alone.

  The first barrier that Philip faced in reforming his army was Macedonia's shortage of good heavy infantry. This fundamental weakness had denied him the option to engage his hoplite opponents at Methone in open battle despite having superior cavalry and a significant edge in raw manpower. Yet, there seemed little that he could do about it in the short term. It would take a long time to raise, equip and train enough locals to upgrade his heavy foot troops, while there wasn't the money in his treasury to just go out and hire foreign spearmen in sufficient number. But as luck would have it, events in Asia at this moment provided the very resources he needed.

  As we've seen, Iphicrates of Athens had prepared a mercenary force for a Persian campaign into Egypt by outfitting enough Greek skirmishers with long spears (called sarissai, sarissa singular, in Macedonia) and small shields to provide a somewhat shock-capable contingent for the left, defensive wing of his phalanx. These pikemen and their hoplite companions had then most likely joined in the satrapal uprisings of the 360s - especially that of Datames, their former Persian commander. But this work came to an end with surrenders to the Great King in 360 and assassination of Datames the next year. Many from Iphicrates' legion must thus have been on their way home by late 359. There's no sign that these men ever influenced the armies of Greece proper during the 4th century (Stylianou 1998, 342 -346); still, similarities between their methods and aspects of Philip's reforms can hardly be a coincidence. At minimum, he copied much of their approach; however, there's a distinct possibility of an even closer tie. The timing of their unemployment plus proximity would have made it ideal for the young king to recruit a few Iphicrateans at a price within his means. And he was assuredly already familiar with what they could do. Iphicrates had served in Thrace after Egypt and there took in Philip along with his mother and older brother (Nepos 11.3.2), protecting them after the death of Alexander II in early 368. The Athenian was formally welcomed into the Macedonian royal family as a reward for this timely assistance. Already a keen student of the military arts, Philip would surely have discussed the Egyptian campaign and its new breed of pike-armed soldiers with his adopted brother at considerable length. He must then have fairly leapt when the opportunity later arose to gain some of these fighters as models for restructuring his own army.

  Leading Philip's fresh national levies was a regiment of hoplites to provide more manpower for the offensive wing of his battle line. Philip might have had a small bodyguard of spearmen as early as 364 (Parke 1933, 156-157); if so, these would have provided a core for the new heavyarmed force. Possibly using the title for his guards, he called the select local hoplit
es pezhetairoi or "foot-companions" (Heckel 2002, 24). This denoted an elevated status much as for his guard cavalry (the hetairoi or "companions"). Under Philip's son Alexander III, these spearmen were called hypaspistai-hypaspists or "shield-carriers." As a practical matter, it's useful to apply this terminology from the beginning. This is due to Macedonia's Iphicratean-style pikemen being better known today by the title of "pezhetairoi." It seems that the rest of the phalanx adopted the old honorific after it was dropped by the hoplites (Heckel and Jones 2006, 31; Bosworth 2010, 98-99). Like their mercenary counterparts, the hypaspists wore a helmet, cuirass and greaves while carrying a dory thrusting spear and aspis.

  The green Macedonians must have received instruction from their professional compatriots. They also no doubt found inspiration on the field from those same savvy warriors, who deployed alongside and were perhaps seeded within their ranks as well. This was a vital component of Philip's success in rapidly creating an effective new army. Indeed, a shortage of just such assistance might have contributed to what seems to have been poor results of any attempt at an upgrade by his brother as well as failure of a possible try at something similar even earlier. Arrhabaeus, warlord of Upper Macedonian Lyncestis and Philip's maternal great-grandfather, had fielded a formation of heavy spearmen in 423. Thucydides specifically identified these troops as "Lyncestian hoplites" (4.124.3) and Arrhabaeus lacked both ready access to Greek mercenary spearmen and probable funds to maintain a sizeable company of hirelings for any extended period; therefore, this heavy corps most likely comprised native skirmishers outfitted anew with thrusting spears and large shields (possibly derived from Illyrian gear already near to hand). Probably in operation for a period of at least two years, these tyro hoplites seem to have lacked the sort of adequate role models and intense training that Philip was now providing and fell quick prey to a Spartan-led phalanx.