Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  It's important to confirm the nature of the hypaspists, since this is essential to understanding just how the early Macedonian phalanx really worked. There has been quite a bit of controversy on this issue, with hypaspists having been described variously as either lightly armored peltasts, chosen pikemen or possibly some manner of hybrid warrior. However, though nothing is certain, there are several lines of evidence strongly supporting the idea that they were traditional hoplites.

  The first clues about the true nature of the hypaspists come from literary sources. While it's not particularly instructive that all Macedonian phalanx fighters were at times generalized as "hoplitai" (simply "heavy infantrymen" in this case), it's of greater value that the title "hypaspistai" likely refers to their bearing hoplite shields. We are probably dealing here with specific terminology from Alexander's day being repeated by authors of the Hellenistic period, who themselves otherwise used the word "aspis" more broadly. A very strong suggestion that this is so comes in a passage from Arrian (1.1.9), which describes hypaspists plying their aspides in an overlapping fashion possible only for large devices that spanned a full body-width, like the traditional hoplite shield. Likewise, we read of hypaspists extending their shields over a wounded companion; an act that also called for an instrument with size sufficient to cover the entire torso. Men giving this sort of aid carried the label hyperaspizantes (Heckel and Jones 2006, 18) in yet another explicit allusion to the aspis. Lastly, Heckel and Jones point out (2006, 41) that hypaspists "are often referred to, loosely, as doryphoroi ('spear-bearers')." Relating perhaps to a role as bodyguards, this would appear to be an express nod to their use of a dory of some sort, a weapon better suited to close personal protection than either a pikeman's sarissa or the javelin of a peltast.

  Further evidence for hypaspists as hoplites comes from ancient graphics. The "Alexander Sarcophagus," possibly a depiction of the battle of Issus in 333 (Sekunda and Chew 1992, 29 30) or Gaugamela in 331 (Heckel 2006), shows infantrymen in action alongside the Macedonian king as per the hypaspists' post next to the royal cavalry. These combatants without exception wear elements of hoplite panoply. Each man has an aspis (shown from both front and back) and "Phrygian" helm (with forward curving crown), while those not shown artistically nude sport a cuirass and some have greaves as well. In keeping with use of the aspis, they wield their onehanded weapons (unfortunately lost) in an overhead manner perfectly suited for a hoplite spear, a broken example of which can be seen near the foot of one of these apparent hypaspist figures (Sekunda 1984, 30). Likewise, the monument at Delphi celebrating Aemilius Paullus' victory at Pydna (168) shows Macedonians carrying large concave shields, perhaps a body of hypaspist elites among the contingent of "picked" men that fought to the bitter end in that engagement. One shield shown from the front covers its holder's entire upper body; and, though lacking a reinforced rim, the backside of another has the distinctive and more vital central porpax and shield-edge antilabe suspension of an aspis. Sadly, the Greeks' weapons have succumbed to erosion; yet all are single-handed and one figure is striking overhead with left leg forward consistent with the use of a dory. Anson (2010, 81-82) cites four more depictions of Macedonian hoplites and/or their equipment: warriors with Macedonian helms holding hoplite spears and shields shown in a painting from the "Agios Athanasios" tomb at Thessaloniki; a hoplite aspis displayed on the facade of the early Hellenistic "Tomb of Judgment" in Lefkadhia; hoplite shields appearing on the Macedonian "Shield Monument" at Beroea; and an aspis (with the device "AE") stamped upon on a Macedonian coin dated 325-300 B.c. All of these pictorial displays indicate that native hoplites were standard within the Macedonian military, and hypaspists are by far the most likely troop type with which they can be identified.

  Backing up the literary and graphic data are archeological finds. Among these is a sauroter from a late 4th century dory (Heckel and Jones 2006, 18, 20). This slender and simple bronze attachment for a hoplite spear differs significantly from the larger, heavier and more complexly shaped iron butt-spikes of sarissai. Nor does it match the tail-spikes/counter-weights of contemporary cavalry lances. Tellingly, this relic carries the inscription "MAK," marking it as being of Macedonian state manufacture and, thus, standard issue for hypaspists (given that other state-supplied troops - pikemen and horsemen - didn't use this particular tool). Other relevant finds of hoplite gear come from the royal tombs at Vergina (Head 1982, 106-107). These include a dory head and highly decorated aspis, both associated with greaves thought to have accommodated the limp of Philip II (see Worthington [2008, 234-241] for counters to contrary claims). The king must have worn these items when he stood among his similarly equipped guard of royal hypaspists.

  The final argument on the hypaspists concerns their function in the line of battle. Comprising the maneuverable, offensive wing, they had to be more mobile than the rest of the heavy formation and we see historical praise for their agility. At the same time, Arrian identified them as the phalanx's prime "shock troops" (per-Selincourt's translation [3.11.9]), marking them as Alexander's most capable hand-to-hand fighters. This called for a repertoire of capabilities best matching those of select hoplites. In fact, by having the hypaspists and mercenary spearmen press an othismos-assisted shock attack on one end of the field while his pikemen used their lengthy weapons to avoid shield-on-shield contact along the rest of the front, Philip created the same sort of "oblique order" that had worked so well for Epaminondas. Only he did so in a much simpler and more effective fashion. Unlike the Theban's method of refusal, which awkwardly restricted advance to a single wing and depended upon cooperative enemy passivity across most of the field, Philip's men could all close in lock-step without concern for how the opposition might react. The totality of information we have from every source therefore lends much credence to Hans Delbruck's long ago conclusion that the corps of hypaspists "was armed entirely in the manner of the old hoplites" (1990, 179).

  Elsewhere among his line troops, Philip used similar mercenary-based equipment adoption and training to create a force of local Macedonian pikemen or "phalangites" (phalanx men). Established in even greater numbers than their hoplite comrades, these less costly soldiers and their hired prototypes would actually provide the bulk of his array, making up its defensive center and left. Like the hypaspists, these troops wore a Phrygian helmet. Commonly painted blue, this distinctive bit of oriental-style headwear reflects the Asian roots of Philip's reforms.

  Along with the hypaspist as hoplite, the other concept vital to understanding how Philip's infantry functioned in his original version of the Macedonian phalanx is the role of the phalangite pikeman as a defensive specialist. Summarized in the earlier discussion of Iphicrates' reforms and assumed above, we can expand here on the reasoning behind this critical determination. In fact, the arguments favoring pikemen primarily being defenders mostly revolve around offensive limitations of the sarissa.

  Hoplites facing a phalangite array would have stopped at the outer limit reachable by the front rank of opposing pike points, it being physically impossible to advance any farther. At that stage, compared to what they would have had to absorb from dory-armed foes, they took much fewer strikes from the pikemen. This reflected that phalangites could attack with only their foremost rank, while traditional spearmen were able to employ at least their first two rows in hitting at an enemy front. Nor was reduction in strike frequency the only shortcoming of the sarissa in projecting force compared to the dory, as both strength and location of the blows that could be made were hampered by a required underhand grip.

  Measurements reported by Gabriel and Metz (1991, 85) and elaborated upon by Schwartz (2009, 80) show that spear strikes delivered underhand are much less forceful than those directed overhand: 18 Nm (Newton-meters) versus 96 Nm. (Note that these numbers are for spears, not sarissai having greater mass. But a heavier pike would have been jabbed at lower velocity. Since mass acts as a single multiplier in calculating force while velocity multiplies as a square, these figures rem
ain informative and, if anything, might actually overstate the relative strength of a sarissa blow.) Thus, with fewer and weaker strikes, a phalangite array must have imparted considerably less force of weaponry than a dory-armed phalanx. And its inability to apply the sort of othismos push available to an aspis-equipped formation then served to further compound this shortcoming. Finally, men dueling along the front of a pike phalanx could not land blows where they would count the most. This was due in part to an inability to engage targets other than those directly ahead because "the angle of the leveled sarissa cannot be changed by more than about five or ten degrees, if that" (Heckel et al 2010, 105). Worse yet, thrusting on low denied strikes at the more vulnerable areas exposed above or just behind the top of the aspis of even an immediately opposite hoplite foe. As Gabriel and Boose note: "Unless the soldier was fortunate to land a blow directly to the face, under the chin, or in the space between the neck and chest armor, the spear was not likely to be a terribly lethal weapon in phalanx combat, at least as long as one's opponent stood his ground" (1994, 21).

  Add the foregoing to flexibility restrictions common to a sarissa array (even compared to the traditional phalanx, which wasn't very agile itself) and you get quite a low attack capability against a formation of hoplites. Yet, it was a very different story when it came to defense. Unless a spearman could cut past the intervening layers of pike points (a task ever harder to do as sarissai grew in length over the years) then he could project no offensive force himself. Thus, simple analysis of the faults and strengths of Philip's pikemen inevitably leads one to conclude that their intended role in fixed battle was to prevent (or at least delay) close contact with facing foes toward giving other components of their army time to win the day.

  In contrast to what was required to upgrade his native infantry, Philip had no reason to make great changes among his crack corps of heavy cavalry - the hetairoi. These were outstanding riders, who had slightly sturdier mounts than the Grecian norm (Head 1982, 172-173). Their gear included a helmet (painted white like those of Epaminondas' horsemen), cuirass and long lance (xyston) -all designed for shock combat. A sole focus on fighting in this way was critical to Phillip's plans for his cavalry and unique among the Greeks, though the techniques must have sprung in the beginning from methods widely employed for spearing game from saddleback.

  Methodology with the xyston probably evolved over time. Maybe less than 3m long, prototypical versions of the weapon were likely employed for the most part in an over-hand fashion just like hunting weapons of similar proportions. This allowed for more forceful strikes and gave a broad radius of reach by preventing the torso of one's own mount from getting in the way. An overhand style also folded the forearm back in recoil, thus protecting the bicep and presenting the smallest possible target to a facing enemy. (This contrasted with an underhand grip, which did not cover the bicep in contraction and, when fully extended, exposed the arm from shoulder to wrist.) Finally, a down-sloping lance held over-hand further shielded the arm and kept the butt-spike from accidentally damaging the horse's rear flank. Still, despite all these considerations, under-handed thrusting must have found use from the beginning as well, especially against lowlying targets. And, as efforts over time to extend its reach resulted in a xyston of greater length with a heftier counter-weight (thus allowing the grip to move back), underhand use likely became predominant.

  Beyond promoting younger nobles to replace losses, any retooling of hetairoi tactics by Philip would have been on a modest scale. It perhaps amounted to little more than practice in mass maneuvers as a way of improving formation integrity. These drills also probably put greater emphasis on wedge arrays copied from Thrace and Thessaly. Rather than the horsemen, it was undoubtedly their light-armed infantry support that actually saw the greater reform at this time.

  Their shorter ranged missiles and vulnerable mounts had always put horsemen at a disadvantage against foot skirmishers. Most armies countered this by setting screening forces in front their cavalry, and the Macedonians followed the most common practice of assigning javelinmen on foot for this task. These were nearly as mobile as mounted troops and could either cover at the rear during retreat or get out in front of a charge. The latter called for thinning out opposing skirmishers and forcing them to use up their supply of missiles. Evidence for how this was done comes from Arrian's account for Granicus River in 334 (1.16.1), where the light infantry was mixed intimately with its riders in the same superior manner that Xenophon praised for the Theban cavalry's supporting skirmishers at Mantinea II (362). In the past, each aristocratic horseman must have provided his own retainers for this duty. Philip would have recognized such a system as being amateurish and a breeding ground for inconsistency. It's probable therefore that he now moved to organize a dedicated cavalry screen, investing it with up to half of his light footmen. Trained as a team, these troops could provide a cohesive replacement for what had been a haphazard mob of individuals.

  By early 358, Philip had amassed around 10,000 infantry and 600 hetairoi (Diodorus 16.4.3). His native foot troops most likely counted 1,000 hypaspists and 3,000 phalangites (one regiment or taxis of the former and two taxeis of the latter per strengths of later years) plus 2,000 skirmishers, about all that the lowlands remaining under royal control could provide. This suggests that there were at least 4,000 mercenaries, just enough to replace Perdiccas' losses and probably matching the homegrown heavy corps at 1,000 hoplites and 3,000 pikemen. Philip had by this point also taken steps to install a better system of logistics. Engels notes (1978, 12) that he forbade the use of wagons, reduced the number of servants (one for each horseman and per file of ten foot soldiers), had his infantrymen carry their own gear and wouldn't allow women to accompany the army into the field. The result of all these changes was a leaner force capable of vastly greater operational mobility. Therefore, as winter drew to a close, Philip prepared to debut his new "Macedonian" phalanx, not knowing just how well it would work nor even dreaming of the lofty heights to which it would take him.

  Paeonia (358 B.c.)

  Philip led his army out in the spring, passing through the mountains on his northern frontier and entering Paeonia. His selection of an opponent for this campaign is instructive. The Paeonians were probably contemplating no more than border raids against Macedonia, and even such modest plans would have been in flux at the moment due to the recent death of their king. This clearly wasn't the most imminent threat on the horizon. It thus seems likely that Philip had a greater focus on further improving his military capabilities than on securing a border.

  Fashioning an effective phalanx called for more than just supply of the right equipment and time to drill. Minimum training for a phalanx fighter was, after all, reasonably modest. Sure, he had to learn a few formation maneuvers, but these often amounted to little beyond lining up and marching straight ahead. At that point, the requirement was to stand firm in the ranks and either prod (with a sarissa) or shove and jab (with aspis and spear). The whole process was not overly complex, perhaps not greatly above what a modern marching band might have to master in a few months of part-time practice. But Philip was well aware that even very basic actions become difficult under the extreme stresses of mortal combat. It took a good deal of confidence and discipline for an army to perform in such dire circumstances. Knowing that only solid victories in the field would breed and reinforce these traits, Philip was setting out to initiate a tradition of success by opening against his weakest foe.

  The Paeonians had a military much like those in nearby Thrace, relying on a mix of javelinarmed light cavalry and peltasts (Alexander the Great's storied Agrianian peltasts were closely related). Unfortunately, we have no record of Paeonias total manpower. Still, it's possible to project numbers from a report that, when finally gathered at strength in Egypt, around 600- 650 of Alexander's cavalrymen were Paeonian (Head 1982, 14). If this was no more than half the full levy (consistent with another 600 Paeonian riders arriving later in Syria and roughly in synch with
the percentage of Thessaly's mounted contribution to the same expedition), then there might have been at least 1,200 horsemen nation-wide. A heavy mobilization would have had most of these riders on hand to confront Philip's invasion. As for foot soldiers, we know that they could compose as little as 60 percent of a lowland Thracian army (Webber 2001, 35), but 80 percent is more likely for a single highland tribal group like that of the Paeonians. This implies that they might have fielded on the order of 5,000 infantrymen.

  Philip marched into Paeonia spoiling for a fight. However, his marked superiority in manpower begs the question of why the Paeonians would ever accommodate him. Surely they could have avoided a confrontation, retreating before the Macedonians and ultimately forcing them to give up and go home. Maybe this kind of passive strategy was too costly or perhaps it wasn't culturally acceptable to a warrior people. It's even possible that the new Paeonian ruler felt that he had to be aggressive in order to prove his mettle in battle and fitness to lead. Yet the answer might be simpler still: the Paeonians most likely believed that they could win.