Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Caught out of formation in premature pursuit, the hoplites from Athens were broken and scattered by the well-ordered line of shields and spear-points that now smashed into them. A thousand Athenians (10 percent) died right there and 2,000 more would surrender as Philip and his hypaspists cleared that end of the allied line and folded around to envelop the remainder of the enemy left. This triggered a pulse of panic that surged along the Greek formation toward the northeast, tearing it apart contingent by contingent as weary men sensed the fight was lost and shed shields and weapons alike to flee lest their foes cut them off from behind. On the far end of this collapse, the Thebans, already battered in their efforts against Alexander and his pikemen, saw their fellow Boeotians bolt and ran as well - all but the Sacred Band. These picked troops fought to the bitter end, battling desperately as the phalangites closed about and broke into their ranks. Taking hits from every side, they died to the last man, with 254 being buried in a single mound near where they went down. Total casualties from the allied center and left wing were probably not quite as bad as those of the Athenians due to this concentration on the Sacred Band and a shorter chase overall; still, they likely ran well above 5 percent fatalities to mark a severe beating. Thus, the day closed on Philip standing thoroughly triumphant and poised to claim mastery over all of Greece.

  Reflections on Chaeronea

  Chaeronea is where the Greek city-states lost their independence and thus stands as a counterpoint to the Persian invasion of 480-479 when Grecian arms had preserved that same freedom. It's therefore a pity that we have no involved account such as those Herodotus left behind for the key engagements of that earlier conflict. This forces us to piece together events on the battlefield from an all too short and general description in Diodorus (16.85.2-86.6) and even briefer segments scattered throughout our other sources. Any resulting reconstruction is therefore unavoidably speculative and worthy of closer examination on some important points.

  THE FALSE RETREAT • Diodorus' description of the battle gives major place to Alexander's exploits on the Macedonian left wing, placing his victory there ahead of that of Philip on the right. But this may better reflect the young hero's glorious later career than actual timing of events at Chaeronea. Chaeronea's own Plutarch, who commended the prince for breaking into the Sacred Band's ranks (vol. II Alexander, 145), made no mention of where that feat came in sequence nor (tellingly in a tract otherwise lavish in praise) claim it as decisive. And, while Justin gave no credit either way, Strabo (9.2.37) mentioned only Philip with regard to Chaeronea and Frontinus' version (2.1.9) clearly grants the determining role to the king in a prolonged and grueling engagement. Most detailed and convincing of all is the description of Polyaenus (4.2.2,7). This shows Philip wearing his foes down in a long slug fest and then withdrawing in tight order until reaching elevated ground. At that moment, "turning around, he attacked the Athenians vigorously and, fighting brilliantly, he conquered." Here, as well as in Frontinus and Justin, there are signs that Athenian lack of experience helped Philip's ploy to succeed. As it turns out, this "false retreat" maneuver is a well documented hoplite tactic of old, lending much credence to Polyaenus' tale.

  Herodotus cited several faux withdrawals at Thermopylae (480). Sparta's Leonidas and his men there "would turn their backs and feign flight all together" and, when the enemy finally caught up in disorder, they would "then suddenly turn around and face them, at which point they would slay countless numbers" (7.211). Similarly, Plato reported a dialogue between his old tutor Socrates and the general Laches (both veteran spearmen) that dealt with this tack (Laches 191 B-C). Socrates points out here that the Spartans at Plataea (479) "ran away," but when their foes broke ranks to pursue, "they turned and fought ... and so won that particular battle." It thus seems highly likely that Philip used the same trick to disrupt and rout the Greek left wing, rolling around then to break apart the entire opposing phalanx. If so, it was only when flank support collapsed on their left that the Thebans faltered and their Sacred Band then fell prey to penetration from Alexander's pikemen.

  CAVALRY ACTION • As a practical matter, anchoring of the phalanxes at Chaeronea against terrain barriers impassible for cavalry pretty much rules out any participation by Philip's horsemen along the edges of the battle. Nor did they launch an assault on the allied rear, as our sources (though they might differ on the critical wing being left or right) all insist that the decision came at the front (as per Justin 9.3.10). With regard to a direct mounted charge, Rahe makes the key point that horses will not initiate physical contact with a solid formation of infantry and says "it seems unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played a decisive role in the struggle" (1981, 87). Given that any attempt at it would be intrinsically suicidal, we can thus fully discount the idea that riders could have broken an intact allied array through a frontal attack. Moreover, even had gaps appeared in the Greeks' phalanx, there would have been no way for horsemen to exploit them. This is because Philip's own heavy infantry was already engaged along the entire line, blocking all possible access to the front ranks.

  Though Diodorus placed cavalry at the scene and archaeological evidence exists suggesting that it could have been involved in the fight (Rahe 1981, 86), there is nothing in our sources to indicate that cavalry in any way determined the outcome. Indeed, all references to combat appear to describe infantry actions. In this vein, Gaebel has looked at the various arguments on the topic of horsemen at Chaeronea (2002, 154-157) and concluded that "it is most likely that Alexander was in command of the infantry on the left wing and that the struggle was primarily one of infantry with cavalry in some subordinate but unknown role." This makes the old tale of Alexander shattering the Sacred Band by means of a gallant charge on horseback into a myth -a fiction that Plutarch should have squelched long ago with his note that the bodies of the Sacred Band lay opposite to the remains of sarissai left by the phalanx that killed them (Rahe 1981, 85). Adding this to what we know of the battlefield's topography, it's therefore probable that the riders and attached foot screens for both sides were confined to a sidebar duel across the Cephissus River. This skirmish was likely inconclusive and kept the Macedonian horsemen from all but the latest stages of the main action, in which they did some clean-up and pursuit after the Greeks gave way.

  A NEAR-RUN THING • The foregoing reconstruction suggests that the fight at Chaeronea may well have turned under very tenuous circumstances, due just as much to Athenian error as Macedonian prowess. This finds independent support in evidence of contemporaries seeing it that way as well. Such a view has emerged from the discovery of fragments of a speech by Hyperides of Athens, who died in 322. Hanson (2008, 34-35) describes the orator's recently found statement that there was no inferiority in Greek strategy or prowess at Chaeronea and it was mere "chance" that handed Philip the victory. This is something in which Hanson believes Hyperides "might well have been right," going on to support that judgment with his own analysis from other sources. If so, this stands as an example of chance favoring the better prepared - those best able to adapt and make their own luck.

  Philip dealt harshly with Thebes in the wake of his victory at Chaeronea, making the city pay an indemnity, stripping it of its Boeotian League and installing a narrow oligarchic ruling body supported by a Macedonian garrison. In short, the Thebans were reduced to a subservient state that was every bit as low as that to which they had sunk before throwing off the yoke of Sparta more than half a century earlier. Interestingly, it was their old Lacedaemonian enemy (which had been neutral in the Fourth Sacred War) that would now suffer next most. Seeking to reward his Peloponnesian allies and discourage this always threatening presence from rising to give him trouble in the future, the Macedonian king ravaged Spartan territory, driving the polls' influence inward until spanning little more than its traditional homeland.

  Beyond Thebes and Sparta, Philip mostly kept direct interference at a minimum in favor of using more diplomatic measures of control. These included backing takeovers by loca
l pro-Macedonian factions in places like Corinth, Megara and Acarnania. Most notably, he did not come down hard on Athens. That city was fully expecting to be besieged, but Philip chose to settle on favorable terms. Though he dismantled the Athenians' naval league, he allowed them to retain their democracy and fleet as well as sovereignty over certain island holdings. The reason for this gentle handling of a bitter foe of such long standing is to be found in the king's plans for the future. These included an invasion of Asia Minor for which Athens would prove a useful ally.

  Tactical Discussion: 358-336 B. C.

  Though Philip II had clearly been honing his new-style phalanx over a period of two decades prior to Chaeronea, that battle stands as the centerpiece of his efforts. It's therefore often touted as the decisive culmination of a major revolution in tactics - the new Macedonian phalanx over the old Greek/Doric one. Yet, what role did innovation really play at Chaeronea and in other Macedonian combats?

  Philip's tactical advances had two major aspects: (1) substitution of pikemen for hoplites within at least a portion of the battle formation (a concept likely adapted from Iphicrates of Athens); and (2) the use of elite, shock-capable cavalry on the wings, especially the right. Since, as we've seen, horsemen played no significant role at Chaeronea, we can assess only the impact of Philip's infantry there. There's no doubt that his phalangites performed quite well on the left wing of his phalanx. The pike array carried out its mission of holding the best enemy spearmen in check as long as needed to ensure success; all the same, this was maybe no more than good quality hoplites might have done in the same place. The battle actually seems to have stalled before Philip and his hypaspists maneuvered on the other wing to bring about a decision. And in this, those old fashioned spearmen were executing a routine that dated back more than a century. In fact, both here and elsewhere, Philip's tactical approach to infantry combat was essentially an improved version of the old Spartan cyclosis maneuver. These methods were thus incremental and evolutionary advances rather than revolutionary changes to traditional phalanx warfare.

  It was actually the coordinated use of shock cavalry in Philip's engagements prior to Chaeronea that seems the more profound tactical step. Greek armies had been steadily increasing and diversifying their use of horsemen during the 4th century and Philip was following that trend in kind. Yet he plied cavalry to effect with much greater frequency and it played a decisive role in a full 75 percent of his engagements after Methone. Moreover, bringing his nation's unique shock-oriented lancers into the process was something completely new. It seems that as substitutes for conventional, javelin-armed riders, his hetairoi would have upped attack potential most against opposition cavalry. This was because foot soldiers were more at hazard from mounted missilemen than lancers who had to get within reach to do any damage. However, chasing off screening riders was generally just what was needed to turn a flank, and horsemen armed with lighter javelins were at serious disadvantage once a heavy lancer could close into contact. Again, this was a sequential improvement. Traditional cavalry could turn a flank too (even for Philip, as his allied Thessalians did at Crocus Plan in 353)-it's simply that the hetairoi often did it better.

  All the same, Philip's greatest contributions to the Grecian art of war might well have been in the areas of training and supply. He married a large and patriotic national army like that of Thebes with the concept of professional soldiering. And, unlike seasonal hires in the mercenary hosts of states like Phocis or Pherae, his native troops served full-time, allowing for exhaustive drill toward skilled execution of his own system of tactics. Going on to support these men with superior operational logistics, he then created an army not only capable of defeating any size or type of opponent, but one that could also go anywhere in his world to do so.

  The foregoing makes it clear that Philip II of Macedonia stood far above his contemporaries. But was there any other figure in his era that could qualify as a significant shaper of the Greek way of war? It seems that the best candidate is a man much reviled in his lifetime and little known today - Onomarchos of Phocis. His career as a commanding general was brief (a mere two seasons) and encompassed only four battles, the last of which being a fatal defeat. Nonetheless, the Phocian warlord conquered both Philip and Thebes in the same year (353). And his victories over the Macedonian phalanx were not only very likely responsible for its later modification, but also introduced the Greek world to the concept of field artillery. This last was to have only limited impact during the 4th century (Alexander the Great employing the concept much less spectacularly on a couple of occasions), yet still remains a stroke of genius. (It also raises the question of just where his rock-throwing devices came from. Paul Bardunias [2011, personal communication] has intriguingly suggested that prototypes were among items "liberated" from Delphi. He points out that Iphicrates seized a quantity of catapult bolts along with some statues meant for that shrine aboard one of the Syracusan ships captured in 372 [Cole, 1981]. This is a good indication that Dionysius likely had dedicated gifts of the associated launchers as well.)

  In 337, Philip created a nearly pan-Hellenic confederacy, the League of Corinth. This was to serve as a platform for confirming his control over Greece as its elected hegemon (leader). It would also provide drafts of manpower for his planned campaign into Asia. Philip formally proposed this as a grand League project to liberate the Ionian Greeks and punish Persia for past transgressions, though Worthington argues persuasively (2008, 168-169) that the prospect of looting Persian wealth might well have been the king's true primary motivation. With no known dissent, the League membership quickly agreed to mount this effort and duly appointed Philip as its commander. He sent an advance force to Ionia the next year to prepare the way. However, Philip fell to the dagger of an assassin that very summer, leaving both his empire and any prospects for an Asian war of conquest in the hands of his son, Alexander. Very young and facing the immense political turmoil created by so sudden and unexpected an ascension to the throne, that newly crowned king would rise to the occasion in legendary fashion.

  Battles in the Era of Alexander the Great (335-324 B.C.)

  "Whenever he heard Philip had taken any town of importance, or won any signal victory, instead of rejoicing at it altogether, he would tell his companions that his father would anticipate everything, and leave him with no opportunities to perform great and illustrious actions. For being more bent upon action and glory than either upon pleasure or riches, he esteemed all that he should receive from his father as a diminution and prevention of his own future achievements; and would have chosen rather to succeed to a kingdom involved in troubles and wars, which would have afforded him frequent exercise of his courage, and a large field of honor, than to one already flourishing and settled where his inheritance would be an inactive life, and the mere enjoyment of wealth and luxury."

  Plutarch (Vol. II, Alexander, 140)

  Alexander III began his reign at the age of 20. Such youth wasn't all that unusual for a successor in an era when disease could claim someone at any time and in a land where assassins or warfare always offered lethal threats. After all, Alexander's father had become king at only four years older following the murder of one brother and then the death of another in battle. What sets Alexander apart is not that he was successful from so early an age, but that his level of achievement was such that he gained far greater acclaim than his sire, a man who, after all, had become the first conqueror of Greece. Many a son had fallen well short of a famous father in the course of Greek history (Dionysius the Great and Dionysius II offered a prime recent example); however, Alexander was to shatter that pattern to such an extent that the title "Great" became his rather than Philip's. One might in all fairness argue as to whether father or son was actually the more skilled general, yet the overall scope of Alexander's accomplishments remains unparalleled.

  European Campaigns

  The death of Philip II in 336 set off a round of rebellion throughout his empire. The Athenians refused to recognize
Alexander's rule, as did the Thebans and Thessalians. Garrisons were expelled from the Cadmea in Thebes and in Ambracia in northwest Greece. Elsewhere, Acarnania, Elis, Arcadia and Argos all broke away. Even beyond Greece proper there were problems. The tribesmen of Illyria to the west of Macedonia and the Thracians to the east had become restive and rumors were flying that Attalus, an officer in the force that Philip had sent to Asia Minor, was subverting his troops in an attempt on the throne. Alexander met these challenges quickly and effectively. He sent a team to assassinate Attalus and, leaving some troops behind to guard against any incursion from Illyria or Thrace, he marched out with the remainder of the Macedonian army to deal with matters in Greece.

  The Thessalians were the closest of the Greek dissidents to hand and they tried to block the new monarch's entry into their land at the pass of Tempe. Alexander's victory there was bloodless. He outfoxed his foes by circling a portion of his army through the mountains to come out in their rear and, hopelessly outnumbered and facing threats now from both front and back, the Thessalians gave up. Their League declared for Alexander and went on to provide him with mounted troops. The young ruler continued southward into Boeotia, and as he then marched about on or near their soil, the other Greek states caved in quick succession rather than again face a Macedonian phalanx on the field of battle. (Note that Sparta had always been an exception in having never formally accepted Philip as hegemon. It would now retain that unique distinction by not bowing to Alexander either.) Alexander next called a meeting of the Corinthian League. This assembly confirmed him as his father's successor, both as leader of the League and as commander for the still pending expedition into Persia. Having thus solidified his position among the Grecian poleis, the new king turned north to deal with the upstart barbarian peoples in that direction.