Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Haemus Pass I. Lyginus River, Hister River (335 B.c.)

  Alexander set out to subdue Thrace in spring 335. He first marched east along the coast from Amphipolis and then headed north toward the Hister (Danube) River. The size of his army isn't fully documented, but it might have had a third of the complete Macedonian muster, the rest being split among the men that Philip had sent to Asia under Parmenio and others left at home with Antipater to keep an eye on the Illyrians. If so, those from the national host that went with the king were likely 2,000 hypaspists and 6,000 phalangite pikemen plus 800 hetairoi with perhaps 300 recently formed and lighter-equipped horsemen. The latter were sarissophoroi or "lancers" also known as prodromoi, probably Thracians that had been absorbed into the Macedonian realm. We know that the cavalry was nearly 1,500 strong (as later seen across the Hister) and included riders from Amphipolis, thus there were probably almost 400 other mounted troops as well as allied and mercenary hoplites (perhaps 3,000-4,000 at eight to ten for each allied horseman). As for foot skirmishers, something like 4,000 appears reasonable. These consisted of men attached to the cavalry, around 1,600 excellent Agrianian peltasts and others that included perhaps 400 archers along with some slingers.

  Alexander's route led him across Mount Haemus, where he took on the local Thracian clans. These had set up on the crest of a ridge along the Macedonians' path, very likely in the Shipka Pass, though another, the Trojan, has also been proposed (English 2011, 22-23). Gathered maybe 5,000-7,500 strong (based upon subsequent casualties), the tribesmen were sheltering behind a barrier of carts and planned to use those vehicles as weapons by rolling them down against any attempt by their heavier armed foes to attack in close-order (Arrian 1.1.7). The barbarians hoped in this way to disrupt the phalanx and make it more vulnerable to their javelins. But judging by Alexander's anticipation of this tactic, the Macedonians must have seen or heard about a similar ploy at some time in the past.

  The solution to the Thracians' scheme was for Alexander to advance with only his hoplites (Macedonian hypaspists and allied/mercenary Greeks) and the best of his light footmen up what seems to have been a modest grade. Where the approach was narrow, the spearmen were closely ranked with each man's aspis nearly edge-to-edge against those on either side, but filed loose enough to cower when the carts careened near. They could thus shelter beneath their broad shields as the vehicles rolled over on a road of aspides without doing any damage. Elsewhere, where the path was wider, men could simply open ranks and let the carts roll harmlessly through.

  Having negated the enemy's opening trick, Alexander formed his men into a Doric-style phalanx before the Thracian battle line, standing among his hypaspists on the left with the Agrianians outboard and placing hoplites from Amphipolis on the other wing with his bowmen off their flank. He then had the archers shift to take post on flatter ground in front of the Greek spearmen, putting them in position to shoot down any sally the Thracians might make on the open, right side of the strike wing as it charged. The king and his hypaspists plus the Agrianian javelineers then closed on the barbarians at speed, the hoplites intent on putting them to the spear as the peltasts added their heaver missiles to the arrows already pelting the opposition's front-fighters. The Thracians didn't wait to die in a shock action for which they were illequipped; instead, they plunged in mass down the backing mountainside. Giving hard chase, Alexander's skirmishers killed 1,500 of the tribesmen (20-30 percent) and captured their camp, including all of its women and children.

  Alexander crested the Haemus range and descended against the Triballi beyond. Crossing the Lyginus River and advancing, he found that the Triballi leader, Syrmus, had withdrawn north with some allied Thracians to take refuge on an island in the Hister River; however, most of his warriors (maybe 12,000-15,000 of them) had moved down to a spot along the Lyginus. The king therefore reversed course to catch the enemy main body by surprise. As the Triballi spread out through the woods along the north side of the river and prepared to launch a shower of javelins, the Macedonians came on in column with their archers and slingers in the van. Alexander's missilemen could far outrange the barbarian peltasts on the other side and he halted his trailing column to let them spread out and begin inflicting damage from afar while the Triballi were helpless to hit back. This drew the tribesmen out from the trees to form up for a charge so as to get their unarmored antagonists within javelin-reach. A portion of the hetairoi under Philotas (son of Parmenio) now rode out to attack the enemy's right wing while other Macedonian horsemen combined with the Greek light cavalry from Amphipolis to attack the left. Meanwhile, the remaining companions got out in front of the phalanx and moved forward as their shock infantry followed. We've no description of the Macedonian heavy formation, but a reasonable guess is that it featured hypaspists and allied hoplites in that order from the left with pikemen lining the rest of the array and foot skirmishers off either wing.

  The Triballi held up for a while in a duel with the Macedonians' leading peltasts and light cavalry, exchanging missiles at a distance. (It's interesting that Arrian's note here on the exchange of javelins in front of the hetairoi off Alexander's right flank offers some of our best evidence for organic attachment of light infantry to those riders at this time.) However, once most of the tribesmen were down to the last javelin for hand-to-hand use, both the lance-armed horsemen on the wings and the phalanx at center were able to close into shock contact. It was no contest from there on as the better-equipped Macedonians and Greeks put the Triballi to rapid rout. And despite the fact that darkness now cut pursuit short, some 3,000 (20-25 percent) of the barbarians died before the last of them got away (Arrian 1.2.7). Alexander took few casualties, losing only eleven hetairoi and 40 foot troops, though the latter are likely only the heavy infantry, thus there might have been more severe losses among his foot skirmishers.

  Alexander next swung east to rendezvous with ships dispatched from Byzantium. He loaded these with hoplites and archers and took them upstream for an attempt on Peuce (Pine) Island where Syrmus had holed up. However, the river's swift current along with the island's steep banks and its Thracian defenders kept his small flotilla from coming ashore. Moving on, the young king switched targets and led his army across the Hister into the territory of the Getae. These were some of the most feared Thracian fighters, whose bravery in combat rested in part on a belief that they were immortal (Arrian 1.3.2 - also, see Webber [2001,10]). The Getae had gathered to the tune of nearly 4,000 horsemen and 10,000 infantry to take up station along the north side of the river where they could best block a Macedonian fording. To foil this tack, Alexander used his ships, a large number of dugout-type fishing canoes and make-shift rafts (formed of tenting material filled with straw) to transit the river at night, using high-standing grain for cover on the far bank. He thus assembled a modest force across the flood that consisted (per Arrian 1.3.6) of nearly 1,500 cavalry (probably all he had, the horsemen getting across by holding onto their swimming mounts) and 4,000 foot soldiers. These last were most likely just the shock troops (half the available Macedonian heavy infantry). A fair number of foot skirmishers attached to the horsemen must have landed as well, presumably among those using the straw-filled rafts.

  Alexander's heavy corps likely had one taxis of hypaspists and two of pikemen. Some of the phalangites put their lengthy pole-arms to novel use in flattening the tall stalks of grain to clear a path for their column, which marched out with the cavalry following at the rear. Having so small a force of line infantry, Alexander set it up in a rectangle once beyond the fields. His formation was perhaps just over 60 shields wide and stood an equal number of ranks deep, having 2m or so between men along each file on the march. Everyone faced forward on the move, but were able to huddle into a compact square if attacked. The heavy infantry could then turn and face out on all sides so as to protect flank and rear from large numbers of light-armed foes. The hypaspists fronted this arrangement in 16-man files, Arrian's account noting that the Getae faced a phalanx with "locked
shields" (1.4.3) in what would appear to be a description of abutting aspides. As for the cavalry and foot skirmishers, Alexander led these from horseback as they moved off the right flank (the left being anchored on the river).

  It seems that once the Getae became aware of the Macedonians' approach they went into a panic quite contrary to their fearsome reputation, never having suspected that the enemy could get across the Hister so quickly and without detection. Moreover, they were also intimidated by the fearsome appearance of the bronze-shielded, spear-tipped phalanx bearing down on them with murderous intent. As a result, the tribesmen broke in fear as soon as Alexander and his horsemen charged out from alongside their hoplites. The barbarians fled first to their city, which lay a short distance beyond the river. Collecting their families and whatever goods they could carry, they then escaped into the interior. Alexander plundered and burnt the town before pulling back to join the rest of his army, which had now also crossed the flow. The local Thracian tribes, the Triballi and even some Celts from farther north soon sent representatives to Alexander with offers of alliance. He next turned about and marched down into the Agrianian and Paeonian lands that lay just north of Macedonia. From here, he would stage to deal with some of the Illyrian peoples farther west that had recently joined in the revolt against his ascension to the throne.

  Pelion (335 B.c.)

  Cleitus, son of Philip's old opponent Bardylis, was leading his Dardanians against the new Macedonian king, and another tribal leader, Glaucias of the Taulantians, was moving to join him. At the same time, yet a third group of Illyrians, the Autariates, were also readying an attack. Alexander arranged for Langaros, king of his allied Agrianians, to occupy the Autariates with a raid on their home territory. He then set off to deal with the Dardanians before they could receive reinforcement. Cleitus had occupied Pelion, a fortified city to the west, and it was here where Alexander caught up with him. A Macedonian assault on Pelion was met by the Dardanians sallying out for a fixed battle. Backed by perhaps 2,000 javelineers and slingers, up to 8,000 Illyrian shock fighters engaged Alexander's phalanx with their heavy-headed spears and large, center-grip shields in a close combat. No details are known for this action, but the barbarians ultimately gave way and withdrew into the city. As such, the battle must have been hard-fought with the Macedonians giving a little better than they got (maybe taking 3 percent losses against twice as many for the Dardanians), but not able to mount an effective pursuit as their enemy pulled away.

  Having shut up his foes in Pelion, Alexander prepared to surround the place with a siege wall and force its surrender. At this juncture, the Taulantians under Glaucias arrived and threatened to strike at the rear of any attack against the city walls. Making matters worse, the Illyrians moved to cut off Macedonian supplies, going so far as to trap a large provisioning party until Alexander came to its rescue with his hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and 400 hetairoi horsemen. (There was only one squadron of 400 riders. This was the royal company of the companion cavalry, which had twice the usual number of troopers and was a mounted counterpart to the royal agema of hypaspists.) Short on food and facing a large and determined enemy force in the surrounding forested uplands, Alexander decided to retreat. However, this was much easier said than done. The escape route was narrow, being bordered on one side by steep cliffs and on the other by a river. What followed was a brilliant display of the Macedonians' training and discipline that let their king bluff past this tricky situation.

  Alexander drew up his native heavy footmen in an oblong formation. This was 60 shields wide and 120 ranks deep, having two times the manpower that he had arrayed along that same frontage on the bank of the Hister a few weeks earlier. He then deployed 200-rider bodies of hetairoi off either flank along with the usual light infantry support. Next, he led his superbly drilled hypaspists (at lest half of them being in the van, the rest maybe forming the rearmost ranks) and pikemen through a dazzling series of parade-ground maneuvers as they worked their way toward the exit from Pelion. These complex evolutions so impressed the Illyrians that most of them simply ran away when the Macedonians finally drew near and made a threatening move on their blocking positions. After the hypaspists and a few select horsemen scared off the last of the barbarians from a hilltop, the army was clear to march away.

  In the ensuing retreat, the hypaspists acted as vanguard and the Agrianians and archers (2,000 men total) as rearguard while the Macedonians made a key river crossing, (This was also covered from the far bank by the fire of both archers and bolt-throwing mechanical bows). Alexander thus won his way clear, but wasn't content. Learning that the Illyrians thought him gone for good and had set up a poorly arranged camp in his wake, he re-crossed the river at night with the hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and two taxeis of pikemen (3,000). These caught the tribesmen unprepared and in their beds, slaughtering many on the scene and killing and capturing others as they fled in confusion. The Illyrians were so shaken that they abandoned Pelion and burnt it down as they took to the hills. Alexander was now able to return to Macedon with a relatively quiescent territory at his back.

  Once home, Alexander found that he had to contend with a new crisis. This was at Thebes, where a group of anti-Macedonian exiles had taken advantage of a rumor that the young king had died during his northern campaigns to raise a revolt against the Corinthian League. Alexander responded with a lightening march to capture Thebes, placing League troops in the Cadmea as he razed the city around it. It was a brutal object lesson that soon had other poleis eager to pledge loyalty to Macedonia, allowing Alexander to turn toward Persia at last.

  The Persian Campaign I

  Parmenio had crossed into Asia in 336 with what might have been 2,000 hypaspists and 6,000 phalangites plus 800 hetairoi and 1,200 light infantrymen (probably 1,000 associated with the heavy infantry and the rest attached to the cavalry at 50 per 200-horse squadron). This totaled 10,000 troops in line with Polyaenus (5.44.4). The Macedonians set up at Abydos on the Hellespont and began moving down into Aetolia, raiding Persian assets, collecting more troops from the Ionians and hiring mercenaries. The Persian response was slow. Artaxerxes III (Ochus) had been poisoned in 338 and his successor, Artaxerxes IV (Arses), was assassinated as well in 336; therefore, it was Darius III who now ruled as Great King. A grand-nephew of Artaxerxes II known for bravery and prowess in single combat, this new monarch was at first encouraged by the death of Philip, thinking that the youthful Alexander couldn't follow-up on his father's plans. But as soon as it became clear in the summer of 335 that Philip's heir was highly capable, Darius began to prepare for defending his kingdom. This was an involved process that called for the many units forming the empire's huge roster on paper to be filled with real soldiers. Darius' first task, therefore, was to buy the time needed for his lengthy mobilization program. He did this by gathering mercenaries already present within some of the eastern garrisons of the empire and putting them under Memnon, who was a Greek from Rhodes and his best general. Memnon's assignment was to march against Parmenio on the coast, where he was to limit the Macedonian's operations while the imperial host mustered inland.

  Granicus River (334 B.c.) and Sagalassos (334/33 B.C.)

  Memnon moved to meet Parmenio and his men with a modest mercenary army. This probably consisted of 4,000 hoplites (per Polyaenus' estimate of his total strength [5.44.4]) and 1,000 foot skirmishers for a 5,000 man total (Diodorus 17.7.3). Arriving at the Greek city of Cyzicus on the southern shores of the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) above the Hellespont, the Rhodian menaced and nearly captured the place in an attempt to draw his foe out of Persian territory. When this failed, he dropped into Aetolia and chased Parmenio and a contingent of his men away from a siege operation at the coastal city of Pitane. Too weak to tackle the enemy's fortified outposts or even risk a large-scale engagement, Memnon then set about waging a clever campaign of maneuver, bedeviling his opponents at every turn. He even managed to catch smaller enemy detachments in isolation on a couple of occasions and send th
em into bloodied retreat (Diodorus 17.7.10; Polyaenus 5.44.4). The Macedonians thus accomplished much less than anticipated before having to fall back on Abydos at the end of the summer. Leaving adequate garrisons in place, Parmenio and his original expeditionary column withdrew over the winter. They were thus able to rest and refill their ranks back home in preparation for the coming invasion.

  When Alexander set out across the Hellespont the following spring, he had a powerful armament at his back for which Diodorus (17.17.3-5) has left a detailed order of battle. His troops included half of the full Macedonian infantry muster (3,000 hypaspists [three taxeis] and 9,000 phalangites [six taxeis]), a like-sized force staying behind with Antipater. There were also 1,800 companion horsemen. These were three-fourths of the hetairoi in seven 200-horse squadrons and one of 400 (the other 600 companions apparently remained with Antipater, who had 1,500 total cavalry). Macedonia's light infantry is not listed, but must have been around 2,000-3,000 strong. The Greek allies added some 7,000 foot soldiers (maybe 5,000 hoplites and 2,000 skirmishers from Boeotia and the Peloponnese). There were also 5,000 mercenaries (perhaps 4,000 spearmen and 1,000 light-armed). Barbarian levies totaled 7,000 men from Illyria and Thrace as well as a team of archers and Agrianian javelineers (elite troops 1,000 strong at half those that had served in the campaigns of 335). This adds up to more than 30,000 infantry in all, which is consistent with our other ancient accounts from Arrian (1.11.3), Justin (11.5.12) and Plutarch (Vol. II, Alexander, 149). (Wells [1963, below 164-165] points out that Plutarch also cited similar numbers given by Aristobulus and Ptolemy while claiming Anaximenes as a lone dissenter with 43,000 footmen. Perhaps this last included non-combatants.) Additional cavalry came from Thessaly (1,800) and the rest of Greece (600 Boeotians and Peloponnesians) along with some barbarian riders from Thrace and Paeonia (900, including maybe 300 Thracian/Macedonian lancers) for a total mounted corps of around 5,000.