Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC
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The Persian national host was still gathering under Darius as Alexander marched into Phyrgia. This left defense of the realm's western provinces in the hands of five satraps on the scene and a few generals. Memnon was the most capable military mind among the latter and he wisely advised greeting the Macedonians with a "scorched earth" policy. This called for refusing pitched battle and falling back while destroying all supplies along the enemy's path. They could thus stall Alexander's advance through shortage of food. (He had set out with only 30 days worth of provisions and would soon need copious local foodstuffs to sustain his men and animals). At the same time, naval forces sent into Greece could raise enough hell that it might compel him to return home. This was a sound plan, but the other commanders wouldn't go along with it. They saw such an approach as undignified and too costly for those whose assets would be torched. It was decided instead to offer battle at a site favorable for a defensive stand. They chose a location along the Granicus River in western Phyrgia where they could set up on high ground behind that stream.
Most claims in our sources for Persian manpower at Granicus River are significantly overblown. In truth, it seems likely that imperial strength was a bit less than Alexander's, thus prompting the defensive strategy of Memnon as well as the actual Persian tactics used in the battle. Our lowest ancient numbers of 10,000 cavalry (Diodorus 17.19.4) and 20,000 infantry (Arrian 1.14.4) are probably closest to reality. The horsemen might have represented ten hazaraba, both satrapal and imperial, which at 60-80 percent of their nominal 1,000-man complement probably totaled only 6,000-8,000 riders. As for the foot soldiers, Memnon had brought his 5,000 mercenaries (including 4,000 spearmen) while small contingents of bodyguards from each of the five satraps present would have raised Greek hoplite strength to around 6,000. (This assumes an average 400 spearmen per guard unit in line with the one documented by Xenophon [Anabasis 1.4.3.] for the satrap Abrocomas.) The remaining infantry would have been nonGreeks. These could have included some Carian and/or Lydian hoplites, but most would have been light-armed. Considering the satrapies involved, the light footmen likely included Carian, Mysian, Cabelee, Phrygian (Paphlagonian) and Cappadocian peltasts (the last two nationalities also carrying a small spear for hand-to-hand use instead of a "last javelin"). These skirmishers probably split in some fashion to provide support for the cavalry as well as a flank screen for their heavy array.
Both armies set up for battle on their respective sides of the Granicus. The Persians had their phalanx of hoplites back a fair distance from the water's edge, with the cavalry and light infantry posted in front and off either flank. This let them take advantage of a rising slope that would force the Macedonians into an unfavorable uphill attack should they get across the river. The alternative of locating directly along the bank was less desirable, because that lower position would expose them to Alexander's archers (including men with mechanical bows) and slingers. These could easily outrange any rearward-standing Persian javelineers and their fire would be devastating if allowed to continue for a sufficient length of time. The only solution in that case would be a disadvantaged cross-river assault against a larger enemy infantry force. The current deployment was much better in that the Macedonian missilemen had to ford the Granicus to get a reasonable shot. And once on the far side, the Persian cavalry and its attached peltasts could launch javelins on them from above and then mount a powerful countercharge down the slope.
Alexander wasn't daunted by this arrangement and fixed upon making a bold attack. He therefore set up his bowmen and Agrianians outboard on the right, followed inward by seven of the eight hetairoi squadrons and then a grouping of the final hetairoi unit (200 riders) leading the Paeonians and Thracian/Macedonian lancers. His heavy infantry phalanx came next. The three hypaspist regiments formed its right wing, half the phalangites (three regiments) were in the center and the rest of the pikemen made up the left wing. Beyond the heavy array, his remaining cavalry took post with the Thracian horsemen standing inside, the mounted Greek allies next and the Thessalians on the far flank. There is no mention in our sources of where the allied and mercenary infantry were, but they might have formed another phalanx at the rear. (Arrian noted [1.13.1] that Alexander advanced on the Granicus "having arrayed his phalanx in two rows." Possibly a reference to a 16-man depth [twice eight], this may actually denote the presence of a second, parallel formation.) Such a reserve arrangement would have been a new tool in the Macedonian box of tactics, added to meet specific challenges presented along the Granicus. His enemy's much smaller force of heavy footmen (the Macedonians alone outnumbered them by 50 percent and had a wider frontage) gave him the luxury of having a back-up battle array. This could counter an encircling attack from the unusually large Persian cavalry force on hand or, should his daring thrust across the river prove a bust, cover a retreat.
While we have descriptions of the lateral arrangement for the Macedonian units, this is not so for their depth. The hypaspists had probably filed at eight to twelve shields under Philip and the phalangites at ten. In Alexander's previous formations the depth had been unusual (up to 120) to accommodate special circumstances during his European campaigns. Clues as to the probable depth of file at Granicus River come from an assumption that an effort was made to match the enemy's frontage. Taking a Persian strength of around 8,000 horsemen, the imperial array would have stretched along 2km at eight deep (maximum useful depth for mounted troops per Polybios [12.18.2], himself a cavalry commander, and Asclepiodotus [7.4]) and 2m lateral spacing. Given similar dimensions for the horsemen with Alexander, they would have stood across 1,250m. By filing eight shields deep for the hypaspists (375m) and 16 deep for the pikemen (375m) he could then equal the Persian front even as he matched his heavy array's width with that of the 6,000-man phalanx at the enemy's rear, which probably stood eight-deep. (His 9,000 reserve hoplites might have had a similar frontage using files of twelve.)
The armies faced off across the river, eyeing each other in silence for some time. This allowed the Persians to adjust their order and increase the concentration of cavalry on their left wing, which was opposite where they saw Alexander riding with the hetairoi to mark the likely focus of his opening attack. And this was indeed the case, as the Macedonian king gave signal and led his horsemen across with the specialist light infantry (right) and the agema of royal hypaspists (left) advancing alongside. The leftmost of the Macedonian cavalry (the squadron of companions with the Paeonians and lancers) crossed first to meet a storm of javelins as their opponents charged down into them. While this lead element drew the enemy in, Alexander drifted rightward and took the rest of his wing over the stream before swinging left to hit the already engaged Persians from that side. Once at closer quarters, the lances of the hetairoi were much more effective than the Persians' shorter and less robust javelins in hand-to-hand combat; moreover, the Asians took a lot of damage from the foot skirmishers that were mixed within the Macedonian array (Arrian 1.16.1).
As Alexander and company were gaining the upper hand on one flank, a similar story was playing out at the other end of the battlefield. The king's allied cavalry had crossed and engaged there as well, working its way up the far bank despite also meeting "showers of darts thrown from the steep opposite side, which was covered with armed multitudes of the enemy's horse and foot" (Plutarch vol. II, Alexander, 150). The Thessalian horsemen particularly distinguished themselves here, so much so that they would trail only Alexander himself in post-battle acclaim. And as the mounted action swirled upslope off either flank, the Macedonian phalanx took its cue from the royal agema and also waded over. Once on the Persian side of the Granicus, the hypaspists and pikemen quickly restored their battle array and began to advance. By that time, many of the imperial commanders had fallen along with a good number of their fellow riders and, badly battered and seeing the phalanx now coming on, it was more than the remaining Persian horsemen could bear. The last of the imperial cavalry broke from the fight and their oriental infantry joined them in
a mass rush eastward. So sudden was this collapse that it left the Greek mercenary hoplites behind. With flanks exposed and facing overwhelming numbers, most of these gave way as well to be mercilessly slaughtered in place by the enclosing wall of spears and pikes or cut down from behind by a swarm of pursuing horsemen and skirmishers.
The satraps that had ignored Memnon's advice and engaged Alexander with an inferior force paid a high price for their folly. Only 2,000 out of 6,000 or so Greek spearmen survived to surrender. (A loss of 67 percent is unusual, but not unreasonable for an encircled force pressed to the end.) And while Diodorus' claim (17.21.6) of 12,000 imperial dead looks high in light of there being only a brief pursuit (Alexander cut it short to concentrate on the mercenary hoplites), losses above 3,000 (15 percent) in addition to those among the Greek hirelings wouldn't be out of line. For Alexander, the reported casualties are suspiciously low. Still, damage was probably minimal for the lightly engaged heavy infantry and no more than modest for the cavalry and foot skirmishers (likely below 5 percent killed). Alexander took Sardis in the battle's aftermath and claimed all of Lydia. Memnon and other survivors from the Persian side escaped to the coast and sought refuge at Miletus.
Alexander marched south from Sardis to liberate Ephesos and then dropped down to capture Miletus, forcing Memnon and his fellows to flee once again. With Lydia and Ionia under control, the Macedonian moved next against Caria. He took Halicarnassus after a siege that featured a number of unsuccessful sallies and skirmishes by the defenders. Leaving his officer Ptolemy behind to hold Carla with 3,000 mercenaries and 200 horsemen, Alexander then went back north. Through fall and winter 334/33, he secured the coastal region of Asia Minor and advanced up the Eurymedon River toward Phyrgia. On the way, he found it necessary to fight a battle before Sagalassos, which lay in rough country west of the Eurymedon headwaters.
Sagalassos was a large city of the Pisidians, whose warriors were peltasts. These mobile fighters used small shields covered with rawhide and wore no armor save for bronze helmets (fashioned with horns and ears like a bull). The Pisidians and a few allied troops from Termessos to the south (also javelineers) had taken a strong position atop lofty terrain in front of town. Alexander arrayed his phalanx, standing with the hypaspists on the right and having his pezhetairoi pikemen filling out the center and left wing. He placed the archers and Agrianians in front of his right wing and Thracian peltasts in front of the left, but kept his cavalry out of the fight due to the unfavorable ground held by the enemy. As the Macedonian formation advanced upslope, the Pisidians struck at both wings, driving off the archers that were at the fore on Alexander's right and killing 20 of them (10 percent) as well as their commander. However, the Agrianians came up to replace the bowmen and were able to withstand this assault, as were the Thracians on the other end of the battle line. Once the phalanx closed into shock combat, its heavier equipped troops began to take a serious toll on the lightly armed barbarians while suffering little harm in return. The Pisidians eventually gave way after losing men all along the front, running from what was clearly a hopeless fight. But though they easily escaped the Macedonians, who were slow in their weighty gear, Alexander followed close behind and took their city by storm.
Once into Phyrgia, Alexander negotiated the surrender of a well-placed force of 1,000 Carian and 100 Greek mercenaries and laid claim to the province, garrisoning it with 1,500 sol diers. He wintered there at Gordian (of the famous "knot"), where he received reinforcements from home. These consisted of 3,000 pikemen along with cavalry from Macedonia (nearly 350), Thrace (200) and Elis (150).
Issus (333 B.c.) and Memphis (333/32 B.c.)
Having no success on land, Memnon set out in 333 to counter Alexander from the sea. This began with an attack on the Greeks of Lesbos, but the Rhodian had hardly gotten the campaign underway when he contracted a disease and died. Still, his forces were able to seize Mytilene, and Pharnabazus then came out to take over the Persian effort in the Aegean. He continued his predecessor's strategy by capturing the island of Tendos. Spending the summer in Phyrgia, Alexander finally began marching out of Gordian toward Cilicia in the fall, accepting surrenders from the Paphlagonians in route. Arriving at the Cilician Gate gorge, he made a nighttime sortie with his hypaspists, Agrianians and archers to frighten off the blockading troops there and gain easy passage. Once in Cilicia, Alexander sent an advance force on to seize the Syrian Gate (the narrow entry into Assyria) while he made a foray into the mountains to deal with some hostile local peoples. He quickly completed this task and headed for the coast to move along until reaching Myriandros, which lay just to the northwest of the already secured Syrian Gate. Alexander camped here to wait out a bout of bad weather (it was now early November and winter was setting in) before entering Assyria.
Darius had by now assembled the imperial host and was waiting to engage Alexander on the open Assyrian plain where his large numbers of cavalry could have the advantage. However, growing impatient, the Great King gave up his favorable position and marched instead to go though a pass known as the Amanic Gate, which lay inland to the north and a bit east of the Syrian Gate. He therefore ended up coming down to the sea north of Myriandros in Alexander's rear. Neither army seems to have been aware of the other until they suddenly found themselves only a short distance apart on the coastal plain. Marching to engage, the forces of Darius and Alexander converged on a point below the seaside town of Issus.
Alexander advanced up the coastal flat in column. As the area began to open up approaching Issus, he shifted his heavy infantry units one by one into a phalanx that stretched from the bounding hills on his right to the sea on the left. Starting with the elite agema, his hypaspists formed across the right wing at 3,000 strong. The phalangite regiments then spread along the middle and left down to anchor against the water's edge. There were now nearly 12,000 pikemen counting those that had arrived in the spring, these latter apparently forming up within the original six taxeis to raise them to around 2,000 men each. Initially, the narrow shoreline strip had demanded that the heavy footmen file four times their minimum (at 32 for the pikemen and 16 for the hoplites), but they were able to spread out as it broadened, going to half that depth. The mercenary and allied hoplites (reduced due to garrisoning for the former and returns to Greece for the latter) remained in the rear with the light footmen and all the cavalry; however, as the plain kept on expanding, rather than extend his phalanx, Alexander chose to post his best horsemen (the hetairoi and Thessalians) off his right wing. There wasn't room there for both contingents to spread out, so the Macedonians rode in front with the Thessalians tucked behind. Elsewhere, some of the other mounted units now took position alongshore on the left side of the heavy array.
The Great King, meanwhile, had come down from the north and stopped to set up camp above the Pinaros River, which flowed westward into the sea. Temporarily posting his cavalry across this small stream, he carefully arranged his foot troops just below his tents in a line above the riverbank, throwing up some field works as well (probably shallow trenches backed by the mounded dirt, though these must have been very minor and/or limited as we hear nothing about them in the ensuing battle). He deployed his phalanx with roughly 15,000 Greek hoplite mercenaries in the center. (This considers that the 30,000 cited in several ancient sources was a nominal figure sans significant reductions for casualties and dispersions to garrison and bodyguard duty. Alexander [Arrian 2.7.6] refers to only 20,000 mercenaries here, which might mean 15,000 hoplites if light footmen made up a typical 25 percent of the mix.) To either side of these, Darius evenly divided the hoplite-armed men from six baivaraba of kardakes, likely his empire's full muster. Arrian claimed that there were 60,000 men in these, but this was an establishment strength and probably twice what was actually present, while using only the heavy element ("hoplites" per Arrian [2.8.6]) cut the number down to more like 15,000. As for the approximately 15,000 rear-rank kardakes bowmen and peltasts from these same units, they massed to the left of their hoplite-a
rmed comrades. Darius covered his flank on the seaward/right side by repositioning nearly all of his horsemen there once the heavy-armed phalanx was set. His cavalry might have numbered 15,000 (citations of 30,000 being subject to reductions similar to those applied to both the mercenary and kardakes elements of the imperial host).
The Persian spearmen had to form long files due to the narrowness of the battleground. They thus probably spanned 1,700m in all, the Greeks covering 950m at twice normal depth of 16 shields and 750m for the kardakes hoplites with similarly doubled files for them of 20. And given that the coastal plain here was only about 2.6km wide (per Callisthenes via Polybios [12.17.4]), deployment of cavalry and light infantry at either end of the line must have been even more crowded. The horsemen on the right therefore probably formed up 60-deep (contingents stacked one behind the other) while the kardakes archers/peltasts leftward likely stood 30-deep. The satrapal infantry levies (perhaps 30,000 in all) mostly gathered behind their phalanx, but some light-armed contingents completed the left wing onto rough terrain, spreading out from there into the hills beyond and well up the Pinaros valley. As for Darius, he is reputed to have taken post on his chariot in the center of the phalanx. Darius was probably surrounded at the rear by two 1,000-man units of heavy-armed kardakes-style bodyguards (these elites are attested at Gaugemela two years later and must have always have been present whenever the Great King took the field).