Fayez Sayegh- the Party Years (1938-1947)

by Adel Beshara

  My relationship to my group … is a relationship between a human being (who could not be if not for the group that contributed to what he is) and a group (which could not be if not for the individuals who formed it). The reality, then, is not one of a group whose interests do not intermix with those of the individuals who constitute it, and not one of an individual insubordinate and holding off everything from the group including his being. Rather, it is a group and an individual that complement each other and neither can exist without the other.26

  Nonetheless, Malik’s pitiable assessment of nationalism spurred Fayez into brainstorming. Around this time, he started to infuse the national doctrine with healthy doses of moral clarity, ethics, and practical human wisdom in an attempt to counter the rising climate of anti-nationalism.27 He found everything he needed to make his vision alive in the fundamental realities of human life of existential philosophy itself: dignity, self-identity, human choices, ethical existence, will, freedom, heroism, and a range of other moral values and principles. Despite what most people thought, Fayez did not see nationalism and existentialism as mutually exclusive or as two sides of a coin. He determined that an existential nationalism existed and could be proved through common logic.

  First, however, Fayez had to demonstrate, in the way of theoretical justification, that:

  An intellectual synthesis exists between nationalism and existentialism.

  Despite its apparent “collective” nature, nationalism is an ideology of concrete lived experience that does not detract from the importance of “individuality” or the “personal”.

  Fayez addressed both requirements with existentialist logic. He argued that, just as the individual is imbued with a sense of morality and quest for existential meaning, the nation is involved in a quest for existential self-actualization and fulfillment. With a clever manipulation of existential jargons, he underscored the presence of existentialist themes at the centre of the national project, especially the notions of “self-liberation”, “citizen”, “freedom”, “individual dignity” and “heroism”.28 His procedure does not entirely negate the “collective” character of nationalism, but it modifies the order of its priorities. Nationalism ceases to be a drive for collective life and becomes a collective instrument for creating a society in which individual choices and freedom are paramount to its prosperity. Fayez then enumerated five conditions that must exist for nationalism to fit into an existential framework:

  It is not jingoistic patronizing;

  It looks critically at the illusions of politics and commercialism that would enslave us;

  It is dynamic and enterprising, because no power enslaves human life more forcefully than disinterestedness and lack of effort;

  It is liberating whether from outside forces or from internal burdens; and

  It encourages people to think for themselves, question the status quo, and look for real virtue in the only place it can be found, inside “ourselves”.

  The existential value of nationalism, then, is that it seeks to answer the question of meaningful personal existence through participation in a collective national meaning.29

  Thus, nationalism is only what we choose to make of it. Unless we allow it, it is not bound to any sense of determinism. How it turns out depends entirely on the trajectory we choose for it, who we are and aspire to be, and the method we adopt in our national pursuits. That choice, and the freedom it posits, determines whether nationalism will be totalitarian or democratic. A narrow jingoistic nationalism may foster the mass conformity on which totalitarianism thrives. Alternatively, when nationalism is based on conscience and logic, it precludes the kind of radical behavior that would result in hedonism. It would be free and moral at the same time.

  The French existential philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, once declared that we are completely responsible not only for who we are, but also for who we plan to be:

  …existentialism’s first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.30

  Fayez also attempted to follow this line of reasoning: that with nationalism, as with every major human project, an incredible amount of responsibility falls on man himself, on the purposes he pursues, and on the “choices” he makes in life. Ultimately, man alone is responsible for creating a meaningful life in an absurd and unfair world. He can choose whether nationalism will be bad or good, excessive or benign, aggressive or passive. It boils down to his ability to make informed personal choices. The pendulum is in his hand. He can swing it towards a nationalism that subdues individual identity and freedom for the group or towards a nationalism that promotes a more balanced approach in life. But what if man cannot choose or is deprived of the freedom to choose? The existential Fayez would reply that the blame would rest primarily with man for allowing such a situation to arise in the first place.

  By “man”, Fayez meant the individual person in line with the existential tradition of Nikolai Berdyaev. A devoted Russian Orthodox Christian, Berdyaev introduced the concept of “personalism” as an existential notion positing “the primacy of freedom over existence, of Spirit over nature, subject over object, personality over the universal, creativeness over evolution, dualism over monism, love over law”.31 For Berdyaev, “personality” is a whole, a unity of multiplicity, changing and affirming itself as a primal unity. It is creative, independent, and a living, concrete, dynamic quality. Unlike the individual who

  . . . is a naturalistic category, biological and sociological, and it appertains to the natural world … Person realizes itself in social and cosmic life, but it can do this only because that within it … is independent from nature and from the principle of society.32

  Personalism stands at the opposite end of collectivism. It emphasizes the human personality over collectives like the society, nation, or state, and it regards the self-worth of every human being and his or her right to the fullness of life as an end in itself. Personality is a “whole” and everything else is “parts”. Personality for Berdyaev

  ... comprises body, soul, and spirit [and] comes from God and not from one’s parents. It has character, which is power over oneself and a victory over slavery to oneself, making possible a conquest of the environment and achievement of independence.33

  Fayez adopted Berdyaev’s theory almost verbatim and then overlaid nationalism with it. He began to represent nationalism as a means to the fulfillment of individual personal welfare and human freedom. Consciously or unconsciously, he moved away from the primacy of society without renouncing it or denying its value. In the process, he metamorphosed the central ideals of Social Nationalism of “truth, goodness and beauty” to the personal level.

  Fayez succeeded not only in offloading the responsibility of nationalism onto the individual, but also in angling it in a “personalist” direction. This completes the transition to an existential nationalism. Presently, nationalism ceases to be a strictly collective enterprise and becomes a project in which our mission is to attain meaning by embracing those activities that generate a sense of universal purpose and value in our personal lives. How we go about this depends on the basic approach we choose. An approach based on logical reasoning is bound to yield a different result from one based on blind faith or misguided idealism. The choice we make and the trajectory we pursue ultimately determine if nationalism will be a desirable aesthetic value or just another absurd charade.

  FAYEZ VERSUS SA’ADEH

  In marrying nationalism to existentialism, Fayez mirrored a topical trend in nascent “Arab existentialism” of blending local and existential themes together. The Egyptian philosopher Abd al-Rahman Badawi (1917-2002) set the pace for this blending with a “major project … aimed at achieving an intellectual synthesis between Sufism and existential philosophy”.34 Badawi maintained:

  The idea of the per
fect man creates the union between Sufism and Existentialism on the basis of the humanist trend. Indeed we found in it the strongest assertion of this humanist trend since it harbours the deification of man. But existentialism places human existence in lieu and in the place of divine existence.

  Badawi proceeded to demonstrate how certain notions, such as “anguish” and the “perfect man”, are central in both existential and Sufi thoughts:

  Between these two trends, existentialism and Sufism (mysticism), there are deep links at the levels of the principles, the method and the targeted aim… the Sufi trend is based on the doctrine of subjectivism, that is it does not recognize any other true existence outside the individual subject.

  Similarly, Fayez sought to fuse the national with the existential to create an “existential nationalism”. His thinking

  Predicated nationalism on individual subjectivity.

  Presented nationalism as a quest for meaning and identity.

  Placed man (the ‘Person’) at the centre of all things.

  This did not represent a complete break with the national ideological doctrine of the SSNP. Many aspects of that doctrine can be easily construed as existential. The “Doctrine” (al-aqidah) itself was largely composed as a written response to a people seeking to define not only what it means to be “national” but also what it means to exist. Its first criterion and starting point is the existential question “who are we?”,35 and its essence, though contextually national, covers issues of broad human and existential concern:

  Since antiquity, our nation has faced a number of critical issues that require sincere answers. These are:

  Are we a living nation?

  Are we a society with a goal in life?

  Are we a people with high ideals?

  Are we a nation with a single will?

  Are we a group of people who realize the importance of methodical action?36

  These questions represent an aspect of existentialism. They mark, on a philosophical level, “the beginning of serious thinking into the very meaning of human community, like ours, and into the supreme goals that give expression to our reality, our existence, and our essence”.37 Hence, existence in the Sa’adeh perspective is not subject to fate or some type of determinism. It depends on the power of the human mind, the value and limitations of our rational nature, and especially, on the realization that life is defined continually by our actions and choices. This demonstrates a clear connection with existentialism, because it places man (‘society’ and not ‘person’) at the center of national existence and existence at the heart of human concern.

  Also, both existential philosophy and Social Nationalism exhibit strong interest in existence as a fact subject to human knowledge:

  We cannot envisage existence without knowledge. Indeed, we cannot claim that any supposed existence that cannot be recognized through knowledge has the same value as a fact, because a fact is a human psychological value, and only man is capable of differentiating between truth and falsehood through knowledge.38

  Like existentialism, Social Nationalism is unconcerned with the metaphysical world. Its frame of reference is strictly human existence from a secular ethical perspective. Neither existentialism nor Social Nationalism accepts the dependence of the individual or the group on supernatural forces or other forces uncontrolled by man. Neither assents to quietism or inaction nor declares that there is no reality except in action. Furthermore, neither subscribes to a pessimistic view of life. According to Sartre, existentialism is a humanism because it reminds “man that there is no legislator but himself”.39 Social Nationalism is “a humanism”, also, because it regards the human mind as the “supreme legislator”.40

  If the affinities between existentialism and Social Nationalism are that strong, why did Sa’adeh rebuke Fayez so sternly over his existentialism? In answering this question, fairness to both Sa’adeh and Fayez must be a basic consideration. By all accounts, Sa’adeh did not ask Fayez to abandon his existentialist views or to abstain from studying or probing its philosophical tenets. He merely instructed Fayez to desist from infusing the Party’s “Doctrine” with explicit existentialist notions and to stop using the Party’s agencies to promote an existential perspective acquired from external sources. As the Party’s founder, it was his moral duty to protect the Party from any initiative that might compromise the integrity of its “Doctrine” or undermine its independence. The truth of any doctrine depends, not on the capability of human reason to reconcile it with external opinions and views, but on the credibility and unity of the message it communicates. Once the message is doctored to convey other than the “truth” it represents, its vitality and coherence suffer and it disintegrates into an arena for conflicting ideas and opinions.

  From this context, Sa’adeh articulated his response to Fayez. The alarming factor for him was not so much Fayez’s foray into existentialism, but Fayez’s sloppy adaptation of existentialist notions that prioritized the individual person over the group. This was both disquieting and intimidating for Sa’adeh, because it negated the social foundations of his own doctrine. Naturally, once the foundations are destabilized, there is no telling what can happen to the structure.

  Fayez misinterpreted Sa’adeh’s response as an infringement on his personal freedom and right to subscribe to the philosophy of his choice. He argued that a Party member could be faithful and true to the “Doctrine” regardless of their philosophical position. The rationale he gave for this contention was simple and direct: one can still believe in “Syria for the Syrians” or in the “independence of the Syrian cause” or in the “separation of religion from the state” – all aspects of the “Doctrine” - without having to adhere to any specific philosophy. Ultimately, what counts is the commitment and not the philosophizing. If Sa’adeh had no hesitation in rejecting this explanation, it is because it suffered from serious shortcomings that cannot be overlooked casually or carelessly:

  It is self-contradictory to suppose that one can simultaneously partake in a collective national cause and cling to an individualist personalist posture. This is tantamount to conducting a war with an army of undisciplined soldiers who regard themselves as separate beings neither attached nor dependent on one another. A national cause, by necessity, is a collective enterprise. As such, it is subject to the criteria of collectivism not individualism.

  It is problematic to claim that a person can concurrently adhere to a national political “Doctrine” framed in collective terms and still be able to follow an independent philosophical path in the personal life. Asking an existential individualist to accept that “The national interest supersedes any other interest” (a principle in the “Doctrine”) is equivalent to asking a religious orthodox person to endorse the “separation of religion from the state” (another principle) or a Communist to acknowledge the nation is more important than class.

  It divests the “Doctrine” of its social philosophical texture and renders it purely political. Fayez’s mistake was that he understood the “Doctrine” as a rigid set of beliefs and dogmas rather than as a philosophical statement about life told from a nationalist perspective. The “Doctrine” appeared to him as a guideline for political independence and social political reforms. However, behind its political veneer, there was a comprehensive outlook lay life and a full-fledged worldview on human ethics, aesthetics, religion, culture, epistemology, existence, identity, dignity, etc. Fayez was acutely aware of the existence of this outlook as evidenced by his constant evocation of its distinctive expressions “al-insan al-jadid” (the new man), “al-nazrah al-jadidah lil hayat” (the new outlook on life), “al-muthul al-ulia” (the high ideals), and “haq, kheir, wa jamal” (truth, goodness, and beauty).

  It is both practically and conceptually unreasonable to assume that a political party can function, let alone achieve its objectives, without some form of internal philosophical uniformity. Generally, political party members would either be required to adhere to the party’s philosophy, if it
has one, or to follow a philosophical outlook that bears strong compatibility with its stated aim. Political parties based on comprehensive social national agendas, such as the SSNP, are particularly subject to this rule.

  It is an obvious recipe for chaos and self-destruction. One can only imagine the disintegration that would stem from allowing members to practice and preach divergent and conflicting philosophies inside a political party while purporting to be pursuing a common political agenda. It is sufficient to transform any political party into an arena for rivalry and dueling currents.

  A second and perhaps more important reason why Sa’adeh rejected Fayez’s existentialism relates to Berdyaev’s notion of personalism. A cursory glance at Berdyaev’s Slavery and Freedom was sufficient for Sa’adeh to formulate a negative assessment of that notion. The absolute value attributed to personality in Berdyaev’s philosophy, which Fayez embraced almost unconditionally, appeared fundamentally anarchic to Sa’adeh:

  Every aberration is admissible and commendable under such a dazzling anarchy. Every desire, every lust, and every recalcitrance is an exigency of “freedom.” There can be no other way to realize individual personality except through such anarchy. For individual personality cannot self-construct except through deviance, objection, insubordination, lawlessness, and being at cross-purposes with the world. Any intellect or thought that restrains the “freedom” of a person is not a fitting “condition” for individual personality.41