Fayez Sayegh- the Party Years (1938-1947)

by Adel Beshara

  Equally troubling was Berdyaev’s characterization of personalism as “a defiance of the cosmic harmony”.42 For Sa’adeh, it amounted to insubordination bordering on total anarchy:

  Personalism is a very subjective doctrine, a perpetual revolt that propels the person to object and rebel in order to assert his personality, and for fear that acceptance of any thought or judgment or convention may be understood as implying acquiescing in a decision stemming from society or the state or God. Disobey and gain! This is the trademark of individual personalism! Disobey and gain; disobey relentlessly to gain even more! It is the golden rule of this unusual creed.

  However, the primary source of concern for Sa’adeh was personalism’s clear and visible opposition to society:

  Even though the principle of individual personalism does recognize the existence of society, it does so for the sole purpose of objectifying personalism … Accordingly, society has no jurisdiction over the individual. Rather, the individual has exclusive jurisdiction over society. Individual personality can hold society accountable, but society cannot hold individual personality accountable!43

  Sa’adeh’s final judgment of personalism was “A doctrine of anarchic selfishness”.44

  Such circumstances, in outline, prompted Sa’adeh to rebuke Fayez over existentialism. Several claims and counter-claims were made during the clash that almost veered the discussion between the two men towards an unpleasant course. At one point, Fayez justifiably argued that, until their clash in 1947, Sa’adeh had never plainly stated that the SSNP was committed to a particular philosophy. While initially insisting he would not be drawn into a personal slanging match, Sa’adeh responded to this claim with alacrity. He told Fayez that had Fayez attempted to study the Party’s principles more thoroughly, he would have discovered the marks of a self-contained philosophical system in them without a statement of declaration.

  Actually, Fayez’s claim was misplaced because, even if it was valid, it did not give Fayez the moral or legal right to promote a philosophical vision in the Party without first consulting with Sa’adeh. As Fayez knew, the Party’s constitution clearly and exclusively reserved that right to Sa’adeh. Inflexible and unwilling to bend, Fayez then took the unusual step of accusing Sa’adeh of seeking to purge the Party of philosophical diversity in order to impose his own personal philosophy on it. The accusation did not stick. Neither Sa’adeh nor the Party took it seriously.

  DID FAYEZ HARBOR A HIDDEN AGENDA?

  Based on the available evidence, there does not appear to have been a hidden agenda or a sinister reason behind Fayez’s behavior. Fayez was fundamentally motivated by a sort of professional pride or desire to demonstrate that nationalism, for all its abuses and misuses, has a rational and moral compass if it is adhered to and correctly applied. Whether the result turns out to be good or bad is determined almost entirely by the trajectory that its advocates choose to pursue and the meaning they impart to life. Hence, it is all about our choices. What this means is that nationalism per se is not flawed, but the potential for flaw exists from the way we frame our actions and decisions.

  Secondly, Fayez was driven by a personal desire to extricate the nationalist discourse from the clutches of xenophobic politics. He wanted to raise nationalism to a level of parity with modern rationalism after the havoc and destruction of the Second World War. Conjoining the national idea with a popular and fast-spreading philosophical approach like existentialism seemed like a great idea. Apart from the theoretical challenge it entailed, the blending of nationalism with existentialism had several advantages:

  It deflects popular and intellectual attention away from the ugly facets of excessive nationalism;

  It injects new concepts, ideas, and thought-patterns into the nationalist ideology;

  It steers discussions in a new direction and opens up new possibilities and insights into the nature of nationalism;

  It expands the nationalist perspective beyond the narrow one-dimensional thought and behavioral pattern prevalent at the time; and

  It imparts a direct human and moral character to nationalism.

  Finally, the desire to steer the Party away from the path of collectivism may have impelled Fayez. With so much negative energy coming from Europe, following a disastrous experience in collective ideologies, the appeal of existentialism as a philosophy of moral striving was too strong to resist. Existentialism stood at the opposite end of collective chauvinism. As such, it served as a useful tool against jingoistic and personality-killing totalitarian tendencies. Fayez probably introduced existentialist notions into the SSNP to counter-check any existing or prospective tendencies of the same sort inside its institutions: idolization of the nation, leader, or party. All forms of idolization were deemed evil or conduits to the evilness of collectivism. Not even society was exempted from this rule:

  The acceptability of the myth that society has a super-personal existence, which can be abstracted from, and which transcends, in time and in existence, the individual persons who alone are real … [gives rise] to a hierarchy of values … in which Society is at the top, and personality lower down in the scale. With this movement performed, the impersonality of society reaches its culminating point: its danger becomes more apparent. A series of confusions sustaining one another, thus gradually lead to the postulation of a self-sustaining, permanent social entity, apart from, outside, and above the individual personalities, and superior to them in worth. Collectivism, with all its horrors, both theoretical and practical, is established as a result.45

  Fayez utilized an existential perspective partly to prevent the Party from sliding into collectivism through the veneration of the nation or its leader by its members. His letter to Ghassan Tueini, from which several passages are quoted above, attests to the veracity of this assumption. Similarly, existentialism served as a means to rid the Party of what Fayez perceived as a glaring “impersonal character” and disposition toward outward appearances as opposed to spiritual essence and the values of true moral existence.

  Based on these considerations, it would be a grave mistake to label Fayez as a Party conspirator. His record of accomplishment in the Party between 1944 and 1947, the period of his most extensive involvement with existentialism, attests to an unmatched devotion and enthusiasm for the national doctrine. He certainly had enough quality work behind him not to be dismissed as a pretender or a villain. Despite their differences, at no point did Sa’adeh characterize Fayez or his existential experiment as an act of treachery or disloyalty: he merely refused to entertain the thought of remodeling the Party’s ideology after Fayez’s ideas, and simultaneously, after Fayez’s personal inclinations.

  CONCLUSION

  Despite his fondness for existential philosophy, Fayez took great pride and pleasure in the SSNP’s national doctrine. For the duration of his active life in the Party, he remained deeply committed to its reform program and attuned to its national message. At times, his spirit and energy for the Party verged on pure evangelism, evidenced by a passage from one of his many speeches in 1946:

  At a time when politicians were trying to attract great masses, enticing them, and begging for their applause, the Social Nationalist Party was working hard to build the new individual: the conscious and mature person who is prepared to volunteer as a soldier in the salvation movement and who expects no reward save sacrifices and difficulties. These new virtues of struggle, which manifested themselves in the National Revival (thus forming a unique new phenomenon in the history of the nation), are our joy and the source of our pride. They are the testimony of history to the eternity of our cause and the integrity of our movement. We present them to you as proof of the values that define the Social Nationalist Party.46

  Fayez lived by the standards of absolute faith. He executed his tasks with the utmost devotion of a Party propagandist and often spoke about a vision of the future that brimmed with the optimism and aesthetics of a glorious past:

  The Party is not a mere political alliance or an orga
nization that indulges in superficialities, styles, formal uniforms, ranks, and Information. Nay! The Party is the conscience of a nation that has awakened, and the spirit of a people that has rebelled in pursuit of glories. The National Party embodies this awakening of the consciences of the faithful aroused by the memories of ancient glories and stirred by the belief that the nation can be and will be as glorious as it was in the past.47

  However, for all its emotional and dramatic power, Fayez’s enthusiasm was tempered by scepticism and anxieties. He led a double life: a public one as the Party’s voice and vehicle to the people and a private one as a rising existentialist keenly aware of, and engaged in, the task of self-definition and trying to find meaning in a broken world. Fayez was comfortable with this duality as long as no one suspected anything or attempted to interfere with him. For almost three years, until Sa’adeh stepped in and brought him back to reality in 1947, no one dared to draw his attention to the potential conflict of interest in his double-life. This fact fuelled Fayez’s ego and sense of self-importance even more. One cannot be without ego and self-pride. Yet these attributes must be tempered by perspective, logic, and a sense of loyalty and direction. If one is in a position of leadership and authority, as Fayez was, an inflated ego can be dangerous and tragic to both one’s self and others.

  Precisely and literally, this is what happened to Fayez. With Sa’adeh absent and the Party’s local leadership beguiled by the temptations of petty politics, he was left alone to do as he pleased. This untamed freedom, coupled with the pleasure of holding several senior posts and an almost exclusive public representation of the Party, instilled a sense of invincibility and independence in Fayez. He certainly felt independent enough to interfere with the Party’s doctrine without consulting anyone. Hence, his endeavor to marry nationalism and existentialism arose. It was an exercise in futility and frustration, but it had seemed like a great idea at the time, at least from Fayez’s perspective. However, it was never more than a marriage of convenience arranged by Fayez for an existential crisis he was having within himself. Regrettably, he did not have the courage to admit this and Sa’adeh did not have the data to judge it as such.

  * * *

  1 See Bernard Paris, Dostoevsky’s Greatest Characters: A New Approach to Notes from Underground, Crime and Punishment, and the Brothers Karamazov.( New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

  2 Not all existentialists are atheists. There is, in fact, a branch in existential philosophy called Christian existentialism. Often traced back to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Christian existentialism is a theo-philosophical movement that takes an existentialist approach to Christian theology. See Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent: An Essay on Christian Existentialism (Court traité de l’existence et de l’existent), translated by Lewis Galantière and Gerald B. Phelan. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948).

  3 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism” (lecture given in 1946). In Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman. (Meridian Publishing Company, 1989).

  4 Ibid.

  5 D. R. Bhandari, “Existentialist Perception of the Human Condition: With Special Reference to Sartre” (unpublished lecture at Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, 1998).

  6 Reproduced in full in the section “Letters” at the end of this book.

  7 Ibid.

  8 Quoted in Samir Khallaf, Lebanon’s Predicament. (Columbia University Press, 1987): 19.

  9 From an unpublished essay found among Sayegh’s papers at the University of Utah’s J. Willard Marriott Library (http://cdmbuntu.lib.utah.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/uu-fasc) Translated and reproduced below.

  10 Fayez Sayegh, al-Baath al-Qawmi. Second Edition. (Beirut: Dar Fikr, n.d.): 197-98.

  11 Ibid, p. 130.

  12 Ibid.

  13 Fayez Sayegh, “Personal existence: An Essay.” (an unpublished Thesis: American University of Beirut, 1945).

  14 Fayez A. Sayegh Collection at the University of Utah: (http://cdmbuntu.lib.utah.edu/cdm/search/collection/)

  15 Ibid.

  16 Ibid.

  17 Habib C. Malik, “The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World.” In Jon Stewart (ed.), Kierkegaard’s International Reception: The Near East, Asia, Australia, and the Americas. (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1989): 76.

  18 Fayez A. Sayegh Collection at the University of Utah: (http://cdmbuntu.lib.utah.edu/cdm/search/collection/) 14 September, 2017

  19 Ibid.

  20 Ibid.

  21 Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904 –1980) was one of the major twentieth-century figures in the study of international politics. Morgenthau’s works belong to the tradition of Realism in international-relations theory, and he is usually considered, along with George F. Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the three leading American realists of the post-World War II period. Morgenthau made landmark contributions to the theory of international relations and the study of international law. His Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948, went through five editions during his lifetime.

  22 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Paradoxes of Nationalism”. (The Yale Review, XLVI, 1957): 481.

  23 See A. W. Purdue, The Transformative Impact of World War II, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2016-04-18. URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/purduea-2016-en URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2016041204 [2017-10-12].

  24 Habib C. Malik, “The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World.” In Jon Stewart (ed.), Kierkegaard’s International Reception: The Near East, Asia, Australia, and the Americas. (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1989): 69.

  25 Quoted in Fayez Sayegh, al-Baath al-Qawmi. (Beirut: Dar Fikr, 2nd ed. n.d.): 74.

  26 Al-Baath al-Qawmi, p. 75.

  27 Sayegh’s method should not be confused with earlier existentialist-centered approaches that accentuated the “individualist” tendencies of nationalism. See Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, (Ed.) Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002 ): 274-75.

  28 It is worth noting that these themes permeated his Master’s thesis and first written work on Existentialism, Personal Existence.

  29 Bruce P. Rittenhouse, Shopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism. (Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2013): 12.

  30 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism” (lecture given in 1946). In Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman. (Meridian Publishing Company, 1989).

  31 Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom. (Semantron Press; 2nd edition, 2009): 10.

  32 N. A. Berdyaev, “The Problem of Man,” http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1936_408.html [16 July 2014].

  33 Richard A. Hughes, “Nikolai Berdyaev’s Personalism.” (International Journal of Orthodox Theology 6:3, 2015): 69.

  34 Yoav Di-Capua, “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization.” (American Historical Review 117(4), 2012): 1061-91.

  35 In Sa’adeh’s words: “The question … “who are we?” means the beginning of the investigation into what our reality connotes. It is the starting point of any human thinking endeavouring to understand its reality, environment, and intentions in life and the world around it. It marks the beginning of serious thinking into the very meaning of human community, like ours, and into the supreme goals that give expression to our reality, our existence and our essence. All of this means that the principles of thought upon which our national renaissance was born and for which the Syrian Social National Party strives, are deep philosophical principles concerned with the crucial issues as distinct from others that appertain to a specific time, and thus pass from existence with that period, or to some incidental form. Rather, they are universal and permanent principles or, philosophically speaking, principles that cannot be ascribed to some momentary specific time or situation, disappearing when these conditions have ceased to exist.” (Ex
tracted from The Ten Lectures).

  36 Ibid.

  37 Ibid.

  38 Ibid. In his PhD thesis, Fayez wrote: “Existential knowledge is knowledge of or about existence, that is knowledge of or about the existence of an existent.” Fayez Abdullah Sayegh, Existential Philosophy, a Formal Examination (unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1950): 16.

  39 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”, ibid.

  40 “The human intellect is the supreme and fundamental source of legislation. It is the supreme gift of man and the means to distinguish categories in life. If principles and procedures are imposed that destroy this capacity to distinguish and perceive they negate the rational mind. This intrinsic feature of man would be annulled and man would cease to be human and fall to the level of beasts that are made to roam around without intelligence or sense of direction.” (Extracted from The Ten Lectures).

  41 A. Sa’adeh, “The School of Selfishness.” (In al-Nashrah al-Rasmiyyah lil Harakah al-Qawmiyyah al-Ijtima’eyah, vol. 1, No. 3, 1948).

  42 N. Berdyaev, Essai de Métaphysique eschatologique. (Aubier, Paris, 1941): 159-160.

  43 A. Sa’adeh, “The School of Selfishness.”

  44 Ibid. Some observers believe existentialism forms a philosophical ground for anarchism. Anarchist historian Peter Marshall claims, “there is a close link between the existentialists’ stress on the individual, free choice, and moral responsibility and the main tenets of anarchism” in Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Harper Collins, 1992): 580.

  45 F. Sayegh, Personal Existence, p. 124.

  46 F. Sayegh, “The National Party Appears Barefaced.” An-Nahda, (Beirut, 1946).

  47 F. Sayegh, “Reform in National Life” in al-Baath al-Qawmi.