History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy

by Niccolo Machiavelli

hereditary enmity to Filippo and his house is universally known, and

  it is impossible that love or hatred, strengthened by the growth of

  years, can be eradicated from our minds by any recent act either of

  kindness or neglect. We have always thought, and are still of the same

  opinion, that we might now remain neutral, greatly to the duke's

  satisfaction, and with little hazard to ourselves; for if by your ruin

  he were to become lord of Lombardy, we should still have sufficient

  influence in Italy in free us from any apprehension on our own

  account; for every increase of power and territory augments that

  animosity and envy, from which arise wars and the dismemberment of

  states. We are also aware what heavy expenses and imminent perils we

  should avoid, by declining to involve ourselves in these disputes; and

  how easily the field of battle may be transferred from Lombardy to

  Tuscany, by our interference in your behalf. Yet all these

  apprehensions are at once overborne by our ancient affection for the

  senate and people of Venice, and we have resolved to come to your

  relief with the same zeal with which we should have armed in our own

  defense, had we been attacked. Therefore, the senate of Florence,

  judging it primarily necessary to relieve Verona and Brescia, and

  thinking this impossible without the count, have sent me, in the first

  instance, to persuade him to pass into Lombardy, and carry on the war

  wherever it may be most needful; for you are aware he is under no

  obligation to cross the Po. To induce him to do so, I have advanced

  such arguments as are suggested by the circumstances themselves, and

  which would prevail with us. He, being invincible in arms, cannot be

  surpassed in courtesy, and the liberality he sees the Florentines

  exercise toward you, he has resolved to outdo; for he is well aware to

  what dangers Tuscany will be exposed after his departure, and since we

  have made your affairs our primary consideration, he has also resolved

  to make his own subservient to yours. I come, therefore, to tender his

  services, with seven thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry, ready

  at once to march against the enemy, wherever he may be. And I beg of

  you, so do my lords at Florence and the count, that as his forces

  exceed the number he has engaged to furnish you, out of your

  liberality, would remunerate him, that he may not repent of having

  come to your assistance, nor we, who have prevailed with him to do

  so." This discourse of Neri to the senate was listened to with that

  profound attention which an oracle might be imagined to command; and

  his audience were so moved by it, that they could not restrain

  themselves, till the prince had replied, as strict decorum on such

  occasions required, but rising from their seats, with uplifted hands,

  and most of them with tears in their eyes, they thanked the

  Florentines for their generous conduct, and the ambassador for his

  unusual dispatch; and promised that time should never cancel the

  remembrance of such goodness, either in their own hearts, or their

  children's; and that their country, thenceforth, should be common to

  the Florentines with themselves.

  CHAPTER V

  Francesco Sforza marches to assist the Venetians, and relieves

  Verona--He attempts to relieve Brescia but fails--The Venetians

  routed by Piccinino upon the Lake of Garda--Piccinino routed by

  Sforza; the method of his escape--Piccinino surprises Verona--

  Description of Verona--Recovered by Sforza--The duke of Milan

  makes war against the Florentines--Apprehensions of the

  Florentines--Cardinal Vitelleschi their enemy.

  When their demonstrations of gratitude had subsided, the Venetian

  senate, by the aid of Neri di Gino, began to consider the route the

  count ought to take, and how to provide him with necessaries. There

  were four several roads; one by Ravenna, along the beach, which on

  account of its being in many places interrupted by the sea and by

  marshes, was not approved. The next was the most direct, but rendered

  inconvenient by a tower called the Uccellino, which being held for the

  duke, it would be necessary to capture; and to do this, would occupy

  more time than could be spared with safety to Verona and Brescia. The

  third was by the brink of the lake; but as the Po had overflowed its

  banks, to pass in this direction was impossible. The fourth was by the

  way of Bologna to Ponte Puledrano, Cento, and Pieve; then between the

  Bondeno and the Finale to Ferrara, and thence they might by land or

  water enter the Paduan territory, and join the Venetian forces. This

  route, though attended with many difficulties, and in some parts

  liable to be disputed by the enemy, was chosen as the least

  objectionable. The count having received his instructions, commenced

  his march, and by exerting the utmost celerity, reached the Paduan

  territory on the twentieth of June. The arrival of this distinguished

  commander in Lombardy filled Venice and all her dependencies with

  hope; for the Venetians, who only an instant before had been in fear

  for their very existence, began to contemplate new conquests.

  The count, before he made any other attempt, hastened to the relief of

  Verona; and to counteract his design, Niccolo led his forces to Soave,

  a castle situated between the Vincentino and the Veronese, and

  entrenched himself by a ditch that extended from Soave to the marshes

  of the Adige. The count, finding his passage by the plain cut off,

  resolved to proceed by the mountains, and thus reach Verona, thinking

  Niccolo would imagine this way to be so rugged and elevated as to be

  impracticable, or if he thought otherwise, he would not be in time to

  prevent him; so, with provisions for eight days, he took the mountain

  path, and with his forces, arrived in the plain, below Soave. Niccolo

  had, even upon this route, erected some bastions for the purpose of

  preventing him, but they were insufficient for the purpose; and

  finding the enemy had, contrary to his expectations, effected a

  passage, to avoid a disadvantageous engagement he crossed to the

  opposite side of the Adige, and the count entered Verona without

  opposition.

  Having happily succeeded in his first project, that of relieving

  Verona, the count now endeavored to render a similar service to

  Brescia. This city is situated so close to the Lake of Garda, that

  although besieged by land, provisions may always be sent into it by

  water. On this account the duke had assembled a large force in the

  immediate vicinity of the lake, and at the commencement of his

  victories occupied all the places which by its means might relieve

  Brescia. The Venetians also had galleys upon the lake, but they were

  unequal to a contest with those of the duke. The count therefore

  deemed it advisable to aid the Venetian fleet with his land forces, by

  which means he hoped to obtain without much difficulty those places

  which kept Brescia in blockade. He therefore encamped before

  Bardolino, a fortress situated upon the lake, trusting that after it

  was taken the others
would surrender. But fortune opposed this design,

  for a great part of his troops fell sick; so, giving up the

  enterprise, he went to Zevio, a Veronese castle, in a healthy and

  plentiful situation. Niccolo, upon the count's retreat, not to let

  slip an opportunity of making himself master of the lake, left his

  camp at Vegasio, and with a body of picked men took the way thither,

  attacked the Venetian fleet with the utmost impetuosity, and took

  nearly the whole of it. By this victory almost all the fortresses upon

  the lake fell into his hands.

  The Venetians, alarmed at this loss, and fearing that in consequence

  of it Brescia would surrender, solicited the count, by letters and

  messengers, to go to its relief; and he, perceiving that all hope of

  rendering assistance from the lake was cut off, and that to attempt an

  approach by land, on account of the ditches, bastions, and other

  defenses erected by Niccolo, was marching to certain destruction,

  determined that as the passage by the mountains had enabled him to

  relieve Verona, it should also contribute to the preservation of

  Brescia. Having taken this resolution, the count left Zevio, and by

  way of the Val d'Acri went to the Lake of St. Andrea, and thence to

  Torboli and Peneda, upon the Lake of Garda. He then proceeded to

  Tenna, and besieged the fortress, which it was necessary to occupy

  before he could reach Brescia.

  Niccolo, on being acquainted with the count's design, led his army to

  Peschiera. He then, with the marquis of Mantua and a chosen body of

  men, went to meet him, and coming to an engagement, was routed, his

  people dispersed, and many of them taken, while others fled to the

  fleet, and some to the main body of his army. It was now nightfall,

  and Niccolo had escaped to Tenna, but he knew that if he were to

  remain there till morning, he must inevitably fall into the enemy's

  hands; therefore, to avoid a catastrophe which might be regarded as

  almost fatal, he resolved to make a dangerous experiment. Of all his

  attendants he had only with him a single servant, a Dutchman, of great

  personal strength, and who had always been devotedly attached to him.

  Niccolo induced this man to take him upon his shoulders in a sack, as

  if he had been carrying property of his master's, and to bear him to a

  place of security. The enemy's lines surrounded Tenna, but on account

  of the previous day's victory, all was in disorder, and no guard was

  kept, so that the Dutchman, disguised as a trooper, passed through

  them without any opposition, and brought his master in safety to his

  own troops.

  Had this victory been as carefully improved as it was fortunately

  obtained, Brescia would have derived from it greater relief and the

  Venetians more permanent advantage; but they, having thoughtlessly let

  it slip, the rejoicings were soon over, and Brescia remained in her

  former difficulties. Niccolo, having returned to his forces, resolved

  by some extraordinary exertion to cancel the impression of his death,

  and deprive the Venetians of the change of relieving Brescia. He was

  acquainted with the topography of the citadel of Verona, and had

  learned from prisoners whom he had taken, that it was badly guarded,

  and might be very easily recovered. He perceived at once that fortune

  presented him with an opportunity of regaining the laurels he had

  lately lost, and of changing the joy of the enemy for their recent

  victory into sorrow for a succeeding disaster. The city of Verona is

  situated in Lombardy, at the foot of the mountains which divide Italy

  from Germany, so that it occupies part both of hill and plain. The

  river Adige rises in the valley of Trento, and entering Italy, does

  not immediately traverse the country, but winding to the left, along

  the base of the hills, enters Verona, and crosses the city, which it

  divides unequally, giving much the larger portion to the plain. On the

  mountain side of the river are two fortresses, formidable rather from

  their situation than from their actual strength, for being very

  elevated they command the whole place. One is called San Piero, the

  other San Felice. On the opposite side of the Adige, upon the plain,

  with their backs against the city walls, are two other fortresses,

  about a mile distant from each other, one called the Old the other the

  New Citadel, and a wall extends between them that may be compared to a

  bowstring, of which the city wall is the arc. The space comprehended

  within this segment is very populous, and is called the Borgo of St.

  Zeno. Niccolo Piccinino designed to capture these fortresses and the

  Borgo, and he hoped to succeed without much difficulty, as well on

  account of the ordinary negligence of the guard, which their recent

  successes would probably increase, as because in war no enterprise is

  more likely to be successful than one which by the enemy is deemed

  impossible. With a body of picked men, and accompanied by the marquis

  of Mantua, he proceeded by night to Verona, silently scaled the walls,

  and took the New Citadel: then entering the place with his troops, he

  forced the gate of S. Antonio, and introduced the whole of his

  cavalry. The Venetian garrison of the Old Citadel hearing an uproar,

  when the guards of the New were slaughtered, and again when the gate

  was forced, being now aware of the presence of enemies, raised an

  alarm, and called the people to arms. The citizens awaking in the

  utmost confusion, some of the boldest armed and hastened to the

  rector's piazza. In the meantime, Niccolo's forces had pillaged the

  Borgo of San Zeno; and proceeding onward were ascertained by the

  people to be the duke's forces, but being defenseless they advised the

  Venetian rectors to take refuge in the fortresses, and thus save

  themselves and the place; as it was more advisable to preserve their

  lives and so rich a city for better fortune, than by endeavoring to

  repel the present evil, encounter certain death, and incur universal

  pillage. Upon this the rectors and all the Venetian party, fled to the

  fortress of San Felice. Some of the first citizens, anxious to avoid

  being plundered by the troops, presented themselves before Niccolo and

  the marquis of Mantua, and begged they would rather take possession of

  a rich city, with honor to themselves, than of a poor one to their own

  disgrace; particularly as they had not induced either the favor of its

  former possessors, or the animosity of its present masters, by self-

  defense. The marquis and Niccolo encouraged them, and protected their

  property to the utmost of their power during such a state of military

  license. As they felt sure the count would endeavor to recover the

  city, they made every possible exertion to gain possession of the

  fortresses, and those they could not seize they cut off from the rest

  of the place by ditches and barricades, so that the enemy might be

  shut out.

  The Count Francesco was with his army at Tenna; and when the report

  was first brought to him he refused to credit it; but being assured of

  the fact by parties whom it would have been r
idiculous to doubt, he

  resolved, by the exertion of uncommon celerity, to repair the evil

  negligence had occasioned; and though all his officers advised the

  abandonment of Verona and Brescia, and a march to Vicenza, lest he

  might be besieged by the enemy in his present situation, he refused,

  but resolved to attempt the recovery of Verona. During the

  consultation, he turned to the Venetian commissaries and to Bernardo

  de' Medici, who was there as commissary for the Florentines, and

  promised them the recovery of the place if one of the fortresses

  should hold out. Having collected his forces, he proceeded with the

  utmost speed to Verona. Observing his approach, Niccolo thought he

  designed, according to the advice he had received, to go to Vicenza,

  but finding him continue to draw near, and taking the direction of San

  Felice, he prepared for its defense--though too late; for the

  barricades were not completed; his men were dispersed in quest of

  plunder, or extorting money from the inhabitants by way of ransom; and

  he could not collect them in time to prevent the count's troops from

  entering the fortress. They then descended into the city, which they

  happily recovered, to Niccolo's disgrace, and with the loss of great

  numbers of his men. He himself, with the marquis of Mantua, first took

  refuge in the citadel, and thence escaping into the country, fled to

  Mantua, where, having assembled the relics of their army, they

  hastened to join those who were at the siege of Brescia. Thus in four

  days Verona was lost and again recovered from the duke. The count,

  after this victory, it being now winter and the weather very severe,

  having first with considerable difficulty thrown provisions into

  Brescia, went into quarters at Verona, and ordered, that during the

  cold season, galleys should be provided at Torboli, that upon the

  return of spring, they might be in a condition to proceed vigorously

  to effect the permanent relief of Brescia.

  The duke, finding the war suspended for a time, the hope he had

  entertained of occupying Brescia and Verona annihilated, and the money

  and counsels of the Florentines the cause of this, and seeing that

  neither the injuries they had received from the Venetians could

  alienate them, nor all the promises he had made attach them to

  himself, he determined, in order to make them feel more closely the

  effects of the course they had adopted, to attack Tuscany; to which he

  was strenuously advised by the Florentine exiles and Niccolo. The

  latter advocated this from his desire to recover the states of

  Braccio, and expel the count from La Marca; the former, from their

  wish to return home, and each by suitable arguments endeavored to

  induce the duke to follow the plan congenial to their own views.

  Niccolo argued that he might be sent into Tuscany, and continue the

  siege of Brescia; for he was master of the lake, the fortresses were

  well provided, and their officers were qualified to oppose the count

  should he undertake any fresh enterprise; which it was not likely he

  would do without first relieving Brescia, a thing impossible; and thus

  the duke might carry on the war in Tuscany, without giving up his

  attempts in Lombardy; intimating that the Florentines would be

  compelled, as soon as he entered Tuscany, to recall the count to avoid

  complete ruin; and whatever course they took, victory to the duke must

  be the result. The exiles affirmed, that if Niccolo with his army were

  to approach Florence, the people oppressed with taxes, and wearied out

  by the insolence of the great, would most assuredly not oppose him,

  and pointed out the facility of reaching Florence; for the way by the

  Casentino would be open to them, through the friendship of Rinaldo and

  the Count di Poppi; and thus the duke, who was previously inclined to

  the attempt, was induced by their joint persuasions to make it. The

  Venetians, on the other hand, though the winter was severe,

  incessantly urged the count to relieve Brescia with all his forces.

  The count questioned the possibility of so doing, and advised them to