History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy

by Niccolo Machiavelli

wait the return of spring, in the meantime strengthening their fleet

  as much as possible, and then assist it both by land and water. This

  rendered the Venetians dissatisfied; they were dilatory in furnishing

  provisions, and consequently many deserted from their army.

  The Florentines, being informed of these transactions, became alarmed,

  perceiving the war threatening themselves, and the little progress

  made in Lombardy. Nor did the suspicion entertained by them of the

  troops of the church give them less uneasiness; not that the pope was

  their enemy, but because they saw those forces more under the sway of

  the patriarch, who was their greatest foe. Giovanni Vitelleschi of

  Corneto was at first apostolic notary, then bishop of Recanati, and

  afterward patriarch of Alexandria; but at last, becoming a cardinal,

  he was called Cardinal of Florence. He was bold and cunning; and,

  having obtained great influence, was appointed to command all the

  forces of the church, and conduct all the enterprises of the pontiff,

  whether in Tuscany, Romagna, the kingdom of Naples, or in Rome. Hence

  he acquired so much power over the pontiff, and the papal troops, that

  the former was afraid of commanding him, and the latter obeyed no one

  else. The cardinal's presence at Rome, when the report came of

  Niccolo's design to march into Tuscany, redoubled the fear of the

  Florentines; for, since Rinaldo was expelled, he had become an enemy

  of the republic, from finding that the arrangements made by his means

  were not only disregarded, but converted to Rinaldo's prejudice, and

  caused the laying down of arms, which had given his enemies an

  opportunity of banishing him. In consequence of this, the government

  thought it would be advisable to restore and indemnify Rinaldo, in

  case Niccolo came into Tuscany and were joined by him. Their

  apprehensions were increased by their being unable to account for

  Niccolo's departure from Lombardy, and his leaving one enterprise

  almost completed, to undertake another so entirely doubtful; which

  they could not reconcile with their ideas of consistency, except by

  supposing some new design had been adopted, or some hidden treachery

  intended. They communicated their fears to the pope, who was now

  sensible of his error in having endowed the cardinal with too much

  authority.

  CHAPTER VI

  The pope imprisons the cardinal and assists the Florentines--

  Difference of opinion between the count and the Venetians

  respecting the management of the war. The Florentines reconcile

  them--The count wishes to go into Tuscany to oppose Piccinino, but

  is prevented by the Venetians--Niccolo Piccinino in Tuscany--He

  takes Marradi, and plunders the neighborhood of Florence--

  Description of Marradi--Cowardice of Bartolomeo Orlandini--Brave

  resistance of Castel San Niccolo--San Niccolo surrenders--

  Piccinino attempts to take Cortona, but fails.

  While the Florentines were thus anxious, fortune disclosed the means

  of securing themselves against the patriarch's malevolence. The

  republic everywhere exercised the very closest espionage over

  epistolary communication, in order to discover if any persons were

  plotting against the state. It happened that letters were intercepted

  at Monte Pulciano, which had been written by the patriarch to Niccolo

  without the pope's knowledge; and although they were written in an

  unusual character, and the sense so involved that no distinct idea

  could be extracted, the obscurity itself, and the whole aspect of the

  matter so alarmed the pontiff, that he resolved to seize the person of

  the cardinal, a duty he committed to Antonio Rido, of Padua, who had

  the command of the castle of St. Angelo, and who, after receiving his

  instructions, soon found an opportunity of carrying them into effect.

  The patriarch, having determined to go into Tuscany, prepared to leave

  Rome on the following day, and ordered the castellan to be upon the

  drawbridge of the fortress in the morning, for he wished to speak with

  him as he passed. Antonio perceived this to be the favorable moment,

  informed his people what they were to do, and awaited the arrival of

  the patriarch upon the bridge, which adjoined the building, and might

  for the purpose of security be raised or lowered as occasion required.

  The appointed time found him punctual; and Antonio, having drawn him,

  as if for the convenience of conversation, on to the bridge, gave a

  signal to his men, who immediately raised it, and in a moment the

  cardinal, from being a commander of armies, found himself a prisoner

  of the castellan. The patriarch's followers at first began to use

  threats, but being informed of the pope's directions they were

  appeased. The castellan comforting him with kind words, he replied,

  that "the great do not make each other prisoners to let them go again;

  and that those whom it is proper to take, it is not well to set free."

  He shortly afterward died in prison. The pope appointed Lodovico,

  patriarch of Aquileia, to command his troops; and, though previously

  unwilling to interfere in the wars of the league and the duke, he was

  now content to take part in them, and engaged to furnish four thousand

  horse and two thousand foot for the defense of Tuscany.

  The Florentines, freed from this cause for anxiety, were still

  apprehensive of Niccolo, and feared confusion in the affairs of

  Lombardy, from the differences of opinion that existed between the

  count and the Venetians. In order the better to become acquainted with

  the intentions of the parties, they sent Neri di Gini Capponi and

  Giuliano Davanzati to Venice, with instructions to assist in the

  arrangement of the approaching campaign; and ordered that Neri, having

  discovered how the Venetians were disposed, should proceed to the

  count, learn his designs, and induce him to adopt the course that

  would be most advantageous to the League. The ambassadors had only

  reached Ferrara, when they were told that Niccolo Piccinino had

  crossed the Po with six thousand horse. This made them travel with

  increased speed; and, having arrived at Venice, they found the Signory

  fully resolved that Brescia should be relieved without waiting for the

  return of spring; for they said that "the city would be unable to hold

  out so long, the fleet could not be in readiness, and that seeing no

  more immediate relief, she would submit to the enemy; which would

  render the duke universally victorious, and cause them to lose the

  whole of their inland possessions." Neri then proceeded to Verona to

  ascertain the count's opinion, who argued, for many reasons, that to

  march to Brescia before the return of spring would be quite useless,

  or even worse; for the situation of Brescia, being considered in

  conjunction with the season, nothing could be expected to result but

  disorder and fruitless toil to the troops; so that, when the suitable

  period should arrive, he would be compelled to return to Verona with

  his army, to recover from the injuries sustained in the winter, and

  provide necessaries for the summer; and thus t
he time available for

  the war would be wasted in marching and countermarching. Orsatto

  Justiniani and Giovanni Pisani were deputed on the part of Venice to

  the count at Verona, having been sent to consider these affairs, and

  with them it was agreed that the Venetians should pay the count ninety

  thousand ducats for the coming year, and to each of the soldiers forty

  ducats; that he should set out immediately with the whole army and

  attack the duke, in order to compel him, for his own preservation, to

  recall Niccolo into Lombardy. After this agreement the ambassadors

  returned to Venice; and the Venetians, having so large an amount of

  money to raise, were very remiss with their commissariat.

  In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino pursued his route, and arrived in

  Romagna, where he prevailed upon the sons of Pandolfo Malatesti to

  desert the Venetians and enter the duke's service. This circumstance

  occasioned much uneasiness in Venice, and still more at Florence; for

  they thought that with the aid of the Malatesti they might resist

  Niccolo; but finding them gone over to the enemy, they were in fear

  lest their captain, Piero Giampagolo Orsini, who was in the

  territories of the Malatesti, should be disarmed and rendered

  powerless. The count also felt alarmed, for, through Niccolo's

  presence in Tuscany, he was afraid of losing La Marca; and, urged by a

  desire to look after his own affairs, he hastened to Venice, and being

  introduced to the Doge, informed him that the interests of the League

  required his presence in Tuscany; for the war ought to be carried on

  where the leader and forces of the enemy were, and not where his

  garrisons and towns were situated; for when the army is vanquished the

  war is finished; but to take towns and leave the armament entire,

  usually allowed the war to break out again with greater virulence;

  that Tuscany and La Marca would be lost if Niccolo were not vigorously

  resisted, and that, if lost, there would be no possibility of the

  preservation of Lombardy. But supposing the danger to Lombardy not so

  imminent, he did not intend to abandon his own subjects and friends,

  and that having come into Lombardy as a prince, he did not intend to

  return a mere condottiere. To this the Doge replied, it was quite

  manifest that, if he left Lombardy, or even recrossed the Po, all

  their inland territories would be lost; in that case they were

  unwilling to spend any more money in their defense. For it would be

  folly to attempt defending a place which must, after all, inevitably

  be lost; and that it is less disgraceful and less injurious to lose

  dominions only, then to lose both territory and money. That if the

  loss of their inland possessions should actually result, it would then

  be seen how highly important to the preservation of Romagna and

  Tuscany the reputation of the Venetians had been. On these accounts

  they were of quite a different opinion from the count; for they saw

  that whoever was victor in Lombardy would be so everywhere else, that

  conquest would be easily attainable now, when the territories of the

  duke were left almost defenseless by the departure of Niccolo, and

  that he would be ruined before he could order Niccolo's recall, or

  provide himself with any other remedy; that whoever attentively

  considered these things would see, that the duke had sent Niccolo into

  Tuscany for no other reason than to withdraw the count from his

  enterprise, and cause the war, which was now at his own door, to be

  removed to a greater distance. That if the count were to follow

  Niccolo, unless at the instigation of some very pressing necessity, he

  would find his plan successful, and rejoice in the adoption of it; but

  if he were to remain in Lombardy, and allow Tuscany to shift for

  herself, the duke would, when too late, see the imprudence of his

  conduct, and find that he had lost his territories in Lombardy and

  gained nothing in Tuscany. Each party having spoken, it was determined

  to wait a few days to see what would result from the agreement of the

  Malatesti with Niccolo; whether the Florentines could avail themselves

  of Piero Giampagolo, and whether the pope intended to join the League

  with all the earnestness he had promised. Not many days after these

  resolutions were adopted, it was ascertained that the Malatesti had

  made the agreement more from fear than any ill-will toward the League;

  that Piero Giampagolo had proceeded with his force toward Tuscany, and

  that the pope was more disposed than ever to assist them. This

  favorable intelligence dissipated the count's fears, and he consented

  to remain in Lombardy, and that Neri Capponi should return to Florence

  with a thousand of his own horse, and five hundred from the other

  parties. It was further agreed, that if the affairs of Tuscany should

  require the count's presence, Neri should write to him, and he would

  proceed thither to the exclusion of every other consideration. Neri

  arrived at Florence with his forces in April, and Giampagolo joined

  them the same day.

  In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino, the affairs of Romagna being

  settled, purposed making a descent into Tuscany, and designing to go

  by the mountain passes of San Benedetto and the valley of Montone,

  found them so well guarded by the contrivance of Niccolo da Pisa, that

  his utmost exertions would be useless in that direction. As the

  Florentines, upon this sudden attack, were unprovided with troops and

  officers, they had sent into the defiles of these hills many of their

  citizens, with infantry raised upon the emergency to guard them, among

  whom was Bartolomeo Orlandini, a cavaliere, to whom was intrusted the

  defense of the castle of Marradi and the adjacent passes. Niccolo

  Piccinino, finding the route by San Benedetto impracticable, on

  account of the bravery of its commander, thought the cowardice of the

  officer who defended that of Marradi would render the passage easy.

  Marradi is a castle situated at the foot of the mountains which

  separate Tuscany from Romagna; and, though destitute of walls, the

  river, the mountains, and the inhabitants, make it a place of great

  strength; for the peasantry are warlike and faithful, and the rapid

  current undermining the banks has left them of such tremendous height

  that it is impossible to approach it from the valley if a small bridge

  over the stream be defended; while on the mountain side the precipices

  are so steep and perpendicular as to render it almost impregnable. In

  spite of these advantages, the pusillanimity of Bartolomeo Orlandini

  rendered the men cowardly and the fortress untenable; for as soon as

  he heard of the enemy's approach he abandoned the place, fled with all

  his forces, and did not stop till he reached the town of San Lorenzo.

  Niccolo, entering the deserted fortress, wondered it had not been

  defended, and, rejoicing over his acquisition, descended into the

  valley of the Mugello, where he took some castles, and halted with his

  army at Pulicciano. Thence he overran the country as far as the

  mountains of Fiesole; and his audacity so increased
that he crossed

  the Arno, plundering and destroying everything to within three miles

  of Florence.

  The Florentines, however, were not dismayed. Their first concern was

  to give security to the government, for which they had no cause for

  apprehension, so universal was the good will of the people toward

  Cosmo; and besides this, they had restricted the principal offices to

  a few citizens of the highest class, who with their vigilance would

  have kept the populace in order, even if they had been discontented or

  desirous of change. They also knew by the compact made in Lombardy

  what forces Neri would bring with him, and expected the troops of the

  pope. These prospects sustained their courage till the arrival of Neri

  di Gino, who, on account of the disorders and fears of the city,

  determined to set out immediately and check Niccolo. With the cavalry

  he possessed, and a body of infantry raised entirely from the people,

  he recovered Remole from the hands of the enemy, where having

  encamped, he put a stop to all further depredations, and gave the

  inhabitants hopes of repelling the enemy from the neighborhood.

  Niccolo finding that, although the Florentines were without troops, no

  disturbance had arisen, and learning what entire composure prevailed

  in the city, thought he was wasting time, and resolved to undertake

  some other enterprise to induce them to send forces after him, and

  give him a chance of coming to an engagement, by means of which, if

  victorious, he trusted everything would succeed to his wishes.

  Francesco, Count di Poppi, was in the army of Niccolo, having deserted

  the Florentines, with whom he was in league, when the enemy entered

  the Mugello; and though with the intention of securing him as soon as

  they had an idea of his design, they increased his appointments, and

  made him commissary over all the places in his vicinity; still, so

  powerful is the attachment to party, that no benefit or fear could

  eradicate the affection he bore toward Rinaldo and the late

  government; so that as soon as he knew Niccolo was at hand he joined

  him, and with the utmost solicitude entreated him to leave the city

  and pass into the Casentino, pointing out to him the strength of the

  country, and how easily he might thence harass his enemies. Niccolo

  followed his advice, and arriving in the Casentino, took Romena and

  Bibbiena, and then pitched his camp before Castel San Niccolo. This

  fortress is situated at the foot of the mountains which divide the

  Casentino from the Val d'Arno; and being in an elevated situation, and

  well garrisoned, it was difficult to take, though Niccolo, with

  catapults and other engines, assailed it without intermission. The

  siege had continued more than twenty days, during which the

  Florentines had collected all their forces, having assembled under

  several leaders, three thousand horse, at Fegghine, commanded by Piero

  Giampagolo Orsini, their captain, and Neri Capponi and Bernardo de'

  Medici, commissaries. Four messengers, from Castel San Niccolo, were

  sent to them to entreat succor. The commissaries having examined the

  site, found it could not be relieved, except from the Alpine regions,

  in the direction of the Val d'Arno, the summit of which was more

  easily attainable by the enemy than by themselves, on account of their

  greater proximity, and because the Florentines could not approach

  without observation; so that it would be making a desperate attempt,

  and might occasion the destruction of the forces. The commissaries,

  therefore, commended their fidelity, and ordered that when they could

  hold out no longer, they should surrender. Niccolo took the fortress

  after a siege of thirty-two days; and the loss of so much time, for

  the attainment of so small an advantage, was the principle cause of

  the failure of his expedition; for had he remained with his forces

  near Florence, he would have almost deprived the government of all

  power to compel the citizens to furnish money: nor would they so